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Impacts- Econ Bad- War- Goldstein



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Impacts- Econ Bad- War- Goldstein


Economic upswing is the most probable route to war
Goldstein 85 (Joshua S, Poli Sci @ MIT, International Studies Quarterly vol. 29, No. 4, Dec 1985, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600380, p. 415 ) ET

There are strong theoretical reasons for long economic waves and recurring major wars to be linked with each other. Causality could potentially run in both directions. Long-term economic upswings could increase the likelihood of war through several mechanisms: (1) the expansionary upswing phase could heighten competition for markets, resources and strategic territory, raising the likelihood of international conflict and war (North and Lagerstrom, 1971); (2) long-term prosperity could support higher military expenditures, arms races, and the costs of war (Farrar, 1977); and (3) prosperity could create an aggressive, expansionist psychological mood conducive to war (Lasswell, 1935: 116-121).13 Conversely, major wars can affect the world-economy, especially prices. Heavy expenditures for war goods raise the overall level of demand, while prolonged wars often reduce the overall level of production (especially in front-line countries) due to war damage, labor shortages, blockades, etc. (Bernstein, 1940). Hence prices tend to rise, and inflation becomes globalized (even affecting neutrals) during a major war. Thompson and Zuk (1982) analyze the effect ofwars on British and US wholesale prices (1750-1938 and 1816-1977, respectively). They find a statistically significant increase in prices following the onset of major wars, and report that 'an impressive proportion of the [Kondratiefi] price upswings' can be accounted for by such wars. In addition to prices, wars may also affect other economic variables such as production, capital investment, innovation, and employment.14

Economic Upswings statistically cause wars – 71% see great power wars and correlation is even stronger
Goldstein 85 (Joshua S, Poli Sci @ MIT, International Studies Quarterly vol. 29, No. 4, Dec 1985, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600380, p. 421- 423) ET

Columns 5 and 6 show the incidence ofwar years during upswings and downswings- column 5 measuring as a war year any year in which a great power war was in progress; column 6 measuring only years in which very major wars were in progress. The first measure matches the upswing/downswing pattern from 1595 on, except for two periods (1747-1761 and 1917-1939). Overall, 71 percent of the upswing years saw great power wars in progress, as compared with 50 percent of the downswing year The correlation is stronger for the incidence of very major wars (column 6). There were no wars this severe before 1595, but after 1595 the upswing/downswing pattern matches the ups and downs of war incidence with only one exception (1917-1939 slightly higher than 1893-1916). Of the upswing years, 40 percent saw very major great power war in progress, as compared with only 6 percent of the downswing years

Impacts- Econ Bad- War- Goldstein



Growth causes war to counterbalance economic superiority
Goldstein, 85 [Joshua, International studies quarterly, v29, n4, p411-444, “Kondratieff Waves as War Cycles,” jstor]

3. The 'power transition' school (Organski, 1958; Farrar, 1977 ;Organski and Kugler, 1980; Doran and Parsons, 1980; Gilpin, 1981) holds that differences in the growth and development of national capabilities lead to shifts in the relative power of the world's major nations. One nation holds the most powerful position in the international order, while rising powers (with growing capabilities) try to establish anew place for themselves in that international order. When a rising challenger has been locked out of the established order, or a leading power fears losing its position to a challenger, war may be used to change or preserve the international order. The power transition model is not explicitly cyclical, except in Doran's 'power cycle' variant, and even in that case is not linked to the economic long wave. It could, however, help to explain the tendency of major wars to recur regularly. After a major war, the international order is restructured around winners and lossers. A long period must then elapse before the losers (or new entrants) can equalize their capabilities with those of the dominant power (which emerged from the war with a head start)-even if all countries have long since recovered economically from the war.


These will be nuclear
Goldstein, 85 [Joshua, International studies quarterly, v29, n4, p411-444, “Kondratieff Waves as War Cycles,” jstor]

First, the incidence of great power war is declining-more and more 'peace' years separate the great power wars. Second, and related, the great power wars are becoming shorter. Third, however, those wars are becoming more severe-annual fatalities during war increasing more than a hundred- fold over the five centuries. Fourth (and more tentatively), the war cycle may be gradually lengthening in each successive era, from about 40 years in the first era to about 60 years in the third. The presence of nuclear weapons has continued these trends in great power war from the past five centuries-any great power wars in this era will likely be fewer, shorter and much more deadly.


