The Speech (Beginning date: 15 October 1927) The general situation



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The Amasya meeting
A meeting with Salih Pasha, the Minister for the Navy, was arranged. It was to take place in Amasya, and the general outlines of domestic and foreign policy, as well as the future of the army, were to be discussed.
We received Salih Pasha personally at Amasya. Discussions lasted from 20th to 22nd October. We were unanimous on the princip1e that we would not consent to the ceding of our territory in Cilicia, in the Vilayet of Aydin or in Thrace. We also agreed on a resolution to the effect that Christian elements should be granted no unreasonable privileges. In the event of any country desiring to invest a large amount of capital in Turkey, it was decided that as such a proposal would be likely to be accompanied by a demand to control our public finances, the National Assembly's decision on the matter should be accepted after experts had studied the details and formu1ated some scheme which would not damage our national interests.
W e convinced Salih Pasha that the Chamber of Deputies might be subject to interference from foreign powers if it were assembled in Istanbul, which was under occupation. In the same way as the French had done at Bordeaux in I 870 ( and, more recently, as the Germans had done at Weimar), we should hold our assembly in some safe place in Anatolia until peace was concluced. Salih Pasha promised to do everything in his power to convince his colleagues of the truth of this argument: he did not, however, succeed in doing so.
An incident in the district of Adapazari
Three men (a certain Talostan Bey, one Bekir Bey, who had arrived with instructions from Istanbul, bringing funds. to pay those who were willing to serve him, and a tax-collector named Beslan) met and prepared an attack on the town of Adapazari; they had with them some armed men they had recruited in the neighbourhood.
The Kaymakam of Adapazari heard of this, and, taking with him a major and about twenty-five mounted men, went out to meet those who were coming to attack the town. When the two sides.met, the attackers were asked what they wanted. They replied: "We want to go to the Telegraph Office in Adapazari to find out whether His Majesty the Su1tan is alive or dead, and whether or not he is still seated on the glorious throne of the Caliph. We cannot accept Mustafa Kemal Pasha as Sultan." According to information received from the Kaymakam, these men a1so said that they were in contact with important peop1e in Istanbul, and that the Sultan himself knew of what they were doing.
We sent reinforcements from Izmit, who succeeded in dispersing the gang. Beslan was captured and Bekir took to flight.
Around this time we received reports from another part of the Adapazari district to the effect that a similar band of mercenaries was being collected by a man called Hikmet. In addition, raids were carried out against the national forces in the country round Bursa.
On 28th October, our organization in Istanbul sent me a telegram in which they said that a council consisting of the Sultan, Damat Ferit Pasha, Adi1 Bey and Ali Kemal Bey (both former Ministers of the Interior) and Sait Molla, had discussed how they could take advantage of Bekir's revolt, which was looked upon as the beginning of a popular uprising against the national forces in the Adapazarl area. Hikmet, having formed a band of his own, had been won over by Sait Molla and incited by him to persecute the Christians.
Other events of October 1919
I beg leave to mention briefly certain events that took place in October 1919.
The Muslim popu1ation of that part of the Vilayet of Izmir which was occupied by the enemy were being massacred. We urged the government to approach the representatives of the Allies with a view to bringing , this situation to an end. It was intended to. ho1d a meeting of protest in Istanbul against these atrocities.This meeting was prohibited.
Anzavur began his treacherous and inhuman activities in the district of Bandirma.
We were informed that thirty officers were preparing to land at Trabzon and Samsun with the object of starting a campaign against the Christians.This was done with the intention of making it easier for foreign countries to invade.
As you know, a British division had originally occupied Maras, Urfa and Antep. These troops were now replaced by French. We tried to prevent this new occupation, first by taking diplomatic steps and later by military operations.
A new and. rather important revolt broke out at Bozkir. We tried in various ways to suppress it.
The tragedy of Yahya Kaptan
The Yahya Kaptan affair marked one of the most important phases of the revolution. As it is very instructive, I wou1d like to give you the details of it.
An essential part of our enemies' plan of action was to show the world that the interior of the country was in a state of unrest and that the Christian popu1ation was the object of constant attacks. They pretended that this was the work of the national forces. Our enemies, in pursuit of this secret aim, had begun to organize bands of irregulars and to incite them against the Christian population. They then blamed the national forces for the crimes they had themselves committed. These activities had begun to spread all over the country , but they were most noticeable in Biga, Balikesir, Izmit and Adapazari because these places were near to Istanbul and therefore more likely to attract attention.
We were forced to take extraordinary measures to dea1 with these activities, which had, it must be admitted, been organized with considerable expertise.The government was openly attributing all these intrigues to the national forces, and had unfortunately succeeded in instilling their ideas into the leaders of our organizations in Istanbul.
The strongest and most important of the armed groups which carried out our operations in the district of Izmit, near Istanbul, was led.by Yahya Kaptan. I had requested him to raise a force in this district. He did this, and for several months succeeded in foiling the intrigues of the treacherous gangs in the area around Istanbul.
On 24th November 1919 I received the following telegram from Kartal, between Istanbul and Izmit:
It is imperative that Yahya Kaptan be handed over to the Government. He has murdered an innocent man in the middle of the village, he has beaten the mayor in public and committed acts of theft and violence against the villagers. If this is not done, the Government will be put in a difficult situation. I await your Excellency's orders.

