Int’l cps- brag lab- wave 1 Theory

US/Russia war would lead to extinction

March 31, 2009, “U.S.-Russia nuclear war still a threat”, http://www.projo.com/opinion/contributors/content/CT_pastoreline_03-31-09_EODSCAO_v15.bbdf23.html]

Soft power K2 Warming

EU leadership key to solving warming

Ischinger 7 German ambassador to Britain, Wolfgang. “Can the EU Fill Leadership Void Left by US?” China Daily, March 22, http://www.china.org.cn/english/international/203945.htm]

In 1990, Charles Krauthammer published his famous essay on the "unipolar moment", about the United States' future power to shape the world at will. He wrote: "The true geopolitical structure of the post-Cold-War world ... is a single pole of world power that consists of the United States at the apex of the industrial west." In 2007, most will agree that the unipolar moment, if it ever existed, has passed. That is only underlined by the failure of the unipolar experiment also know as the invasion and occupation of Iraq and the damage it inflicted on Washington's international legitimacy and credibility. For traditional European Atlanticists, it does not make for pleasant viewing to see US leadership damaged and questioned. But expectations are low today regarding US ability to lead the international community. In the face of a US credibility crisis, some look to Europe to take the initiative and fill the vacuum. Can 2007 be a European moment? Critics will contend that the EU is in no shape to lead, as it continues to grapple with its constitutional crisis, its inability to provide clear foreign policy guidance and its lack of military power. But on three critical global issues nuclear non-proliferation, Middle East peace, and climate change it is better placed than anyone else. Opening nuclear negotiations with Teheran was a European idea in 2004, initially given a lukewarm reception by Washington. More recently, as the EU3-Britain, France and Germany-approach began to be seen as the only game in town, Washington has offered more active support, but so far continuing to stop short of speaking to Teheran directly on the nuclear issue. Bringing Russia and China on board was, again, a European initiative. If a solution emerges, it is likely to be European-brokered. There is much greater cohesion among Europeans on Iran than there was on Iraq five years ago: On Iran, the EU will not be split. When it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, barely any progress has been made over the past six years. The adoption of the road map and the creation of the quartet EU, Russia, the UN, the United States were born of European ideas. They were formally endorsed by Washington, but never seriously pursued and later quasi-abandoned. This year, a major effort by the current EU presidency has led to the quartet's revival and more diplomatic activity. Many in the region doubt, however, whether Washington will have the determination necessary for a breakthrough in the peace process without even more active input from Europe. The European willingness to take more responsibility in the region and to play a role in ending the Lebanon War in 2006, including the deployment of military forces to the country, was an eye-opener for many in the region and beyond. On climate change, the critical question is who can and will lead the international debate about a post-Kyoto regime. If a deal can be hammered out in 2007, and if it has any chance of endorsement in the United States, China and India, it will most likely be the result of the EU's ongoing efforts to move ahead with ambitious goals on carbon dioxide emissions and energy saving. But would a European moment in 2007 not be interpreted as a challenge to the global leadership role of the US? Let's not get carried away. Without active US support, both political and military, none of these major challenges can be resolved. Europeans should beware the hubris of challenging the United States. But the European moment could actually enhance the transatlantic relationship by offering, at a crucial juncture, elements that the United States currently lacks: legitimacy and credibility. That is why our American friends should encourage European initiatives, embrace a European willingness to lead, and welcome the European moment.

Soft power K2 Middle East

EU soft power key to stopping Middle Eastern instability

Bildt 10, Carl Bildt, 10/4/10, Bildt is a staff writer for Regeringskansliet, “The European Union's Soft Power: A Force for Change,” http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/7417/a/90906, NN

