Human resources & employment law cumulative case briefs


Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 104



Download 5.55 Mb.
Page61/108
Date18.10.2016
Size5.55 Mb.
#2406
1   ...   57   58   59   60   61   62   63   64   ...   108

2011 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 104  

LaMont v. Independent School District #728; No. A100543 (5/16/12); http://law.justia.com/cases/minnesota/supreme-court/2012/a10-543.html [enhanced lexis.com version].
FMLA: employer’s attendance policies were not superseded by the Act
Illustrative; not controlling law. In most instances, employees on FMLA leave must comply with company attendance policies.
Pellegrino v. Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, CLC, No.11-2639 (3rd Cir., 4/19/12); http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/112639np.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
FLSA: Rule 23 class action claim and FLSA opt-in provision are not incompatible in the same lawsuit
Illustrative; not controlling law. This 3rd Circuit case aligns it with the 2nd, 7th, 9th and D.C Circuits in holding that there is no "inherent incompatibility" between the FLSA and Rule 23, and it was within the trial court's discretion to administer parallel claims.
[Note: Commentators have written that because the ADEA incorporates the class procedures of the FLSA, this 3d Circuit's opinion also may provide persuasive authority parallel ADEA and Rule 23 class actions in age-discrimination claims.]
Knepper v. Rite Aid, Nos. 11-1684 and 11-1685 (3rd Cir., 3/27/12); http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/111684p.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
Title VII: transgender claims, EEOC adopted reasoning of Justice Scalia in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services Inc.
Illustrative; not controlling law – but something to think about as possible persuasive reasoning in other cases. The EEOC deals with federal employees’ claims under an administrative procedure that differs from the typical one in most other situations. Interestingly, the EEOC cited Justice Scalia’s reasoning in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998); http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/96-568.ZO.html [enhanced lexis.com version].
Macy v. Eric Holder, Agency No. ATF-2011-00751; http://www.scribd.com/doc/90910497/EEOC-Ruling [enhanced lexis.com version].
A transgender woman applied to be an agent with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), and she was informed she was qualified – until she told ATF of her transgender status. ATF didn’t consider transgender status to be a protected classification and reversed its decision. When Title VII was passed, transgender probably was not considered. However, Oncale may have changed that, because the EEOC decided differently, citing Justice Scalia:
. . . But statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil [they were passed to combat] to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed. Title VII prohibits 'discrimination . . . because of . . . sex' in the 'terms' or 'conditions' of employment. Our holding that this includes sexual harassment must extend to sexual harassment of any kind that meets the statutory requirements.
Further, stated the EEOC in its decision, if an employer took an adverse action against an applicant or employee because he or she converted from Christianity to Buddhism, then the action would be because of religion, and thus unlawful. Thus, EEOC sent the case back to the ATF for investigation of this new protected classification in employment law.
With this in mind, transgender considerations need to be made. That is already the situation in New Mexico because under its Human Rights Act, employers with 15 or more employees are subject to these anti discrimination provisions:


  • sexual orientation (= heterosexuality, homosexuality or bisexuality – either actual or perceived), and

  • gender identity (= person's self-perception or perception by others as identity as male/female based on appearance, behavior or physical characteristics either in accord with or opposed to physical anatomy, chromosomal sex, or birth sex).

arbitration agreement, class action, collective actions
Illustrative; not controlling law. The issue was who decides on whether a class action can proceed in an arbitration agreement case – arbitrator or judge? Disagreement abounds, so litigators likely will to read this article and the appellate court decision for additional discussion and ideas.

