I. Terms of Reference 278 II. Economic Data 279 III. Domestic Support 291 IV. Export Credit Guarantees 293
Regarding the adjustment authority related to Uruguay Round compliance in s.1601(e) of the FSRI Act of 2002 (the so-called "circuit-breaker provision")
Download 3.13 Mb.
|
- Navigate this page:
- (c) Is the authority discretionary If so, can its exercise be limited by the legislative branch of government
- (e) What does "to the maximum extent practicable" mean In what circumstances would it not be practicable for the Secretary to exercise her adjustment authority USA
- (a) Please provide a copy of the regulations under which they are currently and under which they were provided during the marketing years 1996-2002;
- (b) Please indicate whether there are any such payments which are not provided to implement the repayment rate for upland cotton within the marketing loan programme. USA
- US and World Cotton Consumption
- 202. Concerning paragraph 7 of the US oral statement, are the expected cash prices shown for February only Can the US provide the prices for January and March of each year as well USA
- Expected Cash Price ($/lb)
- 205. Does the United States accept or agree with the EWG data submitted by Brazil If not, please explain your reasons. USA
- Free Along Ship Export Value (F.A.S.)
- Unit Export Values to Selected Countries
253. Regarding the adjustment authority related to Uruguay Round compliance in s.1601(e) of the FSRI Act of 2002 (the so-called "circuit-breaker provision"): (a) Does it relate to export credit guarantees, crop insurance and cottonseed payments? (b) Does it relate only to compliance with AMS commitments? (c) Is the authority discretionary? If so, can its exercise be limited by the legislative branch of government? (d) How would the Secretary exercise her authority to prevent serious prejudice to the interests of another Member? How would she exercise her authority to prevent a threat of serious prejudice to the interests of another Member? At what time and on the basis of what type of information would she exercise her authority? (e) What does "to the maximum extent practicable" mean? In what circumstances would it not be practicable for the Secretary to exercise her adjustment authority? USA 254. Would payments made after the date of panel establishment be mandatory under the marketing loan, direct payments, counter-cyclical payments and user marketing certificate (step 2) programmes, but for the circuit-breaker provision? USA 255. How does Brazil respond to US assertions concerning the circuit-breaker provision? (see US 2 December oral statement, paragraph 82). Does this mean that US subsidies cannot be "mandatory" for the purposes of WTO dispute settlement? BRA Brazil’s Answer: 168. The United States has admitted what the text of the “circuit breaker” provision in Section 1601(e)(1) of the 2002 FSRI Act already makes clear, i.e. that it only applies to “total allowable domestic support levels under the Uruguay Round Agreements,” i.e., “total AMS.”234 The United States further acknowledges that this provision “is not specifically addressed to forestalling serious prejudice.”235 Indeed, no provision in US law is designed to forestall serious prejudice to US trading partners caused by US agricultural subsidies specifically in support of upland cotton. 169. The current US “total AMS” is $19.1 billion. As long as the United States stays below this level, there is no legal provision in the 2002 FSRI Act granting the Secretary of Agriculture any authority to stem, or otherwise control, the amount of upland cotton subsidies. Indeed, the numerous mandatory provisions of the 2002 FSRI Act text cited in Brazil’s earlier submissions236 requires the Secretary to make the payments to which eligible producers, users and exporters have a legal entitlement. No exceptions for upland cotton are provided for. Thus, these provisions continue to be mandatory in all circumstances where the US total AMS is below $19.1 billion. The Appellate Body and WTO panels have held that measures are mandatory where they cannot be applied in a WTO consistent manner in certain circumstances.237 170. And even were the US total AMS to exceed $19.1 billion, the text of Section 1601(e)(1) does not mandate any reductions if it is not “practicable” to do so. Nor does the text mandate an even, across the board, cut for all programme crops. For example, the Secretary appears to have the discretion to cut corn or wheat subsidies but retain the full amount of upland cotton subsidies. Brazil will provide further comments on the “circuit breaker” provision on 19 January in response to the US Answers to Questions 253-254. 