These days the media is filled with speculation about whether we are heading for policies of revenge or policies of reconciliation between Turks and Kurds in the borderlands between Mesopotamia and Anatolia. Much is at stake here - and there can be no doubt what we Europeans must strive to contribute towards. Indeed, it is to a large extent the process of European modernisation of Turkey that has opened up the present prospect of these policies of reconciliation. As Turkey moves away from some of the traumas of its modern birth, and eyes a new European future, it is also increasingly able to handle the complex issues associated with the Kurdish question. Prime Minister Erdogan has famously stated that it is "more democracy" that is the true solution to this issue. And it might well be that it is the feared success of these policies that has triggered the recent wave of terrorist attacks and activities. We strongly condemn the acts of terrorism we have seen, and we strongly salute the efforts aimed at political solutions that we are now seeing. They simply have to succeed. These tragic and dramatic events have again demonstrated that if we are interested in the stability of the wider region, we have a profound interest in anchoring Turkey in our common efforts at promoting peace, prosperity and reconciliation in the area. Strategic drift in this region could easily be the recipe for strategic disaster. From Israel through Iraq to Iran there is no lack of challenges in the months and years ahead. And for us Europeans this is our immediate neighbourhood. That's clear to everyone in Athens. But it is nowadays equally clear in Stockholm. In the small town of Södertälje just outside Stockholm we already have more refugees from Iraq than there are in the entire United States. In many ways, our Europe extends into the Middle East - and in many ways the Middle East extends into our Europe. There may now be a possibility of moving towards a comprehensive peace between Israel and Palestine. We must give this process - however difficult - all the support we can. I believe the policies of the European Union will be critical to success in these efforts. We all know that the position of the United States is of critical importance as we approach the crucial meetings now ahead of us, and we should salute the determination demonstrated by Secretary Rice in the last few months. She has rightly said that what is needed is a Palestine state not in the distant and uncertain future, but more or less right now. But when it comes to actually contributing to that building of a state in Palestine that will also be the key to the security of Israel, I am convinced that the efforts and contributions of the European Union will be as critical as they have been in state-building in the Balkans. Again and again, we see how the soft power of Europe - the inspiration of our model of integration and shared sovereignty, the magnetism of our process of integration and of building increasingly close relations with our neighbours, the transformational capacity of our experiences in conflict resolution and state-building in complex areas - is becoming increasingly relevant in the world in which we are living. Our Union is today far more than the regional player it was when first Greece and then Sweden - to mention just these two countries - joined. You joined a community of just nine and we a union of just twelve. Today, our Union encompasses 27 countries with half a billion citizens living in a Europe that has never been as free, never been as secure and never been as prosperous. We are the world's largest integrated economy. We are by far the world's largest trading entity. We are a bigger exporter than the number two and number three taken together, and we are the largest market for more than 130 nations around the world. We are by far the world's largest donor of development assistance. And if there is one thing that has impressed me during the year I have served as one of the foreign ministers in the Union, it is the demand that exists across the globe for an ever stronger role and an even stronger political presence of our Union. If we look at the big issues confronting our world in the years ahead - climate change, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, economic growth through trade and reforms, international terrorism, energy security, building bridges between civilisations, trying to lift the bottom billion of our world out of despair - it is very difficult to see them being moved towards some sort of solution without more active engagement on the part of the European Union. I would say that an active role for the European Union is a precondition for moving all of these issues in the direction we all seek - although it is obviously not enough. We must reinforce our cooperation across the Atlantic with the United States - our traditional and firm partner - but we must also intensify our efforts at building truly strategic relationships with the rising and responsible powers of - to name just a few - India, China and Brazil. With the Reform Treaty now agreed, we are creating new possibilities for our Europe to live up to its responsibilities as well as its opportunities in these important areas.

Middle East instability escalates

Primakov, 9 [September, Yevgeny, President of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation; Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences; member of the Editorial Board of Russia in Global Affairs. This article is based on the scientific report for which the author was awarded the Lomonosov Gold Medal of the Russian Academy of Sciences in 2008, “The Middle East Problem in the Context of International Relations”]

The Middle East conflict is unparalleled in terms of its potential for spreading globally. During the Cold War, amid which the Arab-Israeli conflict evolved, the two opposing superpowers directly supported the conflicting parties: the Soviet Union supported Arab countries, while the United States supported Israel. On the one hand, the bipolar world order which existed at that time objectively played in favor of the escalation of the Middle East conflict into a global confrontation. On the other hand, the Soviet Union and the United States were not interested in such developments and they managed to keep the situation under control. The behavior of both superpowers in the course of all the wars in the Middle East proves that. In 1956, during the Anglo-French-Israeli military invasion of Egypt (which followed Cairo’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company) the United States – contrary to the widespread belief in various countries, including Russia – not only refrained from supporting its allies but insistently pressed – along with the Soviet Union – for the cessation of the armed action. Washington feared that the tripartite aggression would undermine the positions of the West in the Arab world and would result in a direct clash with the Soviet Union. Fears that hostilities in the Middle East might acquire a global dimension could materialize also during the Six-Day War of 1967. On its eve, Moscow and Washington urged each other to cool down their “clients.” When the war began, both superpowers assured each other that they did not intend to get involved in the crisis militarily and that that they would make efforts at the United Nations to negotiate terms for a ceasefire. On July 5, the Chairman of the Soviet Government, Alexei Kosygin, who was authorized by the Politburo to conduct negotiations on behalf of the Soviet leadership, for the first time ever used a hot line for this purpose. After the USS Liberty was attacked by Israeli forces, which later claimed the attack was a case of mistaken identity, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson immediately notified Kosygin that the movement of the U.S. Navy in the Mediterranean Sea was only intended to help the crew of the attacked ship and to investigate the incident. The situation repeated itself during the hostilities of October 1973. Russian publications of those years argued that it was the Soviet Union that prevented U.S. military involvement in those events. In contrast, many U.S. authors claimed that a U.S. reaction thwarted Soviet plans to send troops to the Middle East. Neither statement is true. The atmosphere was really quite tense. Sentiments both in Washington and Moscow were in favor of interference, yet both capitals were far from taking real action. When U.S. troops were put on high alert, Henry Kissinger assured Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that this was done largely for domestic considerations and should not be seen by Moscow as a hostile act. In a private conversation with Dobrynin, President Richard Nixon said the same, adding that he might have overreacted but that this had been done amidst a hostile campaign against him over Watergate. Meanwhile, Kosygin and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko at a Politburo meeting in Moscow strongly rejected a proposal by Defense Minister Marshal Andrei Grechko to “demonstrate” Soviet military presence in Egypt in response to Israel’s refusal to comply with a UN Security Council resolution. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev took the side of Kosygin and Gromyko, saying that he was against any Soviet involvement in the conflict.  The above suggests an unequivocal conclusion that control by the superpowers in the bipolar world did not allow the Middle East conflict to escalate into a global confrontation. After the end of the Cold War, some scholars and political observers concluded that a real threat of the Arab-Israeli conflict going beyond regional frameworks ceased to exist. However, in the 21st century this conclusion no longer conforms to the reality. The U.S. military operation in Iraq has changed the balance of forces in the Middle East. The disappearance of the Iraqi counterbalance has brought Iran to the fore as a regional power claiming a direct role in various Middle East processes. I do not belong to those who believe that the Iranian leadership has already made a political decision to create nuclear weapons of its own. Yet Tehran seems to have set itself the goal of achieving a technological level that would let it make such a decision (the “Japanese model”) under unfavorable circumstances. Israel already possesses nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. In such circumstances, the absence of a Middle East settlement opens a dangerous prospect of a nuclear collision in the region, which would have catastrophic consequences for the whole world. The transition to a multipolar world has objectively strengthened the role of states and organizations that are directly involved in regional conflicts, which increases the latter’s danger and reduces the possibility of controlling them. This refers, above all, to the Middle East conflict. The coming of Barack Obama to the presidency has allayed fears that the United States could deliver a preventive strike against Iran (under George W. Bush, it was one of the most discussed topics in the United States). However, fears have increased that such a strike can be launched Yevgeny Primakov 1 3 2 RUSSIA IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS VOL. 7 • No. 3 • JULY – SEPTEMBER• 2009 by Israel, which would have unpredictable consequences for the region and beyond. It seems that President Obama’s position does not completely rule out such a possibility.