v. Florida Metro University, Inc., No. 11-50509 (5th Cir., 5/8/12); http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions%5Cpub%5C11/11-50509-CV0.wpd.pdf; article at http://employerslawyer.blogspot.com/2012/05/5th-circuit-dashes-class-action-in.html [enhanced lexis.com version].
ADA: users of medical marijuana not protected by ADA
Illustrative; not controlling law. Though not controlling law, the reasoning might be found persuasive by other federal courts. What make this decision convincing is that the ADA is a federal law, and under federal drug laws marijuana is still illegal.
James v. City of Costa Mesa, No. 10–55769 (9th Cir., 5/21/12); http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2012/05/21/10-55769.pdf; [enhanced lexis.com version].
In 2-1 decision, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held the ADA excludes from coverage current illegal drug users and that "illegal" includes marijuana use is unlawful under federal law, even though that would be lawful in California:
We hold that doctor-recommended marijuana use permitted by state law, but prohibited by federal law, is an illegal use of drugs for purposes of the ADA, and that the plaintiffs' federally proscribed medical marijuana use therefore brings them within the ADA's illegal drug exclusion. This conclusion is not altered by recent congressional actions allowing the implementation of the District of Columbia's local medical marijuana initiative.
[Note: In 2008, the California Supreme Court held in Ross v. Ragingwire Telecomm. Inc. that the California Fair Employment and Housing Act does not protect current users of medical marijuana.]
Title VII: EEOC and transgender claims

these URL links for recent developments in this area of the law as of May 2012: http://www.eeoc.gov/decisions/0120120821%20Macy%20v%20DOJ%20ATF.txt; article - http://www.constangy.com/communications-401.html.


NM Public Sector: State Personnel Board, disciplinary action, employer’s policies, termination of employment for same offense, significantly different treatment, sufficient evidence of justification for difference; administrative law and procedure: administrative appeal; judicial review; scope of review; and standard of review
Controlling law. Two public employees were treated differently for a DWI arrest or conviction, but the justification offered by the employer for the disparate treatment was sufficient to meet the requirements of previous case law.
Sais v. New Mexico Department of Corrections, No. 32,776, 2012-NMSC-009 (original proceeding on certiorari, 3/22/12).
Richard C. Bosson, Justice:
{1} This Court has previously established the principle that when an employer disciplines two public employees, arrested or convicted of driving while intoxicated (DWI), in a significantly different manner yet based on substantially similar conduct, the employer owes a legal duty to explain that difference satisfactorily with evidence in the record. If not, the court will reverse the action taken as arbitrary and capricious. See In re Termination of Kibbe, 2000-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 14-19, 128 N.M. 629, 996 P.2d 419. The present case offers this Court an additional opportunity to apply and amplify the principles we articulated over twelve years ago in Kibbe. In doing so, we conclude that the employer here, unlike Kibbe, did place substantial evidence in the record to justify the action taken and to explain any alleged differences in the treatment of other employees. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the district court and uphold the State Personnel Board.
ADA: disabling heart condition, direct threat to safety, regarded as disabled, unable to perform essential functions, not a qualified individual with a disability (QIWAD), restriction on placement, reasonable accommodation, no discrimination
Illustrative; not controlling law. This worker’s heart condition posed a direct threat to workplace safety. A QIWAD must be able to perform the essential functions of the job, and the disabling condition must not pose a threat to safety in the workplace.

  • ADA regulations define a “direct threat” as “a significant risk of substantial harm to the health and safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation.”

    • Evidence of a “direct threat” must be based on “a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence.”

    • Whether an individual poses a direct threat includes consideration of the factors:

      • duration of the risk,

      • the nature and severity of the potential harm,

      • the likelihood that the potential harm will occur, and

      • how imminent is the potential harm?

  • Accommodations requested must be reasonable and not unduly burdensome to the employer.

This case illustrates the value of a knowledgeable company engaged in good business practices in handling this kind of situation, and that courts recognize those efforts to do the right thing both for the individual employee under the anti-discrimination laws and for the other employees under the safe workplace laws.


Wurzel v. Whirlpool Corp., No. 10-3629 (6th Cir., 4/27/12); http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/12a0446n-06.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
Background: Brian Wurzel began working for Whirlpool Corp. in 1983 as a materials handler.

  • In 2003 he began complaining of chest pains.

