I. The Atlantic Perspective and the emergence of a Concrete West


II. Future of the Concrete West: A projection of the further geographical unfolding of the Atlantic Perspective



Download 370.03 Kb.
Page2/12
Date26.11.2017
Size370.03 Kb.
#34786
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ...   12

II. Future of the Concrete West: A projection of the further geographical unfolding of the Atlantic Perspective

Let us now examine how the geographical side of the Atlantic Perspective could play out in practice in the remaining areas of the world.


Two disclaimers, before prophesying:
First. I do not expect my sequence to have the clairvoyance of earlier Atlanticists -- Clarence Streit, or before him Henry Adams.

Adams suggested in 1905 that the “Atlantic system”, an informal strategic union built in his time around America and Britain, would move on to include France; then Germany, even if only after a century of conflict; then the even more difficult problem of including Russia, bringing the entire world into a peaceful combine7.

Streit, in the midst of the very cycle of wars with Germany that Adams foretold, independently projected the same sequence, with one proviso: that a deep institutionalization of the Atlantic system would be necessary, in order to consolidate its past accretions, avoid isolationist backsliding, and enable the further accretions to proceed at the appropriate historical moment, avoiding repetition of the near fatal failure after 1919 to integrate Germany.

The almost precise realization of their projections, going many decades and several geopolitical turns down the road, is uncanny. It shows a deep insight into the nature of things. Or perhaps we should say that it shows the Atlantic Perspective makes for such insight, by bringing out the basic realities of the world and its trends.

Adams personally was not confident in making prophecies; he concluded that it might all happen within sixty years, “but, for the moment, the gravest doubts and ignorance covered the whole field.” The Atlantic Perspective gave him a solid perspective, but it had yet to receive its first verifications. Those have since come in.

Can current bearers of the Atlantic Perspective likewise derive foresight from it? Perhaps not with such brilliance, but it at least gives me reason to hope that my projections may have some validity.


Second. My projection of the future sequence is tentative and susceptible to change, the more so the farther out it gets in time. Many parts of it are contingent. And all kinds of disruptions to the schedule are possible --
National disruptions. Some countries are likely in coming years to enter a phase of extremist rebellion against the West, as earlier did Germany, Russia, Japan, China; no one knows which ones. Much of the Islamic world is presently in the throes of such a rebellion; no one knows how long it will last, or how it will end, if ever. The pace of economic development will change drastically in some countries, as yet unknown. Each of the developing countries faces a certain percentage probability of instability and overturns; add them up and it is a high probability for at least one major emerging power regime to go under. Perhaps it will be China, whose severe instabilities have been kept building up under a tight lid; perhaps India, with stable instability (its has stabilized by tolerating its instabilities) and with nuclear war risks from Pakistan.

Transnational disruptions. There could be collapse of the world economy. Global instability. Global wars. War over Taiwan, or Kashmir, or Georgia. Proliferation spun out of control. WMDs used in South Asia, or the Mideast, or between global powers.

Cosmic disruptions. An asteroid hits earth. Space aliens invade. Runaway microbes brought back to earth. Acts of God, divine retribution against nations, the Second Coming, the Mahdi.

Technological disruptions. Biotechnology run wild, mutations, biological war agents don’t stop where intended. Global warming transforms the world. Nanotechnology weapons, invisible swords, gray goo.

The numerous accidents of well-intentioned technological research, pursued competitively by myriad persons and institutions, regulated by countries that still have to compete against each other; bear a cumulative probability of bringing down the world, if malicious uses don’t do it first.

Global warming is the one catastrophe on this long list that is widely expected in mainstream discussion, although others are no less worthy and may be harder to prevent. It is noticed because it is not a future accident but a development in progress. Unrestrained past Western emissions are being compounded by unrestrained use of Western technology in the Third World for growth of population, production, and emissions. Environmentalism is a Western movement, spurred by surplus wealth and by Western environmental science, despite the movement’s anti-Western ideological tinges; the call to restrict emissions faces Third World economy-focused resistance. The West has been unwilling to consider restrictions on Third World use of its technologies, or to place economic pressures such as an emissions tariff, to get Third World countries to agree on global emissions controls. This brings a calculable probability of catastrophic warming, disrupted in turn by chances for scientific breakthroughs on cooling the globe with geoengineering; and brings us back to the importance of the West having sufficient capabilities for joint policy and global leadership, and for a joint discourse that is self-affirming in a normal enlightened way.
With these disclaimers made -- putting now to the side these catastrophic possibilities, real though they are; limiting ourselves, as is usually done in the social sciences, to an analysis based on mundane trends -- it is possible to project a broad outline of the Atlantic geographical future:

a. Past unfoldings: a review

1880- : The main propositions that form the Atlantic Perspective were developed in three phases: 1880-1900, 1914-1919, and 1920-1940. They were systematized by Clarence Streit in the latter phase and and disseminated widely through his book in 19398. They projected two axes of Atlantic growth: institutional concretization of Atlantic unity, and a sequential geographical expansion whose unfolding this institutionalization would facilitate.


1900-1914: “The Atlantic” consisted as yet only of the original Western European and North American democracies, and Australasia. They felt a degree of solidarity, bolstered by the Anglo-American and Anglo-French rapprochements of 1890-1907, but were barely organized together in any form. There was an Anglo-French-Russian entente, but conceived as a part of the traditional European diplomatic checkerboard and balance. There was not yet a Concrete West.
1917-19 and 1941-45: a semi-concrete West comes into existence. In WWI, the Atlantic Alliance of the U.S., British empire, and France, organized with concrete structures, including Allied War Councils. In World War II, organized with a Supreme Council and a Supreme Commander, structures that de facto continued uninterrupted into NATO and continue today.
1947-8, Marshall Plan, implemented by OEEC, an Atlantic-linked European forerunner of EU and OECD, with all European democracies in it.
1949 negotiations for NATO begun among World War II Western allies, adding some of their neighbors; Italy also added by 1949.
1949: The Alliance is institutionalized in permanent form, NATO.

From this point on, a Concrete West clearly exists.
1951, U.S.-Japan Security Treaty; 1952, ANZUS
1952, European Coal and Steel Community (beginning of today’s EU)
1954, Germany added to NATO; this is its definitive integration into the Concrete West
1961 OECD. 1956-60, NATO Parliamentarians Conference and an Atlantic Congress both call for creating an Economic NATO; 1961 OECD formed as the economic NATO, through revision of OEEC charter. It includes all Western European democracies, including those that for legal or diplomatic reasons cannot join NATO. 1964 Japan admitted to OECD. 1971, 1973 Australia and New Zealand admitted to OECD.

OECD since 1973 contains the full membership of the Concrete West.
1970s: Trilateralism emerges as an extension of Atlanticism, expressing the need for developing further the unity of all the OECD-Western countries. NATO however remains the strongest institution of the Concrete West and the only one that carries its identity, using the name of Atlanticism9.
1974-5: G5-6 (now G7-8) formed, giving the West a summit-level visibility; IEA formed, supplementing OECD
1999-2004 Eastern Europe (with a few gaps) joins NATO, EU, and OECD

What next?






Download 370.03 Kb.

Share with your friends:
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ...   12




The database is protected by copyright ©ininet.org 2024
send message

    Main page