The impact is nuclear conflict—it would escalate

London 10 (Herbert, president of Hudson Institute, June 28, 2010, http://www.hudson-ny.org/1387/coming-crisis-in-the-middle-east)
The coming storm in the Middle East is gaining momentum; like conditions prior to World War I, all it takes for explosive action to commence is a trigger. Turkey's provocative flotilla, often described in Orwellian terms as a humanitarian mission, has set in motion a gust of diplomatic activity: if the Iranians send escort vessels for the next round of Turkish ships, which they have apparently decided not to do in favor of land operations, it could have presented a casus belli. [cause for war] Syria, too, has been playing a dangerous game, with both missile deployment and rearming Hezbollah. According to most public accounts, Hezbollah is sitting on 40,000 long-, medium- and short-range missiles, and Syrian territory has been serving as a conduit for military materiel from Iran since the end of the 2006 Lebanon War. Should Syria move its own scuds to Lebanon or deploy its troops as reinforcement for Hezbollah, a wider regional war with Israel could not be contained. In the backdrop is an Iran, with sufficient fissionable material to produce a couple of nuclear weapons. It will take some time to weaponize the missiles, but the road to that goal is synchronized in green lights since neither diplomacy nor diluted sanctions can convince Iran to change course. From Qatar to Afghanistan all political eyes are on Iran, poised to be "the hegemon" in the Middle East; it is increasingly considered the "strong horse" as American forces incrementally retreat from the region. Even Iraq, ironically, may depend on Iranian ties in order to maintain internal stability. For Sunni nations like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, regional strategic vision is a combination of deal-making to offset the Iranian Shia advantage, and attempting to buy or develop nuclear weapons as a counterweight to Iranian ambition. However, both of these governments are in a precarious state; should either fall, all bets are off in the Middle East neighborhood. It has long been said that the Sunni "tent" must stand on two legs: if one, falls, the tent collapses. Should this tent collapse, and should Iran take advantage of that calamity, it could incite a Sunni-Shia war. Or feeling empowered, and no longer dissuaded by an escalation scenario, Iran, with nuclear weapons in tow, might decide that a war against Israel is a distinct possibility. However implausible it may seem at the moment, the possible annihilation of Israel and the prospect of a second holocaust could lead to a nuclear exchange.

Europe Multilateralism key to Middle East Conflict Resolution

Ortega ’06 [October 1 2006, Martin Ortega, from Spain, was a Research Fellow at the EUISS between August 2002 and August 2007. At the Institute, he dealt with the regions of the Mediterranean and the Middle East and the use of force in international relations, “Multilateralism in the Middle East” http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/multilateralism-in-the-middle-east/]

