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Impacts - War

Democracies promote peace – solve disputes without warfare.

Ray ‘1 - Department of Political Science, Vanderbilt University (James Lee, “DOES DEMOCRACY CAUSE PEACE?” February 1, https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/ray.htm) //DK

Does democracy cause peace? The empirical evidence in favor of the proposition that democratic states have not initiated and are not likely to initiate interstate wars against each other is substantial, especially when compared with that whichcould be brought to bear by specialists in the 1970s. Criticismof this evidence has so far met with reasonably persuasivecounterarguments by the defenders of the proposition. Despitea common opinion to the contrary, the theoretical bases for the hypothesis regarding the absence of war between democratic states are highly developed and may to some extent be complementary as well as competitive. For example, some factors may make democratic states unlikely to become involved in serious, militarized disputes in the first place, while other factors enable them to resolve serious disputes without warfare when they do occur.No scientific evidence is entirely definitive, and the greaternumber of democratic states in the post–Cold War era mayincrease opportunities for conflicts that will cast grave doubtson the democratic peace proposition. But for the moment at least,well-developed theoretical bases reinforce a lengthy list of systematic empirical analyses in support of that proposition. Moreover, the multiple streams of arguments and evidence supporting the proposition are highly diverse in character: epistemological(Rummel 1975), philosophical (Doyle 1986), formal (Bueno deMesquita & Lalman 1992; B Bueno de Mesquita, R Siverson,unpublished data), historical (Weart 1994, Ray 1995, Owen 1994),experimental (Mintz & Geva 1993), anthropological (Emberet al 1992, Crawford 1994), psychological (Kegley & Hermann1995), economic (Brawley 1993, Weede 1996b), political (Gaubatz1991), and statistical (Ray & Russett 1996, p. 458). Perhaps,then, the more defensible of the two possible definitive answersto the question "Does democracy cause peace?" is "Yes."

Democracy solves war – prefer our reverse causal, empirically supported evidence

In addition to improving the lives of individual citizens in new democracies, the spread of democracy will benefit the international system by reducing the likelihood of war. Democracies do not wage war on other democracies. This absence-or near absence, depending on the definitions of "war" and "democracy" used-has been called "one of the strongest nontrivial and nontautological generalizations that can be made about international relations."51 One scholar argues that "the absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations."52 If the number of democracies in the international system continues to grow, the number of potential conflicts that might escalate to war will diminish. Although wars between democracies and nondemocracies would persist in the short run, in the long run an international system composed of democracies would be a peaceful world. At the very least, adding to the number of democracies would gradually enlarge the democratic "zone of peace."

No war – democracies have no justification to fight each other

The normative explanation of the democratic peace argues that norms that democracies share preclude wars between democracies. One version of this argument contends that liberal states do not fight other liberal states because to do so would be to violate the principles of liberalism. Liberal states only wage war when it advances the liberal ends of increased individual freedom. A liberal state cannot advance liberal ends by fighting another liberal state, because that state already upholds the principles of liberalism. In other words, democracies do not fight because liberal ideology provides no justification for wars between liberal democracies.59 A second version of the normative explanation claims that democracies share a norm of peaceful conflict resolution. This norm applies between and within democratic states. Democracies resolve their domestic conflicts without violence, and they expect that other democracies will resolve inter-democratic international disputes peacefully.60

No war – democracies have checks in place to avoid rushing into war with each other

Institutional/structural explanations for the democratic peace contend that democratic decision-making procedures and institutional constraints prevent democracies from waging war on one another. At the most general level, democratic leaders are constrained by the public, which is sometimes pacific and generally slow to mobilize for war. In most democracies, the legislative and executive branches check the war-making power of each other. These constraints may prevent democracies from launching wars. When two democracies confront one another internationally, they are not likely to rush into war. Their leaders will have more time to resolve disputes peacefully.61 A different sort of institutional argument suggests that democratic processes and freedom of speech make democracies better at avoiding myths and misperceptions that cause wars.62

No war – multiple checks and barriers

Some studies have attempted to test the relative power of the normative and institutional/structural explanations of the democratic peace.63 It might make more sense, however, to specify how the two work in combination or separately under different conditions. For example, in liberal democracies liberal norms and democratic processes probably work in tandem to synergistically produce the democratic peace.64 Liberal states are unlikely to even contemplate war with one another. They thus will have few crises and wars. In illiberal or semiliberal democracies, norms play a lesser role and crises are more likely, but democratic institutions and processes may still make wars between illiberal democracies rare. Finally, state-level factors like norms and domestic structures may interact with international-systemic factors to prevent wars between democracies. If democracies are better at information-processing, they may be better than nondemocracies at recognizing international situations where war would be foolish. Thus the logic of the democratic peace may explain why democracies sometimes behave according to realist (systemic) predictions.