  • In 2007 he was diagnosed with Prinzmetal’s angina, a condition of coronary artery spasms causing chest tightness, shortness of breath, dizziness, and fatigue.

  • Medically cleared to return to his job as a forklift driver, he began having angina spasms at work in March 2008.

  • As of February 2009 he had experienced at least eleven spasm incidents at work.

    • Most of them required treatment at the plant’s emergency room.

    • According to court records, during one incident he was found doubled-over and “ready to pass out.”

  • At the time of his first heart spasm, the plant physician expressed concerns for his safety and others if he ever became incapacitated while operating machinery.

    • He had a clean driving record and assurances from his cardiologists that he posed no greater threat of sudden incapacitation than any other angina patient,

    • But the plant physician prohibited him from driving a forklift, and he was subsequently reassigned to a temporary position in the plant’s unit of gatekeepers and tollkeepers.

  • In October 2008 he accepted a permanent job in the paint department, which required rotating through a series of tasks, one of which was working with or around a “low-hanging” overhead conveyor line.

  • Another angina spasm attack resulted in the plant physician referring him for an independent medical examination, which was performed in November 2008.

  • Court records show that he had not been fully truthful either with his cardiologists or with the independent medical examiner about the extent of his condition.

  • He was permitted to return to the paint department in December 2008, and in January 2009 he experienced three angina spasms at work. Based on these incidents, information from the plant physician, and the fact that Wurzel worked around heavy machinery and occasionally was out of the sight of other employees, the independent medical examiner reversed his opinion and concluded that he should not be permitted to work either alone or near moving machinery.

  • He took sick leave.

  • In August 2009 the company conducted a “restriction review” to evaluate the situation of his job in the paint department, and it concluded he was not qualified for it because he could not work alone or near moving machinery, both of which were essential requirements of the job. Based on this, he was told he could bid on any other job in the plant that conformed with his work restrictions.

  • He remained on leave, during which he used up twenty-six 26 weeks of paid leave and then took unpaid leave. He eventually returned to work in March 2010, claiming he had been spasm-free for the previous six months.

His ADA claim for “being regarded as disabled” was dismissed in the trial court by granting summary judgment in favor of the employer. The appellate court affirmed that order and judgment, reasoning:

  • The employer’s plant has 2,500 employees and six operating assembly lines, all of which use moving machinery in a workplace that requires extreme care:

    • Workers operate presses, drills, cutting machinery, and numerous vehicles (including forklifts).

    • Forklifts and pedestrians travel the plant’s shared space, with only painted lines to separate them.

  • Wurzel acknowledged in his deposition that there was no way of knowing when his medical condition might flare up, whether it would cause an artery spasm, or how long it would last.

  • Thus, the appellate court concluded:

    • The employer had utilized the most current medical knowledge to reach a reasonable medical judgment that he posed a direct threat to workplace safety.

    • His claim was based on “being regarded as disabled”, so under the ADA the employer was not required reasonably accommodate him, but the appellate court nonetheless concluded that the employer had engaged in a non-discriminatory process to determine the threat posed and, based on the best data available, had made an objective decision regarding his job-related abilities.

NLRA: deposition questions concerning employees' union activity, NLRA Section 8(a)(1) violations, conflict with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) scope of discovery rules


Controlling law. Primarily of interest to litigators, this case needs to be read by them in detail for how the NLRA may supersede the FRCP scope of discovery rules.
Century Restaurant and Buffet, Inc., d/b/a Best Century Buffet, Inc. and Century Buffet Grill, LLC and 318 Restaurant Workers’ Union. Case 22–CA–029242, NLRB @@ (3/27/12); 358 NLRB No. 23; Century Restaurant and Buffet, Inc. [enhanced lexis.com version]
Upset about:

