Masaryk university

‘You know that Chechnya is part of a region in which there is an elevated threat which we have now experienced. The different aspects of Russian policy should be judged accordingly.’⁸¹

‘Chechenization’ of the conflict

The Chechen problem got significant changes after the Nord-Ost tragedy. The strategy carried out towards Chechnya was transferred from the responsibility of FSB to the Interior Ministry. ‘President Putin has pursued a two-pronged strategy to extricate Russia from the war in Chechnya and established a viable long-term modus vivendi preserving Moscow’s role as the ultimate arbiter of Chechen affairs: the first prong was to gain control of the Russian military deployed there, which had long operated without real central control and was intent on staying as long as its officers could profit from the war; the second prong was “Chechenization”, which in effect means turning Chechnya over to former nationalist separatists willing to profess loyalty to Russia.’⁸² ‘The most significant shift, however, was the gradual increase in the amount of power delegated to the local Chechen authorities, led by confident and determined Akhmad Kadyrov.’⁸³ The plan known as ‘Chechenization’ was designed by Aleksandr Voloshin who was the head of Putin’s presidential administration. Plan was focused on an idea that Russia was intending to implement its commands via loyal Chechen subjects. So that, loyal security forces under Ramzan Kadyrov’s control, have got broad power for “political settlement”, implemented by Kremlin. Thus, it was pursued by the ‘chechenization’ of the conflict, in which the conduct of ‘anti-terrorist operations’ were to a large extent transferred to a specially created republican power structures, consisted of ethnic Chechens.⁸⁴

Thus, the plan worked out was successful and even did benefits for the government. Policy allowed the federal government to implement a policy of political settlement without negotiating and with, and fully excluding, the separatist.⁸⁵ Actually, under implemented policy federals did their obvious benefit. On the one hand it gave them an opportunity to call the Chechen militants as ‘terrorists’, on the other hand it diminished fatality events among high ranks.

‘Chechenization’ differs from employed practises such as ‘Vietnamization’ and ‘Iraqification’ which actually were strategies based on strengthening of local loyalist forces to the point that charged them to handle the situation by themselves. ‘Unlike them ‘Chechenization’ means handing Chechnya over to the guerrillas in exchange for their professions of loyalty, the formal retention of Chechnya without the Russian Federation, and an uneasy cooperation with Federal authorities that in practice is constantly re-negotiated.’⁸⁶

‘The consequence of ‘Chechenization’, however, was beneficial for federal government only, but for ethnic Chechen people there was started a new-dimension of hostility and the gravest consequences of project set off most savage feuds which will last for generations on and will be observed with acutely destructive social processes.’⁸⁷ Thus, it was a strategy for shifting the conflict from separatist dimension to the dimension of civil war, which by essence nothing was changed, the war initiated as a Russo-Chechen has been continuing in a level of inter-Chechen war.

Spread of Wahhabism⁸⁸

The other influential issue in the Chechen conflict which needs to pay attention is the Wahhabism phenomenon. Actually, in my opinion, it is the specific factor which both in religious and political dimensions impacted to the almost whole North Caucasus. ‘It is a regional form of the Salafism ideology, which calls Muslims to return to the so-called ‘pure’ Islam of the times of the Prophet Muhammed and the Four Righteous Caliphs.’⁸⁹

The occurred vacuum immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union in an ideological and religious even in moral space gave birth to the non-traditional ideologies to spread across the region, which especially deeply rooted in Dagestan region. It was actually the Islamic renaissance which was ‘obvious parallel to the “golden age” of Shamil’s Imamate, the only time in history when Chechnya existed as a legitimate “uncolonized”, or non-Russian, state’⁹⁰. Wahhabism began to spread in the Northern Caucasus, unlike other religious ideologies which were observed, with the interpretation of radical steps. ‘While the label Wahhabism denoted a totally other and neutral meaning in the Gulf States and elsewhere in the world, it should be understood that in Russia, Chechnya, the Caucasus, and the other former Soviet Union republics this label denoted an ultra militant form of Islam and referred to militant religious groups that promote jihad and-so much so that in Russia the word wahhabist has become synonymous with terrorist.’⁹¹