Prefer our evidence -

More proof – democracies do not go to war with one another – prefer our statistically, empirically supported evidence

Prefer our evidence – theirs is not founded in empirically supported data

Several criticisms of the democratic peace proposition fault the logic that has been advanced to explain the apparent absence of war between democracies. These arguments do not rest on an assessment of the empirical evidence, but instead rely on analyses and critiques of the internal consistency and persuasiveness of the theoretical explanations of the democratic peace. Critics have offered four major challenges to the logic of the democratic peace: (a) there is no consensus on the causal mechanisms that keep democracies at peace: (b) the possibility that democracies may turn into nondemocracies means that even democracies operate according to realist principles; (c) the structural-institutional explanation of the democratic peace is flawed, not least because its logic also would predict that democracies are less likely to be involved in any wars, not just wars with other democracies; and (d) the normative explanation of the democratic peace is unpersuasive.

Prefer our evidence – just because we don’t know for a fact why exactly democracies don’t go to war doesn’t mean that they don’t

AT: Democracies  War

Criticisms of democracy are wrong – history proves democracies are more peaceful and stable than any other governmental form. US demo promo empirically succeed

Karatnycky 97 president of Freedom House, senior fellow at the Atlantic Council's Program on Transatlantic Relations and managing partner of Myrmidon Group LLC, a New York based consultancy that works with investors and corporations seeking entry into the complex emerging markets of Ukraine and Eastern Europe, founder and co-director of the Ukrainian-Jewish Encounter, frequent contributor to Foreign Affairs, Newsweek, the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, the Financial Times, the International Herald Tribune, and many other periodicals. He is co-author of three books and co-editor of eight books on Soviet and post-Soviet themes [Adrian Karatnycky, “Still the Bedrock of a Better World”, The Washington Post, December 29 1997, accessed via LexisNexis June 29 2013] SM

