Impact turns + answers – bfhmrs russia War Good
Successful cyber-attacks cause extinction
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Harbor Teacher Prep-subingsubing-Ho-Neg-Lamdl T1-Round3, Impact Turns Aff Neg - Michigan7 2019 BFHMRS
Successful cyber-attacks cause extinctionCartwright et al 15 (Gen. (Ret.) James E. Cartwright, Chair of the Global Zero Commission on Nuclear Risk Reduction, Chair in Defense Policy Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies, former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Dr. Bruce Blair, Study Director of the Global Zero Commission on Nuclear Risk Reduction, Co-Founder of Global Zero; with Commission members: Ambassador K. Shankar Bajpai, former Chairman, National Security Advisory Board, former Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs, India; Ambassador Richard Burt, former United States Chief Negotiator, Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START); Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Evgeny P. Buzhinsky, Senior Vice President, PIR Center, former Head, International Treaty Directorate, Main Department of International Military Cooperation, Ministry of Defense, Russian Federation; Ambassador Ivo H. Daalder, President, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, former Permanent Representative of the United States to NATO; Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Vincent Desportes, Senior Military Advisor, Panhard General Defense, former Director of the Joint War College (College interarmée de defense, CID), France; Ambassador, (Ret.) Giampaolo Di Paola, former Minister of Defence, Italy, former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee; Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Mahmud Ali Durrani, former National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, former Ambassador of the Republic of Pakistan to the United States; Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Vladimir Dvorkin, Main Researcher, Center of International Security, The Institute for World Economy and International Relations, former Director, Research Institute No. 4, Ministry of Defense, Russian Federation; Gen. (Ret.) Jehangir Karamat, Founder and Director, Spearhead Research, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Pakistan, former Ambassador of Pakistan to the United States; Vice Adm. (Ret.) Yoji Koda, former Vice Admiral of the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force; Vice Adm. (Ret.) Verghese Koithara, Independent Strategic Analyst, former Vice Admiral, Indian Navy; Ambassador Yuji Miyamoto, Chairman of Miyamoto Institute of Asian Research, former Ambassador of Japan to China, former Director of Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan; Gen. (Ret.) Klaus Naumann, former Chairman, NATO Military Committee, former Chief of Staff, Bundeswehr, German Armed Forces; Gen. (Ret.) Bernard Norlain, President, Conseil d’Administration, Committee for the Study of National Defense, former Air Defense Commander and Air Combat Commander, French Air Force; Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Osamu Onoda, Asia Center Fellow, Harvard University, former Lieutenant General, Japan Air Self Defense Force; Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Pan Zhenqiang, Deputy Chairman, China Foundation for International Studies, former Director, Institute for Strategic Studies, National Defense University, China; Ambassador Tomas Pickering, former Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, United States, former Ambassador of the United States to the United Nations, Russia, India, Israel, El Salvador, Nigeria, and Jordan; Min. Paul Quilès, former Minister of Defense, Transport, Interior and Public Security, France; Gen. (Ret.) Lord David Ramsbotham, former Commander Field Army and Inspector General of the Territorial Army, United Kingdom; Rt. Hon. Sir Malcolm Rifkind, former Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, former Secretary of Defense, United Kingdom; Ambassador Yukio Satoh, Vice Chairman, Japan Institute of International Affairs, former Ambassador of Japan to the United Nations; Gen. (Ret.) John J. Sheehan, former Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Command; Vice Adm. (Ret.) Vijay Shankar, Admiral Katari Chair of Excellence, United Services Institute, India, former Commander in Chief of the Andaman and Nicobar Command, former Commander in Chief, Strategic Forces Command of India; Min. Song Min-soon, Chair Professor, Kyungnam University, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea; Air Chief Marshal (Ret.) Shashindra Pal Tyagi, Member, National Security Advisory Board, former Chief of the Air Staff, Indian Air Force; Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Noboru Yamaguchi, Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan, former Commanding General of the Japan Ground Self Defense Force Research and Development Command; Maj. Gen. Yao Yunzhu, Director, Center for China-America Defense Relations, Director, Academy of Military Science, People’s Liberation Army, People’s Republic of China; Maj. Gen. Zhu Chenghu, Director General and Professor of Academic Department of Strategic Studies, National Defense University of the People’s Liberation Army, People’s Republic of China; Baron Karl-Teodor Zu Guttenberg, former Federal Minister of Defense; Fmr. Federal Minister of Economics and Technology, Federal Republic of Germany; and Commission Advisor Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Uzi Eilam, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv University, former Director General of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission, former Chief Scientist and Director of Research and Development in the Ministry of Defense, Israel; “De-Alerting and Stabilizing the World’s Nuclear Force Postures,” Global Zero Commission on Nuclear Risk Reduction, April 2015, p.5-6, http://www.globalzero.org/files/global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report_0.pdf) An arc of latent nuclear instability