Masaryk university faculty of social studies

Table 3: Parliamentary elections results held in January 2007⁶⁴

Since October 5, 2000 and the overthrow of Milošević regime untill May 2012, four parliamentary elections were held in years: 2000, 2003, 2007 and 2008. During this period a fragilely installed democratic system suffered a great deal of setbacks, out of which as more important ones can be singled out: the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić in 2003 and the Kosovo and Metohija self proclaimed independency in 2008. Historical legacy from the 1990s, the transition challenges, as well as the dissolution of the union state with Montenegro had a profound influence on Serbian foreign policy. Combination of those factors obstructed drafting of a single foreign policy strategy, a document which primary importance, above all, rests in the necessity for certain predictability of the states actions in the international relations, both on regional and global level. A lack of such document complicates the analysis of Serbia foreign policy and leaves a lot of space for speculations.

Nevertheless, even without foreign policy strategy document some constants in Serbia’s foreign policy can be noticed. Here I mean primarily on pursuit for EU integrations and firm position on keeping sovereignty and territorial over Kosovo. Whilst EU integrations remains Serbia’s primary orientation in foreign policy, NATO membership, does not appear to be on the list of political elites’ priorities, at least for the time being.

Majority of the parties who participated in governments during 2000 - 2012 period, were a part of DOS (Democratic Opposition of Serbia) - wide political coalition that overthrew Milošević in 2000. That is why I will begin this party programmes analysis by looking back at its programme.

Although DOS programme for federal elections in 2000, titled Programme for democratic Serbia does not address the issue of Serbia’s possible future integrations in NATO it still sheds some light at the future constants in Serbia’s position towards status of Kosovo, which was and still is, a biggest obstacle in relations between Serbia and NATO. The programme itself, among others, contains ten commitments, out of which third reads as follows:

Considering the dominant role of Democratic Party in previous governments I will look into three of its documents. First one is party programme dated to 2001. It is followed by documents titled: Strategy of changes from 2005 and election programme from 2007 titled: For Better life.

Main goal of DPs programme is Serbia’s transformation into modern society. Commitment to regional and international cooperation is stated in section: Our priorities, subsection: European integrations, in which, among other reads:

“Programme goal of DP - our country’s involvement in European Community as soon as possible. We want European structures and standards to become part of our society, and that our state becomes an equal member of European community. Our obligation is to affirm European values wherever we act, and to prepare the country for real European integration.”⁸⁴

What can be seen from this subsection is a strong orientation towards integrations into European community. Phrases like “as soon as possible”, desire for European structures and standards to become part of our society, and commitment to affirm European values on every place where we act, prove that point. However this subsection, as well as the rest of the programme does not explain what exactly DP means under European Community and what is particular nature of European integrations mentioned in the text. Therefore, DPs programme leaves a lot of manoeuvre space for any type of integrations in European society, whether they are economical, political or military. In addition to that, unspecified formulations as equal member of European community and real European integration also leave a lot of space for various speculations.

To conclude, leaving an open door to every type of integrations in which European countries participate, naturally leaves the space for possible NATO membership.

Second document that will be reviewed is Strategy of Changes, which is in fact party’s action plan for the future. Plan identifies and discusses main problems in Serbian society, offers solutions and underlines the continuance of reforms as the state’s most important goal.
Section 4, titled: Institutional reforms, subsection 4.6.: Military and police reforms reads as follows:
“Inclusion in international security organizations, such as Partnership for Peace, Interpol and other, will lead to technical and professional improvement of these services apart from increase in security.”⁸⁵

Aside from acknowledging the benefits of participation in international security organizations and especially in NATO led PfP programme, the document does not deal with it in more detail. In fact, that was the only time that the PfP programme was mentioned in entire document. Further, in section 10 titled: Answers on challenges of time, subsection 10.2. Kosovo and Metohija, reads that DP for its “starting point” in solving the Kosovo status takes, among others, “consistent insisting” on:

“Respect of the resolution 1244 and respect of international standards regarding inviolability of borders by violence.”⁸⁶

In addition it to that it reads:

”Commitment to respect resolution 1244 is international legal framework for Serbia’s participation in solving the Kosovo issue, as well as basis for invitation to the international community to respect its commitments.”⁸⁷

This section shows firmer and more decisive positioning towards the issue of the status of Kosovo, which is apparent in use of constructions as: consistent insisting on and commitment to respect of the resolution 1244, respect of international standards and call to international community to respect its commitments. By stating its respect and commitment to resolution 1244 and international standards regarding inviolability of borders by violence DP evidently tries to take higher moral ground, in order to be able to ask the same from international community, whom she invites to respect its commitments.

Furthermore, it can also be seen that DP maintains that Kosovo is an integral part of Serbia, and that it is ready to insist on the rights provided by UN resolution 1244, in spite of the signals from international community, which promoted Kosovo’s independence as the only solution. ⁸⁸

In following subsection: 10.3. titled: International position of the country and foreign policy, among other, reads:

“Balkan and then European region will for a long time be the framework within which our interests will be reflected. But, we must not forget that relations with the most powerful state – America, can still determine our faith, thus relations with her are of first rate importance. Russia and China, as big countries of global importance, with which Serbia traditionally maintains close relations, must be kept as strategic partners.”⁸⁹

Apart from stressing the importance of maintaining close relations with US, emphasis is also put on the importance of Russia and China as strategic partners. Main reason behind this strategic partnership, besides economical interests, is Russia’s and China’s support for keeping of Serbia’s territorial integrity.⁹⁰

Moreover, maintaining relations with US, Russia and China is considered a must. By using this particular modal verb, which indicates necessity, in this case to cooperation, it is clear that focus on just one of those countries is not an option, as cooperation with all of them is a necessity for Serbia. The necessity of cooperation with US lies in the US dominant position in the region. As for Russia and China, beside economical interests, the necessity of cooperation lies in their support to Serbia regarding the Kosovo issue.