  • side work they had to perform,

  • tip-sharing with their manager, and

  • having to pay for their transportation to work each day,

several wait staff employees met with a union representative about these matters. At that time the union did not represent them, but the union representative agreed to locate an attorney to help them with their wage and hour concerns. As a result of consulting with legal counsel, three of the employees filed a federal lawsuit alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law.
About a couple of months later the union filed a representation petition seeking an election for a unit of wait staff employees, and union representatives and the employer agreed on terms for a withdrawal of the representation petition, and the employer recognized the union as the representative of the wait staff employees. However, they did not agree to dismiss the federal lawsuit as one of the terms, and the parties moved forward with the lawsuit and scheduled depositions of the employee plaintiffs.
During the depositions, the restaurant’s counsel asked the employees these questions:

  • whether they were members of the union;

  • when they became members of the union;

  • whether each of the other plaintiffs were union members;

  • whether they spoke to other union members about the litigation;

  • whether they attended union protests on a weekly basis; and

  • whether they had any agreements with the union related to the outcome of the litigation.

The union filed an unfair labor practice charge, alleging that such questions violated the NLRA, and this NLRB order and decision resulted, which dealt with the cases of Guess?, Inc., 339 NLRB 432 (2003) and Chinese Daily News, 353 NLRB 613 (2008):

  • Guess? required a three-part test to determine if deposition questions are unlawful

  1. whether the questions are relevant to the underlying litigation;

  2. if relevant, whether the questions have an illegal objective; and

  3. if relevant and without an illegal objective, whether the employer’s interest in obtaining the information outweighs the employees’ confidentiality interests under Section 7 of the Act.

  • Century Restaurant and Buffet required of employers that even when they voluntarily recognize a union they may violate the NLRA by asking employees about their union activity directly or indirectly via counsel through otherwise permissible questions in a separate legal proceeding.

“Stigma-plus claim”: government employee accused of improper conduct by juvenile patient, independent law enforcement investigation concluded no basis for charges, access to state database, lack of evidence of false statement against employee


Controlling law. Here is an interesting legal theory, one I had not known of previously. A “stigma-plus” claim is a legal theory that requires a plaintiff to prove, among other things:

  1. that the government made a statement about him or her,

  2. that is sufficiently derogatory to injure his or her reputation,

  3. that is capable of being proved false, and

  4. that he or she asserts is false.


Meacham v. Church, et al., No. 11-4161 (10th Cir., 5/4/12); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/11/11-4161.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]..
Judgment for the defendants by the trial court was affirmed by the appellate court because the plaintiff failed to prove that his supervisor had made a false statement of fact that ultimately lead to the adverse employment action of terminating of his employment. The chronology is somewhat more involved than this description, but as a practical matter, that’s the important practical result of the case – a failure of proof of a required element of the legal theory upon which his case is based. Here is the URL link to the federal district court order for those interested in more details: http://ut.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20100419_0000268.DUT.htm/qx [enhanced lexis.com version]. .
PERA: public sector employees; collective bargaining; ordinances, statutory interpretation
Controlling law. Does the grandfather clause of the Public Employee Bargaining Act apply to the City of Albuquerque Labor-Management Relations Ordinance as it pertains to the process for the appointment of interim members to the Labor-Management Relations Board of the City of Albuquerque?
City of Albuquerque v. Montoya, 2012-NMSC-007; http://www.nmcompcomm.us/nmcases/NMSC/2012/12sc-007.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]
{1} The issue presented in this appeal is whether NMSA 1978, Section 10-7E- 26(A) (2003), the grandfather clause of the Public Employee Bargaining Act (the Act), applies to the City of Albuquerque Labor-Management Relations Ordinance (the City Ordinance), as it pertains to the process for the appointment of interim members to the Labor-Management Relations Board of the City of Albuquerque (the Local Board). When the Local Board must meet during the absence of a member, Section 3-2-15(D) of the City Ordinance provides that the City Council President is to appoint an interim member “with due regard to the representative character of the [Local] Board.” Albuquerque, N.M. Rev. Ordinances ch. 3, art. II, § 3-2-15(D) (1974) (amended 2001). The Court of Appeals characterized the City Council President as “managerial personnel” and held that the President’s appointment of a third member defeated the neutral makeup of the Local Board’s membership. We disagree and hold that the City Council President does not serve in either a “management” or a “labor” capacity, and therefore the City Ordinance provision that provides a procedure by which the City Council President appoints a member to the Local Board during the absence of a member does not violate the Act’s grandfather clause requirement that a local ordinance create a system of collective bargaining.
{2} Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ holding that, because “the [City Ordinance] establishing [the Local Board] is not eligible to be grandfathered pursuant to Section 10-7E-26(A),” the State Public Employee Labor Relations Board (the PELRB) has jurisdiction over the underlying matter. City of Albuquerque v. Montoya, 2010-NMCA-100, ¶ 1, 148 N.M. 930, 242 P.3d 497. We remand to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the other issues not previously addressedconviction vacated under the federal National Stolen Property Act1 ("NSPA") and the federal Economic Espionage Act ("EEA")
Illustrative; not controlling law. This 2nd Circuit case is primarily of interest to litigators and will not be briefed.
United States v. Aleynikov, No. 11-1126 (2nd Cir., 4/11/12); http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/f5b3e4db-97de-43ed-a6bb-aa8005867be2/1/doc/11-1126_complete_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/f5b3e4db-97de-43ed-a6bb-aa8005867be2/1/hilite/; and from Justia - http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/11-1126/11-1126-2012-04-11.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
Essentially, in the 2nd Circuit, companies that have developed proprietary software to use in running their business, but that do not offer to sell or license this software to third parties, no longer can seek federal criminal enforcement under the NSPA or the EEA when such software is stolen.
Arrest and conviction records: EEOC Enforcement Guidance, Number 915.002, published on 4/25/2012
Consideration of Arrest and Conviction Records in Employment Decisions Under