This summer, war swept across the parched lands of the Middle East. Once more, and with a terrible feeling of déjà vu, we were contemplating a fully-fledged, conventional war in Israel and Lebanon. And then, almost unexpectedly, war gave way to a ceasefire and to a fragile peace. This rapid shift – a sign of our hasty times – was the product of several causes: Hezbollah’s resistance, Israel’s hesitant tactics, and international pressure linked to profound disapproval of the war in international public opinion. But let us leave the assessment of last month’s events and the exact combination of causes that led to a sudden peace to future historians. For us Europeans, what really matter are the lessons we can draw from the crisis. Without any doubt, UNSC Resolution 1701 and its subsequent implementation represent a triumph of multilateralism. As Javier Solana said on 13 August, ‘by definition, a resolution seeking to solve a conflict cannot be perfect but it is important to find formulations that are accepted by the parties’. The resolution was the result of multilateral negotiations. An effective ceasefire and further stabilisation required a robust peacekeeping operation, which could only be mounted with key European contributions. Confronted with a serious internation-al crisis, the Europeans stood ready to help to ensure the security of both Israel and Lebanon. The parties and the international community welcom-ed Europe’s determination. In short, multilateralism, responsibility and commitment prevailed over unilateral quick fixes. Now the question is whether and to what extent multilateralism can be applied to other Middle Eastern crises. In the last couple of years, it has become increasingly obvious that the Iranian challenge cannot be tackled through unilateral action. Iran’s nuclear ambitions must be curbed but, at the same time, Iran should be given a place in the international community. The Chatham House report ‘Iran, its neighbours and the regional crises’, published in August, clearly shows how important the strategic position of Iran is in western Asia. Even though targeted military strikes are still being considered in Washington, the European approach, which combines dialogue and firmness, should be preferred. While the added value of multilater-alism in the Iranian case is recognised by almost everyone, multilateralism is not a key element for the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. Some time ago, the two parties abandoned the Road Map and, before this summer’s war, it seemed that Israeli unilateralism was the only way out, something which was fatalistically accepted by the Quartet. Today Israel has at least five options: (a) maintaining the status quo, with continued military action in Gaza and the West Bank; (b) the ‘Sharon plan plus’, which would include permanent withdrawal from Gaza and parts of the West Bank; (c) bilateral negotiations with the Palestinians; (d) renewed contacts in the Quartet or any other analogous multilateral framework; or (e) wait for the next crisis and the drafting of a new ‘1701-type’ resolution. Both political circumstances within Israel and American one-sided views of the conflict do not leave much room for multilateral initiatives. Nevertheless, the Europeans should insist that multilateralism is the only way forward for a durable peace. Finally, putting ‘Iraq’ and ‘multilateralism’ in the same sentence is like trying to mix oil and water. Since May 2003 the US administration has led state-building in Iraq in an almost unilateral manner. However, despite the US’s endeavours, the situation there is extremely worrying. As Kofi Annan put it after his diplomatic visit to the region, ‘in a way, the US has found itself in a position where it cannot stay and it cannot leave’. Sooner or later, the Americans will have to realise that their efforts to stabilise and rebuild Iraq will not bear any significant fruit unless all political forces inside Iraq as well as all neighbours and the international community are directly involved in the search for a modus vivendi. In this respect, the idea of holding an international conference or conducting serious negotiations with a view to drafting a ground-breaking UNSC resolution should be encouraged. In an interconnected and interdependent world, where any single im-portant issue, from Iraq to the greenhouse effect, from drug trafficking to terrorism, has global implications, is there still anyone who believes that problems can be solved unilaterally? Is there anyone who really thinks that isolationism is a credible option? Multilateralism is back and is here to stay. It remains to be seen, though, if the huge long-term human and financial costs of such a policy have yet dawned on us.

Middle East Instability risks nuclear war

Primakov ’09 [September 2009, Yevgeny Primakov is the President of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry and aRussian Federation, Member and a fellow at the Russian Academy of Science, “The Middle East Problem in the Context of International Relations”, Russia in Global Affairs, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_13593]