The third DP’s document is electoral programme from 2007, tilted: Program for better life. In section 9, titled: Strengthened position of Serbia in the World, which addresses foreign policy issues, paragraph 8 reads as follows:

“Euro-Atlantic integrations are our long term political goal that gives Serbia the position in world which she deserves.”⁹¹

Further down this section, after stressing the importance of cooperation with all of the EU member states, US, Russia and China, paragraph 12, reads:

“In the framework of our goals is the admission of our country to Partnership for Peace programme” ⁹²

Naming Euro-Atlantic integrations as a long a term goal, which will provide Serbia with position in world as she deserves is in itself very ambiguous, since it lacks any clarification. Failure to specify the nature of integrations, which besides economical and political can also be military is perfectly reasonable, considering the support NATO membership has in Serbia, as well as the fact that it is an electoral programme. Nevertheless, the programme, due to the lack of transparency, leaves a lot of space for criticism from those who are opposed to NATO membership.⁹³ Furthermore, a statement that they understand the admission of Serbia to PfP programme as a part of their framework of goals, without thoroughly discussing that particular framework, leaves a lot of doubts.

Taking into account all that has been stated above, it can be noticed that DPs never explicitly positions herself in favour Serbia’s membership in alliance, nor against. In fact, neither the acronym NATO nor the full name North Atlantic Treaty Organization, are mentioned in the texts I overviewed in this section.

Although in the documents above reviewed that membership in the alliance is not specifically discussed, some indications of DPs position towards the issue can be noticed. They are actively pro European integrations, but they fail to specify what exactly is meant under that notion. They keep insisting on resolution 1244 of the Security Council, which they hold as a key instrument of keeping Kosovo in Serbia and they are in favour of strengthening of cooperation with Russia and China, since both China and Russia are actively supporting Serbia’s efforts to keep Kosovo in Serbia on the basis of resolution 1244.⁹⁴ And finally, they proclaim Euro-Atlantic integrations as countries long term political goal.

A constant of DS political discourse was an active support to Serbia’s integrations in European structures and active support for keeping Kosovo in Serbia. These positions have proven to contradict each other as the support for Kosovo independence came from highest circles of EU and United States. This became apparent especially after Kosovo declared independence in 2008. However, that did not stop the President, Prime Minister as well as the other DPs officials of trying to go both ways, despite the fact that that was impossible. Proclaimed Euro-Atlantic integrations just add to the ambiguity of DP’s political positions regarding NATO membership.

Considering the above mentioned – two main reasons for such ambiguous position towards stand out. First one can be found in inability to make long term plans considering the status of Kosovo, which is under KFOR’s supervision, while Serbia at same time claims sovereignty over the territory. Such unresolved territorial issue to a large extent hampers every other foreign policy plan, including further cooperation with NATO.

Second reason is in the fact that it would be very hard to convince the citizens of Serbia that the membership in NATO would be useful for Serbia, knowing what views general public in Serbia has of NATO.

Combination of those reasons simply forces a party, which aspires to create state politics, to conceive its intentions in regard of such” burning issue” as the NATO membership was/is at the moment. Nevertheless, it seems that DP foreign policy plans are, if not directly, than at least indirectly inclining towards Serbia’s membership in the alliance. Reason for this claim lays in the fact that DP is the only party relevant political party in Serbia, which is not openly declared pro or contra NATO membership. On a more positive note, that position leaves DP with enough manoeuvre space for future decisions, without a risk for being accused of changing politics.

Democratic Party of Serbia, alongside with Democratic Party can be considered as one of the most influential political parties of 2000-2012 period. DPS was one of the biggest parties in DOS coalition and was considered a leader of democratic changes after the overthrow of Slobodan Milošević in 2000. However, after Kosovo declared independence in 2008, DPS refused to sign Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with EU and left the government, what led government to fall, while at the same time marking decline in support for DPS.

DPS advocates military and political neutrality of Serbia and its members drafted the Resolution of the National Assembly on the protection of Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and Constitutional Order of the Republic of Serbia, in which Serbia’s military independence was proclaimed.

Unlike DP, the DPS has clear position towards EU and NATO. In order to fully understand that position, I will review the party programme⁹⁵ and the interview⁹⁶ with Vojislav Koštunica about his book “Why Serbia, and not the EU”.

In section of the programme titled: Army, paragraphs 7 and 8, read as follows:

“We believe that international integrative processes, such as accession to the Partnership for Peace programme, should strengthen territorial integrity, as well as the overall position of Serbia. Serbia enters these processes primarily because of its state and national interests.”⁹⁷

“We support Serbia's accession to the Partnership for Peace programme. At the same time we are opposed to Serbia's accession to NATO alliance.”⁹⁸

These two paragraphs show that DPS is strongly supporting Serbia’s membership in PfP programme, as well as other international integrative processes, which according to them coincide with state and national interests. On the other hand DPS is against Serbia’s membership in NATO. Moreover, this paragraph also confirms the main criteria for joining integrative process, namely, that they have to be in accordance with state and national interests.

While discussing national unity of governments during his time as the Prime Minister, in period between 2004-2007 and 2007-2008, he explains the reasons behind disagreements among parties in government in respect to the path Serbia should take, stating that:

„the pressure on national unity from western powers, who wanted to declare independence of Kosovo at any cost, was constantly increasing. Internal unity was questioned, shaken and undermined the moment western powers managed to find in Serbia those to whom foreign partner was closer and more important than national unity and defence of the Serbian state.”⁹⁹

Further he notices that:

“at the moment when western powers declared independence of Kosovo, of course we talk about EU, they signed with part of Serbian government Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) at the same time. With that, a part of Serbian authorities agreed with 22 members of EU, which previously recognised unilateral declaration of Kosovo’s independence. That essentially meant amnesty for western countries of every responsibility for its actions on unlawful secession of Kosovo, including NATO aggression on Serbia in 1999.”¹⁰⁰

Here can be seen a list of main reasons which, according to Koštunica, brought down his government in 2008. The blame is put on “western powers” for pressure on national unity and for its desire to declare independence of Kosovo, at any cost. By ascribing the agency to “western powers” and failing to name the particular countries and their representatives, who advocated independence of Kosovo, it can be concluded that all western powers are supporting Kosovo’s independence.