Kaplan has written that democracies excite ethnic and nationalist passions, frequently leading to turmoil and violence. Moreover, he claims, they are unable to make the reform necessary for economic progress. Zakaria has little sympathy for authoritarian solutions, but he argues that democracy cannot be manufactured; it requires the centuries-long maturing of societies and institutions in a framework of "constitutional liberalism."¶ Rosenfeld agrees with Zakaria and Kaplan. He argues that you need "the sort of propertied professional middle class it takes a century or two to shape. . . ." The only trouble with this postulate is the historical record. The centuries-long development of propertied middle classes in Europe did not lead to the emergence of liberal ideas in the 1920s and 1930s, but became the breeding ground for Nazi racism and fascism.¶ By contrast, India avoided ethnocide and genocide under democratic electoral rule held well before its extensive middle class emerged. Amid acute poverty, India's democracy has pursued difficult and much-needed free-market reforms. Similar progress in freedom and tolerance can be observed in democratic post-conflict South Africa and in Nicaragua and EI Salvador, two of the hemisphere's poorest countries, which have healed the wounds of protracted civil war in part through the agency of democratic electoral processes. And in the impoverished Philippines, an electoral democracy has deepened the roots of freedom and established a growing economy through tough-minded market reform.¶ The problem with the new-found pessimism about democracy is that it is misplaced. It blames the victim by wrongly ascribing violence and turmoil to the actions of weak new democracies rather than to the military coups or illiberal insurgencies to which they fall prey.¶ A second problem with this skepticism is that it is unjustified. Each year, Freedom House issues a year-end survey of the state of political rights and civil liberties around the world. In 1995, there were 117 democratically elected governments, of which 76 were free. This year's just-released survey finds that while the number of democracies has remained static at 117, the number of free countries has increased to 81. What accounts for this trend? Successive competitive elections, which result in stronger political parties, stimulate debate over policy alternatives and force leaders to face the judgment of public opinion. Moderation and incremental liberalization are the result. In short, trends suggest that what Farced Zakaria calls "illiberal democracies" are in decline.¶ The record of many electoral democracies that have faced ethnic and separatist conflicts and tensions confounds Robert Kaplan's claim that democracy inflames nationalist passions. In Russia, the war in Chechnya ground to a halt under the pressure of voter discontent (President Yeltsin began serious negotiations weeks before the June 1996 elections amid growing popularity of antiwar candidate Aleksandr Lebed). In Moldova, despite civil war in a breakaway region, democratic elections saw the weakening of the appeal of the more extreme nationalist parties. In Ukraine, a combination of elections and federalism has preserved the peace in predominantly Russian Crimea, which many predicted would be an ethnic tinderbox. Even Turkey, which continues to suppress its Kurdish minority and has a poor human rights record, has a military that cannot engage in wanton destruction in part because of the constraints imposed by the democratically elected civilian leadership and a vibrant civil society. In short, restraint, constraint, negotiation and compromise are more likely if leaders know that their policies are subject to regular public review and electoral disapproval.¶ Contrast this with the record of nondemocratic states. Serbia's authoritarian leader has fomented hate-based nationalism and backed proxies in a war against the democratically accountable leaders of Bosnia. The dictatorship in Burma has pursued a relentless war against the Karen minority. And there is the ruthless anti-Kurdish war that has been waged by Saddam Hussein.¶ In the end, the pessimism of the democracy skeptics isn't always so pessimistic. Fareed Zakaria is right to suggest that it is better to "consolidate democracy where it has taken root and to encourage the gradual development of constitutional liberalism around the globe." But if he examines the record, he will find that authoritarian rulers rarely are enlightened and almost never are willing to countenance constitutional liberalism based on checks and balances and limits on their power. By contrast, the record shows that constitutional liberalism tends to evolve even in weak electoral democracies that don't possess the institutional and civic structures of mature free societies.¶ Despite the doubts of some critics, the United States' promotion of democratic values, civil society and democratic elections pursued vigorously under Presidents Reagan and Clinton has done a great deal of good. It has transformed the political and economic face of Eastern Europe and Latin America. It has brought hundreds of millions of people greater personal liberty and autonomy. It has promoted democratic openings in Asia and Africa.¶ While it is right to take a hard look at what works and what doesn't in the effort to expand the scope of democracy and human liberty, a decade of efforts to promote democratic transitions around the world has not failed, as Stephen Rosenfeld suggests. It has made the world a better place. But more important, the promotion of democracy has increased the prospect that in the years ahead the world will be better still.

AT: Backsliding

No backslide – democracies don’t revert back to autocracies and can be stopped even if they start to

The Argument: A second criticism of the logic of the democratic peace argues that democracies cannot enjoy a perpetual peace among themselves because there is always a possibility that a democratic state will become nondemocratic. This possibility means that even democracies must be concerned about the potential threat posed by other democracies. John Mearsheimer argues that: "Liberal democracies must therefore worry about relative power among themselves, which is tantamount to saying that each has an incentive to consider aggression against the other to forestall future trouble."77 In other words, the realist logic of anarchy, which posits that states exist in a Hobbesian world of fear, suspicion and potential war, applies even to relations between democracies.78¶ Response: There are four reasons for rejecting claims that fears of democratic backsliding compel democracies to treat other democracies as they would treat any nondemocratic state. First, the historical record shows that mature, stable democracies rarely become autocracies.79¶ Second, democracies are able to recognize and respond to states that are making a transition from democracy to authoritarianism. Democratic states thus can pursue a policy of accommodation toward other democracies, hedge their bets with more cautious policies toward unstable or uncertain democracies, and abandon accommodation when democracies turn into nondemocracies. There is no reason to assume that democracies will become autocracies overnight and then immediately launch attacks on democracies.¶ Third, like some other realist arguments, the claim that states must give priority to preparing for an unlikely dangerous future development rests on flawed logic. It assumes that states must base their foreign policies almost entirely on worst-case scenarios. Similar logic would imply that, for example, citizens in any country should act on the basis of the assumption that domestic law and order might collapse into anarchy and violence.¶ Fourth, the claim that democracies must worry about the relative power of other democracies (which may become autocracies) relies on the same shaky logic that predicts that states cannot cooperate because they need to worry about the relative gains achieved by other states. The relative-gains argument holds that in international politics, cooperation is rare because it often gives greater gains to one state, and these relative disparities in gains can be turned into advantages in power than can be used to threaten the state that gains less.80 The relative-gains argument sometimes assumes that states have high and constant concerns about relative gains. In practice, however, relative-gains concerns vary and are often almost nonexistent.81

