Iii: Diaspora, Remittances & Caribbean Development



Download 186.21 Kb.
Page3/3
Date09.07.2017
Size186.21 Kb.
#22858
1   2   3

CONCLUSION


As Aldrich (1982) points out, brokers in networks are created by the search to reduce transaction costs (288). Within the GDN, the broker links actors with complementary interests, and facilitates the transfer of information, financial and investment capital, human capital, and technology. In general, respondents in various sectors of the DPE have noted the limited participation of Caribbean households, communities and firms in the development, marketing or maintenance of the infrastructure of services used by the Caribbean Diaspora in North America.

The study suggests that higher participation by Caribbean firms and households as brokers rather than senders/receivers in the diasporic economy is a superior strategy for reducing the costs associated with diasporic transactions. It also implies that rather than attempt to redirect existing financial flows, much of which already represents a return on previous investment towards productive uses, attention in the Caribbean should be paid to adding to the range of services available to various tiers of the Diaspora to both improve their long-term prospects of higher-incomes and generate profits that might contribute to productive investment in the region.








1 The colonial relationship is actually a major determining factor of the direction of migration, as most immigrants to the core countries from Taylorism onwards come from countries where specific core states have had an active political, military and/or economic presence. (Sassen, 1997)

2 Over 25, 000 workers from the Caribbean died building the Panama Canal, almost one-third of the total workforce.



3 Among those groups also implicated in the Cold War’s migration trends were the victim/labour diasporas of Southeast Asia e.g. Philippines, Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos. These communities would leave their countries for North America (and Europe) because of political and economic instabilities, largely caused or facilitated by ongoing rivalry among the larger powers (China, USSR, and USA) (Live, 2002: 41).

4 The same also applied to global cities in parts of Europe. As Brah notes, African-Caribbean and South Asian people who migrated to cities in Britain in the post-war (WWII) period occupied a “broadly similar structural position” in unskilled or semi-skilled occupations and on the lowest echelons of the economy (Brah, 1996: 96).

5 It should be noted that the duration and extent of this process is not uniquely Caribbean, as other ‘plantation economies’ such as the Philippines, North/North Eastern Brazil and Cape Verde have also experienced similar trends.

6 A related aspect of remittances and diaspora is that of Illegal Migration. Some level of certification for migrant workers, regardless of their legal status, would facilitate their participation in the mainstream and diasporic economy. Legal migrants are less prone to underpayment and other forms of exploitation, and thus are more willing and able to participate more fully in political lobbying, entrepreneurship, (full-time) employment and other aspects of the transnational political economy. (Grant, 2000: 10, 36-37)

7 Henderson’s study reveals that diasporic relations may have some influence on the demand for foreign products.

8 According to Orozco (2003), HTAs in the Caribbean tend to raise less than USD 20,000 per annum.

9 As O’Neil notes an “uncertain embrace” of circular migration among experts in the development community (2003:.2), CARICOM governments have only recently begun to look carefully at the issue.

10 In fact, the US Commission for Graduates from Foreign Nursing Schools has extended its equivalency testing to overseas sites as of late 2004- reducing the transaction cost of migration for nurses from the Caribbean (Schmid, 2003: 27)

11 The contribution of gendered migration patterns to family structures in the Caribbean (and its diaspora) is also an important issue, especially in light of findings by researchers such as Welch (1994), Craton (1993) and Higman (1984) that displace matrifocality as an endemic feature of Caribbean African slavery.


12 Some interviewees reported that some semi- to highly-skilled women diminished their educational achievements in order to qualify for migration under the migrant employment schemes of the time.

13 In the period 1993-1998, for example, just under 25,000 persons were deported to the political Caribbean, among which the Dominican Republic (11, 954) was the major destination, followed by Jamaica (7,886), Haiti (2,111), Trinidad and Tobago (1,101), and Guyana (968). (Bower, 2001: 15) In addition, given the fact that that just under half of the deportees in this period were deported for criminal offenses, (Bower, 14) the negative impact of this on regional and national security is also a major consideration for the Caribbean states.

14 Lower Stratum (low potential, high contribution)

As noted in Chapter 2, the Lower Stratum group usually lacks access to capital for trade and major investments, it is the major source of remittances, and is also generally tied to diasporic identities. Two major groups may be identified in this stratum:


Migrant Low Income Workers

The migrant component of the receiving states’ working class, this group is usually consists of low-paid unskilled and semi-skilled workers. These workers tend to operate at skill levels that are at or below their training and ability, and are prone to transmigrant working patterns.


Illegal/ Undocumented Migrants

While they often overlap with the lower strata and prime movers (as co-workers and employees, respectively), illegal migrants are categorised separately because of the limited range of action and interaction afforded to them by their status.





Download 186.21 Kb.

Share with your friends:
1   2   3




The database is protected by copyright ©ininet.org 2024
send message

    Main page