Major Ahmet Necati
After receiving this suspicious telegram, I asked Rüstü Bey, Commander of the 1st Division at Izmit, to prevent Yahya Kaptan being handed over to the government in view of the useful services he had performed for us.
A few days later, Rüstü Bey sent us this telegram:
From the, enquiries I have made so far , it seems evident that Yahya Kaptan has not committed any murder , nor has he been guilty of an assault on the mayor. On the contrary, it seems that the reason Major Necati wants him out of the way is that he sees him as an obstacle in the way of his own personal ambitions.
This telegram from Rüstü Bey was soon followed by another .
Major Necati, in spite of the fact that he was . assigned to the Artillery School at Maltepe, is pillaging the area with a gang belonging to Küçük Aslan the Albanian, pretending ,that they are national forces.
This gang has perpetrated crimes such as the kidnapping of a rich man named Stelianos and the murder of the Greek watchmen at Darıca, which have caused problems for the government. In view of the fact that these offences have been blamed on Yahya Kaptan, who had nothing whatever .to do with them, and that false accusations against him have been sent both to you and to the government, I can only conclude that these individuals, on pretence of being national forces, have no other intention than- to make difficulties for the people and the government, while filling their own pockets at the same time. They may also have some political aim.
Yahya Kaptan has behaved very honourably, and has not taken part in any of these acts of violence; on the contrary, he has prevented these gangs from committing crimes in the area for which he is responsible. He is now the object of official persecution. yesterday he came to see me and told me that his life is in danger.
Although I do not know with whom Necati Bey is in communication in Istanbul, it is rumoured that he receives money from time to time from some secret source.
In January the government sent a military force from Istanbul, which surrounded Yahya Kaptan and his men at a place called Tavsancıl. No encounter between the two forces took place. Yahya Kaptan surrendered. He was then killed outside the village with a sharp instrument and his head cut off. The government's verdict was that he had been "shot while attempting to escape".
Arrival in Ankara
Having been unable to prevent the Chamber of Deputies from meeting in istanbu1 itself, we decided that the only course of action left open to us was to form a united and determined group in the Chamber. In this way we would be able to pursue our aim of "safeguarding the territorial integrity of the homeland and the independence of the nation ". It was with the formation of such a group in mind that we decided to ask the deputies to send a representative from each liva to Eskisehir. At this meeting in Eskisehir we particularly wanted to discuss the safety of the deputies while they were in Istanbul. For various reasons, however, we decided to hold this meeting not in Eskisehir, but in Ankara,
After waiting in Sivas for another month, we left for Ankara, announcing that this would be the seat of the Representative Committee from now on. Although objections were raised to our moving from Sivas, reason dictated that the Committee should be nearer to Istanbul and the western provinces than to the eastern ones. Some of our western and south-western vilayets were actually under enemy occupation. It was necessary to set up and fortify strong lines of defence.There was no such danger, however, in our eastern provinces. Moreover, it is a general rule that those who assume supreme command in wartime should be as near as possible to the field of operations if they are to contro1 the genera1 situation. Ankara was connected with the fronts and with Istanbul by a railway line.
Cemal Pasha tries to prevent our meeting
While we were sending out invitations to the deputies to come to Ankara, there were those who were doing all they cou1d to make sure that the delegates did not come and that the meeting did not take place.While waiting for a rep1y from our organization in Istanbul we ran into opposition from the man who was supposed to be our delegate in istanbu1: Cema1 Pasha, the Minister of War. Here is the telegram he sent us:
To His Excellency Mustafa Kemal Pasha: I have the honour of bringing' to your attention the fact that a group of deputies who are at. present in Istanbul have handed to ,me the following petition: .
1.It is essential that the Chamber of Deputies should meet as soon as possible. The fact that some deputies have recently been invited to Ankara may delay the opening of Parliament.

