I think that this is a great public forum topic: it relates to a current event that will educate students on some of the nuanc
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Lesson 4.2 Day 3
| 13NFL1-Compulsory Voting Page 64 of 163 www.victorybriefs.com COMPULSORY VOTING LAWS BACKED BY STRICT ENFORCEMENT CAN SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE INCOME INEQUALITY. Alberto Chong and Mauricio Olivera – 2008 Research Department, Inter-American Development Bank. Does Compulsory Voting Help Equalize Incomes Economics & Politics . Volume 20, No. 3. With regards to our variable of interest we find that compulsory voting appears to have no effect on income inequality, as shown in Regression 1 on Table 3. The coefficient of the compulsory voting variable is unexpectedly positive but it is statistically non-significant at conventional levels. When we include a dummy variable that captures the level of enforcement of com- pulsory-voting laws, the result is still statistically insignificant, although the sign of the coefficient shifts from positive to negative. This is shown in Regression 2. Finally, when using a dummy variable that captures strong enforcement of compulsory-voting schemes only, the sign of the corresponding coefficient is negative and statistically significant at conventional levels. This is shown in Regression 3. This finding implies implying that countries with strict enforcement of compulsory- voting laws have, on average, a Gini coefficient that is 3.7 points lower. The model explains 44% of cross-country inequality In Regressions 4 –6 we test the same three first specifications as before but use an index of political rights instead of civil liberties. The results are similar. In short, mandatory- voting laws that on paper require individuals to vote but bear little or no consequence when not done, do not have a bearing on the distribution of income. This is unsurprising because the lack of impact may occur either because the increased number of voters, if any, may not be representative of the voting population, or simply because additional voters do not go to the urns insignificant numbers. On the other hand, compulsory-voting laws that are linked to a penalty or consequence when not voting are, indeed, associated with an improvement in the distribution of income, possibly as voter representation increases. Download 2 Mb. Share with your friends:
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