256. The United States submits that the Panel cannot make rulings without allocating precise amounts of payments to upland cotton production. However, to the extent that such precise data is not on the Panel record, to what extent can the Panel rely on less precise data, and on reasonable assumptions, in fulfilling its duty under Article 11 of the DSU in this case? USA ANNEX I-8 Answers oF THE UNITED STATES to Questions Posed by the Panel Following the Second Substantive Meeting of the Panel (22 December 2003) A. TERMS OF REFERENCE 192. Regarding the interest subsidies and storage payments listed by the United States in its response to the Panel's Question No. 67: (a) Please provide a copy of the regulations under which they are currently and under which they were provided during the marketing years 1996-2002; 1. For interest subsidies and storage payments under the 1996 Act (marketing years 1996‑2002), the relevant regulations are found at 7 CFR 1427.13 and 1427.19 (2000 ed.) (first published at 61 FR 37601, 18 July 1996).238 Under the 2002 Act, those rules are found at 7 CFR 1427.13 and 1427.19 (2003 ed.) (first published at 67 FR 64459, 18 October 2002).239 We describe and discuss these provisions below in response to part "(b)" of this question. (b) Please indicate whether there are any such payments which are not provided to implement the repayment rate for upland cotton within the marketing loan programme. USA 2. Interest subsidies and storage payments are support provided in connection with the marketing loan programme. On a forfeit of warehouse‑stored upland cotton under loan, the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) pays warehouse charges for the loan period (even though the farmer had title during that period) and forgives interest. 7 CFR 1427.13 (2000 ed. and 2003 ed.). As for redemption of cotton under loan, repayment rates depend on the world market price. If the repayment amount set on that price is low enough, CCC may have to forgive interest and pay storage charges because the repayment amount will not be enough to satisfy the loan amount and those charges. See 1427.19(e) (2000 and 2002). By contrast, if the repayment rate set on the world market price is high enough, the producer pays both. Id. In general, if the loan is repaid, there is not an interest subsidy at all; rather, in 7 CFR Part 1405, it is provided that CCC will charge the sum of (1) the rate that CCC pays the Treasury and (2) another 1 per cent per annum. We are not aware of any other payments that would be responsive to the panel’s question. 194. Does the United States maintain its position stated in response to the Panel's Question No. 67 that "it would not be appropriate for the Panel to examine payments made after the date of panel establishment"? If so, please explain why. Can Brazil comment on this statement? BRA, USA 3. In response to the Panel’s Question 67, which asked the parties "to calculate and submit estimates of the AMS for upland cotton for marketing years 1992, 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002," the United States stated, in the context of its calculation of the AMS for marketing year 2002, that "it would not be appropriate for the Panel to examine payments made after the date of panel establishment, on which the Panel’s terms of reference were set. Measures taken after the Panel was established cannot be within the Panel’s terms of reference."240 The United States continues to believe that this statement is accurate. Past panels have frequently been confronted with the issue of the date as of which measures should be examined. Panels have generally determined to examine those measures as of the date of panel establishment as a matter both of terms of reference as well as for practical reasons (for example, so as to allow findings to be made with respect to a measure withdrawn after the panel was established but before panel proceedings were completed). 4. The Panel’s terms of reference were set by the DSB at its meeting on 18 March 2003, namely, "[t]o examine, in the light of the relevant provisions of the covered agreements cited by Brazil in document WT/DS267/7, the matter referred to the DSB by Brazil in that document and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in those agreements."241 In that panel request, Brazil identifies the measures at issue as "prohibited and actionable subsidies provided to US producers, users and/or exporters of upland cotton."242 In Brazil’s answer to question 19 from the Panel, Brazil clarified: "Brazil’s Request for Establishment of a Panel (‘Panel Request’) challenges two types of domestic support ‘measures’ provided to upland cotton and various different types of export subsidy measures. The first type of domestic support "measure" is the payment of subsidies for the production and use of upland cotton. These payments were and continue to be made between MY 1999 to the present (and will be made through MY 2007) through the various statutory and regulatory instruments listed on pages 2‑3 of Brazil’s Panel Request. Brazil referred to these payments at pages 2‑3 of the Panel Request as ‘subsidies and domestic support provided under’ or ‘mandated to be provided’ under the various listed statutory and regulatory instruments. Brazil has tabulated the different types of payments (i.e., the measures) made under these legal instruments in paragraphs 146‑149 of its First Submission."243 That is, to the extent that "payments" are at issue (as opposed to Brazil’s challenge of certain legal instruments "as such")244, the "measure" is "the payment of subsidies for the production and use of upland cotton." Only those payments made through the date of panel establishment could be "measures at issue" within the meaning of DSU Article 6.2 (as opposed to measures not yet taken, such as the Agricultural Assistance Act of 2003, which had not been enacted at the time of Brazil’s panel request). 