However, Wahhabism first began to manifest as an ideology among antigovernment extremist groups in Arabic countries in the 70-80s, in Afghanistan–in 80’s, and since the late of 80’s and already in 90’s during the period of perestroika and glasnost in Caucasus and Central Asia.⁹² Thus, Islamic extremism in the form of terrorist groups and illegal armed formations in these countries, took form as a result of Wahhabi prevention into the Muslim environment of these states.⁹³ Spread of Wahhabism in Chechnya came gradually upon the surface after the coup and has almost passed four stages.⁹⁴ Initial stage of Wahhabism in Chechnya started with the seizing of power by Dzhokhar Dudayev which in a result the situation has changed profoundly, the administration mostly was occupied by representatives of “independent Chechnya” who were religious and political radicals and was supported by Wahhabism. They fairly straightened their position in the newly established government and the promoted “Wahhabism” occurred as an alternative to the traditionally trended Islam in the region. Even Dzhokhar Dudayev mentioned that “he would like to see the Chechen Republic to be an institutional secular state, this is what we are fighting for; this is the ideal that we seek to achieve... if religion takes priority over an institutional secular system, a more striking form of the Spanish inquisition and Islamic fundamentalism will emerge [in Chechnya]”⁹⁵ which, however, meant that although his views were not underpinning “Wahhabism” at all but actually it became one of the initial steps towards the secularization. All the same, yet in this period the activities of Wahhabites in the North Caucasus as a whole did not really extend beyond a limited criticism of traditional Islam.⁹⁶ Period was remembered with the influx of foreign money for rebuilding of Islamic expression which was observed for early post soviet period.

With the beginning of the first Chechen war religious got a stronger support in public scale, and particularly contributed in marked radicalization of Islam in Chechnya. The radicalization of the religious was in some extent the vulnerable point, and even became theme of dispute among high ranked figures within the state. ‘Mufti of the republic, Akhmed Kadyrov who declared jihad on Russia in 1995, yet before his presidency demanded that the Ichkerian government adopt strong measures against Islamism and ban “Wahhabism”.’⁹⁷ ‘Despite all of preventive measures since 1996 the resistance leaders and their troops have switching their traditional allegiance from the Sufi branch of Islam to a radical interpretation of Wahhabism that celebrates death, suicide, and mass murder as weapons against the infidels.’⁹⁸ ‘Under the influence of... Arab mujahedeen, Basayev... appeared to have metamorphosed gradually from a Chechen nationalist to a Chechen Muslim.’⁹⁹ Thus, although the first war was essentially nationalist and separatist in nature and the goal was national independence from Russia, even toward its end Chechen leaders were beginning to feel the effects of the Wahhabist influence in terms of funding and ideology, which it was actually imported in its military form and full scale from the Middle East into Chechnya.¹⁰⁰

In following years, after Dudayev acting president Zalimkhan Yandarbiyev, replaced secular courts and established the Supreme Sharia Court of Ichkeria which became in some years indicator of the Islamization and impacted on the social and cultural life on the nation. ‘As a confident supporter of the “Islamic model” he declared Islamic law and the Arabic language compulsory subjects in one of his first decrees.’¹⁰¹ It was, however, unexpected step for society, people did not expected such drastic turn of Islamizing, which was hard for them to adopt. In the Supreme Court included a total implementation of sharia, which was not popular among Chechens and only served to deepen the contradiction between the traditional culture and the whole-scale introduction of sharia by the Wahhabis.¹⁰² Traditional Islam in Chechnya faced with the ideological incompetency, it was challenged by radical views and even was pushed to the margins of social life. Religious views in Chechnya clashed, the trainings in Wahhabis mosques were completely opposing the peculiar Sufism traditions of Chechnya which pursued by the straining of the situation between Wahhabits and traditional views of Sufi Chechen people. The distinctive features between the religious ideologies are followings:

‘Traditional Chechen Muslims esteem Ustazies which are the spiritual teachers who first accepted and distributed Islam in Chechnya. These priests knew the Arabic language and could read and translate the Koran. UStazies declared values of pacifism, mercy and compassion. They were against any type of warfare. In contrast the new ideology proclaimed by Wahhabits glorified war as the path of jihad and martyrdom as a main value that should be adopted by every Muslim in Chechnya;