AT: Peace Theory Flawed

Prefer our evidence – criticisms of the structural/institutional theory for democratic peace are flawed

Lynn-Jones 98 Editor, International Security; Series Editor, Belfer Center Studies in International Security, member of the Editorial Board of Security Studies, His articles have appeared in Foreign Policy, International Security, and Security Studies, as well as in many edited volumes [Sean Lynn-Jones, "Why the United States Should Spread Democracy", Belfer Center Programs or Projects: International Security, March 1998, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/2830/why_the_united_states_should_spread_democracy.html] SM
The Argument: Critics of the structural-institutional explanation of the democratic peace make the following arguments. First, the structural-institutional model fails to explain why democracies go to war with nondemocracies, even though they do not fight other democracies. If leaders of democracies are constrained from going to war by the public, this constraint would also prevent democracies from fighting nondemocracies.82 Many studies report, however, that democracies have the same rate of war involvement as nondemocracies.¶ Second, critics argue that the public is often just as warlike as the leaders that they are supposed to constrain. Public jingoism and enthusiasm for war accompanied the outbreak of World War One and helped cause the Spanish-American War. The structural-institutional model thus erroneously assumes that the people are usually more pacific than their leaders.83 A related argument suggests that recent extended intervals of peace may have led publics to forget the horrors of war. The end of conscription in many countries and the tendency for wars to be fought by volunteer professional armies may further erode public opposition to the use of force.84¶ Response: The criticisms of the structural-institutional explanation of the democratic peace are not persuasive, for four reasons. First, this explanation can account for why democracies only avoid wars with other democracies, because democracies may behave differently toward states (i.e., democracies) with domestic institutions that constrain their ability to go to war quickly. Democracies may distinguish between states on the basis of their political institutions, and pursue different policies toward those that are constrained by democratic institutions. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman argue that "some political institutions help foster beliefs ... about the dovish inclinations of certain states. Democratic institutions are visible signs that the state in question is likely to face high political costs for using force in its diplomacy."85 A slightly different form of the argument suggests that the constraints of democratic decision-making become much more severe when the government of a democracy attempts to mobilize the country for war against a fellow democracy. Thus the institutional argument does not actually predict that democracies will pursue peaceful policies toward all types of states.¶ Second, the institutional-structural explanation, properly formulated, need not rest on the assumption that the public is peace-loving while leaders are eager to go to war. Some proponents of the democratic peace proposition, including Immanuel Kant, have assumed that the people are less eager to favor war, because they will ultimately be forced to pay its costs.86 The logic of the theory, however, can be recast in terms of checks and balances. In a democracy, the executive branch, legislative branch, and the public all constrain each other''s ability to make rash and hasty decisions for war.¶ Third, the critics overlook how the existence of domestic constraints in a pair of democratic states can enable a democratic dyad to spend more time seeking a peaceful settlement of a conflict than a dyad with one or no democracies. If both states in a crisis are unable to mobilize quickly, they will have more time to resolve the crisis without war. Bruce Russett argues: "If another nation''s leaders regard a state as democratic, they will anticipate a difficult and lengthy process before the democracy is likely to use significant military force against them. They will expect an opportunity to reach a negotiated settlement."87¶ Finally, critics of the institutional-structural explanation have not addressed the claim that democratic institutions endow democracies with better information-processing capabilities that enable democracies to limit the myths that cause war and to avoid wars when international circumstances render war unwise.