5. Thus, for purposes of the Panel’s Peace Clause analysis or the evaluation of the "effect of the subsidy" for purposes of the Panel’s actionable subsidies analysis, Brazil’s choice to obtain establishment of this Panel several months into the 2002 marketing year but well before that marketing year was completed necessarily impacts the payments ("measure") that the Panel may examine. The payment of subsidies after panel establishment cannot alter the measures within the Panel’s terms of reference and properly before the Panel, just as the cessation of payments after panel establishment would not prevent the Panel from making findings as to those payments that had been made as of the date of establishment. B. ECONOMIC DATA 195. Does the United States wish to revise its response to the Panel's Question No. 67bis, in particular, its statement that "the United States ... does not maintain information on the amount of expenditures made under the cited programmes to US upland cotton producers"? Did the United States make enquiries of the FSA in the course of preparing its original answer? 6. Question No. 67bis inquired about annual amounts granted to upland cotton producers per pound and in total expenditures under each of the decoupled payment programmes. The United States of course conferred with US Department of Agriculture personnel, including FSA personnel, concerning this question and reported to the Panel that USDA "does not maintain information on the amount of expenditures made under the cited programmes to US upland cotton producers."245 That response remains accurate today: because those payments are decoupled from current production, expenditures under such programmes are not tracked by whether the recipient produces upland cotton. In fact, the United States does not collect production data based on actual harvesting figures reported by farmers; we do not understand Brazil to have asserted the contrary.246 7. Brazil has also not asserted that the United States maintains information on the receipt of decoupled payments for upland cotton base acres by upland cotton producers. Rather, it has presented a novel methodology developed by the Environmental Working Group (EWG) to compare disparate data separately collected by the United States to attempt to infer that information. 247EWG compared the farm numbers of recipients of decoupled payments for upland cotton base acres with the farm numbers of recipients of marketing loan payments in marketing years 2000‑2002. It bears emphasis that the latter database is not a production database based on actual harvesting figures reported by farmers; the marketing loan database merely records the quantities of cotton on which a recipient has received payments. By comparing the matches by farm number between the two databases, EWG calculated that the share of decoupled payments for upland cotton base acres paid to upland cotton "producers" (that is, recipients of marketing loan payments) was 71.3 per cent in marketing year 2000, 76.9 per cent in marketing year 2001, and 73.6 per cent in marketing year 2002. 8. As we have previously mentioned248, using the marketing loan payments database to identify "producers" would be contingent on marketing year prices; only if prices are sufficiently low would a high proportion of production of a crop receive marketing loan payments. This appears to have been the case for upland cotton in some recent marketing years but will not always be so (for example, no marketing loan payments are being made in the 2003 marketing year) and was not the case for other commodities (in marketing year 2002, total marketing loan payments of only $16.3 million for soybeans, $16.3 million for corn, and $16.1 million for wheat were made).249 9. We note that Brazil has not made any adjustment in the outlay figures it has presented to the Panel for purposes of both Peace Clause and its actionable subsidy claims to reflect the fact that the EWG percentages are substantially lower than the 87 per cent revision made by Brazil to correct its initial Peace Clause analysis. The adjustment resulting from the EWG data in the total decoupled payments for upland cotton base acres made to upland cotton "producers" is also substantial. Since Brazil presents the EWG percentages as Brazil's own data, Brazil has effectively conceded that its own figures should be corrected at least as follows:
The Panel can see a rather striking decline in the decoupled payments at issue that have not been reflected in Brazil’s argumentation to the Panel. 10. We note further, however, that the EWG figures do not end the story. These figures represent only the first step in a proper calculation of the decoupled payments received by upland cotton producers that benefit upland cotton. For example, as detailed in the US answer to question 242 from the Panel, the literature on decoupled payments indicates that these payments benefit the owners of the base acres on which payments are made; payments made on rented acres will be captured by landowners through increased rent or other arrangements. Brazil itself has conceded that as of marketing year 1997 – that is, only the first year after introduction of the production flexibility contracts – already 34‑41 cents per dollar of production flexibility contract payment were capitalized into land rents.253 Thus, based on its own evidence, Brazil should have