The use of the internet and the Web as critical elements used to achieve strategic organisational objectives has been widely adopted by contemporary terrorist organisations. The Spanish terrorism and internet scholar Javier Jordán (2008) claims that contemporary terrorist organisations would not be able to operate effectively without them. Indeed, Justin Webster argued “without the internet it is difficult to imagine al-Qaeda”.43
In addition, according to the scholar Dorothy Denning, a major reason explaining the widespread adoption of the internet and the Web as the dominant media channel for their operations, is that traditional media channels are comparatively expensive and subject to editorial control, while online communication is cheaper, has a very low barrier to entry and can be viewed by anyone with an internet connection. She puts it that:
‘One reason the Internet is popular among activists is its cost advantage over traditional mass media. It is easier and cheaper to post a message to a public forum or put up a Web site [sic] than it is to operate a radio or television station or print a newspaper. Practically anyone can afford to be a Web publisher. In addition, the reach of the Internet is global. A message can potentially reach millions of people at no additional cost to the originator. Further, activists can control their presentation to the world. They decide what is said and how. They do not have to rely on the mass media to take notice and tell their story “right”’ (Denning, 2001: 8).
The notion that the internet and the Web have lowered the costs associated with the attainment of strategic objectives for terrorist organisations is significant because it argues that the fulfilment of such actions is at once more affordable and less difficult. Curto et al. (2007) underscored this point by claiming that the internet has facilitated the opportunity to maintain the cohesion of terrorist groups while simultaneously publicising the acts they have committed. They claim that the internet has allowed terrorist organisations to live a double life with strategic centrality and tactical de-centrality (Curto et al, 2007).
The previous assertion can be applied to the case of ETA. The organisation maintains an active Web presence with a website and pro-Basque independence presences in a number of online forums. Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) too regularly posts anti-Spanish commentary on its website and various other Web portals (Wiemann, 2008, Soriano, 2010). Soriano (2010) demonstrated this in his analysis of Jihadi online propaganda in Spain, claiming that the use of the internet has produced a qualitative and quantitative increase in communication activity within the group. Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb is now an actor capable of understanding the requirements of the information society (Soriano, 2010).
Terrorism and internet scholars, as outlined earlier in this chapter, have documented the ways in which terrorist organisations use digital media sources for a wide range of operations, enabling them to better collaborate and conduct certain operations across national borders, such as the indoctrination and recruitment of potential supporters. The indoctrination (Jordán, 2008) of potential supporters is achieved through the posting of multimedia content depicting images and videos of atrocities committed against Muslim civilians, beheadings and the final demands of suicide bombers (Davis, 2006). In addition, the inculcation of potential supporters is conducted by engaging with people on online discussion forums and websites with the aim of influencing users’ perceptions (Rogan, 2006). However, the ultimate aim of indoctrination techniques for Jihadist groups is not always clear. Taboul’s (2008) analysis of Jihadist francophone forums revealed that online users were concerned with being part of a community rather than committing violent acts, especially for those who do not reside in the Middle East. The overall aims and objectives of terrorist groups are therefore being achieved by exploiting online users’ need for ‘religious, moral, emotional and material support and it seems that social solidarity within this virtual community…reflecting the sense of being a minority in Europe’ (Rogan, 2006).
In addition, the internet has been used as a method for financing terrorist operations through the illegal activities of underground criminal networks. Terrorist organisations operating in Spain have been known to make use of online criminal methods to generate funds, such as identification theft, phishing and credit card fraud (Fragoso, 2010)44. The relationship between cybercrime and terrorist organisations in Spain will be investigated in more detail in the following chapter.
Terrorist organisations operating within Spanish borders are also known to use the internet as a means of obtaining information about specific targets (Soriano, 2010). Paz (2004), for example, documented the ways in which the perpetrators of the Madrid attacks downloaded and followed the instructions from a publication uploaded to the Global Islamic Media and The Information Commission in Support of the Iraqi People entitled Message to the Spanish People, in which Jihadists are encouraged to perpetrate attacks against Spain (Paz, 2004).
It is apparent that terrorist organisations engage with diverse and growing audiences using social media services (Conway, 2005). As outlined in detail in Chapters One and Three, the development of social media technologies enables people to engage in discussion on events both retrospectively and in real-time, hitherto difficult via traditional media channels. People affected by terrorist attacks in Spain use a variety of online platforms through which to express their views about the events, such as discussion forums, social networks and microblogs. While the use of these technologies enables people to debate the rationale behind the terrorists’ motives, the internet and the Web have in turn given terrorist organisations the opportunity to address audiences of millions and the opportunity to counter the occurrence of misinformation in online forums (Soriano, 2010). Used in this way, the internet can help terrorist organisations influence public opinion and debate in real-time across national borders; ‘[i]n other words, the Web has been a timely, efficient and effective tool for conducting information warfare’ (Burton, 2006: 8).
