Democracy Promotion Fails in Post-Conflict Reconstruction/DDR

Democracy Promotion Fails in Post-Conflict Reconstruction/DDR

Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow Hoover Institute, In Search of Democracy, 2016, p. 23-4

The first lesson of the recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan is the first rule of all theorizing about democracy: In order to have a democratic state, a country must first have a state. And that requires an effective monopoly over the means of organized violence. However, when states have collapsed, often the only way to reestablish this monopoly quickly is through some kind of international military or peacekeeping intervention. Such an intervention must be prepared to use force even after the end of war to rein in spoilers and implement a plan for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants into a new national army and police. But a foreign intervention, particularly one that seeks to forge a certain kind of peace, may become the target of violent resistance. Moreover, when the international community intervenes to impose order, it also typically assumes responsibility for interim administration of the country, or at least for resurrecting some kind of indigenous government. Such an interim government may be able to gain public acquiescence for a time (partly in gratitude for the reduction of fear and violence). If it lacks any clear basis of representativeness, however, it may quickly find its legitimacy challenged. Increasingly, the response has been to rush to elections to fill the legitimacy voice, but this may only make matters worse if elections are not well prepared and if there has not been time for a representative plurality of parties to form, organize, and begin to canvas public support. The bulk of Chapter 22 offers guidelines for democracy promoters in post-conflict situations. Among these: study closely to the local context; commit adequate militarily and financial resources (and prior to that, assess carefully the difficulty of the task in order to judge the level of commitment necessary establish international legitimacy and support for the post-conflict intervention; generate legitimacy and trust within the post-conflict country; organize local elections before national ones; promote knowledge of democratic norms and institutional choices; disperse economic reconstruction funds and democratic assistance as widely as possible and promote local participation and ownership, not least in constitution-making.

US Democracy Assistance Causes Resentment

Marina Ottaway, Carnegie Endowment, 2008, Beyond the Façade: political reform in the Arab world, eds. M. Ottaway & J. Choucair-Vizoso, p. 4

The answers given to these questions from various quarters are usually more influenced by politics than rigorous analysis. Many Arabs chafing under the control of unpopular regimes tend to dismiss all changes as purely cosmetic, and they resent the approval expressed by Western governments and organizations for the steps enacted by Arab regimes. Regime supporters portray even modest measures as momentous indications of change, as does the Bush administration, anxious to convince the American public that its policies are working and that U.S. pressure is turning the Middle East into a more democratic region that is less of a danger to the United States.
TAKING CREDIT FOR DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE DELEGITIMIZES NEW DEMOCRACIES

Jennifer L. Windsor, Executive Director, Freedom House, 2010, House Hearing: Human Rights and Democracy Assistance: Increasing the Effectiveness of U.S. Foreign Aid, June 10, [http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg56888/html/CHRG-111hhrg56888.htm]

First, attributing progress in a country to specific U.S.-Government-funded programs may undermine the very legitimacy of groups and individuals that are the intended beneficiaries of those resources. If you say that assistance to Ukraine brought about the Ukrainian Orange revolution in Ukraine, that delegitimizes the very people that brought about that change. U.S. programs absolutely helped, but that doesn't mean that they have been--they themselves are the cause for the change.

Democracy Doesn’t Cause/Result From Economic Liberalization

Marina Ottaway, Carnegie Endowment, 2008, Beyond the Façade: political reform in the Arab world, eds. M. Ottaway & J. Choucair-Vizoso, p. 6

It is particularly important not to confuse all positive change taking place in a country with democratization. Economic reform does not automatically lead to democratization, and countries with abundant state control of and interference wit the market can be democratic, as the history of Western Europe after World War II shows. More recently, China has introduced breathtaking economic reforms without moving significantly in the direction of democracy. Singapore has educated its population, created a legal environment favorable to investment, and introduced many other positive changes thought to be conducive to democracy, but it is not moving toward democracy. Indonesia, in contrast, has seen some real change in the political realm in a socioeconomic environment that, by frequently used standards, is extremely unfavorable. Positive change can occur on man different fronts without democratizations, and there can be democratization while other conditions are poor.
NO EVIDENCE THAT ECONOMIC GROWTH SUPPORTS DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS

Julia Chocair-Vizoso, Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 2008, Beyond the Façade: political reform in the Arab world, eds. M. Ottaway & J. Choucair-Vizoso, p. 270

Furthermore, the partial economic liberalization launched by Arab states is unlikely to compromise their ability to maintain robust security services in the near term. Resource-rich states will continue to receive substantial revenues from both oil and gas industries, which are unlikely to be fully privatized. Resource-poor states like Egypt and Jordan capitalize on their geostrategic usefulness to the United States and receive substantial amounts of U.S. economic and military aid.