The Middle East conflict is unparalleled in terms of its potential for spreading globally. During the Cold War, amid which the Arab-Israeli conflict evolved, the two opposing superpowers directly supported the conflicting parties: the Soviet Union supported Arab countries, while the United States supported Israel. On the one hand, the bipolar world order which existed at that time objectively played in favor of the escalation of the Middle East conflict into a global confrontation. On the other hand, the Soviet Union and the United States were not interested in such developments and they managed to keep the situation under control. The behavior of both superpowers in the course of all the wars in the Middle East proves that. In 1956, during the Anglo-French-Israeli military invasion of Egypt (which followed Cairo’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company) the United States – contrary to the widespread belief in various countries, including Russia – not only refrained from supporting its allies but insistently pressed – along with the Soviet Union – for the cessation of the armed action. Washington feared that the tripartite aggression would undermine the positions of the West in the Arab world and would result in a direct clash with the Soviet Union. Fears that hostilities in the Middle East might acquire a global dimension could materialize also during the Six-Day War of 1967. On its eve, Moscow and Washington urged each other to cool down their “clients.” When the war began, both superpowers assured each other that they did not intend to get involved in the crisis militarily and that that they would make efforts at the United Nations to negotiate terms for a ceasefire. On July 5, the Chairman of the Soviet Government, Alexei Kosygin, who was authorized by the Politburo to conduct negotiations on behalf of the Soviet leadership, for the first time ever used a hot line for this purpose. After the USS Liberty was attacked by Israeli forces, which later claimed the attack was a case of mistaken identity, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson immediately notified Kosygin that the movement of the U.S. Navy in the Mediterranean Sea was only intended to help the crew of the attacked ship and to investigate the incident. The situation repeated itself during the hostilities of October 1973. Russian publications of those years argued that it was the Soviet Union that prevented U.S. military involvement in those events. In contrast, many U.S. authors claimed that a U.S. reaction thwarted Soviet plans to send troops to the Middle East. Neither statement is true. The atmosphere was really quite tense. Sentiments both in Washington and Moscow were in favor of interference, yet both capitals were far from taking real action. When U.S. troops were put on high alert, Henry Kissinger assured Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that this was done largely for domestic considerations and should not be seen by Moscow as a hostile act. In a private conversation with Dobrynin, President Richard Nixon said the same, adding that he might have overreacted but that this had been done amidst a hostile campaign against him over Watergate. Meanwhile, Kosygin and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko at a Politburo meeting in Moscow strongly rejected a proposal by Defense Minister Marshal Andrei Grechko to “demonstrate” Soviet military presence in Egypt in response to Israel’s refusal to comply with a UN Security Council resolution. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev took the side of Kosygin and Gromyko, saying that he was against any Soviet involvement in the conflict. The above suggests an unequivocal conclusion that control by the superpowers in the bipolar world did not allow the Middle East conflict to escalate into a global confrontation. After the end of the Cold War, some scholars and political observers concluded that a real threat of the Arab-Israeli conflict going beyond regional frameworks ceased to exist. However, in the 21st century this conclusion no longer conforms to the reality. The U.S. military operation in Iraq has changed the balance of forces in the Middle East. The disappearance of the Iraqi counterbalance has brought Iran to the fore as a regional power claiming a direct role in various Middle East processes. I do not belong to those who believe that the Iranian leadership has already made a political decision to create nuclear weapons of its own. Yet Tehran seems to have set itself the goal of achieving a technological level that would let it make such a decision (the “Japanese model”) under unfavorable circumstances. Israel already possesses nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. In such circumstances, the absence of a Middle East settlement opens a dangerous prospect of a nuclear collision in the region, which would have catastrophic consequences for the whole world. The transition to a multipolar world has objectively strengthened the role of states and organizations that are directly involved in regional conflicts, which increases the latter’s danger and reduces the possibility of controlling them. This refers, above all, to the Middle East conflict. The coming of Barack Obama to the presidency has allayed fears that the United States could deliver a preventive strike against Iran (under George W. Bush, it was one of the most discussed topics in the United States). However, fears have increased that such a strike can be launched by Israel, which would have unpredictable consequences for the region and beyond. It seems that President Obama’s position does not completely rule out such a possibility.

Soft power K2 General Conflict

Only soft power efforts by the EU can solve for global instability and conflict

Frewen 10, Justin Frewen, 9/23/10, Frewen is a staff writer for STWR, “The EU and Soft Power: An Iron Fist Behind the Velvet Glove,” http://www.stwr.org/imf-world-bank-trade/the-eu-and-soft-power-an-iron-fist-behind-the-velvet-glove.html, NN

The European Commission´s Agenda 2000, drawn up as the second millennium drew to a close and in the immediate wake of the Cold War, boldly declared the EU´s intention to play an enhanced role in global affairs through the implementation of a `soft power´ approach to international relations. But does the EU really rely on soft power to obtain `consensus´ with partner States to advance its foreign policy objectives, or has it been only too willing to resort to more coercive methods, particularly with weaker States? The concept of soft power was first developed in 1990 by the former Assistant Secretary of Defense and Dean of Harvard University, Joseph Nye, in his book Bound to Lead. He further clarified what he meant in his article “Soft Power”. Soft power is the capacity to “get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments”, and depends on three types of resources: the State´s culture, its political values and its policies. These resources become effective when they appeal to others, are seen to have legitimacy and are morally authoritative. Soft power is therefore understood as a means to achieve international policy objectives through co-operation and partnership. While the staple of hard power is coercion, soft power relies on attraction. While some commentators view hard power as more or less synonymous with military force, Nye includes economic power, depending on its manner of deployment. Economic sanctions and the application of commercial power to compel other States into adopting particular policies can therefore also be regarded as the exercise of hard power. For many analysts, the EU´s decision to promote its foreign-policy objectives through soft power is directly attributable to its negligible hard-power resources, particularly when compared with those of the US. They argue that the EU has been obliged to rely on negotiation, multilateral partnership and `contractual agreements´ to achieve its foreign policy aims. At the same time, the EU´s impetus to pursuing international policy objectives through soft power fits nicely with its declared support for values such as human rights, the rule of law, good governance, `free´ trade and social justice. In fact, the EU employs a range of mechanisms to advance its foreign policy goals. A major pillar in this area consists of the EU´s provision of development and humanitarian aid. Including Member States’ contributions and overall EU development-assistance allocations, the EU is by far the largest provider of aid globally. However, although the EU has committed to allocating 0.7% of its budget to development assistance by 2015, it is not likely to attain this target. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is used to enable the EU to speak and act in a unified manner on international issues. At the core of the CFSP is an official commitment to the use of soft power by means of diplomacy. Where necessary, however, recourse is made to trade, aid and the provision of peacekeepers to resolve complicated conflicts and `promote´ international understanding. The EU also avails itself of a range of trade-related mechanisms to further specific policy goals. For example, the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) provides preferential market access to `developing´ States, including duty-free and quota-free entry benefits for many of their exports. GSP plus extends this market access even further for vulnerable developing countries that have ratified and introduced what the EU esteems to be critical international conventions on issues such as good governance, human rights, environmental protection and labour rights. Arguably the greatest attraction of the EU for other States is the prospect of preferential access to the largest single global market. The EU has thus made ample use of trade agreements to promote its foreign policy objectives. The Union enjoys trade agreements with virtually every State worldwide and has considerable persuasive power as to their final formulation, given the carrots of preferential access to its internal market, inclusion in a free trade area or even potential membership of the EU, it can dangle at the negotiating table. These trade agreements have therefore become a formidable weapon in the EU´s foreign policy armoury. The efficacy of this approach, in promoting EU policy goals, is clear from even a cursory examination of the Stabilisation and Association Agreements that were entered into with countries in South-Eastern Europe (SEE). By inserting a range of conditions in these agreements, in return for certain economic inducements, the EU was in a position to exercise influence over the policy-making processes of SEE States. In this respect, the 2000 Cotonou Agreement between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) State countries is perhaps the most illuminating. Set up to replace the Lomé Agreements, which had been in force since 1976, Cotonou now includes 79 ACP countries and the 27 EU Member States. Under the four Lomé Agreements, the ACP were granted trading preferences with the EU that they did not have to reciprocate. However, the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 led to calls for the Lomé Agreement to be revised to conform with WTO policies, primarily driven by the principle of reciprocity. At the same time, the demand to remove non-reciprocal preferential EU market access from the ACP coincided with the EU´s own foreign policy objectives, in particular the promotion of free trade and greater market access. In effect, the EU has used Cotonou to introduce trade liberalisation amongst the ACP faster and deeper than that required by the WTO. For the ACP, whose economies are comparatively fragile and thence less able to compete on the international stage, the introduction of Cotonou has been far less favourably received.