No war – critiques of the statistical support for democratic peace are factually inaccurate and/or skewed

Impact – War (Impact Calc)

Prefer our evidence – even if democracies fight 0.1% of the time, that’s still a reason to vote aff

AT: Alt Causes

No alt causes – empirics support that there’s no alt causes to the democratic peace

No alt causes – lack of a chance to fight does not explain the democratic peace

Response: The most sophisticated statistical analyses of the evidence for the democratic peace take these variables into account and still conclude that there is a strong relationship between democracy and peace.108

No alt causes – realism doesn’t explain the democratic peace

AT: Democratization leads to war

No risk of a turn – democratization does not lead to war, and even if it does it’s still net better than not democratizing

Lynn-Jones 98 Editor, International Security; Series Editor, Belfer Center Studies in International Security, member of the Editorial Board of Security Studies, His articles have appeared in Foreign Policy, International Security, and Security Studies, as well as in many edited volumes [Sean Lynn-Jones, "Why the United States Should Spread Democracy", Belfer Center Programs or Projects: International Security, March 1998, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/2830/why_the_united_states_should_spread_democracy.html] SM
The Argument: One of the most important arguments against U.S. efforts to promote democracy is the claim that countries engaged in transitions to democracy become more likely to be involved in war. Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder make this argument and support it with statistical evidence that shows a correlation between democratization and war. They suggest that several causal mechanisms explain why democratization tends to lead to war. First, old elites play the nationalist card in an effort to incite conflict so that they can retain power. Second, in emerging democracies without strong democratic institutions new rulers compete for support by playing the nationalist card and search for foreign scapegoats for failures.113 This type of electoral competition increases the risk of internal and international conflict.¶ The argument that democratization causes war does not directly challenge the usual form of the democratic peace proposition. Mansfield and Snyder recognize that "It is probably true that a world where more countries were mature, stable democracies would be safer and preferable for the United States."114 Instead, the arguments suggests that attempts to spread democracy have significant risks, including the risk of war.¶ Responses: Mansfield and Snyder have advanced an important new argument, but even if partially true, it does not refute the case for spreading democracy internationally. Taken to extremes, the Mansfield/Snyder argument would amount to a case for opposing all political change on the grounds that it might cause instability. Promoting democracy makes more sense than this course, because the risks of democratization are not so high and uncontrollable that we should give up on attempts to spread democracy.¶ First, there are reasons to doubt the strength of the relationship between democratization and war. Other quantitative studies challenge the statistical significance of Mansfield and Snyder''s results, suggest that there is an even stronger connection between movements toward autocracy and the onset of war, find that it is actually unstable transitions and reversals of democratization that increase the probability of war, and argue that democratization diminishes the likelihood of militarized international disputes.115 In particular, autocracies are likely to exploit nationalism and manipulate public opinion to launch diversionary wars-the same causal mechanisms that Mansfield and Snyder claim are at work in democratizing states. Mansfield and Snyder themselves point out that "reversals of democratization are nearly as risky as democratization itself," thereby bolstering the case for assisting the consolidation of new democracies.116 In addition, very few of the most recent additions to the ranks of democracies have engaged in wars. In Central and Eastern Europe, for example, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia have avoided major internal and external conflicts. Of these countries, only Slovenia was involved in brief series of military skirmishes with Serbia.117 Russia has been involved in a number of small wars on or near its borders, but so far it has undergone a dramatic transition toward democracy without becoming very warlike.118 There is little evidence of international war in Latin America, which also has witnessed a large-scale transition to democracy in recent years. Countries such as Mongolia and South Africa appear to have made the transition to democracy without going to war. The new democracies plagued by the most violence, including some former Soviet republics and the republics of the former Yugoslavia, are those that are the least democratic and may not qualify as democracies at all.¶ All of this evidence suggests that whatever may have increased the war-proneness of democratizing states in the past may not be present in the contemporary international system. It may be that states making the transition from feudalism to democracy became more war-prone or that the emerging democracies of the 19th century were European great powers that embarked on imperial wars of conquest. These factors will not lead today''s new democracies into war. Finally, if the democratic peace proposition is correct, the higher proportion of democracies in the current international system may further reduce the risk that new democracies will not engage in war, because they will find themselves in a world of many democracies instead of one of many potentially hostile nondemocracies.¶ Second, it is possible to control any risks of war posed by democratization. Mansfield and Snyder identify several useful policies to mitigate any potential risks of democratization. Old elites that are threatened by democratization can be given "golden parachutes" that enable them to at least retain some of their wealth and to stay out of jail.119 New democracies also need external assistance to build up the journalistic infrastructure that will support a "marketplace of ideas" that can prevent manipulation of public opinion and nationalistic mythmaking.120 Finally, an international environment conducive to free trade can help to move new democracies in a benign direction.121