Furthermore, he also directly accused his former coalition partners as those to whom foreign partner was closer and more important than national unity and defence of the Serbian state, thus implying that they are betraying their nation. Nationalistic rhetoric is apparent in connection he makes between the two clauses in sentence quoted above, by putting the two clauses in antonymic relations. The ideological aspect of such statement is clearly visible when, for instance, one tries to put syntagm “foreign partner” in antonymic relations with “national unity” and/or “defence of state” in different context.

Koštunica also criticises SAA stating that signing of the agreement meant amnesty of western countries of every responsibility and its role in unlawful secession of Kosovo and NATO aggression. Emphasising the responsibility of “western countries” (again not specified which!) in secession of Kosovo he accuses and lists them as the only guilty for Kosovo’s secession once again claiming that the secession was unlawful. A term aggression is obviously used to “blacken the enemy” by putting the operation in negative and unlawful context.

After that, when he comments on possibilities to accept politics of European integrations as most important goal of Serbia and take new, more positive attitude towards the policies of Brussels and Washington regarding Kosovo, he asserts:

“No, for me, such a firm position is out of the question”¹⁰¹

Then he explains his position, stating that:

“my interest is tied to the politics which are led and determined by interests of Serbian people and Serbia. I consider conducting politics that EU has no alternative just in order to stay in power as nationally irresponsible.”¹⁰²

In addition to that, he adds:

“When I say that I can’t represent and conduct nationally irresponsible and erroneous politics, I mean that the price, which Serbia is going to pay because of that politics, is incomparably higher than the price, which would be paid if politics of national unit was maintained and unwillingness to agree with taking of Kosovo and Metohija by force.”¹⁰³

He expresses his belief that the course of Serbian politics is nationally irresponsible and erroneous and that the price for conducting such politics will be incomparably bigger and on long standing than sticking to the national politics. He makes direct accusation against DP when he states: Conducting politics that EU has no alternative just in order to stay in power I consider nationally irresponsible as it was their slogan on 2008 elections.¹⁰⁴ By claiming that the present course of Serbian politics (from 2008 onwards) is nationally irresponsible and erroneous he aims at discrediting of the later governments. As a matter of fact, agreeing with pro EU integration politics for Koštunica is agreeing with taking Kosovo by force, which clearly shows that he puts Kosovo over EU integrations.

When it left the government, DPS scarified its votes and coalition partners for the sake of its principles. However by doing so it reduced chances of possible involvement in formation of future government o minimum, as every government formed since 2000, including those in which they participated was supporting Serbia’s EU membership.

Yet again, every government from 2000 on also believed that they can keep Serbia’s sovereignty over Kosovo by conducting their politics by formula “Kosovo and EU.”¹⁰⁵ On the other hand DPS, when realised, that such politics do not give any results and that the EU position towards Kosovo independence is solid,¹⁰⁶ left the government.

In advance he presents his views of international relations, stating:

“International relations are based on conflict of interests and that in every conflict of interests, which appears amongst Serbia and European Union is publically stated, preference over our interests will be given to the EU interests, than on the basics of common sense it can be concluded in advance that the costs of such politics will be too high and detrimental for Serbia.”¹⁰⁷

From this it is clear that he perceives EU membership as harmful to the national interests of Serbia regarding Kosovo, and claims that on the basics of common sense is clear that the price for joining EU would be too high and detrimental for Serbia, therefore directly implying that Serbia could not become and EU member without recognising independence of Kosovo. Calling upon a common sense, reveals ideological aspect of the claim he makes, meaning “everyone who doesn’t agree with me, are lacking a common sense” ,id est, EU membership equals with too high and detrimental price for Serbia, since it would include recognition of Kosovo’s independence.

It is why he advocates the path of military and political neutrality, stating that:

“above all, thanks to our politics, Serbia is military neutral.”¹⁰⁸

He then asserts:

“by all means, we should fight to preserve military neutrality, because, there is no valid reason why Serbia should join NATO pact.“¹⁰⁹

Here Koštunica fails to give any examples for such position towards NATO, which in a way proves that he does not even want to discuss them. It is most likely so because if he was to list and discuss pro and contra reasons for NATO membership, he might find himself in a position where they would be undeniable fact going in favour if NATO membership, as for instance, modernisation of the armed forces or perhaps economical benefits for the arms industry. This way he just states that there is no valid reason for membership and leaves it at that.

Mentioning the military neutrality as foreign policy goal he moves on to discussing political neutrality, stating that:

“It would be much harder to fight for political neutrality of Serbia, too.”¹¹⁰

Further he explains:

“there will be a lot pressures from Brussels and Washington to stop political neutrality of Serbia. After all, the EU itself is a part of military alliance led by United States.”¹¹¹

After that he asks:

”why would Serbia be politically neutral, i.e. independent and sovereign state, when it is much better for EU and US to supervise Serbia and constantly give her new conditions that should bе fulfilled?“¹¹²

By creating an image of supervised and conditioned Serbia from the EU and US, he clearly expresses his doubt in the intentions of EU and US in respect to Serbia. Using the syntagms as by all means (should be fought to preserve military neutrality), (there will be) a lot of pressures and fight for political neutrality (of Serbia) he also shows his view of the difficulties which follow promotion of neutrality.

From the above mentioned we can conclude that DPSs and Koštunica’s views are very straightforward, and that they leave very little, if any, space for speculations. However, when in opposition, one can more freely speak his and criticise then when in office. With use of such rhetoric and uncompromising approach DPS remove any possibility for political compromise, which is essential if one aspires to actively participate in creation of state policies.

He continues further by discussing possible future position of Serbia in EU and NATO, stating:

“We shouldn’t deceive ourselves in thinking that the voice of Serbia in NATO or the voice of Serbia in EU as their member would be equal. It is known by whom and how decisions are made in NATO and EU. Relation of Brussels and Washington to Serbia teaches us that only as politically and military neutral country, we can make decisions and take care of our dignity and national interests.”¹¹³

Highlighting only the inequality between member states in NATO and EU, he purposefully fails other aspects of the cooperation as well as the potential benefits. Sentence It is known by whom and how decisions are made in NATO and EU, inevitably carries in itself negative connotation by deliberate omission of agency, which leaves readers with overly general insinuations regarding “those decision makers”. Furthermore he states that Conduction of Brussels and Washington to Serbia teaches us that only as politically and military neutral country, we can make decisions and take care of our dignity and national interests. This sentence opens many questions, as for instance: In what way position of Brussels and Washington to Serbia teaches “us” that politically and military neutral country we would be able to make decisions and take care of our interests? Is it realistic for such small and economically weaken country to pursue neutrality? What about the costs of such neutrality?, which unfortunately remain unanswered.