stretches around the globe. From Central Europe through South Asia to Northeast Asia and into the seas surrounding China, the nuclear weapons countries, or their close allies, are involved in geopolitical, territorial and other disputes that have the potential to combust and escalate. The arc indeed girdles the world inasmuch as instability lies in the nature of bilateral and multilateral relationships and is affected by global problems of proliferation, terrorism, nuclear materials and weapons control, transparency and many others. Crisis management is more difficult in today’s security environment than it was in the bipolar world of the Cold War. Conflict dynamics are less stable. Under the right conditions, any of the hotspots along this arc could morph into a nuclear flashpoint. A nuclear crisis could escalate through inadvertence or intention and also spread virally to other parts of the world. Many countries possess nuclear forces, and their postures are coupled, tightly in some cases and loosely in others. A nuclear confrontation or detonation would raise nuclear tensions and alert levels around the world. Such a multipolar nuclear crisis could follow an unpredictable course and prove difficult to stabilize. This report identifies ways to control crisis escalation and reduce the myriad risks of deliberate or unintentional use of nuclear weapons. It is both diagnostic in that it examines the risk of nuclear weapons use in the various nuclear weapons countries, as well as prescriptive in offering some remedies. Any balanced assessment of worldwide nuclear risk finds cause both for encouragement and concern. One piece of good news is that the global stockpile of nuclear weapons has plunged from a peak of 70,000 in the 1980s to approximately 16,000 today. If nuclear risk and stockpile size are correlated, then dramatic progress has been achieved. But the overall decline mCasks the gloomy fact that some arsenals are growing rapidly and posing greater risks, as in South Asia. This dichotomous pattern is pervasive. A few examples: Good news: Russian nuclear weapons and fissile materials are substantially more secure against theft today than they were when the Soviet Union collapsed over two decades ago. Bad news: (i) the world is home to sponsors of proliferation, nuclear black markets, and promoters of terrorism, (ii) large quantities of nuclear weapons are constantly in transit around the world – and transportation is the Achilles heel of security, and (iii) the risks of terrorist capture of weapons and materials have increased in South Asia over the past two decades. Pretty good news: the number of nations possessing nuclear weapons has climbed slowly while a greater number of aspiring proliferators have abandoned their programs. Bad news: the number of nations that possess or aspire to possess a peaceful nuclear energy program that could be transformed into a nuclear weapons program is fast growing, and many of these potential proliferators are lacking in good governance. Good and bad news: non-kinetic and conventional weapons (offensive and defensive) and global surveillance and intelligence have provided a credible alternative to nuclear weapons for some nations, but they pose threats to other nations that lead them to increase their reliance on nuclear weapons. While these overly simplified illustrations of risk correlations present a mixed picture, this commission finds an overall pattern: risks are generally trending in the wrong direction. The cup appears to be more than half empty in today’s security environment of proliferation, nuclear build-ups in Asia, spreading extremism, burgeoning cyber warfare, vulnerable nuclear command and control networks, vulnerable and insecure nuclear weapons storage sites and delivery platforms (particularly silo-based strategic missiles), and de-stabilizing global military competition featuring rapid innovation in weapons technology and modalities of warfare. In the current environment, much needs to be done to reduce nuclear risks. The slope from a crisis to nuclear brinksmanship to escalation to the use of nuclear weapons with cascading global implications is a much too steep and slippery one. This latent instability is tremendously aggravated by the simple fact that the amount of time for decision-making at any point along this spectrum may be far too short. In general, warning and decision timelines are getting shorter, and consequently the potential for fateful human error in nuclear control systems is getting larger. The short fuses on U.S. and Russian strategic forces compound the risks. One-half of their strategic arsenals are continuously maintained on high alert. Hundreds of missiles carrying nearly 1,800 warheads are ready to fly at a moment’s notice. These legacy postures of the Cold War are anachronisms but they have not yet been consigned to the trash heap of history. They remain fully operational. These postures – geared to very rapid reaction – reflect an entrenched mindset of “use or lose” with roots in the Cold War and in past decisions that perpetuated vulnerabilities in strategic forces and their chain of command. Bureaucratic inertia perpetuated a status quo that featured vulnerable land-based forces and nuclear command, control, and communications networks prone to collapse under the weight of attack, even a small-scale strike. These vulnerabilities have not gone away. In some respects the situation was better during the Cold War than it is today. Vulnerability to cyber attack, for example, is a new wild card in the deck. Having many far-flung missiles controlled electronically through an aging and flawed command-control network and ready to launch upon receipt of a short stream of computers signals is a nuclear (surety) risk of the first order. It seems the height of folly in an era of rapidly mutating cyber warfare capabilities. This concern is reason enough to remove nuclear missiles from launch-ready alert. Download 0.83 Mb. Share with your friends:
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