AT: Transition Impossible

Now ripe for transition - Domestic conditions in Cuba triggered

Simonyi and Otero 3/12 - Ambassador András Simonyi (60) is the Managing Director of the Center for Transatlantic Relations (CTR) at The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, Washington D.C.; and former Ambassador of Bolivia to the United States. (András Simonyi and Jaime Aparicio Otero, the Huffington Post, “Cuba's Future Transition to Democracy Can Be a Success,” 3/12/13, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andras-simonyi/cubas-future-transition-t_b_2859520.html, accessed 6/26/13, IS)

It is too early to say how Hugo Chavez's passing will effect developments elsewhere in the region. One wonders first and foremost about the consequences on and in Cuba. It is a reminder to the Castro brothers that power is ephemeral. Cuba is ready for change. In spite of the efforts by the regime to paint a rosy picture, eye witnesses tell a sad story. Living conditions are bad, the economy survives only at the mercy of Venezuela. The Inter-American Human Rights Commission, in its 2012 a report on Cuba, speaks of "permanent and systematical violations of the fundamental rights of Cuban citizens." Ironically, however while the Cuban people suffer, the regime is internationally stronger than ever. Progressive rock musicians, like Gorki in the band Porno Para Ricardo, are prevented from writing and performing freely. The international pressure for the respect for human rights is weak and inefficient. It seems like the ethic conscience of the west is comfortable with the situation. It shouldn't be. Solidarity with the people submitted to human rights violations by dictatorships is a moral imperative. However, the opposition movement is gaining voice, even in face of a forgetful international community. They are increasingly self-confident. Oswaldo Paya is now dead, but others, like Yoani Sanchez stepped into his place. Courageous people, who defy threats and speak more and more openly about the true state of the country. They deserve all the support they ask for. Cuba is ripe for change.

AT: No Rights Abuses

Be skeptical of their evidence – human rights abuses are rampant, but are often covered up by the totalitarian Cuban government.

Rogers 4/18 - Crime and Courts Reporter for the Manrietta Times, expert on sociology and human rights in foreign nations (Jasmine, Manrietta Times, “WSCC highlights human rights violations in Cuba,” 4/18/13, http://www.newsandsentinel.com/page/content.detail/id/573141/WSCC-highlights-human-rights-violations-in-Cuba.html?nav=5061, accessed 6/25/13, IS)

MARIETTA - In hopes of raising awareness about the ongoing human rights violations taking place in Cuba, Washington State Community College is hosting a trio of Cuban human rights activists for a series of discussions that start today and lead up to an open forum to be held at the college Saturday.¶ The three-day event is part of the Evergreen Arts and Humanities series.¶ "In America, we don't hear a lot about human rights violations. We may hear something about China, or North Korea or Burma. But rarely is the issue addressed concerning Cuba, which is only 90 miles away from American soil," said Tanya Wilder, chair of the Evergreen Arts and Humanities series.¶ The event will feature John Suarez, the International Secretary for the Cuban Democratic Directorate, Anna Lee, the Christian Solidarity Worldwide Advocacy officer for Latin America and Laido Carro, president of the Coalition of Cuban-American Women and a Cuban exile.¶ Cuba has been under a totalitarian regime for 54 years, the longest running tyranny currently suffered by any country, said Carro, who fled the country at age 12 shortly after the Cuban Revolution began.¶ "The brutality of what is going on over there is not known because of the propaganda, because this is a police state that uses all its resources to make sure the world thinks otherwise," said Carro, who regularly communicates with activists still in Cuba.¶ The recent transfer of power from Fidel Castro to his brother Raul in 2011 was followed by a loosening of restrictions for Cubans who wanted to travel outside of the country.¶ However, the move was purely tactical, said Carro.¶ The government routinely kills and tortures dissidents who speak out against the Communist regime, she said.¶ "When you talk to people in other counties they don't believe you. It is a priority to make sure everyone understands what is there 90 miles away," said Carro.

AT: Aff Worsens Human Rights

And the affirmative’s world of travel is not mutually exclusive from an improvement in human rights. Capitalism and increased wealth are critical to political and social freedoms.

