Human resources & employment law cumulative case briefs
Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit
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- Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit
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- Jurisdiction: 10 th Circuit, New Mexico
Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit Smothers v. Solvay Chemicals, Inc., No. 12-8013 (10th Cir., 1/21/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/12/12-8013.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version] There were genuine issues of material fact that needed to be tried on the matter of pretext for discrimination on the FMLA and ADA claims. However, dismissal of the employment contract claim was affirmed because “the Handbook provision ‘unambiguously gives [Solvay] the discretion to discharge employees who violate safety rules”, and thus the employee did not qualify for progressive discipline. Litigation: adverse employment action – failure to hire, Indian Preference Act- 25 U.S.C. § 472, 5 C.F.R. § 213.3112(a)(7), failure to state a claim - 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
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Litigation: untimely appeal, dismissal affirmed Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit Tillotson v. Pueblo State Hospital, et al., No. 13-1406 (10th Cir., 1/21/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-1406.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version] Summary by the appellate court: Chris Tillotson filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Pueblo State Hospital and the Attorney General of Colorado. The district court dismissed the complaint as legally frivolous because it did not allege facts stating any colorable claim against the named defendants and it was barred by the statute of limitations. Mr. Tillotson then filed an untimely appeal, which we dismissed, noting that he had not requested an extension of time from the district court. A week after our dismissal, he filed a pleading in district court requesting an extension “on the statue [sic] of limitations in the case.” R. at 46. We liberally construe this request as a motion to extend time for filing a notice of appeal. The district court denied the request. Mr. Tillotson appeals. Dismissal affirmed. NMHRA: Human Rights Act – freedom of religion, adverse employment action - termination
Jurisdiction: New Mexico Rist, et al., v. The Design Center at Floor Concepts, 2013-NMCA-109 (1/29/13); http://www.nmcompcomm.us/nmcases/NMCA/2013/13ca-109.pdf; 53.4 SBB 30 [enhanced lexis.com version]. {1} Marvin and Lee Rist (Plaintiffs) were dismissed from their jobs at The Design Center at Floor Concepts (Defendant) in Las Cruces, New Mexico. Plaintiffs alleged that they were punished for not participating in religious activities at the invitation of Defendant’s owners. Plaintiffs filed suit under the New Mexico Human Rights Act (NMHRA), NMSA 1978, §§ 28-1-1 to -15 (1969, as amended through 2007), alleging discrimination. After Plaintiffs’ presentation of their case, the district court granted dispositive defense motions for directed verdict. We affirm. BACKGROUND {2} Defendant hired Plaintiffs in the fall of 2006. Lee Rist, the son, was first hired as a polisher of granite but was quickly trained for and promoted to the position of templater. Marvin Rist, the father, was hired to manage the operations. Defendant’s two owners are members of the Jehovah’s Witness faith, as were some of its employees, and Plaintiffs, who are of a different faith, allege that they were the targets of proselytizing efforts by the owners and other employees. Following several such overtures, Plaintiffs were invited to attend a religious service around Easter in April 2007. After Marvin told the owners to stop urging Lee to attend religious events, both Plaintiffs say they were ostracized by the owners and fellow workers. Subsequently, Lee was required to work as a templater and a polisher, and Marvin alleges that he was stymied in his efforts to do his job by uncooperative salespeople. In June 2007, two months after the last incident involving a dispute over religion, Plaintiffs were fired along with one other employee in what Defendant said was a reduction in the work force as a result of a decrease in business. Defendant also claims that Plaintiffs were ineffective in their jobs. {3} Plaintiffs filed complaints with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the EEOC). Both ignored requests for information from the EEOC. Eventually, the EEOC issued right-to-sue letters to Plaintiffs. The complaints with the EEOC were cross-filed with the New Mexico Human Rights Division (the Division). Plaintiffs did not receive a letter of nondetermination from the Division. {4} After receiving their right-to-sue letters from the EEOC, Plaintiffs filed this action, alleging “wrongful termination” and unlawfully discriminatory practice under the NMHRA, Section 28-1-7(A). After Plaintiffs presented their case, Defendant moved for directed verdicts. The district court granted the motions for: (1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction resulting from Plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies, (2) Plaintiffs’ failure to allege a cause of action for the common law tort of retaliatory discharge, (3) Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages, and (4) Plaintiffs’ claims against the two owners of the business individually. Public Sector: union