adjusted the EWG figures downwards by 22 to 27 per cent to reflect the capture by landowners (who are not producers) through increased rent of 34‑41 per cent of decoupled payments on the 65 per cent of cotton acres that are rented.254 Furthermore, this study as of marketing year 1997 is consistent with the evidence presented by the United States that as rental contracts come up for renewal the full value of the decoupled payments on rented acres will be captured by landowners and capitalized into land values.255 Thus, to reflect the benefit to upland cotton producers, the EWG data should be adjusted downwards by 65 per cent to reflect the fact that "[n]ot all operators [producers] can therefore be considered as true beneficiaries of the [PFC] programme, since competitive cropland rental markets work to pass through payments from PFC recipients who are tenants to the owners of base acres."256 Only those upland cotton producers who are owners of upland cotton base acres will receive the benefit of those decoupled payments. 11. Finally, to answer the Panel’s question on the total payments for upland cotton base acres that benefit upland cotton producers would require information relating to the total value of each recipient’s production. The EWG figures, adjusted to account for the capture of 65 per cent of those payments by owners of base acreage who are not cotton producers, would need to be allocated across the total value of production in order to calculate the subsidy benefit to upland cotton. Brazil has not brought forward information to permit that allocation; in fact, as discussed in more detail in the US answer to question 256 from the Panel, Brazil has not even claimed that such an allocation is necessary. Accordingly, it does not appear possible to calculate the total payments to upland cotton producers that benefit upland cotton nor any per pound measurement. 196. Please provide the latest data for the 2002 marketing year on payments under the marketing loan, direct payments, counter-cyclical payments, user marketing certificate (step 2) programmes and export credit guarantee programmes. BRA, USA 12. Data for marketing loan and user marketing certificate programmes are for upland cotton only and are current as of 12 December 2003.257 • Marketing loan programme (includes loan deficiency payments, marketing loan gains, and certificate gains): $832,836,963 • Step 2 payments (data are on a October 2002 ‑ September 2003 fiscal year basis): $415,379,000 13. Data for direct payments and counter‑cyclical payments are presented for upland cotton base acres only and are current as of 12 December 2003.258 • Direct payments: $181,811,374 million. (Because the 2002 marketing year was a transition year between the 1996 and 2002 farm bills, $436,805,000 in Production Flexibility Contract payments were made in 2002.) • Counter‑cyclical payments: $1,309,471,167 14. Data for export credit guarantee programmes are only available on a fiscal year basis (October 2002 ‑ September 2003) and apply to all cotton. No breakout is available for upland cotton. The value of registration guarantees is $234,423,344. This figure represents the coverage applied for by exporters, not actual exports. An exporter may apply for a guarantee but not actually ship the goods.259 Outstanding claims are $280,898, less than one-tenth of one per cent of the value of registrations (further evidence, specific to cotton export credit guarantees in particular, that premiums are more than sufficient to cover operating costs and losses). 197. Please provide actual data for 2002/2003 for US exports, US consumption and per cent of world consumption to replace the projected data in Exhibit US-47. If available, please provide projected data for 2003/2004 to replace the forecast data. USA 15. The 11 December 2003 World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates report, published by USDA’s Office of the Chief Economist, the Department’s official commodity estimates, provide the latest data available. Note that 2002/03 is still considered an estimate and 2003/04 is considered a projection.260 US and World Cotton Consumption (1,000 480‑lb bales)
The updated data show that the US world market share is basically unchanged from Exhibit US‑47; in fact, US world market share using the 11 December 2003 data is the same (19.6 per cent) as reported in the exhibit.262 Viewed in conjunction with the data in Exhibit US‑47, the data further confirm that there has been no increase in US world market share following a consistent trend over a period when subsidies to upland cotton have been granted. 198. Please comment on the respective merits of the price-gap calculations of MY1992 deficiency payments in US comments of 27 August, footnote 14 ($867 million), and Brazil's response to the Panel's Question No. 67 ($812 million). 16. The two calculations use similar methodologies to measure MY 1992 deficiency payments. Both measures calculate deficiency payments as the deficiency payment rate times eligible production. Both the US and Brazil measures use the same deficiency payment rate for MY 1992 of 15 cents per pound. The difference between the two measures can thus be attributed to how each calculated the amount of production eligible for deficiency payments. 