Coyne 07 – Writer for the Economist in New York, analyst of economic development in rising nations. Also Harper Professor of Economics at George Mason University. (Chris, The Economist, “Capitalism and democracy: friends or foes?,” 8/27/07, http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2007/08/guest_blogger_chris_coyne, accessed 6/25/13, IS)

IN THE current issue of Foreign Policy, former U.S. secretary of labor, Robert Reich, contends that capitalism and democracy are not complements as is often assumed. According to Mr Reich¶ Conventional wisdom holds that where either capitalism or democracy flourishes, the other must soon follow. Yet today, their fortunes are beginning to diverge. Capitalism, long sold as the yin to democracy’s yang, is thriving, while democracy is struggling to keep up. ¶ The cause of this divergence, Mr Reich contends, is that companies seeking an advantage over global competitors have invested increasing amounts of money in government lobbying, public relations and bribery. This process of corporations' “writing their own rules” has weakened the ability of average citizens to have their voices heard through the democratic process.¶ Mr Reich is correct to emphasize the importance of the rules of the games for economic, political and social outcomes. The rules of the game provide incentives for individuals to pursue certain courses of action. Interactions by the same individuals will have very different outcomes under different institutional arrangements.¶ The key, then, is to change the rules of the game so that the unproductive rent-seeking activities of corporations are minimized. This is easier said than done. Although an increasing number of economists are exploring the process of institutional change, our understanding of the mechanisms that facilitate sustainable change is still rudimentary.¶ While I agree with Mr Reich’s focus on the rules of the game, I am not convinced that capitalism and democracy are at odds. The late Milton Friedman emphasized that economic freedom promotes political freedom and is also necessary for the sustainability of political freedom over time. His underlying logic is that competitive capitalism separates economic power from political power. One could point to Chile, Taiwan and South Korea as examples where Friedman’s logic seems to hold.¶ Tyler Cowen and Eric Jones have highlighted the cultural gains from capitalism. They conclude that trade in cultural products exposes societies to alternative institutions, values and ideals. Based on this same reasoning, I have written on the importance of free trade in goods, services and cultural products as a means of exporting the foundations of liberal economic, political and social institutions.

AT: US Forcing Demo on Them

Cuban populous wants democracy

UPI, 2011 (“Poll: Cubans want democracy”, 11/23, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2011/11/23/Poll-Cubans-want-democracy/UPI-67761322080731/)//AB

Some three-quarters of the people of Communist Cuba largely favor switching to democracy and a market economy, results of a poll indicate. El Nuevo Herald in Miami reported Wednesday the poll by the International Republican Institute found three of four Cubans favor multiparty elections, freedom of expression and other aspects of democracy. It also said nearly 90 percent said they want to convert to a market economy, including the right to own property and run their own businesses. The survey also found 70 percent of respondents are skeptical of Cuban President Raul Castro's reforms, with 52 percent saying they don't see any evidence of reform. "There are a lot of headlines here in the U.S. about changes coming to Cuba, but IRI's survey shows that the Cuban people themselves are not necessarily seeing it so far," IRI President Lorne W. Craner said in a statement Monday. The poll was conducted in July and is based on the responses of 572 adult Cubans. The newspaper didn't report a margin of error.

AT: Castro Democratizing Now

Liberalization is not happening in the SQ. Castro hasn’t and won’t do anything to liberalize his people.

Miami Herald 2/26 (The Miami Herald, “Cuba’s Raúl Castro’s proclaimed changes are no more than lipstick on a zombie,” 2/26/13, http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/02/26/3255364/cubas-raul-castros-proclaimed.html, accessed 6/28/13, IS)

