Impact turns + answers – bfhmrs russia War Good
---xt: no ccp instability !
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Harbor Teacher Prep-subingsubing-Ho-Neg-Lamdl T1-Round3, Impact Turns Aff Neg - Michigan7 2019 BFHMRS
---xt: no ccp instability !No threat to the CCP---at: economy key to ccp Dickson 16 (Bruce J, professor of political science and international affairs and chair of the political science department at the George Washington University, “The Survival Strategy of the Chinese Communist Party”, The Washington Quarterly, 39:4, 27-44) These examples of Chinese public opinion raise doubts about the conventional wisdom on China. While many claim there is no civil society in China, the number of NGOs has steadily grown over the past decade or more. Most do not engage in political activities, but do offer useful cultural and social goods and services. The Party aggressively censors social media and the Internet, but most people claim they do not encounter censorship while online, and of those who do, the most common response is “it doesn’t matter,” not outrage. While most outside observers —and Party leaders themselves—posit that economic growth is the primary source of the Party’s legitimacy, GDP growth is uncorrelated with regime support. Instead, pocketbook factors, in particular recent gains in family income and expectations of additional gains in the near future, are a prominent source of regime support. The main tenet of modernization theory—that economic modernization leads to democracy—does not yet fit the Chinese case. China may come to experience what is often called a revolution of rising expectations that will generate societal pressure for democratization, but there is scant evidence of that as of yet.¶ The prospects for regime change depend on more than just popular support, of course. Elite splits, coups, civil wars, and crises (like defeat in war and economic decline) are more often the triggers for regime change. But the findings presented here, consistent with other surveys in China, indicate that the regime currently does not face insurmountable challenges to the status quo from society. Chinese elites may not have a full consensus on their policy goals or how to achieve them, but they also do not have to cope with a society impatient for political change. The Party does have to contend with dissidents and other political activists, but these individuals seem to have little popular support.¶ When public opinion is generally content with the status quo and optimistic about the direction of the country, we should not anticipate a revolutionary moment is imminent. In this kind of context, China watchers should not interpret each local protest as a portent of regime change. Protests are mostly limited to material demands—payment of wages and pensions, illegal land-grabs by local officials, opposition to industrial and commercial development plans, the cover-up of local corruption and malfeasance—and are often successful. In fact, these protests provide useful information to higher-level officials about what is happening at the local level.30 Officials are often willing to make concessions on these types of material demands, while also singling out a few alleged protest leaders for punishment. The Party may be willing to address the demands of protestors, but it does not want to encourage other people to engage in strikes and other public protests. Rather than an indicator of opposition to the regime, protests may be a valuable source of feedback. There are certainly risks in using protests as feedback, but local protests have not yet coalesced into organized social movements. That would be a much more threatening development for the Party, which is why it prevents groups with similar interests from engaging in organized collective action. Download 0.83 Mb. Share with your friends:
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