Traditional Chechen Muslims make use of prayer rituals of chanting, clapping their hands and rocking the body, which is named “zikr”. Traditional Chechen Muslims glorify God by chanting the name of Allah, some prophets and the Ustazies. Wahhabits condemn these practices and call them idolatry. Wahhabits on the contrary use “nashids” prayers that repeat portions of the Koran and Islamic writings that give glory to Allah, his own prophet Muhammad and that invoke jihad;

Wahhabits distributed many new religious publications in Chechnya, the most prominent being the book entitled “One God”. This publication took issue with any practices that did not strictly reinforce the oneness of God and that made any use of intermediaries to God or glorifying any of his prophets or saints, all of which are traditional Chechen Islamic practices;

Chechen men and women traditionally dress in European fashions and are free in their clothing following only minimal habits of modesty that are common to many other European and modern Muslim countries. By contrast the women who followed the Wahhabit ways began to dress in hidjab, covering themselves in ways that Chechen women have never done so in the past. Hence the Wahhabits proposed dress that differed dramatically from ethnic and modern clothes of Chechen women. They likewise proposed a new image for Chechen men as well with long hair, moustaches, beard and Arabic clothing;

Traditionally Chechen families consider the father as the head of the family. Wahhabits by contrast promoted the concept of Muslim brotherhood stating that Muslim brothers (i.e. fictive kin) are more important than parents and other family members. As a result conflicts arose in many families where parents were no longer respected as they were in the past;

Wahhabists created in Chechnya Sharia courts in which they punished with beatings by canes those who were caught drinking alcohol, using drugs and other crimes. Before Wahhabism these were government courts for serious crimes but only public condemnation in society for issues of moral trespass;

Wahhabism became an extreme trend in Chechen expressions of Islam. In Chechnya Wahhabits killed traditional Muslim leaders who tried to resist their activity. The majority of Chechens did not support Wahhabism but the assassination of traditional Chechen imams became a means to silence the majority.’¹⁰³

The second stage of Wahhabism in Chechnya started probably after the end of the first Chechen war. In this stage in the first time was observed the clash of the ideas. The major armed collision between them took place in May 1997, near to the mountain village Chabanmakhi. Immediately after this the Dagestan parliament passed a law entitled “On the fight against Islamic fundamentalism”, which triggered mass hunts for country’s sectarians.¹⁰⁴ In July 1998 the Wahhabit group attempted to take over the Chechen city of Gudermes and it was the first armed attack of the Wahhabits against Chechen religious authorities. However, this military clash between Sufi adherents and the radicals brought Aslan Maskhadov back to the side of the Sufis, and as a follower of the Naqshbandi tariqa (the brotherhood of Usman Hadji), repeated the same mistake made by Dudayev, but unlike Dudayev Maskhadov’s policy of conciliation between Sufis brought an incredible outpouring of enthusiasm among the followers of Sufism in Chechnya.¹⁰⁵ Despite to it, the following two years were witnessing to the institutional unification of Chechen and Dagestan Wahhabists. The goal of Wahhabists was firstly to establish a united Islamic State, spreading their ideology across the borders and encompassing Dagestan and Ichkeria, which would be forming a Caucasian caliphate. Thus in August, 1999 the fragile peace was broken, rebel leaders Shamil Basayev and Ibn Khattab led a rebel incursion into neighbouring Dagestan to recover former Chechen ethnic territory and to declare a reunited Islamic state.¹⁰⁶ However, they were faced with an obstacle in Dagestan which formed opposition and unlike in Ichkeria required military support against armed extremist groups. The impending war waged as “liberation of Dagestan”¹⁰⁷ one more time compelled Dagestan administration to think over the expansion of wahhabism towards Dagestan territory. Apparently, the public opinion estimated this invasion not as a wahhabi extremism but rather as a manifestation of Chechen aspirations.¹⁰⁸ The preventive measures against the spread of wahhabism put a significant damper on creation of “an Islamic Caucasus state extending from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea” which, in its turn, led to a worsening of Chechen-Dagestan relations.