In Juan of the Dead, an enterprising but admittedly lazy Cuban and his small band of friends face a Havana full of zombies (the regime claims they are dissidents but Juan knows better) by starting a zombie-disposal service. At one point in the comedic, award-winning Spanish film made in Cuba, Juan answers the phone and a plea to get rid of “the old man” with a subtle line: “ Compañero, you’ll have to handle that family matter yourself.”¶ After 54 years of the Castro brothers’ communist dictatorship, a new generation of Cubans want to take charge of their destiny, to rid themselves of the zombies who blindly follow the Castros.¶ On Sunday, Raúl Castro seemed to toss them a lifeline — the 81-year-old successor to his ailing brother Fidel says he’s leaving Cuba’s presidency in five years and that the communist island’s constitution will soon include term limits for future leaders.¶ Castro tapped Miguel Diaz-Canel, a 52-year-old engineer, now seen as his potential successor, for first vice president. He also shook up the rubber-stamp National Assembly by promoting 69-year-old Esteban Lazo Hernandez, Cuba’s highest ranking black official, to replace Ricardo Alarcon, 75, who served for two decades as assembly president.¶ No doubt, Raúl Castro expects the international community to see these changes as the Great Awakening for Cuba’s leadership gerontocracy, a “historic transcendence” for a new generation to take the mantle and for Afro Cubans to finally bust the iron ceiling that has kept black Cubans from key positions.¶ If only that were so. This is nothing more than lipstick on a zombie.¶ The dictatorship may get a new face but no one elevated by Fidel or Raúl Castro can be considered a Cuban leader in the image of, say, the former Soviet Union’s reformer, Mikhail Gorbachev.¶ Indeed, Diaz-Canel is not the first “young” leader to be seen as a potential heir to lead the one-party state. Remember former Foreign Ministers Roberto Robaina and Felipe Perez Roque? Or former Vice President Carlos Lage? All have disappeared from public view, ousted by the Castro brothers when they became too big for their political britches.¶ As for U.S. policy toward Cuba, there’s nothing in Sunday’s proclamations from Havana that would warrant a thawing of relations. The Obama administration already has made it easier for Cuban Americans to visit their loved ones in Cuba and send remittances. As the State Department spokesman Patrick Ventrell noted on Monday, the United States remains “hopeful for the day that the Cuban people get democracy, when they can have the opportunity to freely pick their own leaders. We’re clearly not there yet.”¶ Certainly the Helms-Burton law that maintains the U.S. embargo requires more than a promise of some elusive change five years from now when the dictatorship will be 59 years old.¶ Diaz-Canel, a former higher education minister and ex-head of the Communist Party in Villa Clara and Holguin provinces, has been traveling with Raúl Castro on key missions abroad and leading delegations on other trips. He is reported to have been in charge of many of Raúl Castro’s economic changes, such as allowing the sale of homes and lifting travel restrictions for some Cubans. All these are seen as efforts to bolster Cuba’s ever-depressed top-down economy, which Raúl Castro maintains are ways to “perfect socialism, not destroy it.”¶ Like we said, lipstick on a zombie.

AT: Tourism Now

Cuba’s tourism industry is running low

Tamayo, 6/18 – (Juan, “Cuba cites drop in U.S., European arrivals as tourism sags”, Miami Herald, 6/18, http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/06/17/3456404/tourism-to-cuba-sags-mostly-because.html)//AB

Cuba’s tourism arrivals shrank by nearly 5 percent in April compared to the same month last year, largely because of significant drops in visitors from the United States and southern Europe, according to official reports. But its income from tourism held steady, apparently as Cuba raised its prices and reached out to more big-spending tourists, moving away from its traditional attractions of low-cost, all-inclusive beach resorts. Cuba’s National Statistic Office (ONE) reported that tourist arrivals fell from 288,000 in April of last year to 274,000 in the same month this year — a 4.9 percent drop. The 1.2 million visitors for the first four months of this year was 1.4 percent down from the same period in 2012. Of the 18 source countries listed separately by ONE, the three at the top — Canada, United Kingdom and Germany — saw increases of 1.3 percent, 8.1 percent and 11.8 percent, respectively. Visitors from Spain plunged by 29.5 percent from April to April — from 6,359 to 3,834 — from Italy by 7.2 percent and from France by 6.8 percent, according to the ONE report. But the most significant drop was in the “other” category, which ONE uses to lump together arrivals from the United States and all other countries with less than 2,000 or so tourists. That fell from 63,248 in April of last year to 54,771 this April — 13.4 percent. Arrivals from “other” countries also fell from 258,378 in the first quarter of 2012 to 243,782 in the same period this year, according to ONE. Johannes Werner, editor of the Tampa-based Cuba Standard, a publication that tracks the island’s economy, said the drop in Spanish and Italian arrivals reflected the financial crisis lashing those countries. Spain, for instance, has 20 percent unemployment. “This shows the continued weakness of the southern European markets, which have been historically strong sources of tourists for Cuba,” Werner said. As for the drop in U.S. arrivals, Werner said he could only speculate that the initial wave of interest in travel to Cuba after the Obama administration began easing restrictions on such travel in 2008 “has flattened out a bit.” Cuba travel industry officials in Miami told El Nuevo Herald in February that only 45 charter flights to the island were scheduled for March, compared to 60 in September.

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