Civil Society Assistance Fails: Based on Faulty Assumptions

Civil Society Assistance Fails: Based on Faulty Assumptions

Marina Ottaway & Thomas Carothers, Carnegie Endowment, 2005, Unchartered Journey: promoting democracy in the middle east, eds. T. Carothers & M. Ottaway, p. 256

Francesco Cavatorta & Vincent Durac, International Relations Lecturers Dublin City University and University College Dublin, 2011, Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World: the dynamics of activism, p. 16-7

For its part, the United States government established the Middle East Partnership Initiative in 2002 with the objective of creating “educational opportunity at a grassroots level, promote economic opportunity and help foster private sector development, and to strengthen civil society and the rule of law throughout the region.” Much of the funding goes to civil society organizations as they are the most preferred partners according to the creators of the Initiative. Even the World Bank, which had never really tackled the question of democratization and political pluralism, is today very much concerned with these issues and has programs in place to promote them through its links with civil society organizations. While these new policy tools have proven to be ultimately unsuccessful in transforming the Middle East because of their inherent contradictions, such as the dilemma of pushing for a democratization that would favor anti-Western political movements, it does not negate the assumption that it is civil society that has to drive the change from below. This belief in the effectiveness of civil society reflects a very specific normative understanding of the concept. But, it is precisely at this juncture that the assumptions of the transition paradigm and assumptions concerning the role of civil society need to be re-evaluated in light of the criticism that they are not, in fact, very useful in analyzing the political reality we face.
ENTIRE SOLVENCY CLAIM FOR CIVIL SOCIETY RESTS ON FLAWED ASSUMPTIONS AND EXPECTATIONS

Benoit Challand, Research Fellow-European Institute in Florence, 2009, Palestinian Civil Society: foreign donors and the power to promote and exclude, p. 29-30

The main aspect underlined here is that NGOs have been often described in a benevolent manner, probably because of the teleological assumptions entailed in some of the democratization studies. But does civil society exist because of the existence of a modern liberal state, or, in a chicken-egg manner, does the modern state exist because of the existence of civil society? This is the paradox formulated by Michael Walzer: “a democratic civil society seems to require a strong and responsive state.”

A study of western history tends to show that some forms of civil society existed well before the founding of a modern democratic state with the establishment of guilds, corporations and the like, and that the civil society we tend to refer to is the product of international democratic arrangements. Therefore the whole functionalist expectations bestowed on civil society are flawed from the beginning. This type of democracy-centric expectations about civil society can be found in the many articles in the beginning of the 1990s trying to decide for once whether there is a civil society, say, in a Muslim majority society. Of course, authors could not find the “same” civil society as in the “west.” The fact is that there is a civil society in many of the Middle Eastern states but Western categories limit their perceptions.

A final, but small, analytical problem arises from the fact that advocacy NGOs – when not all NGOs – are too often equated with civil society. This is true not only for the academic production (as in the case of transnational studies), but also for some NGO actors in democratizing countries, proving thus the impact and influence of dominant interpretations of democratization and civil society upon domestic actors. Therefore, one should adopt a vocabulary about NGOs that does not bring together under the same label the two things of civil society and of one of its proxy, namely NGOs.

Benoit Challand, Research Fellow-European Institute in Florence, 2009, Palestinian Civil Society: foreign donors and the power to promote and exclude, p. 2

Without a thorough investigation of both concepts (origins and meaning of civil society in its European historical context, as well as the disputed existence of an Arab civil society), no satisfying and receivable conclusions can be attained about the potential success of civil society promotion by international donors in the Arab Middle East. There must be first an investigation about the assumptions, preferences and shortcomings of the concept of civil society on both sides (assuming that one accepts the temporary opposition western versus Arab), and deconstruct the way by which (political) Islam and (western) civil society are represented, at worst, as enemies, and at best as rather exclusive characteristics. To do so, attention will be dedicated to epistemological, political and institutional dimensions of civil society promotion in the Arab Middle East.
U.S. CIVIL SOCIETY ASSISTANCE BASED ON MANY INACCURATE CONCEPTIONS OF HOW THEY OPERATE AND WHAT THEY CAN ACHIEVE

Amy Hawthorne, Carnegie Endowment, 2005, Unchartered Journey: promoting democracy in the middle east, eds. T. Carothers & M. Ottaway, p. 104-5

The first myth is that democratization in authoritarian countries can occur without real politics and without conflict. The United States often seems to embrace a vision of civil society drawn from the “people power” model –citizens embracing democratic values and banding together to fight authoritarian rule. But at the same time, the United States is attracted to the idea of supporting civil society in the Middle East because it seems safely nonpolitical. The United States continues to be extremely apprehensive about real citizen mobilization in the Arab world and does not want civil society to play a mobilizing role. But in cases of democratic transitions where citizen movements emerged as an important democratic force, the decisive stages of such activism usually came not with democratic microparticipation through NGOs but with mass politics as a conflictive nature, such as mobilization, protests, and demonstrations. Such politics are often accompanied by extensive unrest and violence (for example, man hundreds of Indonesians were killed in the 1998 protests that pushed Suharto from power). This is not to suggest that the United States should encourage unrest and violence, obviously, but, rather to point out that fundamental political change is always destabilizing to a certain extent.

