Human resources & employment law cumulative case briefs
Jurisdiction: read the full decision
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- Jurisdiction: 11 th Circuit
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Jurisdiction: read the full decision Chicago Mathematics & Science Academy Charter School, Inc. and Chicago Alliance of Charter Teachers & Staff, IFT, AFT, AFL-CIO, 359 NLRB No. 41, find summary and URL link in: http://m.nlrb.gov/weeklysummary/summary-nlrb-decisions-week-december-17-21-2012, 11th case down in that collection [enhanced lexis.com version]. The Board asserted jurisdiction over a Chicago nonprofit corporation that operates a charter school. Its recent tendency has been toward asserting jurisdiction, but not always. However, in this case, the union and those filing appellate briefs amici, which included the NEA and AFL-CIO, argued that the NLRB should not assert jurisdiction, and the CMSA and the National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, as amici, argued that the NLRB should assert jurisdiction. Hence, be careful what you ask for. [*Note: Appellate “friends of the court” briefs, or “amicus” or “amici” briefs, are allowed by appellate courts from entities that are interested in the outcome, though not parties to the dispute, and those entities usually have expertise or experience that might assist the appellate court to better understand the issues and more effectively decide the case. For example, see: https://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/documents/236/chicago_mathematics_brief.pdf.] The full opinion and the cited article will better explain the intricacies in this specialized area of the law than any attempt at briefing it. Wage and Hour: commission pay, written contract, method of computation and payment, provide signed copy, signed acknowledgement required; AB 1396, Cal. Labor Code § 2751 Jurisdiction: California Here is a notice by Fisher & Phillips, LLP, that in California as of 1/1/13 . . . . . . a new California law requires that employees entering into employment agreements which involve compensation, even in part, on a “commission” basis must be provided a written contract which sets forth the method by which the commission is computed and paid. Employers must provide the employee with a signed copy of the commission agreement and obtain a signed acknowledgment of receipt of the copy. URL links:
FLSA: nursing mother, employer provided time and place to express milk, request not a “complaint”, adverse employment action, no retaliation Jurisdiction: 11th Circuit Miller v. Roche Surety & Cas. Co., Inc., No. 12-10259 (11th Cir., 12/26/12); http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/unpub/ops/201210259.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. The opinion does not inform us about why the nursing mother’s employment was terminated. What does seem clear, however, is that employers and employees ought to discuss the needs of nursing mothers in the workplace in order to:
. . . so that litigation can be avoided. PER CURIAM:* Danielle Miller sued Roche Surety & Casualty Co., Inc., Roche Bail Bonds, Inc., and Shannon Roche (collectively Roche), asserting claims under two provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 215(a)(3),207(r)(1). Specifically, Miller alleged that Roche violated § 207(r)(1) because it did not give her a time and place to express breast milk and that Roche violated §215(a)(3) when it terminated her employment after she asked for a time and place to do so. The case went to trial before a jury. After Miller’s testimony, the district court granted Roche’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, concluding that there was not a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury to find that Roche violated either FLSA provision. On appeal, Miller argues that the district court erred in granting Roche’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. After careful review, we conclude that the district court properly entered its judgment. [* “Per Curium” essentially means a unanimous opinion by the entire court.] Background:
Litigation:
FLSA: restructuring workweek to reduce overtime, no violation Jurisdiction: 8th Circuit Abshire v. Redland Energy Services, LLC., No, 11-3380 (8th Cir., 10/10/12); http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opns/opFrame.html; http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-8th-circuit/1612943.html [enhanced lexis.com version]. The employer changed the designation of the workweek to reduce overtime pay, and both the trial court and the appellate court ruled that did not violate the Fair Labor Standards Act. LOKEN, GRUENDER, and BENTON, Circuit Judges. The Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) provides that covered workers employed “for a workweek longer than forty hours” must be compensated “at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate” for work in excess of forty hours. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). Five current and former employees of Redland Energy Services, LLC (“Redland”), commenced this action alleging that Redland violated this overtime provision by changing the designation of their workweek, but not their work schedule, so that fewer hours qualified as “overtime.” Agreeing with a Department of Labor investigator, the district court1 found no FLSA violation and granted Redland's motion for summary judgment. Abshire v. Redland Energy Servs., LLC, 822 F.Supp.2d 874 (W.D.Ark.2011). The employees appeal, arguing that the district court misinterpreted § 207(a)(1) and an implementing regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 778.105, and that disputed issues of material fact made summary judgment inappropriate. Reviewing the grant of summary judgment de novo, we affirm. Grey v. City of Oak Grove, 396 F.3d 1031, 1034 (8th Cir.2005) (standard of review). Background:
]Note: Though the appellate court found that the employer’s purpose did not affect the legality of such a change under the FLSA, an employer must intend the change to be permanent, i.e., an employer cannot avoid overtime payments by changing the workweek designation from week to week. Also, check earlier briefs in this database for similar rulings allowing such a change.] Settlement: written settlement agreement, Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (“OWBPA”), enforcement, timeliness of appeal – entry of judgment - Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a) Jurisdiction: 10th Circuit Walters v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 11-5130 (10th Cir., 1/8/13); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/11/11-5130.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. This case primarily involves issues important to litigators, so it is cited for them to read, but it will not be briefed. Discrimination: gender, tight clothing, “too sexy”, adverse employment action, no unlawful discrimination Jurisdiction: Iowa Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C., No. 11-857 (12/21/12); http://www.iowacourts.gov/Supreme_Court/Recent_Opinions/20121221/11-1857.pdf; http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2012/images/12/21/11-1857.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. In a commercial of a few years a man sang “I’m too sexy for my shirt!” In the state of Iowa, an employee apparently was too sexy for her job, according to the boss’s wife, but firing her was not an adverse employment action based on illegal gender discrimination. Mansfield, Justice: Can a male employer terminate a female employee because the employer’s wife, due to no fault of the employee, is concerned about the nature of the relationship between the employer and the employee? This is the question we are required to answer today. For the reasons stated herein, we ultimately conclude the conduct does not amount to unlawful sex discrimination in violation of the Iowa Civil Rights Act. The full opinion is entertaining as well as educational, so take advantage of the links above. Title VII, Civil Rights: § 1983 Jurisdiction: 8th Circuit Henley v. Brown, No. 11-2561 (8th Cir., 7/26/12); http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/12/07/112561P.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. The United States Constitution, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, might be an alternative basis for certain claims that might also have been raised under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII. Bye, Author, with Loken and Melloy, Circuit Judge: In action alleging civil rights violations by defendants while plaintiff was undergoing training to be a Kansas City police officer, the district court erred in characterizing plaintiff's employment discrimination claims as gender claims for which Title VII was the exclusive remedy; while Title VII provides the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination claims created by its own terms, its exclusivity ceases when the employer's conduct also amounts to a violation of a right secured by the Constitution; case is remanded to the district court to determine whether the allegations in the complaint were sufficient to establish a Section 1983 action that was plausible on its face. Background:
PPACA: Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, “Obamacare”, contraception, exemption, First Amendment, health insurance, mandate, morning after pill, preventive care, religious employer, Religious Freedom Restoration Act Jurisdiction:10th Circuit This is a developing area with cases in various statuses, which means further attention is necessary:
NLRB: witness statement, confidentiality, disclosure Jurisdiction: All. Stephens Media, LLC, 359 NLRB No. 39 (Dec. 14, 2012); http://www.nlrb.gov/cases-decisions/board-decisions [enhanced lexis.com version]. This a case for litigators dealing with what witness statements need to be disclosed and which do net. Accordingly, the full decision needs to be read. FMLA: possibly returned to a lesser position, interference, jury issue, summary judgment reversed, difference between retaliation and interference claims Jurisdiction: 11th Circuit Rodriguez v. University of Miami Hospital, No. 11-15206 (11th Cir., 12/3/12); http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/unpub/ops/201115206.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Summary judgment was reversed by the appellate court because the employee was placed in a temporary position after returning from her authorized FMLA leave. Of importance here is the distinction between the analysis of an FMLA retaliation claim and an FMLA interference claim for purposes of summary judgment:
In this case, the employer was found by the appellate court to have failed meet that burden, and the matter will be remanded (returned) to the lower court to allow a jury to decide the issue. Background:
Appellate decision:
Title VII: gender, hostile work environment, hurtful joking, severe and/or pervasive, provocation, threats of violence, .357 Magnum, retaliation, adverse employment action, termination, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), 2000e-3(a), summary judgment dismissal affirmed Jurisdiction: 10th Circuit This case involves a different twist on a hostile work environment claim, because the complaining was terminated for implying to the alleged perpetrator that she might shoot him. Significant portions of the courts’ reasoning are quoted as a refresher on the law applying to hostile work environment and retaliation. Gaff v. St. Mary’s Regional Hospital, No. 12-6064 (10th Cir., 12/19/12); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/12/12-6064.pdf; Gaff v. St. Mary’s Reg’l Med. Ctr., No. 5:10-CV-00926-C (W.D. Okla. Jan. 19, 2012) ; http://www.morelaw.com/verdicts/case.asp?n=5:10-cv-00926-C&s=OK&d=54443; 2012 WL 163878 [enhanced lexis.com version]. Background:
Litigation:
Title VII’s hostile-work-environment doctrine protects against severe or pervasive sexual harassment. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998). “An employer creates a hostile work environment when the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.” Morris v. City of Colo. Springs, 666 F.3d 654, 664 (10th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Title VII, however, does not create a “general civility code.” Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81. “[R]un-of-the mill boorish, juvenile, or annoying behavior that is not uncommon in American workplaces is not the stuff of a Title VII hostile work environment claim.” Morris, 666 F.3d at 664. To discern the difference, we look among other things to “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” In this case, the record is replete with evidence Mr. Nelson conducted himself immaturely. But it also shows that Ms. Gaff was Mr. Nelson’s superior, not the other way around; that Mr. Nelson had no authority over her; and that he never interfered in any way with her work performance. It shows, too, that by Ms. Gaff’s own admission most of Mr. Nelson’s conduct would not have offended anyone else. And it shows what offensive remarks there were, were isolated: Ms. Gaff, for example, can point to only one instance of Mr. Nelson’s making a sexually explicit comment. Given these circumstances, the district court correctly held that, under the precedents of both the Supreme Court and this court, a hostile work environment claim will not lie. See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (“A recurring point in [the Supreme Court’s hostile-work-environment] opinions is that simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81; Morris, 666 F.3d at 664; Hall v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 476 F.3d 847, 851 (10th Cir. 2007). Alternatively, Ms. Gaff maintains St. Mary’s unlawfully retaliated against her for reporting Mr. Nelson’s behavior. Even if Mr. Nelson’s behavior didn’t violate Title VII, she says, she believed in good faith it did. And, she says, such a belief is enough to entitle her to relief under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision. But Ms. Gaff misstates the law. Our precedents don’t permit a retaliation claim to be “based on an unreasonable good-faith belief that the underlying conduct violated Title VII.” Crumpacker v. Kan. Dep’t of Human Res., 338 F.3d 1163, 1171 (10th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). The belief must be reasonable. Fischer v. Forestwood Co., 525 F.3d 972, 979 n.3 (10th Cir. 2008). And for the same reasons Ms. Gaff wasn’t subjected to a hostile work environment, it wasn’t reasonable for her to believe she was. Title VII protects against unlawful discrimination, not “simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788. [Note: The name Oncale is pronounced OWNcal, in case you were wondering.] FMLA, Title VII: hostile work environment, race – age – gender, retaliation, summary judgment dismissal affirmed Download 5.55 Mb. Share with your friends:
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