17. In their response to the Panel’s Question No. 67, Brazil provides a simplistic calculation of payment production by multiplying the upland cotton programme yield times the amount of area eligible for deficiency payments. But as the United States previously indicated263, the average programme yield for deficiency payment recipients in MY 1992 was 601 pounds per acre and the average programme yield for 50/92 recipients was 628 pounds per acre. By contrast, Brazil incorrectly estimates programme yields to be 531 pounds per acre. This underestimates deficiency payments for MY 1992. 18. The US calculation uses the methodology set out in paragraphs 10 and 11 of Annex 3. Consistent with the 1995 US WTO notification, payment production is the sum of production eligible for basic deficiency payments and production eligible for 50/92 payments. Eligible production for basic deficiency payments in 1992 was equal to 5,544 million pounds (9.226 million acres times the average programme yield of 601 pounds per acre). Multiplying the price gap times eligible production gives basic deficiency payments equal to $832 million. The same formula is used to calculate deficiency payments under the 50/92 programme. For 1992, the price gap is the same as that calculated for the basic deficiency payments (15 cents per pound). Eligible production under the 50/92 programme was 254 million pounds (404 thousand acres times the average programme yield of 50/92 participants of 628 pounds per acre). Deficiency payments under the 50/92 programme were thus equal to $35 million (0.92 times 254 million times $0.15). Total deficiency payments under the price gap methodology were thus equal to $867 million ($832 million plus $35 million). 19. We also note that this calculation is conservative in that it uses the actual payment acreage (that is, acres planted for harvest or participating in the 50/92 programme on which payment was received) rather than eligible acreage to calculate the "quantity of production eligible to receive the applied administered price."264 Using instead the base acreage minus the 10 per cent acreage reduction figure and the 15 per cent normal flex acres (14.9 million effective base acres265 x 0.75 = 11.175 million acres) and multiplying by the programme yield (602 pounds per acre), the "quantity of production eligible to receive the administered price" is 6,727 million pounds, yielding a price gap deficiency payment calculation of $1,009 million. 201. Is data available to show the proportion of US upland cotton production sold under futures contracts, and the prices under those contracts, at different times during the marketing year? If so, please provide summarized versions to the Panel. How does a futures sale impact the producer's entitlement to marketing loan programme payments? BRA, USA 20. In April 1999, the US General Accounting Office published a report on farmers’ use of risk management strategies.266 Based on survey data from the 1996 USDA Agricultural Resource Management Study, the study showed that between 35 and 57 per cent of cotton farmers used a hedging instrument in 1996. (The ranges reflect a 95 per cent confidence interval.) In addition, an estimated 63 to 89 per cent of cotton farms used cash forward contracts in 1996.267 These survey results suggest that even seven years ago a large proportion of cotton farmers either directly or indirectly priced their cotton off of organized futures and options markets. 21. For 18 December 2003, total open interest for all cotton futures contracts on the New York Board of Trade was 79,283 contracts268 while open interest for all cotton options contracts on the NYBOT totalled 320,657 contracts.269 Based on a contract size of 50,000 pounds, total open interest on futures and options contracts represent 41.7 million bales. While a bale of cotton may be hedged several times throughout the marketing chain, we note that 41 million bales is approximately 2.3 times the total size of the US upland cotton crop. A futures or options contract transaction has no effect on a producer’s entitlement to marketing loan programme payments. 202. Concerning paragraph 7 of the US oral statement, are the expected cash prices shown for February only? Can the US provide the prices for January and March of each year as well? USA 22. The following tables show the average daily closing futures price for the December contract for January, February and March, as well as the average for the three months. As the United States previously noted270, the differences between months is small. As outlined in paragraph 162 of the US further rebuttal submission, the expected cash price is calculated as the futures prices minus a 5‑cent basis. Average Daily December Futures Closing Prices ($/lb)
Source: New York Board of Trade (Exhibit US‑124) Expected Cash Price ($/lb)