The second myth is that civil society activism can alone crate a democratic opening. In every case where citizen activism emerged as an important force in political change, it could only do so after broader social, economic, or political changes created new conditions that enabled this to happen.

The third myth is that civil society consists of latent democratic forces simply awaiting activation by Western donors. As was discussed above, in the Middle East different parts of civil society play different roles, and only some sectors have the potential or inclination to push for democratic change. It is unlikely that donor assistance can change this.

Amy Hawthorne, Carnegie Endowment, 2005, Unchartered Journey: promoting democracy in the middle east, eds. T. Carothers & M. Ottaway, p. 103

Finally, expectations about how democratization would occur were unrealistic. Projects that encouraged closer NGO-government interaction and cooperation had no demonstrable effect on improving the environment for civil society. With regard to advocacy programs, encouraging NGOs with dubious popular support to press government officials for policy changes raises the question of on whose behalf they are advocating. This approach bypasses the role of political parties in representing constituency interests to government, a key element of a democratic process. Moreover, encouraging advocacy on issues that excluded “religious and political” interests had the effect of encouraging a buzz of activity around marginal issues while core issues of power, contestation, and identity were supposed to remain taboo. Real advocacy must at some point touch on these issues, sensitive as they are.

The hope that microparticipation in civil society groups would generate broader democratic reform was similarly unrealistic. Democratization requires, among other things, an opening at the higher level of political institutions, contestation for national office, and expanded political liberties. These changes cannot be brought about by small numbers of citizens working to improve neighborhood garbage collection. Participation in ground-level community activities is valuable for many reasons, but such participation gains political meaning only when it leads to genuine empowerment.
AUTHORITARIAN GOVERNMENT CONTEXT OF MIDEAST CIVIL SOCIETY NEGATES ASSUMPTIONS OF LINK BETWEEN CSOs AND DEMOCRACY

Francesco Cavatorta & Vincent Durac, International Relations Lecturers Dublin City University and University College Dublin, 2011, Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World: the dynamics of activism, p. 29-30

In her book Barriers to Democracy, Jamal analyses the ways in which civil society dynamics in authoritarian contexts reinforce authoritarian rule and how an increase in trust and social capital has reverse effects on attitudes towards democracy. As we know, the conventional literature on civil society postulates that democratic change stems from the close correlation that exists between a vibrant associational life, the generation of social capital and the growth of democratic values and attitudes. However, Jamal challenges this assumption and argues that associational life in authoritarian contexts is distinctively different from that in established democracies. The dynamics that are produced by the relationship between authoritarian regimes and civil society organizations are fundamentally different, despite the fact that similar trends, such as the increase in interpersonal trust among association members, exist in both authoritarian and democratic contexts.

Jamal’s argument is that the authoritarian constraints put in place by the regime make it necessary for associations to decide how best to operate to fulfill their mandate and achieve their objectives within those constraints. If the association wants to achieve some of its objective and therefore succeed in seeing the most preferred policy implemented, it will have to play by the rules of the authoritarian regime. Thus, it is only by working through corrupt networks of patronage that the association will be able to satisfy the basic needs of its members and achieve its goals, because only the regime can deliver the “goods.” For example, if the social goal of an association is to deliver health care services in a specific neighborhood, it will have to obtain permits and licenses and will have to rely on suppliers of medicines and so on. Whatever the bureaucratic procedure the organization is involved in, mechanisms of patronage will enter into play. The decision to work through patronage and corrupt networks is made in the knowledge that this will “speed things up” and is therefore beneficial to the members of the group and the people it will serve. This might take place even if the individuals involved in the organization resent and oppose the regime in place, because what matters most is the organization’s overarching objective. A similar pattern occurs where organizations with a more distinctly political agenda are concerned. In this case, corrupt networks and personalistic links might be used to secure permission to benefit from foreign funds or to hold meetings. The contention is that the use of these networks of patronage reinforces the central role of the authoritarian regime, because they strengthen non-democratic access to decision-makers. Paradoxically, social capital increases within these associations because, by working within the constraints set, their members can be reasonably certain of positive outcomes for the group, which then has no interest in dismantling such networks in favor of fairer and more democratic ways of access to decision-makers since this would diminish their benefits. This remains the case despite their potential formal rejection of authoritarianism and their “democratic” ethos. It follows that the opposite is also true and that organizations which do not utilize or do not have patronage networks available to them have lower levels of social capital because of their more “democratic” values. Organizations that refuse to play within the given constraints, or that cannot do so because of their own structural weaknesses have a much harder time attaining their objectives, face harassment from the authorities and therefore display low levels of social capital.

