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Multipolarity is unstable- higher risk of conflict
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Multipolarity is unstable- higher risk of conflictSwisa 13 (Maya Swisa, University of Southern California, “Future Stability in the European Union: Realism, Constructivism, and Institutionalism”, Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union: Vol. 2011, Article 11. DOI: 10.5642/urceu.201101.11)//vl Realism assumes that states are the main actors in the international system. Because states are merely trying to survive in the anarchic system, they will act based on self-interest or raison d'etat as a guiding principle in their relations with other states (Walt, 1998).Accord-ing to realism, states are in a constant state of war.The root causes of war and peace stem from the distribution and character of military power (Mearsheimer, 1990). John J. Mearsheimer (1990), a proponent of offensive realism in the neo-realist approach, predicts instability in Europe with the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a multipolar system. Because the realist paradigm focuses on the virtue of state sovereignty and power, realists do not predict that states will cede sovereignty to a supra-national power and cannot explain the continued existence of the European Union. Because the EU poses somewhat of a conun-drum to most realists, so few realists have attempted to apply realist theory to explain EU actions. Accordingly, this paper takes Mearsheimer's offensive realism as representing the overall realist perspective for the future of EU security since Mearsheimer is the only realist who has attempted to apply realism to the case of Europe. Mearsheimer (1990) attributes the relative peace in Europe during the Cold War era to three key factors: "the bipolar distribu-tion of military power on the Continent; the rough military equality between the two states comprising the poles in Europe, the United States and the Soviet Union; and the fact that each superpower was armed with a large nuclear arsenal" (pp. 6-7). Now that these systemic mechanisms are no longer in place, he argues that instability within Europe will increase, and the chances are higher that European states could go to war with one another. While Mearsheimer points to the importance of safeguarding the three systemic mechanisms, he also points to a more minor threat to European stability—hyper-nationalism. Mearsheimer (1990) argues that hyper-nationalism is attributed to the emergence of past wars in Europe and will be a factor in the emergence of future wars. Bipolarity occurs when the distribution of power in the international system is domi-nated by two major powers as poles. In contrast, multipolarity involves three or more domi-nant powers as poles (Mearsheimer, 1990). According to some realists, bipolarity increases stability and peace because there are fewer possible conflict dyads to emerge between com-peting poles. Additionally, bipolarity makes deterrence more feasible because fewer imbal-ances in the power structure provide a stronger foundation for deterrence to take place (Mearsheimer, 1990). In order for deterrence to be effective, both sides must have roughly equal capabilities in order to prevent the use of weapons or military forces against one an-other. Furthermore, within the confines of a bipolar system, "prospects for deterrence are greater because miscalculations of relative power and of opponents' resolve are fewer and less likely" (Mearsheimer, 1990). Therefore, the prediction assumes that if multipolarity should emerge in the international system and include certain EU member states (e.g. Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and possibly Italy (Mearsheimer, 1990)) as poles, the likelihood of war and instability within the EU will be much higher than the Cold War bipolarity. Their theory of unipolarity is wrong- Waltz can’t account for instances of international politics under hegemony Pashakhanlou (Arash Heydarian, “Waltz, Mearsheimer and the post-Cold War world: the rise of America and the fall of structural realism”, International Politics; Basingstoke Vol. 51, Iss. 3, (May 2014): 295-315.DOI:10.1057/ip.2014.16)//vl The option that Waltz has consistently opted for in his publication after 1993 is that neither Russia nor China is a great power and that the United States is the reigning hegemon in a unipolar world (see, for example, Waltz, 1997, p. 914, 2000a, p. 23, 2000b, p. 27, 2004, pp. 4-6). For instance, in his article 'Structural Realism after the Cold War' published at the dawn of the new millennium, Waltz (2000a, p. 27) writes that '[u]pon the demise of the Soviet Union, the international political system became unipolar'. Although Waltz has constantly claimed that the post-Cold War era has been characterized by unipolarity and global American hegemony in his publications published after the 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics', he has insisted that the unipolar moment will be brief and that the world is moving towards multipolarity (Waltz, 2000a, pp. 29-41, 2000b, pp. 25-36). It is not hard to see why Waltz consistently points out that unipolarity will be short-lived and that the world is heading towards multipolarity. That is because his theory assumes that states will balance against a preponderant power, no matter how benign the hegemon might be (Waltz, 2000a, p. 30). Waltz (2000a, pp. 30, 36-38) maintains that his theory cannot specify exactly when American power will be balanced but affirms that historically speaking it will be done in the blink of an eye. Waltz (2000a, pp. 36-38) is also careful to point out that the United States cannot do anything to solidify its hegemony as a new balancing coalition will be formed against it, no matter what measures it takes to prevent such an outcome.7 Waltz (2000a, p. 30) specifically acknowledges that the balancing principle that his theory is based on suggests that American hegemony and unipolarity will be replaced by a multipolar system consisting of the European Union or a German-led coalition, China, Japan, and in a more distant future, Russia, as the most likely balancers. The fact that Waltz does not consider unipolarity in Theory of International Politics has raised many eyebrows in IR as has already been noted, but so has his constant claim that unipolarity is soon to be replaced with multipolarity in his publications after 1993. As Richard Little puts it, '[g]iven the significance that Waltz attaches to the economics analogy and the importance