Relations are collapsing now --- conflicting territorial interests, economic contestation, support, arms, geography, interests
RM 6/14 (RM, citing over 50 experts’ opinions on the China-Russia military alliance, 6-14-2019, "Expert Round-Up: How Likely Is a China-Russia Military Alliance?," Russia Matters, https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/expert-round-how-likely-china-russia-military-alliance) ank
Leon Aron, Director of Russian Studies, American Enterprise Institute Russia and China are hardly any closer in foreign policy than they are in trade. To be sure, the two countries stand together in their declared opposition to U.S. primacy in world affairs. … They vote almost in unison at the United Nations. Yet away from the global limelight and closer to their shared Eurasian home, the two countries are hardly aligned. They poach in each other’s spheres of influence, contest each other’s clients and reach for each other’s economic and geopolitical assets. China has failed to support Russia in matters of great geopolitical importance to Moscow. Beijing refused to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after the Russian-Georgian war in 2008. It abstained from, instead of voting against, the U.N. resolution condemning Russia’s 2014 seizure of Crimea. (Foreign Affairs, 04.04.19) Chinese-Russian military cooperation in particular is often held up as evidence of a growing closeness. Much has been made of the fact that Russia has sold China the latest version of its most advanced antiaircraft S-400 missile defense system. But India, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are next in line for the same equipment. And although China was the first to buy Russia’s most advanced Su-35 jet fighter, it will not be the last. … Overall, from 2013 to 2017, India was a far likelier destination for Russian defense hardware than China, with 35 percent of Russian arms exports going to New Delhi, compared with 12 percent to Beijing. (Foreign Affairs, 04.04.19) [T]he most promising portent of an alliance might be the personal relationship between the rulers of the two countries. The Putin-Xi bonhomie extends beyond surface pleasantries. They have met more than 25 times, far more frequently than either has with any other head of state. … Putin’s and Xi’s kinship is real and formidable, but even it may not be enough to overcome the obstacles to a genuine alliance. One such obstacle is aptly described by a Russian expression, “istoriya s geografiey.” Literally “a history with geography,” the collocation refers to a seemingly straightforward matter suddenly turned into something involved and complicated. History and geography militate against an entente cordiale between the two Eurasian giants. Authoritarian states sharing a 2,600-mile border, with much of that boundary first imposed by imperial Russia on a weaker neighbor, are hardly ideally set up to build mutual trust. (Foreign Affairs, 04.04.19) Samuel Charap, Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation; John Drennan, Former Special Assistant to the Executive Director, International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS); and Pierre Noël, Senior Fellow in Economic and Energy Security, IISS Moscow has found itself in the position of demandeur vis-à-vis Beijing, creating an increasingly imbalanced bilateral relationship. … Both sides devote significant effort and political capital to managing their bilateral relations effectively; they take a pragmatic, behind the-scenes approach to resolving disputes and publicly stress the positive elements in the relationship. These ‘relationship management’ efforts have helped to mitigate the potential tensions created by Russia's relatively weaker position post-2014. (Survival, 01.31.17) There are limits to the Russia–China relationship, however. China will not make Russia the centerpiece of its foreign policy, which is increasingly global and multidimensional. … While historic Russian mistrust of China has abated in recent years, elites in Moscow prize their foreign-policy independence and thus continue to search for additional partners in the Asia-Pacific, including some of China's regional rivals. Ultimately, both countries' leaders are unsentimental pragmatists, and when their strategic calculus differs, there are limits to how far they will go to sacrifice for the other. (Survival, 01.31.17)