With the attack on Dagestan, actually, began the third step of Wahhabism. Thus, the expected march on Dagestan was realized in summer 1999, which ‘no doubt, this provocative intervention in Dagestan brought about the never-ending second war in Chechnya, a conflict with far graver consequences for the Chechen nation than even the first war of 1994-1996’¹⁰⁹. ‘By then the Wahhabit organization had became an underground guerilla and terrorist structure made up of many small groups, or cells, similar to Al-Qaeda affiliates.’¹¹⁰

The fourth stage of Wahhabism began almost after the middle of 2000, since when was declared the official end of the second war. In this period Wahhabism was precluded but appeared much devastating and its terroristic image was pointed out as a salient characteristic. Thus the guerilla strategy of the war shifted to the terroristic form and ‘it was no longer possible for the nationalist separatist rebels to operate openly’¹¹¹ However, despite the import and spread of militant Wahhabi ideas into Chechnya during the past ten years since the fourth phase, it is important to state that the majority of the Chechen population continues to follow its Sufi roots and popular support for terrorism does not currently exist.¹¹² ‘Even today there growth a new young generation of Chechen Sufis, who received Sufi education in Syria and Turkey, and there is a new ideology- or, more accurately, the rebirth of a forgotten ideology of resistance to Russia – which makes Sufism in Chechnya more vibrant and pure than it was ten years ago.’¹¹³

Thus, wahhabism had passed long way before arriving in Chechnya, through Bosnia and Karabakh and finally reached to Chechnya. Unlike, others conflict regions in Chechnya wahhabism took root and it has left some impacts behind itself which has deepened radical views among Chechen people. Fundamentalist Islam gradually pushed aside the traditional peaceful Sufism. According to the taken interview with expert Tomas Šmid, scholar from Masaryk University, the spread of wahhabism in Chechnya is explained with some nuances that it has manifested itself with some clear factors, which are first of all indicates itself as a very severe but not complicated ideology, and secondly, due to this feature it was easy to spread it among the young generations, which with a big desire includes in interests of wahhabis too, especially those young people who have demonstrated disorientation and did not possess profound knowledge about the religion. The next step was to lash out recruited young people against the old Sufi tariqat.

Today in the Northern Caucasus, concretely in Kabardino-Balkaria is formed organization of “Black Hawks”, posing itself as an ‘anti-wahhabis’ movement which is against of the militants who are hiding themselves behind of the religious slogans, killing civilians.¹¹⁴ Still organization has not precisely introduced itself, almost no information is known about it such as about its ideology, structure or number of members. Furthermore, the other blurring point is its confidentiality, it is difficult to claim that organization is controlling by some political powers or vice-versa it has been created as an underground organization. However, one is clear that organization based on anti-Islamic spirits which is exist even since the middle of 1990s as an anti-radical spread of Islamism. Thus, the complexity of the point consists of its knottiness that makes it sufficiently difficult to give exact estimation to the question, such as it appeared on the religious or inter-ethnic background; or there is quite disparate reason, such as it is one new level of civil war?!

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the mutual attitudes between the Russian Federation and the newly formed countries and their Muslim societies were not that smooth. The post-Communist Islamic revival in Russia began gradually, but gathered steam in the late 1990s.¹¹⁵ Even, in the internal Muslim republics included into the Russian Federation was sensed the growing tendency of the Muslim elites and self-consciousness. Ethnic separatism problem in Russian, particularly in the Caucasus, became vulnerable discussed question for a long time period and actually ‘since that time radical Islam has gradually permeated the fabric of Chechnya’s socio-political environment’.¹¹⁶ In the country the Islamic phenomena was growing faster and religious claims came forward as a political Islamic movement in regional scale. But if to objectively assess this issue we can see that ‘all problems in the North Caucasus are not the direct result of Kremlin policies’¹¹⁷. The process just was aided by the fade of the communist ideologies from the scene, which the occurred vacuum, in its turn, paved the way for radical Islam for gaining strength.