EU soft power is key to global hegemony and stopping conflict

Lough 14, John Lough, 1/17/14, Lough is a staff writer for the Moscow Times, “The EU Should Maximize Its Soft Power,” http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/the-eu-should-maximize-its-soft-power/492931.html, NN

Manipulated by Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych and outplayed by President Vladimir Putin, the European Union has emerged with a bloodied nose from Ukraine. While Ukraine's leaders have not agreed so far to join the Russian-led Customs Union, indications are that they have signed away control of swathes of the country's strategic industries in return for a $15 billion bailout package from Moscow and a short-term reduction in the price for Russian gas. Russian carrots and sticks have held the day and in practical terms, the prospect of Ukraine moving closer to Europe seems more remote than ever. But the question of Ukraine's future orientation is still far from settled. Although the EU may have missed its moment, recent opinion polls indicate that more 60 percent of Ukrainians now support integration with Europe. The "Euro maidan" protests have shown that there is an active part of society in Ukraine ready to voice its preference for living in a country with rule of law and accountability of leaders, where people have real opportunities to improve their lives. Many of the current protesters on Maidan Square in Kiev are owners of small businesses that cannot develop because of institutionalized corruption. Russia's current development model holds no attraction for them. Opposition leaders speak confidently of being able to take the protests east to regions traditionally supportive of close ties with Russia and consolidate support for Ukraine's gravitation toward European norms and values rather than the governance model based on "brotherly" relations with Russia. While it is difficult to tell to what extent this confidence is justified, Moscow's strong-arm tactics to prevent Kiev from signing the Association Agreement have undoubtedly alienated some of its key constituencies in the country. This is the behavior of a bullying neighbor rather than a strategic partner. From an EU perspective, these are encouraging trends for the longer term. Unlike Russia, the EU is not a geopolitical actor and does not think like one. This makes the" protests particularly striking since they have shown that the EU's soft power remains impressively strong in Ukraine as it also does in Georgia and Moldova. And this despite Europe's current economic woes and the introspection of its leaders. Yet if EU countries want to see Ukraine begin to reform itself and avoid the risk of divisions within the country deepening and becoming unmanageable, they cannot rely on passive soft power alone to pull Ukraine in the right direction. They need to play a smarter game to maximize the EU's soft power advantage. The key to achieve this is better communication with Ukrainian society. The EU has so far failed to give clear explanations about the nature and benefits of the Association Agreement, including the establishment of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, or DCFTA. A full-scale campaign is required to build understanding in society of what the EU is offering and to address disinformation about the effects of the DCFTA on economic relations with Russia. Russia has been using hard and soft tools to undermine support among Ukraine's leaders and broader society for gravitation toward Europe. Last summer, Moscow arbitrarily imposed trade restrictions on different sets of Ukrainian exports from metals to chocolates, as a taster of the measures it could enforce if Ukraine implemented the DCFTA. At the same time, it conducted its own accompanying public relations effort to dissuade Ukraine's elites from building closer ties with the EU. The message was that the provisions of the DCFTA were unaffordable for Ukraine since the EU would not provide financial support, and that they would have a negative effect on Russia by displacing Ukrainian goods into the Russian market as a result of Ukraine's free trade agreement with Russia. This, in turn, would require a response from Russia to defend its economic interests. The EU was conspicuously silent. Not a single EU leader challenged the Russian arguments by delivering the obvious messages: the DCFTA offers Ukraine excellent opportunities to expand its markets in the EU and attract investment that will modernize industry, raise productivity and help make the Ukrainian economy competitive over the long term. Russian capital does not offer the same opportunities. Mexico has a free-trade agreement with the EU and is a member of the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA, so there is no reason why Ukraine cannot have a free trade agreement with the EU and trade successfully at the same time with Russia.. The EU has powerful messages to differentiate its offering to Ukraine from Russia's: Integration is a voluntary process. The EU has an excellent track record of supporting institutional reforms that allow countries to function better and raise living standards. The DCFTA will stimulate growth and make Ukraine more competitive in international markets. Ukraine's citizens will benefit from better products and improved services. Ukrainians know that in contrast, Russia is experiencing accelerating stagnation that is largely the result of incapacity to conduct structural reforms required for economic modernization. Ultimately, of course, Ukrainians should choose how they want to be governed and how they want the country to develop. To make that choice, they need a debate based on reliable information. It is time for the EU to seize the opportunity in Ukraine and make its soft power count.

