Gulf War Air Power Survey
Fuel bladder storage in AOR
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- Maintaining the Force
- Measuring the Results Logistics Performance
- Evaluating the Results
Fuel bladder storage in AOR. Fuels support provided to U.S. and Coalition aircraft during Desert Shield/Desert Storm was an enormous undertaking. A total of 44,825,480 million barrels (1,882,670,174 gallons) of petroleum products was consumed during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. At the height of the war, the Air Force issued approximately 15 million gallons of jet fuel per day. This included over 11 million gallons per day issued in the AOR, and 4 million gallons per day issued to aircraft operating out of Europe. In all, over 111,000 U.S. and allied combat sorties were flown without a single refueling delay or incident. Over 120 R-14 air transportable hydrant refueling systems, 220 R-9 refueling vehicles, 679 50,000-gallon fuel bladders, and over 926 fuels personnel were employed to store and issue this much fuel. Unsuccessful negotiations with the Saudi Government to allow U.S. storage in Saudi Arabia had been going on for years. Therefore, a significant amount of reliance on host nation support would be required to provide adequate refueling capability. In the absence of any signed agreements, much of this support was based on hand shakes and assumptions. Host nation support was, however, a major contributing factor to the success of the fuels operation. All ground fuels and most of the jet fuel except for JP-5 (for Navy aircraft) and JPTS was provided from within the theater. Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Oman contributed 41,835,132 barrels (1,757,075,564 gallons) of fuel for land, sea, and air operations. (Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates donated the fuel free of charge.) Otherwise, extensive sealift would have been required, exposing the inadequacy of the U.S. tanker fleet. The dollar amount of the contribution (calculated in U.S. dollars at $1.20 per gallon) is approximately $2 billion. Additionally, commercial airport contractors provided plane refueling support, host military provided aircraft refueling at military bases, and host nation trucks and drivers provided most of the inland distribution of fuel from refineries and depots to the bases. These actions removed a major burden from Army Central Command, which was responsible for bulk fuel inland distribution and had committed most of its truck companies to moving fuel for ground forces. By contrast with the combat-trained munitions personnel, most fuel supervisory personnel had little or no knowledge on locating and setting up a bare base fuels management support equipment system. For example, at one location with over one-hundred fuels personnel, the R-14 mobile fuel hydrants were out of service because no one knew to flip the reset switch. Many individuals had no contact (i.e., training) with the equipment in over ten years. This lack of experience and knowledge required that Air Force, Central Command establish a special team to set up fuels management support equipment systems at most of the beddown locations. Maintaining the Force Maintenance during Desert Shield and Desert Storm was generally without critical, mission-limiting problems. Even when problems arose, they were ameliorated by the relatively healthy supply and innovative procedures. With some exceptions, mission-capable rates during both Desert Shield and Desert Storm were roughly the same as peacetime rates or slightly lower, although variations occurred from month to month and from one type of aircraft to another. Other services had similar experiences with their flying units. The tooth-before-tail (fighters before supply units, for example) nature of the deployment had a differential effect on mission-capable rates that varied with maintenance concept. During the first month of deployment, F-15 forces suffered a drop in combat-ready aircraft of between nine and fifteen percent compared to peacetime rates. The F-16 and A-10 forces, for which intermediate maintenance is less of a concern, did not experience that drop. Where maintenance methods used during Desert Shield and Desert Storm differed sharply from anticipated methods (e.g., establishing intermediate maintenance support in Europe rather than in theater), imbalances between maintenance and other logistics factors appeared quickly. The most prominent imbalance was with transportation and was aggravated by the lack of in-transit visibility. Most Tactical Air Command (TAC) and TAC-gained Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Units deployed to the AOR received engine and avionics intermediate support from U.S. Air Force Europe locations. Strategic Air Command established similar capabilities in Europe and at Andersen in Guam. Compelling reasons for establishing centralized support centers outside the AOR included (a) the resulting reduction in people and equipment in a theater with an already-strained bare-base support structure and (b) increased efficiency of an established facility. The European facilities were underutilized. Their limiting factor was the lack of retrograde components and engines on which to work. The desert environment appears to have had little persistent effect on equipment reliability. Major exceptions were T-64 and T-700 helicopter engines (used on the CH/MH-53 and MH-60 helicopters, respectively). As a result of sand erosion problems, the engines achieved reliability levels approximately one-tenth that of peacetime levels. The T-64 unreliability was compounded by a two-level maintenance concept predicated on the normal reliability level. Maintenance men and women accounted for approximately thirty-eight percent of all Air Force personnel deployed to the AOR and, in terms of numbers, were the single largest manpower element, although an accurate count will probably never be available. The actual tail-to-tooth ratio was larger, since Desert Shield and Desert Storm maintenance was also supported from the European theater, Guam, and the continental United States. There is no evidence, however, that too many maintenance personnel were deployed in the AOR; in fact, the