Jurisdiction: New Mexico Albuquerque Police Officers’ Association, et al., v. City of Albuquerque, et al., 2013-NMCA-110 (11/20/13, certiorari denied 1/22/14); http://www.nmcompcomm.us/nmcases/NMCA/2013/13ca-110.pdf; 53. 4 SBB 34 [enhanced lexis.com version]. {1} In this action alleging breach of a collective bargaining agreement, Plaintiffs, Albuquerque Police Officers’ Association and select individuals (collectively, the Plaintiffs shall be referred to as APOA), appeal from a summary judgment entered in favor of Defendants, City of Albuquerque, Albuquerque Police Department, and Mayor Richard Berry (the Mayor) (collectively the Defendants shall be referred to as the City). This dispute concerns APOA’s contention that the City violated the parties’ multi-year collective bargaining agreement (CBA) when it failed to implement the final phase of a salary increase for police officers set forth in the CBA. We reverse. Title VII, ADEA: litigation, time limits
Jurisdiction: 10th Circuit Denny Benton’s pro se case (representing himself without an attorney) was dismissed as untimely filed after the 300-day limit had elapsed from the date his employment ended. His claims for equitable relief from the strict application of the time limit for filing were rejected:
Benton v. Town of South Fork and Police Department, et al., No. 13-1179 (10th Cir., 1/9/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-1179.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. From the opinion: Title VII and ADEA claims were all time-barred because (1) he failed to file his charge of discrimination within 300 days of September 23, 2009—the day that he resigned his employment with South Fork, and (2) he failed to demonstrate grounds supporting equitable tolling or estoppel. The magistrate judge also recommended dismissal of Mr. Benton’s claim regarding the State Patrol’s failure to release records. Finally, the magistrate judge recommended against exercising jurisdiction over Mr. Benton’s remaining state law claims. Wage and Hour: retaliation
Jurisdiction: 1st circuit
Summary judgment in federal trials is allowed if there is an issue of material fact about which no reasonable jury could disagree; state trial court rules vary on this evidentiary standard. The legal definition of a “material fact” is explained well at http://definitions.uslegal.com/m/material-fact/. Summary by the appellate court: Appellee Flight Services fired Appellant Joseph Travers as he pursued a lawsuit against the company under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). Flight Services says it terminated Travers for violating company policy. Travers says he was fired in retaliation for his FLSA lawsuit. Because a reasonable jury could return a verdict for Travers without relying on improbable inferences or unsupported speculation, we vacate the district court's grant of summary judgment to the company. The court expressed concern about a possibility of proof of a plausible that the preexisting retaliatory motive. At-will: adverse employment action - termination, unemployment benefits, Minn. Stat. § 549.04, subd. 1 (2012)
Jurisdiction: Minnesota Dukowitz v. Hannon Security Services, No. A11-1481 (MNSC, 1/2/14) [enhanced lexis.com version]:
Summary by its supreme court: Respondent Hannon Security Services (“Hannon”) terminated appellant Jane Kay Dukowitz from her position as a security officer. In this appeal, Dukowitz presents two legal questions for our consideration. The first question is whether the public-policy exception to the employment-at-will rule applies to a termination resulting from an employee’s application for unemployment benefits . The second question is whether a district court has discretion to consider a non-prevailing party’s status as an indigent litigant when it awards costs and disbursements to a prevailing party in a civil action. Because we conclude that the public-policy exception to the employment-at-will rule does not apply in this case and that Minn. Stat. § 549.04, subd. 1 (2012), does not permit a court to consider a non-prevailing party’s indigent status, we affirm.
Jurisdiction: New Mexico American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees Council 18, AFL-CIO, CLC, v. State of New Mexico, New Mexico State Personnel Board, et al., 2013-NMCA-106; http://www.nmcompcomm.us/nmcases/NMCA/2013/13ca-106.pdf 53.3 SBB 30 (NMCA, 1/15/14) [enhanced lexis.com version]. Summary by the appellate court: {1} The American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees Council 18, AFL-CIO, CLC (the Union) appeals from the Rule 1-012(B)(6) NMRA dismissal of its action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the New Mexico State Personnel Board and Sandra Perez, the Board Director, (collectively, the Board). The action arises from the Board’s adoption of a regulation defining the contract phrase, “shift work schedule” that is in Article 21, Section 5 of a collective bargaining agreement between the Union and the State of New Mexico (the Agreement). In its action, the Union asserted that the regulation violated the Contract Clauses of the United States and New Mexico Constitutions. The district court agreed with the Board that the regulation was “prospective” in its application and therefore did not impair the Agreement and run afoul of the Contract Clauses. The court dismissed the case under Rule 1-012(B)(6), holding that the Union had not stated a claim on which relief could be granted. We hold that the complaint stated a claim on which relief could be granted and reverse the district court’s ruling. Title VII, PDA: policy, medical restrictions – accommodation – failure, pretext – summary judgment Jurisdiction: 6th Circuit Latowski v. Northwoods Nursing Ctr., No. 12-2408 (6th Cir., 12/23/13, unpublished); http://pacer.ca6.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/reports.pl?CASENUM=12-2408&puid=; 2013 BL 352840 [enhanced lexis.com version]. The employer’s policy of accommodating medical restrictions limited itself to conditions arising only from conditions related to work. Recent law extends conditions to conditions other than those related to the workplace. Summary judgment in favor of the employer was reversed and remanded for full trial. Wage and Hour: unemployment insurance benefits – exclusion Jurisdiction: Tennessee Westgate Smoky Mountains at Gatlinburg v. Phillips, et al., No. E2011-02538-SC-R11-CV (TNSC, 12/23/13); http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/westgateopn_0.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. This licensed time-share salesperson was not covered by the Tennessee Employment Security Law because she was a “licensed real estate agent”, which is a classification excluded from that law. NLRB: D. R. Horton, arbitration agreement, class action – collective action, Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), unfair labor practice (ULP), clarify rights Jurisdiction: 5th Circuit D.R. Horton, Incorporated, v. National Labor Relations Board, No. 12-60031 (5th Cir., 12/3/13):