2. This situation will be regarded by foreigners as evidence that the legislative body is operating under the influence of outside forces. This fact is certain to give rise to a good deal of mistrust at home and abroad.

3. The Chamber cannot perform its functions under such conditions.

4. The sending of a delegate vested with wide powers to Istanbul in order to talk to the deputies will be sufficient to achieve the desired effect.

5. We expect those concerned to give urgent instructions to the delegates who have gone to Ankara to return to Istanbul, or to postpone their departure if they have not yet left Istanbul.

Cemal

Minister of War
Our decision to hold a meeting with the deputies had been made known six weeks before. If these gentlemen, who pretended to have as their aim the same nationa1 ideal as ourse1ves, really thought that this meeting would be dangerous and detrlmenta1 to the national interest, why had they not discussed their views with us ear1ier, before they telegraphed to the deputies invited by us, urging them to come to Istanbul? And why should these people, who had shown no signs of impatience when the statutory period of time within which new elections must be held had long since passed, suddenly show so much enthusiasm? These gentlemen did not want me to be in personal contact with the deputies.
I asked Cemal Pasha to send me the names of the deputies who had handed him the petition. Later I heard that it had been drawn up by the Grand Vizier, who had then instructed some of the deputies to sign it and then send it to me.
A false prophet at Bayburt
While we were engaged in dealing with the difficulties in Istanbul I have been speaking of a bloody and rather serious incident took p1ace near our eastern borders. The cause of this was a self-styled 'prophet.'
Four hours' journey from Bayburt there is a village called Hart. A certain Sheikh Esref had been spreading Shiite propaganda there. In response to this, the mufti and the ulema of Bayburt sent a deputation to the sheikh. They asked him, in the name of the local authority, to come and answer certain questions. The sheikh did not come.
The 1oca1 authorities then sent a detachment of fifty men to Hart. The sheikh, angered by this, ordered his followers to disarm them. He took them all prisoner, some of them he killed.
Some troops were then collected at Bayburt, but it was thought preferable to settle the affair without further bloodshed. Several deputations of religious men and officers were sent to reason with the sheikh and persuade him to capitulate to the authorities.

Sixteen days passed. The appeals of the 1ast deputation had no effect on him. He said to them: "You are all giaours! I will listen to nobody. I will not surrender. I shall fight to the end! God has to1d me that He has chosen me to preach His word." He had proclamations signed 'The Upholder of God's Laws' and 'The Long Awaited Messiah' put out in the neighbouring villages, and obtained their support.