Important characteristic of Koštunica’s discourse is the use of the inclusive "we". Such use of language, as for instance in sintagms: We shouldn’t deceive ourselves, It is known (to us), Conduction of Brussels and Washington to Serbia teaches us and we can make decisions, by including the reader and himself is trying to show that he is “one of the people” and it clearly reveals demagogue.

He makes further remark, while discussing Serbia’s military neutrality, stating that:

“present military neutrality of Serbia relates above all to NATO pact, because there is no other military alliance in world today.”¹¹⁴

From the above discussed extracts from DPSs programme and interview with its leader, Vojislav Koštunica, it can be seen that DPS stands firmly opposed to Serbia’s integrations in NATO. Moreover, they perceive such integrations must be avoided at every cost and in both texts remain clear that membership in PfP programme is seen as sufficient form of security cooperation.

With its current 7% percent of the vote¹¹⁸, acquired on 2012 elections in comparison to 17.7% won on 2003 elections, DPS remains active, but due to its rigid political views relatively unimportant actor in Serbian politics.

The former Milošević party – Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), managed, from the ruins after 2000, to steadily built its place in the Serbian political arena, while its ratings recorded constant growth. In SPSs party programme, central position among foreign policy priorities is held by Kosovo and EU integrations.

In chapter titled: Political democracy, section 13 Autonomous province of Kosovo and Metohija, paragraph 1, reads as follows:

“Kosovo and Metohija is integral part of Serbian identity and statehood. For Serbian socialists, Autonomous province of Kosovo and Metohija is inseparable part of Republic of Serbia, and solving of problems caused by violent secession, illegal and illegitimate aggression of NATO and unilateral declaration of independence is the most important state, national, historical, moral and spiritual issue of Serbian people and Republic of Serbia.”¹¹⁹

Presenting Kosovo as integral part of Serbian identity and statehood clearly shows that SPS sees Kosovo as something that cannot be separated from Serbia, considering it as a part of Serbian national being. Referring to Kosovo as to autonomous province and inseparable part of Republic of Serbia further reaffirms such position. Furthermore, few interesting moments can be noticed, while discussing the solution for problems, which are according to SPS, caused by violent secession, illegal and illegitimate aggression of NATO and unilateral declaration of independence is the most important state, national, historical, moral and spiritual issue of Serbian people and Republic of Serbia.

First we can notice a framing of violent secession, illegal, illegitimate aggression and unilateral declaration against national, historical, moral and spiritual issue of Serbian people and Republic of Serbia, which is aimed at positioning “us” against “them” ,that is, “good” vs. ”bad” or painting “black” and “white” picture of the situation. Moreover, if the overwording in describing secession of Kosovo is taken into account, it can clearly suggest the socialists’ position towards NATO and its role in Kosovo’s declaration of independence. Positioning violent secession, illegal and illegitimate aggression and unilateral declaration of independence versus most important state, national, historical, moral and spiritual issue of Serbs and Serbia presents socialists’ view of the matter and adds dimensions of morality and spirituality, which are certain to provoke a reaction in already anti-NATO membership mood of Serbian public.

Second and more important, is an emphasis on solution of problems as most important issue of Serbian people and Serbia. This emphasis on solution does not necessarily implies positive solution, namely, return of Kosovo under Serbia’s sovereignty, but it also leaves enough space for “other solutions”, primarily reaching some kind of compromise between Kosovo and Serbia, which would satisfy both the Serbian side and the international community. In addition to that an important characteristic of SPSs discourse can be noticed. It is usage of inclusive “we” in relation to Serbian people, which is aimed at creating an image that they speak in the name of the people.

The socialists are also strong supporters of military neutrality. In chapter Political democracy, section 14 Security and policy of neutrality, paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, among other, read as follows:

“The world and the Balkans region were exposed to great security challenges, risks and threats. We consider that proliferation of weapons and joining military alliances are not adequate responses to those challenges.”¹²⁰

Further it reads:

“Taking into consideration great human and material damage, suffered in war destructions in 20^th century – First and Second World War, in civil war and ethnic conflicts during final decade of the last century and NATO bombing – socialists consider that Serbia should develop a concept of military neutrality.”¹²¹

In addition to that it reads:

What is important to notice in these paragraphs is that status of Kosovo is not directly mentioned as a reason behind support for military neutrality. Instead, as reasons behind their support to military neutrality, SPS takes: proliferation of weapons, great human and material damage in the region that occurred during the wars in the last century. However, although every reason seems valid, a further elaboration on military neutrality is omitted. Additional explanation of what exactly they mean under the notion of military neutrality, how can a country as Serbia support its military neutrality and should not the country be recognised by some agreement as military neutral¹²³, are missing. Hence, taking into consideration all that, the decision on military neutrality seems as just one declarative-political decision that is adopted to stop Serbia’s further integrations in NATO.¹²⁴

Further, in the same section, paragraph 4, reads as follows:
“It is a fact that Republic of Serbia is committed for joining the European Union. On the other hand, the concept of Euro Atlantic integrations implies three aspects: political, economical and military security integrations. Thereby, apart from all transformation that it went, especially after the end of “Cold war”, NATO still remains primarily military alliance. Serbia today is not a target for threats out of which it could be protected in military alliance. Besides, the socialists at the same time maintain the fact that illegal and illegitimate attack on our country, great material destructions, human casualties, military and political support to secessionists have created serious obstacle to Serbia’s membership in NATO. We understand the accession of Serbia to Partnership for Peace programme as a confirmation of our readiness for accepting the highest standards in the area of security and commitments which arise in context of strengthening of security in international community. We consider this as a sufficient form with which we can satisfy our needs on the field of security and fulfil international commitments.”¹²⁵

Asserting that at present Serbia does not face any outside threats, which would lead her to join the military alliance, is presented as an argument against NATO membership. Furthermore, SPS argues that the NATO is still primary a military alliance and that its role in illegal and illegitimate attack on our country, great material destructions, human casualties, military and political support to secessionists have created a serious obstacle for Serbia’s membership in alliance. They consider PfP as sufficient form with which we can satisfy our needs on the field of security and honouring of international commitments. Placing PfP programme, as sufficient form of cooperation with NATO, SPS clearly positions itself in respect to Serbia’s potential full membership in NATO.