evidence indicates that the Air Force went to war with fewer personnel than it would have planned. There were actually thirty-three percent fewer personnel in the AOR than usually required to support and properly maintain the number of aircraft there. A study of eight primary bases is included in chapter 8. Both the base-level and industrial-level capacities exceeded demands generated by the Gulf conflict. At the industrial level, the number of repairable units produced was constrained primarily by lack of retrograded units on which to work. The acceleration of aircraft through programmed depot maintenance provided for almost 1,000 additional flying days. However, the additional flying days were not fully used. Military Airlift Command only used approximately one-third of the 174 additional flying days made available for C-141 aircraft. An impression apparently created during the Gulf Conflict and remaining afterwards is that U.S. Air Force aircraft had mission-capable rates “equal to or better than” peacetime ratesoften with an emphasis on “better than.” The mission-capable rates were generally good but they were not that good. Mission capability rates appear to have been approximately the same or lower than peacetime rates. The appearance of improvement was an illusion caused by the differences between peacetime systems and the largely ad hoc reporting systems of Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Automated maintenance management support to the theater was not available until late in the war (roughly December 1992). Absence of aircraft status information hampered attempts by various headquarters to ascertain the health of the fleet (although phone calls and messages helped). The absence of configuration data, especially on engines, compromised the ability to perform maintenance, although again other factors such as healthy spares stocks prevented critical shortfalls. Measuring the Results Logistics Performance No single factor made logistics support of air power a successful element of the Gulf War. The reality of what happened and how end results were achieved make an instructive story of serious problems and timely solutions. Fundamentally, but with some important exceptions, the resource requirements of the Gulf Conflict did not stress the resources and processes available at its inception. Basically, the needs of the conflict were satisfied by an existing logistics capability originally sized for a much larger conflict and augmented by significant host nation support, payment in kind, and other unplanned support. Logistics performance has some obvious measures, such as mission-capable rates, that are intermediate and partial indicators at best. For example, maintenance and supply may create a mission-capable aircraft, but correct ordnance may not be available. Operations requirements are, to a degree, determined by expectations of actual logistics capabilities hence, the visible requirement may not be the “real” requirement. Unfortunately, a number of measures, including mission capability, inevitably involve a “who gets the blame” componentleading to inaccurately reported results. However, at least a provisional picture of logistics performance in the Gulf War can be drawn by using an evaluation framework from the four levels-of-war schema described in the Effectiveness report.3 The four levels of war follow: Political - decisions and actions that set war objectives and overall conflict parameters Strategic - decisions, actions, and efforts bearing directly on the achievement of war aims Operational - decisions, actions, and efforts focused on the orchestration of the theater from the Commander-in-Chief's view, and Tactical - decisions, actions, and efforts concerning how to plan or execute particular scenarios. The logistics discussion concentrates on the operational and strategic levels of support. At the operational level, relevant questions center on (a) what did the Commander-in-Chief U.S. Central Command ask for and (b) to what extent did logistics satisfy or not satisfy the requests. Beginning with direct operational support: did the combination of intertheater airlift and sealift deliver the force where and when it was supposed to be? The Commander-in-Chief U.S. Central Command initially directed deployment of a force package consisting of an Army Corps, a Marine Division, three carrier battle groups, the 1st TAC Fighter Wing, and twelve follow-on fighter squadrons. With a lack of initial unit prioritization plus desired closure dates of “now,” a cumulative movement requirement represented an airlift demand six to seven times normal capability. The initial deployment goal was quickly modified but continued to change rapidly as the perceived threat changed.4 Thus, a realistic view is that requirements matched capability rather than capability matched requirements. However, the issue is more complicated, since the airlift provided was constrained by a combination of self-imposed limits (i.e., the timing and extent of reserve call-up and Civil Reserve Air Fleet activation), a limited number of off-load locations in the AOR, and nearly useless automated information systems. Air refueling was provided on demand and was available with few exceptions when and as needed. There were two primary operational efforts: refueling during deployment and combat sortie refueling in the AOR. An increased tempo of Tanker Task Force activity on a grand scale characterized the deployment; it required, however, a furious level of coordination to marry tankers and receivers while simultaneously acquiring beddown and overflight rights for the deployment route structure. Within the SWA theater, the single greatest limiting factor affecting air refueling was the availability of air space. During the heaviest flying period in Desert Storm, virtually no room existed in the air for additional refueling tracks. Nevertheless, more than four receivers for every boom or drogue were in the air at any time. In phase I of Desert Shield, CINCCENT requested and received six squadrons of C-130s as intratheater airlift. A seventh squadron was considered but not ordered up because a beddown site was not available. Utilization overall was less than expected for