‘The phenomenon of ‘Islamic radicalism’ is an extremely significant one for Russia because of at least two circumstances: firstly, because there are about twenty million Muslims living in Russia (including 3.5 to 4 migrant Muslims); secondly, because in the 15 years since the collapse of the USSR, Russia has been shaken by ethno-political conflicts with an apparent confessional component.’¹¹⁸ However, one may stress on that that the Islamic tendencies and radical sentiment in the North Caucasus are stronger than the rest of Russia. Today it is difficult to explain any suggested conflict related with Caucasus, particularly with Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia, without using Islamic factors, radicalism. Moreover, Chechnya-may be in a limited scale-became “exporter” Islamic radicalism in Muslim regions of Russia and CIS, and it was Chechnya where was materialized “Islamic threat” for Russia, which is being continuing almost since the middle of 1990s.¹¹⁹

If to say honestly may be it is possible to eliminate only the Chechen separatism, using some political tools, but it is definitely impossible to root out Islamic radical views, because in Caucasus it is a self-generating character of peoples’ nature. And actually the last two decades were observed as a period of rebirth of this Islamic fundamentalist values in Caucasus. However, in this period for the appearance of Islamic radical views and their extremist interpretations in the region played much influential role the rise of wahhabism and its active political impact. ‘There can be no doubt that this was prompted by the transition from one socio-political formation to another within the region, the collapse of the USSR, the disappearance of communist ideology, the beginning of democratic change, and weakness of the political and administrative system that subsequently emerged in Russia.’¹²⁰ According to the objective analysis of Russian scholar Malashenko, A., the roots of activity of Islamic radicalism in the Caucasus links to some distinguishable features:

internal socio-economic root-cause consists of dissatisfaction of the Muslim population on their financial situation, a disappointment in the ruling elites who are unable to offer a fast and painless recovery. Hereat the social protest gained radical religious shape;

the second forward coming reason for reviving Islamism may be the resistance to external pressure which consolidated the opposition-the Muslim nations, under the banner of holy war;

the third reason for the activity under the slogans of radical Islam was the influence from the outside, which hides the main idea of expansion of interaction with the criminality, including the relations with developing drug trafficking.¹²¹

In a result, all these reasons coincided in eastern Caucasus, which facilitated radical Islamic views with the opportunities to start to spread across the region. On the other hand it is important to take into account the proximity of radical Islam to the mentality of Caucasian ethnicities. Thus, war in Chechnya was a key element not only for Islamic rebirth in adjacent regions, but also it was observed with a high level of political confrontation. Of course, it is also undeniable fact that the occurred Islamic radicalism became a mean tool for several beneficiaries.

Analyzing Islamic factor in the Chechen War we can see that Islam did not stand in the core of this war, although it played main stimulating role for its incompletion, and furthermore, it could be a good pretext for exercising economical and political aims. Originally the separatist movement in Chechnya was unrelated to Islam, its ideology was ethnic nationalism and its goal was the establishment of an independent national state.¹²² The other approach to the issue is suggested by Geydar Dzhemal, the chairman of Islamic Committee of Russia, is that the Islamic factor can play necessary mean role for straightening Russia’s position against the process of Western expansionism. Summarizing these analyses we cannot do any precise conclusion that because all of above mentioned factors are partially right in their points, however, they all just coincide in one common point, that is that all of them assert the fact that Islamic pattern as a political tool emerged as a feedback reaction, and although it was not the direct reason of the war but, at least, was its consequence. Here would be worth just to recall a quotation from the first Chechen president Dzovkhar Dudaev. He said: “they [Russia] have forced us to take the way of Islam even if we were not properly prepared to embrace Islamic values. Now we could succumb to a perverted form of Islam, which might be dangerous to the West”¹²³.

‘One of the common effects of Chechen conflict like other any conflict is that it includes a radicalisation and polarization of opinion.’¹²⁴ Most observers agree that in the overall context of the Chechen conflict Islam-and especially radical Islam-played a negative role, while in began as a direct outcome of Russia’s military reaction to Chechen separatist tendencies, Chechen appeal to Islam exacerbated the conflict and, by welcoming the infiltration of foreign radical elements, led to further destabilization of the North Caucasus.¹²⁵ In additional, wahhabism pattern was a turning point of ‘construction of Modern Chechen identity and the fractionalization and radicalization of the separatist movement.’¹²⁶ ‘More importantly, by summer of 1999 a dual radicalisation was peaking in Russia and Chechnya that was driving the momentum on both sides for a return to conflict.’¹²⁷ The Islamic project was contributed for expansion of the Chechen conflict, turning it from a confrontation between the Centre and the subject of the Federation in a multi-fold regional conflict, beyond the internal affairs of Russia, which were involved some neighbouring countries, as well as some national and international Muslim organisations.