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964:

http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/upload/arrest_conviction.pdf.
Table of Contents



  1. Background

    1. Criminal History Records

    2. Employers’ Use of Criminal History Information

    3. The EEOC’s Interest in Employers’ Use of Criminal Records in Employment Screening

  2. Disparate Treatment Discrimination and Criminal Records

  3. Disparate Impact Discrimination and Criminal Records

    1. Determining Disparate Impact of Policies or Practices that Screen Individuals Based on Records of Criminal Conduct

      1. Identifying the Practice or Policy

      2. Determining Disparate Impact

    2. Job Related for the Position in Question and Consistent with Business Necessity

      1. Generally

      2. Arrests

      3. Convictions

      4. Determining Whether a Criminal Conduct Exclusion Is Job Related and Consistent with Business Necessity

      5. Validation

      6. Detailed Discussion of the Green Factors and Criminal Conduct Screens

        1. The Nature and Gravity of the Offense or Conduct

        2. The Time that Has Passed Since the Offense, Conduct and/or Completion of the Sentence

        3. The Nature of the Job Held or Sought

      7. Examples of Criminal Conduct Exclusions that Do Not Consider the Green Factors

      8. Targeted Exclusions that Are Guided by the Green Factors

      9. Individualized Assessment

    3. Less Discriminatory Alternatives

  4. Positions Subject to Federal Prohibitions or Restrictions on Individuals with Records of Certain Criminal Conduct

    1. Hiring in Certain Industries

    2. Obtaining Occupational Licenses

    3. Waiving or Appealing Federally Imposed Occupational Restrictions

    4. Security Clearances

    5. Working for the Federal Government

  1. Positions Subject to State and Local Prohibitions or Restrictions on Individuals with Records of Certain Criminal Conduct

  1. Employer Best Practices

FLSA: exempt status, “salary basis”, 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a)(1973) was amended in 2004 to “salary actually received” rather than “employment agreement”


Illustrative; not controlling law: In order to be considered to be paid on a "salary basis" within the meaning of 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a)(1973), which was amended in 2004, the employee must actually have been paid. The 6th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that actually paying an employee's salary is a necessary condition to meeting this standard.
Orton v. Johnny's Lunch Franchise, No. 10-2044 (6th Cir., 2/21/12); http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/12a0047p-06.pdf;