In addition, terrorist organisations further disperse their narratives using the internet and the online multimedia platforms created by traditional mainstream media corporations. Weimann (2006) claimed that the confluence of multimedia online platforms from traditional media corporations, in tandem with online terrorist rhetoric, resulted in the two-step flow of information from terrorists to journalists, the internet to the public, demonstrating how terrorist organisations are becoming more adroit at strategically using information and communication technologies. However, the apparent openness of this “flow” is contested by Hoskins and O’Loughlin who claim that Western mainstream media organisations exhibit a propensity to overlook online media channels, such as ‘terrorist monitoring sites, Arabic media, and jihadist websites’ own self-monitoring and feedback services’ as sources of information and, in the process, fail to present alternative perspectives on how terrorist content might be palatable to some audiences (Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2010: 1).
It is at this point that it is pertinent to elucidate some of the theoretical frameworks that help examine the nature of communication explored in this thesis. This analysis begins by introducing the concept of Herman and Chomsky’s Manufacturing Consent theory (1988) that seeks to explain the nature of communication by studying the political economy of such communications methods. Secondly, it examines the media culture theory, where communication and narratives are transmitted through cultural norms and relationships, a multifaceted method where narratives are not communicated through one particular channel. Finally, the contest model from Cottle (2006) is explored in which it is determined that communication and the construction of certain narratives are given form through the writer’s antagonism with government policy.
Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky (1988), as mentioned previously, focused on constructing a theory explaining the nature of communication in the media by explaining the political economy of its production. They argued that because the media is an industry, just like any other, and relies on financial contributions to maintain its existence, the content and nature of its output is determined to a lesser or greater degree to the dictates of market forces. Several factors contribute to this according to Herman and Chomsky, the first of which concerns media organisations’ dependence on multinational news organisations for news content. Such multinational organisations can include governments and other corporations who produce newsworthy content. If media organisations are openly critical of such organisations then they are subsequently denied access to them and, by implication, a source of revenue (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). In addition, they claim that contemporary media organisations are extremely financially powerful as they are able to place their content across a range of media and distribution channels. The corollary of this is that space for alternative media is decreased and only wealthy media organisations are able to attract readers, something that is underscored by analyses of online traffic to the most popular news websites (ComScore, 2010).
Finally, Herman & Chomsky argue that media organisations are restricted in the range of news they can offer because of the necessity of attracting funds from advertisers. Advertisers are essentially the ‘patrons who provide media subsidy. As such, the media compete for their patronage, developing specialized staff to solicit advertisers and necessarily having to explain how their programs serve advertisers’ needs’ (Herman & Chomsky, 1988: 8).
This theory is useful because it can be applied to understandings of the nature of communication following the 11 March 2004 Madrid attacks when media organisations were instructed by Aznar to publish content blaming ETA, in spite of the mounting evidence to the contrary (Moreno, 2004). However, as will be presented subsequently, this led to discontent amongst the Spanish public. It is also pertinent to consider the limitations of the manufacturing consent theory, not least the argument put forward by Antoniades et al. (2010) that different media and strategic narratives are ‘projected across media systems, re-mediated and translated and responded to differently’ (Antoniades, Miskimmon & O’Loughlin, 2010: 9). If this is the case, then it is arguable that consent may be one element that is interpreted from media content and that Herman & Chomsky’s argument needs to be expanded to accommodate the various ways in which target audiences respond to media content and narratives.
The media contest model was advanced by the scholar Simon Cottle who maintained that the relationship between media organisations and the government or other influential institution cannot be known beforehand. Rather, it is only possible to determine whether consent has been granted by conducting a retrospective analysis and this, therefore, leaves space for other elements such as dissent and contestation to occur (Cottle, 2001 in Bromley ed., 2001). This theory is useful in that it demonstrates that other forces were instrumental in explaining the nature of communication following the 11 March 2004 Madrid attacks. It provides an explanation for the high volume of negative media coverage directed towards the Aznar Government after it emerged that ETA was not responsible for the attacks, that Aznar had provided newspaper editors with erroneous information and that an al-Qaeda-inspired group had admitted culpability for the attack.
Finally, media culture theory contends that media content is created according to the normative values and representations in society and culture (Cottle, 1998). Simon Cottle argued in his analysis of the application of Ulrich Beck’s (1999) risk society theory to the structure and practice of contemporary media that the creation of media content is shaped by ‘“value conservatism” or the value of preservation that seeks to check uninhabited industrialism’ (Cottle, 1998: 11). In order to illustrate this, Cottle makes the case that media coverage concerning the environment or ‘ecological journalism taps into a surrounding typification of the environment as a cultural good, and thereby enjoys increased media coverage and interest’ (Cottle, 1998: 12).
Cottle’s argument concerning the validity of the media culture theory has utility in explaining the reason why certain narratives continued to be discussed within certain media channels. This can be observed in the narrative condemning the Aznar Government’s provision of erroneous information to the mainstream media concerning the authorship of the Madrid terrorist attacks in their immediate aftermath, when evidence from the security services contradicted the story. This is a cultural process because the emergence of this particular narrative reflected the normative values of Spanish culture in relation to this event; namely, that Spanish citizens were entitled to know the truth of the events that occurred on 11 March 2004 in Madrid.
The use of digital media was widespread following the terrorist attacks on 11 March 2004, during which, communities of online users came to user-generated-content sites to comment on the events and discuss news perpetrated by the mainstream media. This use of social media is analysed further in this chapter.
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