that economists attach to monopoly, the failure to open up the issue of unipolarity in Theory of International Politics is surprising, while the focus on multipolarity in the post-Cold War era becomes distinctly odd' (Little, 2007, p. 189). However, if one analyses Waltz's defensive realism on its own terms, it no longer appears odd that Waltz ignores unipolarity in Theory of International Politics , still maintained that the international system was bipolar as late as 1993, and has consistently argued that the unipolar moment will be short-lived and focused on multipolarity in his publications published after 1993, even though he finally acknowledged that the post-Cold War world has been unipolar in these later works. Waltz's defensive realism is after all unable to account for international politics under hegemony and unipolarity. The Problem of Hegemony and Unipolarity in Waltz's Defensive Realism As we have already seen, Waltz's defensive realism is a state-centric systemic theory of international politics based on the anarchic structure of the international system and the distribution of capabilities across the system that revolves around balance of power, which can be either bipolar or multipolar, according to Waltz's writings in Theory of International Politics. In an anarchic unipolar world there are however no longer any systemic constraints to shove and shape state behaviour in the international system. After all, Waltz (1959, p. 159) maintains that states are judges in their own cases in an anarchic system, which means that even though anarchy may still persist in Waltz's post-Cold War world, it cannot by itself constrain the behaviour of states as they can do whatever they please in the absence of a global Leviathan. In a unipolar world there is by definition no other greater power to balance against the hegemon to constrain its behaviour either. Hence, the necessary structural constraints that Waltz (2000a, p. 27) relies upon to explain state behaviour are no longer at play under this condition. Even Waltz (2004, p. 5) implicitly acknowledges this fact in a passage where he writes that '[t]hrough the long years of the Cold War the might of each superpower balanced the might of the other and moderated the behavior of both of them. Now the only superpower left in the field is free to act on its whims and follow its fancies'. Waltz (2003, p. 5) goes on to postulate that in a unipolar world there are no longer any checks and balances on the hegemon, and its behaviour is therefore determined by its own internal policies rather than external structural pressures as the latter are almost non-existent in a unipolar world. This revelation suggests that Waltz's (2004, p. 3) theory, which 'explains how external forces shape states' behavior, but says nothing about the effects of internal forces' as he himself points out, cannot explain anything at all under the condition of unipolarity and hegemony, as the external pressures are gone in unipolarity and state behaviour is guided by internal forces as clarified above. If we consider Waltz's own arguments that (a) there are hardly any external forces in a unipolarity and state behaviour is instead determined by internal forces and (b) that his defensive realism can only explain how external forces affect state behaviour and has nothing to say about the effects of internal forces, then the only conclusion that can be drawn is that his theory is inherently unequipped to explain international politics under hegemony and unipolarity. It is also important to note that it is not only the behaviour of the sole great power in the international system, the hegemon, that becomes an anomaly to the theory under unipolarity, but the entire system as a whole. That is evident when Waltz (1979, p. 72) maintains that '[i]n systems theory, structure is a generative notion; and the structure of a system is generated by the interactions of its principal parts [the great power(s)]' as the 'fates of all the states ... are affected much more by the acts and the interactions of the major ones than of the minor ones'. For this reason, Waltz claims that '[i]t would be as ridiculous to construct a theory of international politics based on Malaysia and Costa Rica', but persists, that focusing 'on great powers is not to lose sight of lesser ones. Concern with the latter's fate requires paying most attention to the former. Concern with international politics as a system requires concentration on the states that make the most difference. A general theory of international politics is necessarily based on the great powers. The theory once written also applies to lesser states that interact insofar as their interactions are insulated from the intervention of the great powers of a system' (Waltz, 1979, p. 73). Hence, as Waltz's theory is admittedly based on the great powers and can only account for the behaviour of other states in so far as they can be induced from that of the great power(s), this must consequently mean that his defensive realism cannot account for the smaller states either in unipolarity as it is incapable of explaining the behaviour of the only great power in the system under these conditions. As such, Waltz's state-centric theory of international politics becomes inherently unable to account for any state behaviour at all under unipolarity, and this is why the entire system becomes unexplainable by his theory. Indeed, as Waltz has recognized that the international system has in fact been characterized by unipolarity and American hegemony since the end of the Cold War in his writings after 1993, then this must mean that his theory cannot have had any explanatory power in the post-Cold War world, if assessed on its own terms. Waltz's later appreciation for the role of nuclear weapons helps little in this regard. As Waltz himself acknowledges these weapons are properties of the units and their inclusion to his theory would lead to 'reductionism', which is exactly what he wants to avoid (Waltz 1979, pp. 65, 74, 2000a, pp. 5-6). In the words of Waltz (2004, p. 3) himself, 'although neorealists admit that unit-level causes are important, they refuse to include them in their accounts'. In sum, the entire post-Cold War period thus far has posed an anomaly for Waltz's defensive realism as it has been unable to account for what it is designed to do: explain 'international outcomes' or 'a small number of big and important things' (Waltz, 1986, p. 329, 1996, pp. 54-57). Download 0.83 Mb. Share with your friends:
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