wartime (3.71 sorties per day in Desert Shield and 3.42 during Desert Storm versus the wartime planning factor of 4.0 ), but the difference is easily understood. First, the SWA theater was quite large. The flying time from Riyadh to Tabuk, as an example, is over five hours. Additionally, assigned aircraft were withheld for potential air evacuation of casualties, and those aircraft are counters when calculating overall utilization rate. The most intense test of intratheater airlift occurred during the “Hail Mary” movement of XVIII Airborne Corps before the ground war. In that fourteen-day period, C‑130s flew over eight sorties per daytwice the wartime planning factor. With regard to munitions, the evidence indicates that all missions requiring armament received it when they needed it. Not all missions received munitions preferred however. In particular, CBU 87/89s, Paveway II, and GBU 27 munitions were in short supply and rationed. Management of munitions was not that much different from previous warsit was done manually. The Air Combat Command Director of Supply made what appeared to be an astounding claim that not a single Desert Storm sortie had been lost due to supply. In the process of achieving this performance, however, supply revamped its planned use of the Combat Supply System and Standard Base Supply System, substituting the CENTAF Supply Support Agency in their place. Problem items included chemical gear, Halon, and personal weapons; lack of those items could have had a serious impact had the war taken a different turn. Further, the excellent supply performance did not always extend to support of communications equipment, Harvest sets, and other airbase functions. But the bottom line is that supply produced sorties. Overall, maintenance also produced the sorties requested. The detailed narratives indicate that aircraft were ready.5 If sorties were lost, it was because of ground and air aborts. Desert Shield aborts occurred at approximately the same rate as in peacetime; Desert Storm rates were only slightly higher.6 Additionally, mission capability rates were generally excellent, even if they were about the same as peacetime rates rather than better. Battle damage rates were very low, and the repair rates were consistent with expectations of the ABDR program. In answering the question, what did the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) require and get, intertheater airlift arose as the only possible exception to a general conclusion that what was required was provided, when it was needed. Even in the intertheater case, however, there was no firm set of requirements against which to measure performance; therefore, the strategic view must be examined to create a holistic perspective. A strategic view raises the following questions: How “stretched” was logistics? Where were the long and short poles in the logistics tent? Where was there margin and how much? What was the reserve capability to fight an extended war or another war? From this view, a conclusion that intertheater airlift did not produce would make even less sense because its full capability was not exercised. First, the Civil Reserve Air Fleet III was never activated and Fleet II only partly utilized (an average of only fifteen commercial aircraft were needed and tasked per day7). Reserves were not called up until 22 August, and even then the call-up was partial for maintenance skills. An average of sixty C-141 and fifteen C-5 aircraft were withheld each day8 to support missions other than the Gulf War. Thus, despite the fact that the Gulf War airlift effort dwarfed the Vietnam and Berlin airlift efforts, it did it with reserve capacity. As was true for intertheater airlift, only part of the then-existing refueling capability was committed to the Gulf War; forty-four percent of the KC-135 and eighty-one percent of the KC-10 tankers force. The balance of tankers was withheld to support the Single Integrated Operations Plan and other normal missions, and both KC-135 and KC-10 aircraft were used for intertheater airlift. Beyond that, it is not at all clear whether committing more tankers to Desert Storm would have been productive; airspace in the theater was saturated. A maximum of 149 C-130s were deployed to the theater during Desert Storm where they airlifted 154,000 short tons of cargo and 184,000 passengers during Desert Storm, a substantial accomplishment. However, 149 C-130s represented only one‑third of the Air Force's C-130 fleet.9 It must be concluded that a robust capability to expand intratheater airlift was available if there had been a need. During Desert Storm, 69,000 short tons of ammunition were dropped on the enemy. A much larger total of nearly 350,000 short tons was shipped by sea and air by the time hostilities ceased; most of the difference represented munitions in the sealift pipeline at the time the conflict terminated. It must be concluded that a robust capability was available to extend the war beyond 28 February if the need had arisen although the amount of remaining armament varied by type. This chapter previously stated that no record was found of a sortie having been lost because of a supply problem. There are several reasons for this level of success. First, the size of the war readiness spares kits deployed to the theater had been determined on the assumption that no resupply and very limited intermediate maintenance would occur in the first thirty days; however, resupply began almost immediately and intermediate maintenance was available. Hence, an interruption in supply would actually have been planned and would not have been viewed as a serious problem. Second, worldwide resources were available to the war effort, and the combination of supply information systems with Desert Express demonstrated a reliable capability to move those resources to the user in three to four days. Since the most valuable supplies (and also the components most likely to cause a grounding condition) were repairable rather than consumable, the question then becomes maintenance's ability to repair rather than supply's ability to stock, store, and issue. The above reasons are also indicators of supply's capability to have supported the conflict at higher levels or