The Serbian Radical Party (SRS) was one of the biggest opposition parties in 2000-2012 period. However, in 2008 the party split in two, as a result of disagreements among the party leadership, namely, between party leader Vojislav Šešelj, who is presently tried at ICTY, and Tomislav Nikolić, at the time acting as his deputy. Disagreement came as a result of Nikolić’s attempt to restructure the party, after it lost in 2008 elections, which Šešelj refused. Soon after that Nikolić was expelled from the party. He responded by creation of parliamentary group called Forward Serbia! Later he founded Serbian Progressive Party (SPP), whose members were primarily from moderate wing of SRS. The new party eventually won over majority of the SRS voters, thus becoming strongest opposition party in Serbia in the eve of 2012 elections.

Main goal of SRS can be found in chapter I, titled: National programme, section 1: Unification of Serbian lands, paragraph 2, which reads as follows:

“The goal of Serbian Radical Party is uniting of all Serbian people and formation of state community on whole Serbian national territory, which will include Serbia, Montenegro, Republic of Srpska and Republic of Serbian Krajina. Serbian Radicals’ desire is that the united Serbian state is named Great Serbia, to be democratically organised with liberal market economy, modern law order and developed social protection.”¹²⁶

Due to such main programme goals, SRS was unable to find political partners between 2000 and 2012, in spite of large support which enjoyed. Constant insisting on nationalistic politics and anti-EU position were direct reasons behind the split that occurred. In the same chapter, section 50 titled: Position towards international organizations, paragraph 1, among other, reads:

“Serbian Radical Party will strive for our country to be a member of those international organisations which will respect its sovereign will, her interests as well as principle of non interference in internal issues and affairs of every state. Our country does not have reasons for joining particular international organisations which serve for conducting political will of one or a group of states at the expense of other members of such organisation. If that multifaceted agreement which presents constitutive instrument of the organisation doesn't determine joint but particular goals and prepare actions with which all signatories won't be satisfied, our country doesn’t have interest to participate in the work of those organizations.“¹²⁷

„look what just happened after signing the Stabilisation and Association agreement with Republic of Serbia, public debt has grown for few billions of dollars, unemployment has risen for 200000 people, who lost their jobs, and finally number of people living beneath poverty line in Republic of Serbia has increased.“¹³⁰

Singling out signing of Stabilisation and Association agreement as single cause for the unemployment and disregarding economic crisis that started the same year clearly shows selectivity in choosing information that will be presented. A lack of any data to support his claims just indicates to what extent his world view is ideologically coloured.

In addition to that, another member of SRS, General Božidar Delić states:

“Serbian Radical party strongly opposes Serbia’s accession to NATO pact. She will do everything to stop previous activities on so called “silent” or “crawling” accession to NATO. We can never forget 78 days of bombing of Serbia in 1999 as well as bombing of other Serbian countries that occurred few years earlier. NATO is a criminal organization, which also killed, part from soldiers, women, children, civilians on our territory...”¹³¹

By characterising NATO as essentially criminal organization which on our territory killed soldiers, women, children, civilians Delić aims primarily at reminding of the people of the victims of NATO intervention and thus influencing their position towards NATO membership. This is done by making of a connection between NATO and killing of women, children and civilians. Main goal of such discourse is to spur an emotional reaction of the people, which would lead to the state where emotions affect ratio and make him unable for emotionless reviewing arguments pro and contra NATO membership.

In addition to that, he adds:

“Serbian Radical Party supports full participation of Serbia in Collective Security Treaty Organization. None of seven members of this organization recognized Kosovo and, the head of this organization is our brotherly Russia which is by the way our strongest ally in defence of our sovereignty over Kosovo territory.“¹³²

In this statement another important characteristic of SRS political programme can be noticed. That is foreign and security policy orientation towards Russia. SRS envisages full participation of Serbia in Collective Security Treaty Organization and as the main reasons are asserted the facts that the members of CSTO did not recognised Kosovo’s independence and that Russia is leading country of the organisation. An adjective brotherly is connected with Russia, which shows the degree of sympathies towards Russia, which is intended at revival of traditional belief that Russia is Serbia’s most loyal ally.

From the reviewed parts of their programme it is clear that SRS is against any form of alliances that do not respect Serbia’s territorial integrity. This automatically means that they are against EU and NATO due to their support to Kosovo independence. They therefore propose alliance with CSTO just due to the fact that they have not reckognised Kosovo and that Russia is Serbia’s brotherly country. Without any desire to disregard Russia’s help to Serbia in past, it seems that such alliance is impossible due to the NATO surrounding Serbia from all sides.

Uncompromising positions regarding most important issues in Serbian society prevented SRS from participating in any coalitions, and eventually it led to the split, after which, moderates founded Serbian Progressive Party¹³³, who eventually won in 2012 elections. Strong nationalistic and isolationist rhetoric have cost SRS of support among citizens of Serbia, who opted to give their votes to Serbian Progressive Party. That led SRS from having 27,6% of votes in 2003 to only 4,6% in 2012 election, which for the first time in 12 years since 2000, left her under the electoral threshold.