Lt, Col, Halit Bey had gone to Bayburt to take over command of the 9th Division, He marched to Hart at the head of a sufficient number of troops on 25th December 1919, Still the sheikh refused to surrender. On lst January 1920 I was informed that the affair at Hart was over. It had ended when the false prophet, his sons and some of his disciples had been killed. I congratulated Halit Bey on his success.
A public meeting in Ankara
I felt it my duty to become better acquainted with the worthy inhabitants of Ankara, who had welcomed me so warmly and given me so much encouragement.So, while we were waiting for the arrival of the deputies we had invited, we held a public meeting. I shall tell you briefly what we talked about.
Firstly, the Wilson principles. Some of the fourteen points in these principles applied to Turkey. The Ottoman Empire, defeated and forced to sue for peace, had put all its hopes in a miracle in view of the reassurance these principles seemed to offer.
Then there were the articles of the armistice signed at Mondros on 30th October 1918. These articles, especially Article Seven, were 1ike a corrosive poison eating into the brain of every patriot. This seventh article alone was enough to seal the fate of what remained of our country, as it provided for the possible invasion and occupation of the country by the enemy.
The miserable spectacle of Cabinets composed of weak and. incapable men which succeeded each other in Istanbul was felt to symbolize the depths to which our guiltless and long-suffering nation had sunk. However , the awakening of the nation that had taken place over the last nine months had started to alter this picture: the situation had improved and would continue to do so. If the nation preserved the unity it had gained and did not shrink from making every sacrifice in the cause of independence, its success was assured.
The principles laid down by the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses were the foundation on which Turkey must build her future.
Talks with the deputies arriving in Ankara
The deputies did not come to see us all together on the same day, they came and went singly or in small groups. This meant that we had to repeat, day after day, almost the same points to each individual or group.
You will readily understand that the first thing to be done was to increase their confidence, so first we showed them the positive and encouraging aspects of the situation at home and abroad. After this, we repeated to them time and time again the fact that consciously cultivated unity and mutual co-operation directed towards a well-defined goal are an unstoppab1e force. We exp1ained that the survival and well-being of any group depends on its ability to stand together. W e told them that the salvation of our country required the setting up of dedicated and well-run organizations, and that these organizations had to be directed by people capable of forging them all into a single whole. Thus We expressed the necessity for a strong and united party in the Chamber of Deputies which was soon to meet in Istanbul.
Those deputies who had been e1ected by the nation because of their allegiance to the principles formu1ated by the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses shou1d therefore form a party whose name indicated their support of the organization which promulgated these principles: namely, a 'Party for the Defence of Rights.'
The National Pact
We consulted the deputies on the way in which the aims and demands of the nation cou1d be expressed, in brief but weighty terms, in a manifesto. Preliminary drafts for this manifesto, which was to be called 'The National Pact', were made. Later, in the Chamber of Deputies in Istanbul, this manifesto reached its final form; the principles it contained were fully and clearly defined.
All the individuals and groups with whom we held discussions 1eft us with the assurance that they were fully in accord with us. Nevertheless, we never heard that a 'Party for the Defence of Rights' had been .formed in the Chamber of Deputies in Istanbul. Why was that, I wonder? I am still waiting for an answer to this question !
The reason is that the men who should, for their consciences' sake and for the sake of their country, have formed this party were--cowards. They thought it was too dangerous to be1ong to the nationa1 movement. They were also stupid; they believed that they could achieve their great aims by prostrating themselves before the Sultan's throne and by ingratiating themselves with the foreigners, forgetting that the means of salvation is, and always will be, the people.
Conditions for non-intervention in Istanbul
The Chamber of Deputies was opened on 12th January 1920. I was abso1ute1y certain that an attack wou1d be made on it and that it would be disso1ved. I had even decided what we wou1d do if this shou1d happen. We made arrangements for it to meet at Ankara.