under different circumstances. What then was maintenance's reserve capability? The evidence (except for the C-5) is reasonably convincingthe operational tempo was less than maintenance's capability at all three levels: organizational, intermediate, and depot/industrial. Although the evidence at the organizational level is fragmentary, as indicated earlier, it is fairly conclusive at intermediate and depot levels. At the intermediate level in the AOR for example, one avionics shop per wing was deployed compared to the planned one per squadron.10 Although direct evidence of the intermediate workload at Air Force avionics shops in Europe was not uncovered, a basis exists for concluding that engine shops were underutilized. Depot-level capability was clearly in excess of that demanded. The depot was able to accelerate program depot maintenance beyond operation's requirements, and only selective surging of repairables was needed. Evaluating the Results The final values of the measures of merit for each logistics functional area are without question positive (and would hardly be credible otherwise we won the war). Below the macro levels described previously, a combination of successes and serious problems appear to signal trends in at least five areas: precrisis preparation, precrisis planning, precrisis training (especially to the degree a combat-experienced nuclei demonstrated), logistics command and control, and improvisation. Each is summarized below: Precrisis preparation was one of the most important factors underlying the achieved success in the Gulf War. Prepositioning, as an example, saved the equivalent of over 3,500 strategic airlift sorties for Air Force- related equipment alone, and a total of greater than 10,000 sortie missions overall. The importance of this prepositioning can be grasped by noting that only approximately 5,000 intertheater airlift sortie missions were flown during the phase I deployment. The prepositioned tonnage was equal to approximately one-half of the amount eventually dropped. Supply preparation, focused as it was on a potential central European war, provided a robust source of repairables and consumables for the Gulf War. More broadly, the sizing of air power, motivated as it was in general by a postulated central European conflict, entailed an across-the-board level of preparation that was more than adequate when compared with the demands of the Gulf War. The allied contribution of fuels, subsistence, vehicles, and construction equipment, among other needs, further enhanced the favorable supply situation. Chapters 2 and 3 make the points that deliberate, detailed TPFDD-level planning for a war in SWA did not yet exist in August 1990, the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) was immature, and not enough time was available to set up, load, and schedule missions using FLOGEN (a flow generation model). These circumstances are fact. However, to then conclude that had there been a complete TPFDD, a mature JOPES, and time to run FLOGEN, all would have been well is a mistake because the hidden assumption is that an adversary, allies, and even weather are willing to follow the planned script. In how many wars has that been the case? Unrealistic assumptions, planned capabilities that did not materialize, and providential capabilities already in place led to a series of improvisations during the conflict. Some have been touted with good reason as successful innovations; they can be viewed alternatively as necessary workarounds. Some of the major logistics improvisations follow: • Desert Express helped ensure an adequate level of transportation supporting essential resupply. Users loved it, and it materially reduced backorders. It helped to fix a broken priority system that viewed all movement requests as equally urgent. • The CENTAF Supply Support Agency became a fast, effective instrument for perceiving need for and source of critical parts. It relieved problems with the combat supply system designed for an out-of-date, unusable tactical shelter system. • Establishing the CENTAF Rear at Tactical Air Command at Langley AFB took advantage of in-place, knowledgeable capability. It eliminated the impossible requirement that CENTAF (9AF) move forward and, at the same time, create CENTAF Rear. • The BlueBall Express expedited the movement of supplies from ports to in-theater bases. It made up for the Army inability to mount line haul“teeth before tail” kept support assets in the CONUS. • The Air Force Logistics Information File linked transportation and supply together to provide intertheater in-transit visibility. It helped correct the problem of losing track of parts as soon as they entered the transportation system. • Putting intermediate-level maintenance in Europe and the Pacific took advantage of in-place, mature technical capability. That action solved difficulties with facilities and with moving intermediate level maintenance from CONUS to the AOR. It provided relief for the cap imposed on the growing military population in the AOR. Relying upon Military Airlift Command requirements augmentation was not an innovation, but a reversion to manual methods. The inability of JOPES and FLOGEN to handle rapidly changing requirements and tracking munitions manually were also not innovations, but reversions to traditional methods because alternatives were lacking. No single thread ties all of the improvisations together, but two themes (or evils) dominate: unrealistic prior planning assumptions and an inflexible command and control apparatus that stumbled in the face of change: The themes are not original with the Gulf Conflict and may be as old as war itself.11 In fairness to the “unrealistic” planners and architects of “inflexible” command and control systems, those themes are a lot easier to discern in retrospect. Why, however, did they not impact the outcome? The answer is: a superb resource base plus five and one-half months to prepare. Now the resource base that made the difference is being reduced; future wars may or may not be preceded by nearly six months in which to prepare. The potential outcome with a different mix of resources and time deserves consideration. 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