Serbian Renewal Movement (SRM)
In more than twenty years of presence in Serbian political arena SRM went from being a major opposition party during the 1990s to having around 2% of the vote at present. Nevertheless it succeeded, via various coalitions to actively participate in the political life of Serbia.
In section 2 of their programme, titled: Our principles, paragraph 3 read as follows:
“We are in favour of Euro Atlantic integrations of our state. We are in favour of Serbia in European Union and NATO alliance, because our main goal for Serbia to be strong in every possible aspect.”¹³⁴
In this paragraph SRM clearly positions itself towards both the EU and NATO. Unlike, many other political actors, they explicitly state, that they are In favour of Serbia in European Union and NATO alliance, justifying such position with desire to have Serbia, which is strong in every possible aspect.
Furthermore in section 4, titled: Serbia in Europe, paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 read:
“Serbia in European Union is a foundation and roof of Serbian Renewal Movement programme.”¹³⁵
“This is dictated by national, developmental, security and spiritual interests.”¹³⁶
“What the state of Yugoslavia was, till the last decade of 20^th century, as united legal, political and economical space for its entire people, that is united Europe for Serbia in this century.”¹³⁷

Their comment to EU integrations is best formulated in statement that Serbia in EU is a foundation and roof of SRM, using this metaphor to suggest that EU membership of Serbia is the foundation of their political activities. Moreover, they perceive EU as being in national, developmental, security and spiritual interest Serbia. This overwording, aside from shedding light to ideological aspect of their actions, clearly suggest, that SRM believes EU membership would be beneficial to Serbia in every way possible.

“As a member of EU, Serbia will have the opportunity to maximally protect its rights and security of local Serbs and Serbian religious and historical heritage in Kosovo and Metohija.“¹³⁹

Use of adjectives as “kosovise” and “europeise” to denote disintegration in former and integration in latter case is a metaphor aimed at showing what SRM considers as positive and what as negative process. They claim that the only way Kosovo Gordian Knot could be resolved is by europeising Serbia, i.e. Kosovo will remain a problem until Serbia becomes a member of EU. Integration of the entire region in EU is by SPO seen as the only feasible solution both for Serbia, Serbs at Kosovo and Serbian religious and historical heritage at Kosovo. However, SRM never mentions the independent Kosovo and Serbia’s EU membership. This implies that they believe that Serbia should enter the EU with Kosovo as its integral part.

In section 6, titled: Serbia in the Balkans, paragraphs 2 and 3, read:

“Thereby, we are assured that the first step in European orientation of Serbia must be arranging the relations with neighbours in the region we live in. Although we are surrounded by new and old neighbours today, we, principally, assume that our immediate surroundings is changed from the foundations and that our relations with all of our neighbours must be built on new foundations.”¹⁴⁰

“In spite of many differences, what all of us at this time have in common, is a desire to become a part of European Union as soon as possible. This common interest is good foundation to overcome the heritage of turbulent past of the region, ethnic and territorial litigation, problems with national minorities, solution of the status of refugees and displaced persons.”¹⁴¹

From these two paragraphs it is apparent that one of the main focuses of SRM’s politics is reconciliation. As the only feasible way for that to happen they see desire to become a part of European Union which, according to SPO presents a common interest of all nations in the region.

To summarise, SRM sees the EU and NATO as the only solution for the problems that affect the region. However, they do not position themselves clearly towards the Kosovo issue. The party leader, Vuk Drašković, during the time he spend in Foreign minister’s office, recommended “three E plan¹⁴²”, in which Kosovo perceived as euroregion¹⁴³ under the sovereignty of Serbia. Of course majority of EU and NATO member states already recognised Kosovo as an independent state, and the chances of reconsidering their position and accepting Serbia with euroregion as a new member remain only in domain of theory. Therefore, in spite of SRM’s strong rhetoric in favour of EU and NATO integrations, the status of Kosovo, still looks as it would present a stumbling stone for future integrations.

G17 (Group 17) was an NGO founded in 1997 by 17 most eminent economists from Serbia and Montenegro. It was primarily concerned with the reforms in social and economic structures of Serbia. In 1999 it transforms into G17PLUS – an expert network for help to the citizens of Serbia, which gathers various profile experts, who were ready invest their knowledge in solving of the existential problems of Serbia’s citizens, through realization of specific humanitarian and developmental projects. In 2002 it became political party.¹⁴⁴

G17PLUS party programme was adopted in 2004. In section I, titled: Basic principles, subsection 1 Mission, reads as follows:

“G17 PLUS as her main goals sets creation of economically strong and democratically stable Serbia, which aspires to become leader at the Balkans.”¹⁴⁵

Furthermore in subsection: European orientations, reads:

„Serbia's place is in Europe. There is no doubt that we will, with comprehensive economical and law reforms, create conditions for full membership in European Union. The question is only whether that will happen sooner or later.“¹⁴⁶

In addition to that it reads:

„All issues in Serbia relating to Montenegro, Kosovo and Metohija, Vojvodina or the region must be addressed to these frameworks, on democratic basis and with the perspective of joining the European Union.“¹⁴⁷

Here can be seen that EU membership is top priority G17PLUS and that their goal is to create conditions for full membership in European Union. Moreover, they look upon EU as to as certain base to which all issues in Serbia relating to Montenegro, Kosovo and Metohija, Vojvodina must be adjusted for the purpose of membership in EU.

In addition to that, section titled: Active foreign policy reads:

“In a domain of foreign policy, clear and long term strategy must be adopted, with no regard to the form of relations between Serbia and Montenegro. For that we need to create a state programme, which would clearly define the steps, procedures and pace of country’s accessions to European Union and Euro Atlantic security and other integrations, and as an ultimate, goal the programme would put complete integration in existing global structures. More active role in all forms of regional initiatives, programmes and projects is necessary, just as the proposal of new, more efficient forms of cooperation and connecting in South East Europe. Realization of these priorities is not possible without thorough reorganization of diplomatic apparatus.”¹⁴⁸

In this chapter G17 PLUS stress the necessity of clearly defined path towards European Union and Euro Atlantic security and other integrations. The end goal is complete integration in existing global structures. Such strait forward position towards EU and Euro-Atlantic integrations inevitably leads to question: what about Kosovo?