Impacts- Econ Bad- War- Goldstein- Long Wave Theory Defense


Long wave theory proven- more than 10 examples
Goldstein 5 (Josh, poli sci @ MIT, NATO Conference, Feb 5, http://www.joshuagoldstein.com/jgkond.htm ) ET

Looking forward, moving clockwise around Figure 2, I projected that an upturn in production, marking a change from the “stagnation” quarter-cycle to the “rebirth” phase, would be the next development, perhaps starting in the mid-1990s (I would now say 1992). Specifically, the “stagnation” phase (running from 1980 to 1991) was defined as follows: “production growth is low and uneven; investment is low; war severity declines; inflation is low (or prices even decline); innovations begin rising; real wages fall.” The subsequent “rebirth” phase starting by the mid-1990s was defined thus: “production growth picks up again, investment follows; prices are low; war severity is low; innovation is high; real wages are high. During that rebirth phase, according to my theory, great-power war and military spending would continue a downward trend that I dated from the late 1970s, while inflation remained in check but production growth accelerated. Barron’s magazine in 1988 subtitled an interview, “Joshua Goldstein Looks to the Nifty ‘90s.” These projections of an upcoming phase of prosperity and peace ran counter to the short-term trends and conventional wisdom in the late 1980s. President Ronald Reagan had reversed the post-Vietnam trend by sharply increasing military spending, while “Cold War II” had replaced an earlier period of détente. These trends were “counter-cyclical,” I wrote. The idealized long wave scheme in Figure 2 was not intended to track long-wave phase timing exactly, but in fact it tracks quite well. Taking literally the timing of the sequence shown in Figure 2, we may set the “price peak” at the top to 1980 – the last firm point of reference at the time of writing in the late 1980s. The price peak indicates the end of a phase of higher inflation and, historically, a period of price deflation (as between the World Wars), or in recent times a period merely of lower inflation. At the same time, the real wage trough indicates a rising trend in real wages (which reflect inflation inversely). About twelve years into the cycle, or 1992, would be the production trough, indicating a pickup in the pace of production growth after a long sluggish period. In 1995, the investment trough marks a similar upturn in investment, and around nineteen year after the price peak, or 1999, innovations peak and begin a period of either decline or slower growth in innovation. Finally, out around 21 years into the cycle, or 2001, the war trough indicates a new upturn in military spending (historically an upturn in great-power war severity). The price trough (ending a half-cycle of low inflation) would come at “+/- 25" years, around 2005.


Long wave theory proved by 2001
Goldstein 5 (Josh, poli sci @ MIT, NATO Conference, Feb 5, http://www.joshuagoldstein.com/jgkond.htm ) ET

According to my long-wave sequence, sometime around 1977 should have marked the end of a war upswing period and the start of a downswing to last until roughly the turn of the century. The interesting thing about the projection in the late 1980s is that U.S. military spending had recently reversed a long trend of decline and risen somewhat (even as a percent of a rising GDP). The long-wave model projected a renewed downward trend, and that is what actually occurred (Figure 3). In terms of U.S. military spending, however, the 1977 date would seem somewhat late. (The 1940-80 war upswing has always been problematical in my scheme because of the huge war right at the start). In terms of long-wave timing, the new upturn in U.S. military spending since 2001(see Figure 3) is worrisome, as it could signal the starting gun for a new long-term upswing of rising military spending, an upswing that could even culminate in another ruinous great-power war in the coming decades.

Long wave theory proven right by the 90’s

Goldstein 5 (Josh, poli sci @ MIT, NATO Conference, Feb 5, http://www.joshuagoldstein.com/jgkond.htm ) ET

I am not sure how best to measure production – in my earlier research I used several scholars’ long-term production indexes – but the growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) seems a good measure to start with. The Penn World Table [7] provides GDP data adjusted for purchasing-power parity. In Figure 5 I have graphed the growth rate in the U.S. GDP per capita, adjusted for inflation. According the long-wave sequence, the phase from 1969 to 1991 should be characterized by slow and uneven growth, then the period since 1991 by more robust growth. What one sees in the data is not so much a slowdown and then speed-up of per capita GDP growth, but rather a greater volatility and then stability. During the nominal production “downswing” of 1969-91, ever-lower valleys and ever-higher peaks alternate rapidly). Then in the nominal production upswing from 1992 forward, we see a dramatic stabilization of growth rates – around 3 percent a year in real per capita terms – for a solid nine years. I am not sure what to make of this stable period, but it is an interesting change just at the time the long-wave sequence calls for a phase shift in production growth.


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