Joint task force transformation initiative

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SC-31 COVERT CHANNEL ANALYSIS

Control: The organization:

Performs a covert channel analysis to identify those aspects of communications within the information system that are potential avenues for covert [Selection (one or more): storage; timing] channels; and
Estimates the maximum bandwidth of those channels.

Supplemental Guidance: Developers are in the best position to identify potential areas within systems that might lead to covert channels. Covert channel analysis is a meaningful activity when there is the potential for unauthorized information flows across security domains, for example, in the case of information systems containing export-controlled information and having connections to external networks (i.e., networks not controlled by organizations). Covert channel analysis is also meaningful for multilevel secure (MLS) information systems, multiple security level (MSL) systems, and cross-domain systems. Related controls: AC-3, AC-4, PL-2.

Control Enhancements:

covert channel analysis | test covert channels for exploitability

The organization tests a subset of the identified covert channels to determine which channels are exploitable.

covert channel analysis | maximum bandwidth

The organization reduces the maximum bandwidth for identified covert [Selection (one or more); storage; timing] channels to [Assignment: organization-defined values].

Supplemental Guidance: Information system developers are in the best position to reduce the maximum bandwidth for identified covert storage and timing channels.

covert channel analysis | measure bandwidth in operational environments

The organization measures the bandwidth of [Assignment: organization-defined subset of identified covert channels] in the operational environment of the information system.

Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement addresses covert channel bandwidth in operational environments versus developmental environments. Measuring covert channel bandwidth in operational environments helps organizations to determine how much information can be covertly leaked before such leakage adversely affects organizational missions/business functions. Covert channel bandwidth may be significantly different when measured in those settings that are independent of the particular environments of operation (e.g., laboratories or development environments).

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

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SC-32 INFORMATION SYSTEM PARTITIONING

Control: The organization partitions the information system into [Assignment: organization-defined information system components] residing in separate physical domains or environments based on [Assignment: organization-defined circumstances for physical separation of components].

Supplemental Guidance: Information system partitioning is a part of a defense-in-depth protection strategy. Organizations determine the degree of physical separation of system components from physically distinct components in separate racks in the same room, to components in separate rooms for the more critical components, to more significant geographical separation of the most critical components. Security categorization can guide the selection of appropriate candidates for domain partitioning. Managed interfaces restrict or prohibit network access and information flow among partitioned information system components. Related controls: AC-4, SA-8, SC-2, SC-3, SC-7.

Control Enhancements: None.

References: FIPS Publication 199.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

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Directory: publications
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publications -> Adjih, C., Georgiadis, L., Jacquet, P., & Szpankowski, W. (2006). Multicast tree structure and the power law
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publications -> Sa michelson, 2011: Impact of Sea-Spray on the Atmospheric Surface Layer. Bound. Layer Meteor., 140 ( 3 ), 361-381, doi: 10. 1007/s10546-011-9617-1, issn: Jun-14, ids: 807TW, sep 2011 Bao, jw, cw fairall, sa michelson

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