Section: Negotiations with Kosovo Albanians, reads as follows:

“Serbia has historical obligation to protect Serbian citizens in Kosovo and Metohija and, with the help of international community, to enable everyone who wants to return to their ancestral homes to do so. Serbia, also, must protect and take care of its traditions. Kosovo is a cradle of Serbian history and its cultural and church heritage is a part of Serbian identity. Permanent solution for status of Kosovo and Metohija must involve guaranties of full autonomy to the Serbian communities on the north of Kosovo, Kosovo polje and Binačka Morava, as well as Serbia’s jurisdiction over monasteries of Gračanica, Visoki Dečani and Pećka Patrijaršija.”¹⁴⁹

This paragraph presents a solution for the Serbs and Serbian heritage in Kosovo. G17PLUS does not request Serbia's sovereignty over territory of Kosovo, but instead supports the autonomy for Serbs as a necessary element of permanent solution for status of Kosovo and Metohija. Although they do not discuss the properties of this autonomy, the very notion of autonomy for Serbs in Kosovo, implies that such autonomy will be within the framework of Kosovo, rather than under the sovereignty of Serbia. In fact, G17PLUS, in its party programme neither presented Kosovo to under the sovereignty Serbia, nor as it should be under its sovereignty, which is quite a step away from the rest of the parties considered in this paper.

CHAPTER V:

Government documents and strategies

Out of a variety of documents when it comes to possible future membership of Serbia in NATO two specific documents stand out. Those are: Resolution of the National Assembly on the protection of Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and Constitutional Order of the Republic of Serbia and National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia.

The Resolution of the National Assembly on the protection of Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and Constitutional Order of the Republic of Serbia¹⁵⁰ was adopted on December 26^th 2007. In its preamble, the resolution highlights threats to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia which arise from unilateral declaration of Kosovo’s independence and from the announcements of certain states, that they will recognise its independency.

Furthermore, the resolution states that Serbia has the right and obligation to resort to legal means in order to counter such course of events and expresses her readiness to contribute to a peaceful and compromised solution. It also expresses need to defend the honour and dignity of Serbian people.¹⁵¹

„1. Based on the report of the state negotiating team on the second stage of talks on the Kosovo and Metohija future status (August 10 – December 10), the National Assembly agrees that the Albanian side has evaded the actual talks in the same manner as in the first stage, led by Martti Ahtisaari. The main reason for this obstruction is the stance of certain Western states that Kosovo should get independence. In the light of this stance, there was no actual encouragement for the Albanian delegation to seek a compromised solution on the Kosovo and Metohija future status in the course of the negotiations;”¹⁵²

In first sentence of the article 1, all the blame, for the failure of negotiations¹⁵³ is put on the Albanian side and certain Western states. Albanian negotiation team is accused to have evaded the actual talks and certain Western states for taking the stance that Kosovo should get independence. What can be noticed here is that all the blame for failure of negotiations over status of Kosovo has been put on the other side, which signals that the Serbian side is seeking moral high ground against the “Western states”, who show support for independency of Kosovo, and the Albanian side, which used this support to dismiss any compromise and continued to insist on independence from Serbia. These accusation, made against the other two parties in negotiations, besides “shifting the blame” also questions the efforts and/or perhaps the capabilities of Serbia’s negotiation team, especially if we take into account that the negotiations, after naming Martti Ahtisaari as UN special envoy for Kosovo in 2005, were initiated in 2006 and ended in November 2007.¹⁵⁴ Besides that, main reason for alleged lack of commitment to compromise by Albanian side is the stance of certain Western states, which supported Kosovo’s independence. By omitting to specify, which particular countries supported Kosovo Albanians in their aspirations, and instead ascribing agency to certain states in the West, clearly signals either uncertainty, which particulate states do support Kosovo independence or perhaps more likely, reluctance to make a direct accusation against particular EU countries, considering that the EU is Serbia’s main economical partner.¹⁵⁵

“2. The National Assembly agrees that certain Western states are severely opposed to a continuation of talks on Kosovo and Metohija’s future status, which prevented the Security Council from finding a compromised solution to this issue. These states encouraged Albanian representatives in Kosovo and Metohija to declare the province’s independence and threatened the Republic of Serbia with the recognition of this illegal act:”¹⁵⁶

In article 2, certain Western States have been labelled as being sharply opposed to continuation of negotiations over Kosovo and Metohija future status. Hence, those “certain” states have been put in the first plan as directly responsible for failure of the Security Council to find a compromise between two sides. Moreover, these states are accused of having encouraged Kosovo Albanians in their pursuit of independence, while at the same time; they threatened Serbia with recognition of Kosovo and Metohija as independent state. By presenting such view of the course of negotiation over status of Kosovo, where Kosovo Albanians are encouraged, while Serbia was threatened, clearly suggests that Serbia was not getting a nearly equal position and treatment in these negotiations as the Albanian side did. This article, the same as previous one, fails to specify, which particular Western countries gave their support to Kosovo’s independence. Here the authors of the text go even a bit further and state that these states directly threatened Serbia to recognise Kosovo as independent state. By using the word “threat” to describe increasing voices of support to Kosovo’s independence, the authors of the resolution try to bolster their position. However, in order for those voices to be perceived as threat, there has to be something that is required of Serbia. As no requirements were mentioned it appears that international community support to Kosovo independence was a decision, which was perceived as best solution for peace and stability in the region. Serbia had very little, if any, say in it.

“3. The National Assembly agrees with particular concern that with its conclusions from December 14, 2007 (conclusions 65–70), the Council of the European Union heralded activities regarding Kosovo and Metohija in the province itself which would directly endanger the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia;”¹⁵⁷

The hereby mentioned conclusions¹⁵⁸ 65-70, adopted by Council of the European Union on December 14^th 2007 are by the creators of the text viewed as a direct threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia. The main reason behind such perception of EU councils’ conclusions lays in the fact, that they dismiss present status quo and call for definite solution of the Kosovo status, without referring to Kosovo as integral part of Serbia, but instead they treat Kosovo as an independent actor. Moreover Kosovo is seen as sui generis case that does not set any precedent, which directly dismissed claims from Serbian officials, which suggested that recognition of Kosovo as independent state will present serious precedent. ¹⁵⁹ Although the conclusions of the Council do not specifically mention Kosovo’s independence, they treat Kosovo as an independent actor, which was enough cause for an alarm in Serbia.