Joining other circuits in rejecting the D. R. Horton decision by the NLRB, the appellate court summary states: The National Labor Relations Board held that D.R. Horton, Inc. had violated the National Labor Relations Act by requiring its employees to sign an arbitration agreement that, among other things, prohibited an employee from pursuing claims in a collective or class action. On petition for review, we disagree and conclude that the Board’s decision did not give proper weight to the Federal Arbitration Act. We uphold the Board, though, on requiring Horton to clarify with its employees that the arbitration agreement did not eliminate their rights to pursue claims of unfair labor practices with the Board Free Speech: advertisement – “currently employed”, statute – N .J.S.A. § 34:8B-1 Jurisdiction: New Jersey New Jersey Dep’t of Labor and Workforce Dev. v. Crest Ultrasonics et al., No. A-0417-12T4 (N.J. App. Div., 1/7/14) [enhanced lexis.com version].
Advertisements by the New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development stating that applicants “must currently be employed did not infringe on a constitutional right to free speech. Summary by the appellate court: In this case of first impression, appellants challenge the constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 34:8B - 1, a measure the Legislature enacted in 2011 after the Governor ' s conditional veto of a more sweeping version of the proposed law. Subject to certain exceptions that do not apply here, the statute bars employer s seeking to fill job vacancies in this State from purposefully or knowingly publishing advertisement s stating that job applicants must be currently employed in order for their applications to be accepted, considered, or reviewed. Litigation: jury instruction – retaliation – motivation, prejudicial error, adverse employment action – termination, new trial Jurisdiction: California Mendoza v Western Medical Center Santa Ana et al., No. G047394 (Cal.App.Ct.Dist.4,Div.3, 1/14/14) [enhanced lexis.com version]:
Pertinent rationale of the appellate court: It is therefore clear that the court erred in its instruction of the jury. The court should have instructed the jury to determine whether Mendoza’s report of sexual harassment was a substantial motivating reason for Mendoza’s discharge. Following Harris and Alamo, we conclude this error was prejudicial. The jury’s verdict in favor of Mendoza was extremely close (a nine to three vote). No other instructions provided to the jury could have cured the erroneous instruction with regard to the contested element. Viewing the evidence “in the light most favorable” to defendants (Huffman v. Interstate Brands Corp. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 679, 692), there is a reasonable probability that the instructional error prejudicially affected the verdict. FLSA, NM MWA: overtime
Jurisdiction: 10th Circuit, New Mexico Padilla v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Council 18 (10th Cir., 1/3/14); http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/13a1047n-06.pdf; http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-2080.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. The plaintiff worked for the city Water Authority and also provided services for the union, which together amounted to more than 40 hours a week. His wage and hour overtime claim failed because he was not an employee of the union, but rather a volunteer. Summary by the appellate court: Plaintiff Andrew Padilla appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (“AFSCME”), Council 18 (“Council 18”) on his claims for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and the New Mexico Minimum Wage Act (“NMMWA”). Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. Reasoning of the trial court:
Adverse Employment Action:
Jurisdiction: California Redeker v. Collateral Specialists Inc., No. A136291 (Cal.Ct.App.1st,4th, 11/ 4/13, unpublished) http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/nonpub/A136291.PDF [enhanced lexis.com version]. The employer claimed it fired Redeker because he violated his confidentiality agreement, and Redeker contended that was a pretext to hide retaliatory termination in violation of public policy. The appellate court found that was a triable issue of fact because the firing occurred soon after he contacted government agencies with allegations that the employer had misclassified some workers as independent contractors and he was continuing his search on that matter. Summary by the appellate court: Plaintiff James A. Redeker brought this case against his former employer, Collateral Specialists Inc. (CSI ), for wrongful termination in violation of public policy and Labor Code section 1102.5 , unfair business practices, and invasion of privacy. In this appeal, he challenges the trial court’s order granting CSI summary judgment. We affirm summary adjudication of Redeker’s claim for invasion of privacy, but we reverse summary adjudication of his other three claims. Read the opinion at pp. 6-7 for a description of how the McDonnell Douglas evidentiary framework for order of proof may vary depending on the legal theory and facts involved. Title VII – PDA, ADA, FMLA: pregnancy, remarks, reasonable accommodation, leave, adverse employment action – termination of employment Download 5.55 Mb. Share with your friends:
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