A communication from Istanbul on 19th February 1920 brought us the following news: "The British dip1omatic representative has given a verbal assurance to the government that the capital will be left to the Ottoman Empire. However, he has demanded that the massacre of Armenians, and our operations against all Allied troops (including those of Greece ), should cease immediately. He added that if this was not done, the terms of our peace agreement might be altered."
What could be the meaning of this verba1 communication? Could it mean that they had resolved to occupy Istanbul as well as the districts already occupied by the Greeks, the French and others, but that if we accepted the conditions they imposed they might abandon the idea?
Or. perhaps it meant this: "The occupation by the Greeks, French and Ita1ians is already an accomplished fact. The occupation of Istanbul is contemplated; if you will allow the Greeks, the French and the Ita1ians to remain unmolested in their zones of occupation and show that you consent to this occupation, we will give up the idea of occupying Istanbul."
Or, finally, did it mean that the Allies had doubts about the ability of the Istanbul Government to dismantle the lines of defence set up by the national forces in the districts occupied by the enemy, and that they planned to occupy Istanbul on the pretext that neither operations against the Allied Powers and the Greeks nor the supposed massacre of Armenians had been stopped?
I believe that subsequent events have shown the 1ast of these interpretations to be the correct one.
Allegations of massacres of Armenians were undoubtedly not in accordance with the facts. Quite the contrary, the Armenians in the southern districts armed by the foreign troops and encouraged by the protection they gave, were carrying out attacks on the Muslims of these areas. Animated by a spirit of revenge, they were pursuing a policy of ruthless extermination. This was the cause of the tragic incident at Maras. Joining forces with the foreign troops, they razed the old Muslim town to the ground with their artillery bombardment and heavy machine-gun fire. They killed thousands of innocent and defenceless women and children. These atrocities, unparalleled in history, were perpetrated by the Armenians. The Muslims mere1y offered resistance and defended themselves in order to save their lives and their honour. The telegram which the Americans, who remained in the town with the Mus1ims during the five days of the massacre, sent to their representative in Istanbul shows, in a way which puts the matter beyond dispute, who were the instigators of these tragic events.
Was not the situation in the districts of Izmir and Aydin similar to this? The Greeks daily reinforced their troops and built up their supplies of munitions, thus completing their preparations for an offensive. At the same time they carried out minor attacks at various points along the line.
The fact of the matter was that our nation was committing no acts of aggression anywhere, against any foreigner.
A victory and a defeat
There was an ammunition depot at Akbas, which is situated on the European side of the Straits, not far from Gallipoli. In this depot, which was guarded by the French, there was a 1arge quantity of arms and ammunition. The Istanbul Government, believing it to be in their interest to comply with the wishes of the Allied Powers in every respect, had promised to surrender some of the arms and ammunition stored in this depot. The Allied Powers intended to send them to Wrangel's army. a Russian ship had arrived at Gallipo1i to carry them to Russia. The government had previously obtained the consent of our organization in Istanbul for this.
But now, Köprülülü Hamdi Bey, one of our heroic comrades, at the head of a division of national troops, crossed the Straits on rafts during the night of 26th February 1920, reached the European shore, seized the depot at Akbas, arrested the French guard and cut the communications. Then he sent all the arms and a large part of the ammunition to Lapseki (on the Asian shore), meanwhile taking the French soldiers with him under escort. After he had taken the arms and ammunition into the interior of the country , he sent his prisoners back. We estimated that about 8,000 Russian rifles, 40 Russian machine-guns and 20,000 cases of ammunition were stored in the Akbas depot.Following

this incident, the British landed 200 men at Bandirma.


At about the same time, Anzavur had succeeded in creating quite a serious situation in the districts of Balikesir and Biga. At Balikesir his intention was to take the nationa1 forces in the rear. He was in command of a considerable number of men. A bloody battle took place at Biga between Anzavur's men and the nationa1 forces that had been sent against him. Anzavur won the day. He scattered our troops, captured our artillery and heavy machine-guns, killed some of our officers and men and took others prisoner .

Hamdi Bey, the hero of Akbas, was among those killed. Then Ahmet Anzavur extended his criminal activities even further.


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