EU practices Effective multilateralism, empirically proven to be able to bring nations together

Geoghegan-Quinn 13[ Máire Geoghegan-Quinn is the European Commissioner for Research, Innovation and Science, “EU Science: Global Challenges & Global Collaboration'” http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-186_en.htm]

Mr Cookson, Ladies and gentlemen, I am delighted to have the opportunity to talk to you about Global Challenges and Global Collaboration for EU science. We are living in exciting, if challenging, times with profound changes to the global research and innovation landscape. Growth economies such as China, India, Russia or South Africa are transforming themselves, and investing strongly in their research and innovation base. More and more scientific publications are co-authored by scientists from different countries, while multinational companies are increasingly investing in research and innovation outside their home countries. This is to be welcomed, because the challenges that we face today such as climate change, public health or energy supply affect people across the globe, and require global solutions. The European Union is an excellent place to perform research. While we account for just 7% of the world’s population, we’re responsible for 24% of research expenditure, 32% of high-impact publications and 32% of patent applications. We have traditionally strong links with partners such as the United States and Japan, and we’re strengthening our links with fast-growing economies. And like everyone, we are keen to improve our competitiveness, and we can do this by ensuring that our researchers, innovators and businesses have access to knowledge, including the knowledge produced outside our own borders. At the same time, strengthening our collaborations opens up mutual market access for our companies. For all these reasons, international cooperation remains a crucial part of our research and innovation policy at European level, and it is a vital component of our new programme for Research and Innovation, Horizon 2020. The strategy we’re adopting under Horizon 2020 builds on the achievements of the 7th Framework Programme - or FP7 - that comes to an end this December. For example, FP7 has been supporting the European and Developing Countries Clinical Trials Partnership, in which 14 EU Member States, Norway and Switzerland, cooperate with sub-Saharan countries in the battle against HIV/Aids, malaria and tuberculosis. Researchers from 80 different countries have participated in the immensely successful Marie Sklodowska-Curie actions, while the European Research Council funds scientists from anywhere in the world to conduct their research in Europe. ITER is another flagship project. Together with China, India, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the United States, we are attempting to demonstrate the viability of nuclear fusion as an energy source. Rare diseases research is a prime example of the advantages of international cooperation, which can maximise scarce resources, share data and coordinate research efforts that might not be viable on a smaller scale. The International Rare Diseases Research Consortium (IRDiRC) was launched in April 2011 to foster international collaboration in diagnosing rare diseases and developing new therapies. The Joint Research Centre also provides dozens of good examples of international cooperation, such as in the fields of nuclear safety and the prevention and mitigation of natural disasters. The level of cooperation is such that around 20% of the projects funded by FP7 include at least one international partner in its consortium. Around 5.4% of all FP7 participants come from ‘third countries’, with the top five sources being Russia, the USA, China, India and South Africa. While we have done a lot to foster international cooperation, we’re not resting on our laurels. We have much more to do. That is why last September the Commission adopted a new strategy for international cooperation in research and innovation. The strategy lays down three key objectives: First: Strengthening excellence in research and innovation by facilitating access to knowledge, people and markets across the globe. Second: Tackling global challenges. We need to cooperate internationally to tackle the major societal challenges that I mentioned earlier. Third: Supporting external policies. Many of the international commitments that the EU has signed up to, such as the Millennium Development Goals, are underpinned by research and innovation. Horizon 2020, the new EU programme for research and innovation due to start in 2014 will be the main tool for implementing our international cooperation strategy. Horizon 2020 will be open to participation from all countries, but we will be a bit more restrictive as regards providing funding from the EU budget. This is to take account of the fact that a number of countries have invested so strongly in their research and innovation base that they are now able to cooperate on an equal footing. In addition, there will be targeted cooperation actions. It will be up to policymakers to decide upfront both the area and the partner for cooperation. The targeted actions will be selected on the basis of common interest and mutual benefit, and in some cases will be developed from the ongoing dialogues with our global partners. In terms of the countries and regions with whom to cooperate, the Strategy identifies three groupings: Enlargement and neighbourhood countries and EFTA (Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein). The focus is on fostering these countries' integration into, or alignment with, the European Research Area, including through their possible association to Horizon 2020. Industrialised countries and emerging economies, where the focus is strongly on competitiveness, access to knowledge and markets; and, Developing countries, where the accent is on enhancing the research and innovation capacities of these countries to assist them in their socio-economic development and in tackling the challenges most relevant to them. The resulting targeted actions will be clearly laid out in a set of multi-annual roadmaps that will specify for each country and region the topics on which we wish to cooperate. The roadmaps will subsequently be implemented through a range of instruments including collaborative projects, networking between projects or joint initiatives between the EU and third countries, such as coordinated calls. In addition to these funding actions, a specific point of attention of the new strategy will be to promote common principles for engaging in international cooperation. These principles, to be mutually agreed between the Union and international partners, will enable researchers from across the globe to collaborate in full confidence. We will work to create a level playing field for research and innovation with common principles on issues such as research integrity, gender and open access. The protection of intellectual property will be particularly important as we move to Horizon 2020 and its increased support for innovation activities. This strategy also represents the further development of the international dimension of the European Research Area, and in this respect it is essential to deepen our work with Member States on international cooperation. In this respect, important progress has been made through the Strategic Forum for International Science and Technology Cooperation, where important steps have been taken to move forward common strategic research and innovation agendas, for instance with India. Launching this strategy has only been the first step. Making it work will require the full and visible integration of international cooperation into Horizon 2020 and a sound governance structure. As part of this governance and to ensure that we stay on track, the Commission will produce a report every two years to measure progress and assess impact. The first report, planned for early 2014, will also contain the first multi-annual roadmaps. Ladies and gentlemen, research and innovation are vital elements of the Union's future. They are also essential ingredients of any approach that seeks to address today's global challenges. Europe is reaching out to the world to join forces in addressing those challenges. I wish you all an interesting conference and fruitful discussions. Thank you.