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=Orton+v.+Johnny%27s+Lunch+Franchise+LLC&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&case=3150857976950394260&scilh=0 [enhanced lexis.com version].
John Orton began working for Johnny's Lunch Franchise in September 2007 as its Vice President of Real Estate and Site Selection with a base salary of $125,000. He alleged the when the company began having financial trouble in August 2008 it stopped paying him. However, he continued working until he and the entire executive staff was formally laid off on December 1, 2008.
He claimed FLSA violations in his district court action, but the appellate court reversed his award on the grounds the district court incorrectly relied on language from the pre-2004 version of the regulations. Significantly, in 2004 the Department of Labor revised 29 C.F.R. § 541.602(a) to state:


    1. - Salary basis.

* * *
(a) General rule. An employee will be considered to be paid on a “salary basis” within the meaning of these regulations if the employee regularly receives each pay period on a weekly, or less frequent basis, a predetermined amount constituting all or part of the employee's compensation, which amount is not subject to reduction because of variations in the quality or quantity of the work performed


This revised regulation changed the focus from “the terms of the employee's agreement with the employer” to the salary actually received by the employee, i.e., . . “if the employee regularly receives”. . . .
On another issue, primarily of interest to litigators, the appellate court also noted that the district court erred by failing to acknowledge that exempt status is an affirmative defense under the FLSA, which the employer had the burden of proving, and thus the district court erred by dismissing his complaint on the grounds that the allegations in his complaint were not sufficient to clearly establish as a matter of law that Orton was an exempt employee
OSHA: recordkeeping citation policy rejected; “continuing violations” theory
Illustrative; not controlling law. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals is considered by most legal experts as the most persuasive of the federal appellate courts, so this decision by it on recordkeeping may be strong persuasive authority for other circuits. Essentially, it held that OSHA recordkeeping violations must be cited within six months of the failure to record, and if not, then the citations will be considered untimely. What this means is that if an employer fails to properly record or maintain workplace injury and illness records for the requisite five-year period under OSHA’s recordkeeping regulations, that would not be a continuing violation that would toll the six-month statute of limitations for issuing citations – i.e., the practical effect of is that it limits OSHA’s ability to issue citations for recordkeeping violations that fall outside the statutory six-month limitations period, as stated in the federal The limitations provision states, “[n]o citation may be issued . . . after the expiration of six months following the occurrence of any violation.”
Occupational Safety and Health Act. AKM LLC, d/b/a Volks Constructors v. Secretary of Labor, No. 11-1106 (D.C. Cir., 4/6/12); http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/018A542863EAA754852579D8004EAFF4/$file/11-1106-1367462.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
The decision sets forth the applicable provisions of OSHA and of DOL regulations, and the opinion states:
We think the statute is clear; the citations are untimely. The statute of limitations provides that ”no citation may be issued ... after the expiration of six months following the occurrence of any violation.” Like the Supreme Court, we think the word “occurrence” clearly refers to a discrete antecedent event – something that “happened” or ”came to pass” ”in the past.”
[However, it is important to note that this decision applies only to recordkeeping. The D.C. Circuit pointed out that under other circumstances, such as an employer continuing to use unsafe equipment or sending untrained employees into dangerous situations, “OSHA may be able to toll the statute of limitations on a continuing violations theory since the dangers created by the violations persist.” For example, see Compass Environmental, Inc., v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission; Department Of Labor, No. 10-9541, 663 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir., 12/19/11); 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 25070; http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/10/10-9541.pdf briefed previously in this database.] [enhanced lexis.com version]
Title VII, FMLA: dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)(6); race, religion, national origin ethnic heritage; retaliation
Download 5.55 Mb.

Share with your friends:
1   ...   57   58   59   60   61   62   63   64   ...   108




The database is protected by copyright ©ininet.org 2024
send message

    Main page