Francesco Cavatorta & Vincent Durac, International Relations Lecturers Dublin City University and University College Dublin, 2011, Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World: the dynamics of activism, p. 18

It is therefore unsurprising that the concept and practical application of civil society in the context of democratization has also undergone a profound re-examination. The enthusiasm with which civil society has been adopted as the explanatory variable for a host of democratic processes has been dampened more recently in view of both new theoretical and empirical insights. From a theoretical point of view, the most significant contribution has come from those scholars who question the positive normative traits of civil society activism and, by implication, the associated belief that a stronger civil society leads inevitably to demands for more democratic participation in authoritarian settings. The enthusiasm for civil society relies greatly on the normative connotation of the concept and policymakers, as we have seen, still underpin their pro-democracy policies with the unquestioned assumption that strengthening civil society will inevitably lead to the dismantling of authoritarian rule. Once the positive normative liberal connotation of the concept is shed, its usefulness in examining the reality of civil life in any given context re-emerges because it is no longer linked to what is a partisan, albeit dominant, interpretation of the concept. This then facilitates the analysis of civil society in the context of authoritarianism and processes of democratization, as the focus of investigation is the nature and objectives of the associations and groups constituting civil society and not on civil society as a “normative” whole.
CIVIL SOCIETY NOT NECESSARILY PRO-DEMOCRACY

Amy Hawthorne, Carnegie Endowment, 2005, Unchartered Journey: promoting democracy in the middle east, eds. T. Carothers & M. Ottaway, p. 92

As noted at the beginning of this chapter, civil society is best understood in neutral terms, as the zone of voluntary associative life beyond family and clan ties and separate from the market. The form and character of such associative life can differ considerably, depending on the context. In democracies, the vast majority of civil society organizations are indeed civil and prodemocratic, influenced by a free political atmosphere, the rule of law, and the prevailing social consensus in favor of democratic values. But civil society organizations are not inherently counter-hegemonic or liberal; particularly in authoritarian environments, civil society can be dominated by apolitical, progovernment, or even illiberal groups that fulfill roles other than democratization. For civil society to play a democratizing role in such settings, a critical mass of organizations and movements must develop three key attributes: autonomy from the regime, a prodemocracy agenda, and the ability to build coalitions with other sectors of civil society (and other forces, such as political parties) to push for democratic change. Civil society in the Arab world has not yet acquired these attributes.
DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE RESTS ON PROBLEMATIC ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS

Eric Davis, Political Science Professor-Rutgers, 2009, Publics, Politics and Participation: locating the public sphere in the middle east and north Africa, ed. S. Shami, p. 387-8

From a different perspective, the literature on democratic transitions provides another example of the danger of overemphasizing the problems associated with applying Western concepts in non-Western contexts. The notion of the “prerequisites of democracy” that preoccupied much of the modernization literature of the late 1950s and early 1960s ultimately proved to be a poor predictor of the development of democracies in non-Western societies. The spread of democratic governance to many areas of the non-Western world during the 1990s, following the fall of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, points to the problematic character of much of the prior theorizing on “democratic transitions,” which argued that a nation-state needs to reach a certain level of economic development before democratic governance can take hold. The fact that many poorer countries such as Mali, Benin, Malawi, Mozambique, Nepal, and Bangladesh have, in recent years, been able to establish and sustain democratic polities, at least in the sense of participatory elections, suggests that, in certain instances, concepts may travel across cultural boundaries with fewer problem than might, at first glance, seems possible.
SUCCESS OF CIVIL SOCIETY BASED ON FAULTY ASSUMPTIONS

Mathijs van Leeuwen, Professor Radboud University-Netherlands, 2009, Partners in Peace: discourses and practices of civil-society peacebuilding, p. 41-2

Denise M. Horn, Professor International Studies-Northeastern University, 2010, Women, Civil Society and the Geopolitics of Democratization, p. 12-3

The transitologists were followed by the “conslidationists” who examined “consolidated” democracies, where it appeared that democratic institutions were beginning to take root. The definition of democracy, however, remained rather superficial, based upon an institutional approach rather than real structural and attitudinal changes. The literature has since begun to question the efficacy of democratization efforts, particularly those that promote the (supposedly independent) NGO sector as the central focus of civil society. If we think about NGOs as a mechanism of hegemonic influence, however, the debate is refocused—the structural and attitudinal changes we would expect to see in democratization are reinforced by international ideological and political concerns. Civil society no longer represents a site of contestation set between the private and public sectors within a state, but has become a site of interaction (and influence) between local civil societies and global politics.

The idea—however tenuous—that civil society and democratization are parallel processes has a strong hold on European and American policy makers. This speaks to the construction of civil society as imagined by Western European and American scholars. In the neo-Tocquevillian model, for example civil society is predicated on the freedom (of the individual) to act according to his (or her, but generally his) personal social predilections or political bent, which ultimately results in democratic political organization. The relationship between democratic institutions and civil society then becomes a mutually reinforcing relationship; civil society in non-democratic states, as Foley and Edwards note, will become a site of radicalism against the state. Democracy begets democratic civil society—but civil society is necessary to beget democracy. This is the paradox Walzer brings to our attention: given power imbalances within civil society, and the inequities of state power, “only a democratic state can create a democratic civil society.” Nevertheless, civil society has come to be viewed by theorists and policy makers alike “as a necessary precondition or companion of democracy in every context.”