EU soft power key to global stability

EurActiv 13, EurActiv, 4/10/13, EurActic is a news agency primarily concerned with issues occurring in the European Union, “Vimont: EU shouldn’t underestimate its soft power,” http://www.euractiv.com/security/vimont-eu-shouldn-ashamed-foreig-interview-530870, NN

The Syrian war has been going on for two and a half years now, and has turned into a humanitarian disaster. Despite all the goodwill and humanitarian aid, Europe hasn’t been capable of changing the course of this conflict... Yes, but it is a shared responsibility of the United Nations and of others. Now, of course, we haven’t been able to solve this crisis. But the EU is playing its part with all its diplomatic contacts. And we are trying to improve humanitarian access as much as we can. The EU has responded to each of the UN’s calls for aid donations, whenever possible, and we’ve received appraisal from the UN on this. On the issue of chemical weapons inspections and the elimination of the chemical weapons in Syria, we are going to bring some contributions to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and to the UN. So we’re working on all of this. Looking at the developments in Syria over the past weeks, would you agree that Europe is simply not a power broker, and it can only play a role when backed by global powers in international community – notably the US? No, I think it is more complicated than that. Each situation has to be looked at on its own. Syria is not Mali; Mali is not Libya; Egypt is very different altogether. In each case, we have tried to do whatever we can. Syria itself is an example in which the whole international community had failed – at first. The first actual success only happened last week, with the new Security Council resolution [on the dismantling of Syria’s chemical weapons] and the decision by the OPCW in The Hague. But Europe was hardly involved in initiating these actions... Well, no, you’re right. The issue of chemical weapons became more prominent and therefore the Americans put pressure [on Syria], threatening with military strikes. That this came about was a good thing. Europe wasn’t there for the initiative itself but we have been as helpful as possible ever since. Again, I’m not saying that what we have done was going to solve the crisis – that is certainly not the case. You mentioned Egypt earlier, a country that has always been closely connected to EU member states. Is the EU getting its point across: and does it have an actual impact on what is happening domestically? It is a very difficult issue, we all agree. But one thing that frustrates me from time to time is that people argue that Europe is absent in Egypt; that we’re not visible. Egypt is the perfect example where Europe is in fact clearly involved. [EEAS High Representative] Catherine Ashton currently is back there [in Egypt] again. The EU is the only player that is able to discuss with everyone. We have invested a lot of effort, including visits from the high representative [for foreign and security policy, Ashton], with special representative for the Southern Mediterranean region Bernardino Leon. We’re there, trying to push for a solution. We haven’t succeeded in bringing two sides together, I agree. The hardliners in Egypt have been the ones that have prevailed so far. But we are doing all we can and are the only ones is involved at the moment. And we are working in a way that is, I feel, the right attitude: not lecturing, not patronising, but listening and trying to work out a solution that is supported by the Egyptians themselves. The amount of diplomatic effort put into this by the EU is also considerable. Catherine Ashton is closely involved in person. Bernardino León is one of the EU’s top international diplomats. What if the EU invested an equal amount of resources into other conflicts, and in Syria for that matter? Well, we are involved everywhere – in some cases more visible than in others. Take Tunisia, for example, where we have been discussing the present political deadlock with everyone. We are present in Libya, in Yemen... We are trying to be as active as we can, at least in our neighbourhood. I don’t pretend that we are succeeding as much as we’d like. But we’re trying. It seems there has been a lot of interest on Egypt, and perhaps high representative Ashton’s visit contributed to our visibility there.

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