Source: Futures Price minus 5‑cent cash basis. 205. Does the United States accept or agree with the EWG data submitted by Brazil? If not, please explain your reasons. USA 23. USDA provided the EWG with payment data under a Freedom of Information Act Request. Although the United States can confirm the data transmitted to EWG was correct, we do not know if the data has changed after EWG further processed the information. Taking that data at face value, the United States would note the following. 24. As was reported in the US Answer to Panel Question 125(5) and the US oral statement of 2 December, a preliminary review of data from the Farm Service Agency shows that approximately 47 per cent of upland cotton farms eligible for decoupled income support payments planted no cotton in marketing year 2002. This number is consistent with the Environmental Working Group data presented by Brazil in its further rebuttal submission that showed the per cent of farms receiving only contract payments in 2000, 2001, and 2002 (46, 45, and 45 per cent, respectively).271 Thus, the EWG data support the US position that decoupled income support is, in fact, decoupled from production decisions since nearly half of historic upland cotton farms no longer plant even a single acre of cotton.272 25. The EWG data also show that Brazil’s 14/16 adjustment to decoupled payments, even on Brazil’s faulty allocation theory, is too small an adjustment. Brazil has asserted that 87 per cent of decoupled payments for upland cotton base acres are received by upland cotton producers and support to upland cotton. However, the EWG data suggest that in marketing years 2000, 2001, and 2002 only 71, 77, and 74 per cent, respectively of upland cotton base acreage payments went to farms that planted upland cotton. Thus, the EWG data support the US position that Brazil has overestimated and failed to properly calculate the subsidy benefit to upland cotton provided by these payments. For further detail, please see the US answer to question 195. 26. We also note a serious misuse of the EWG data when Brazil claims that, because approximately 92 per cent of total marketing loan payments received in MY 2002 by farms planting upland cotton were upland cotton payments, therefore such farms must predominantly produce cotton. In fact, marketing loan payments crucially depend on whether prices are above or below the loan rate for the crop at issue. Soybeans and corn saw high prices in MY 2002, meaning few marketing loan payments were made in MY2002.273 Furthermore, the data collected by the United States in response to Brazil’s request for certain information demonstrate that for MY 2002 upland cotton planted acres accounted for only 29.4 per cent of total cropland of those farms receiving production flexibility contract payments for upland cotton base acreage. Thus, the EWG data on marketing loan payments does not support an inference that farms producing upland cotton are so "specialized in upland cotton"274 that it would be "reasonable" to attribute decoupled payments for upland cotton base acres almost entirely (87 per cent) to upland cotton. 206. Please explain how the graph in paragraph 40 of the US further rebuttal submission was derived. In so doing, please clarify whether the figures are on a cents per pound basis or some other basis. What averaging method was used? Can you prepare individual charts showing average US and Brazilian cotton prices for each of those third country markets? USA 27. The data were based on official export data reported by the United States and Brazil, as obtained and published in the "World Trade Atlas". The World Trade Atlas is a service that monthly provides world‑wide trade information for a fee. 28. The United States reports its export values to the World Trade Atlas as F.A.S. and Brazil reports its values as F.O.B. Free Along Ship Export Value (F.A.S.) – The value of exports at the seaport, airport, or border, port of export, based on the transaction price, including inland freight, insurance, and other charges incurred in placing the merchandise alongside the carrier at the port of exportation. The value, as defined, excludes the cost of loading the merchandise aboard the exporting carrier and also excludes freight, insurance, and any charges or transportation costs beyond the port of exportation. Free On Board (F.O.B.) – A standard reference to the price of merchandise on the border or at a national port. In F.O.B. contracts, the seller is obliged to have the goods packaged and ready for shipment at the place agreed upon, and purchaser agrees to cover all ground transport costs and to assure all risks in the exporting country, together with subsequent transport costs and expenses incurred in loading the goods onto the chosen means of transport. FOB is greater than FAS except when the vessel is not changed at the port of export, in which case the values are equal. 29. The World Trade Atlas publishes an average unit price for exports. The average unit price is calculated by dividing the value of the exports by the quantity for selected HS codes. Average unit prices are expressed in dollars per kilogram. This value was converted to dollars per pound for the graphs. 30. The graph in paragraph 40 of the US further rebuttal submission is a comparison of simple average unit prices of cotton exports from the United States and Brazil to Argentina, Bolivia, Italy, Philippines, Portugal, Indonesia, Paraguay, and India. The data for each third country market is provided in the following table. Unit Export Values to Selected Countries
Source: World Trade Atlas Directory: english -> tratop e -> dispu e dispu e -> Annex g list of exhibits submitted by the parties dispu e -> World Trade Organization dispu e -> World Trade Organization Download 3.13 Mb. Share with your friends:
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||