“4. The National Assembly agrees that the declaration of Kosovo independence, as well as the recognition of the province’s independence on the part of any state, will be a harsh violation of international law, primarily the UN Charter, Helsinki Final Act and UN Security Council Resolution 1244. Such acts and activities will directly jeopardise the sovereignty, territorial integrity and constitutional order of the Republic of Serbia;”¹⁶⁰

Article 4 points out to the implications, which the declaration of Kosovo independence can cause. Stating that such act would present harsh violation of international law and further specifying particular acts that it would violate, once again presents an attempt to gain higher moral ground by presenting yourself as the one who respects international law, unlike those who disrespect it. An adjective harsh here is used to emphasise the seriousness of such act. The article also warns other states to respect international law.

“5. The National Assembly agrees that the establishment of the proposed EU mission for implementing Ahtisaari’s rejected plan will be a violation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and constitutional order of the Republic of Serbia. In July 2007, the Security Council rejected six draft resolutions based on Ahtisaari’s plan, including those based on annexes 10 and 11. These annexes concerned the set up of an EU mission and NATO forces in Kosovo and Metohija. Bearing in mind, the National Assembly demands that prior to the arrival of any mission which would replace the current UN administration, a compromised solution for the future status of Kosovo and Metohija, which the UN Security Council will approve, must first be found through talks. The National Assembly demands that the Serbian government reaches agreement with the EU that an EU mission cannot come to Kosovo and Metohija, i.e. Serbia’s territory, without an appropriate decision of the Security Council;”¹⁶¹

Article 5 accentuates that by implementing Ahtisaari’s rejected plan¹⁶², Serbia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and constitutional order would be violated. Stating that the plan was eventually rejected and pointing out, that the Security Council rejected six draft resolutions based on Ahtisaari’s plan, is intended to emphasise how inadequate that plan was, and to dismiss its legitimacy. This of course implies that the potential arrival of the EU and NATO troops will also be illegitimate, therefore framing NATO troops as equal with occupation forces. In addition to that, article 5 also demands that before arrival of any troops a compromised solution must be found through talks. Further insisting on compromised solution, despite failure of prior negotiations, can be seen either as a desperate reach for the last straw, or it is just an attempt to present Serbian side as one, who is willing to negotiate, against those who want to implement one sided solution. This becomes evident if we take into account a series of indications that the Kosovo independency is the only feasible solution, mainly coming from the main actors in the negotiation process EU and USA. ¹⁶³

“6. Due to the overall role of NATO, from the illegal bombardment of Serbia without a Security Council decision to Annex 11 of the rejected Ahtisaari’s plan, which determines that NATO is “ultimate supervisory authority” in an “independent Kosovo”, the National Assembly hereby declares the neutral status of the Republic of Serbia towards effective military alliances until a referendum is called, at which the final decision on this issue will be made;”¹⁶⁴

Article 6 overviews the role of NATO from illegal bombardment of Serbia in 1999 to the role given to the alliance in Annex 11 of rejected Ahtisaari’s plan, according to which NATO is “ultimate supervisory authority” in an “independent Kosovo”. Pointing to NATO’s role in illegal bombardment and in rejected Ahtisaari’s plan tends to emphasise the illegitimacy of the NATO acts in Kosovo from 1999 intervention till the day. By using the term bombardment, instead of perhaps operation or intervention, referring to the Operation allied force, the authors evoke bombs, shells or missiles, unlike to the more neutral terms as operation or intervention, which adds violent and even brutal dimension to the operation. Furthermore, claim that in accordance with Ahtisaari’s plan, NATO is given a role of ultimate supervisory authority in an independent Kosovo is by itself very interesting, as the document does not contain such formulation.¹⁶⁵ However, Annex 11 does implicitly deals with Kosovo as an independent subject and mentions that International Military Presence (IMP) will be subjected to direction and political control of the North Atlantic Council through the NATO Chain of Command.¹⁶⁶Taking that into consideration, it can be concluded that such formulation is deliberately used by authors of the resolution, in order to get a support for military neutrality of Serbia. In spite of the fact that neutrality is declared towards effective military alliances from the context is clear that it refers specifically to NATO, which is the only relevant military alliance in the area.

Article 7 consists of seven paragraphs in which an action framework for state organs and other public factors responsible for defence of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and constitutional order of the Republic of Serbia is presented. With respect to their relevance for the international community paragraphs (b) and (đ) deserve more detailed consideration.

“b) All acts of declaration and recognition of Kosovo and Metohija’s independence, as well as all activities in the international surroundings which might stem from these acts, regardless of who adopts and implements them, will be declared null and void and in contravention of the constitutional order of the Republic of Serbia. Appropriately, Kosovo and Metohija will be considered a constituent part of the Republic of Serbia in all interior and foreign affairs of the state, its organs and public factors. This stance will be relevant for any individual act or activity on the part of state organs and public factors until the adoption of a compromise solution on the issue, based on UN Security Council Resolution 1244. Diplomatic and all other relations with states which recognise the Kosovo and Metohija independence will be particularly reconsidered;”¹⁶⁷

Three main directives are given in this paragraph. First, that all acts of declaration of independence and recognition of that independence will be declared null and void and in contravention of the constitutional order of the Republic of Serbia. Invoking the constitution as the highest law serves as justification for the annulment of these acts. Stating that regardless who adopts and implements those acts they will in any case be declared null and void shows clear determination for keeping principles and national interests of Serbia and its constitutional order. Second point is that Serbia will still consider Kosovo as integral part of her territory in all interior and foreign affairs of the state. This essentially means that Republic of Serbia will maintain all of her institutions in Kosovo and that it will continue to treat the province as a part of Serbia. And finally third directive is that relationship with countries that recognise Kosovo will be particularly reconsidered. This can be understood as a kind of warning to the states who considering recognition of Kosovo, stating that in the case of recognition not only diplomatic but also all other relations will be carefully revised.

“đ) The National Assembly orders the Serbian government that all international agreements which the Republic of Serbia signs, including the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, must be aimed at the preservation of Serbia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity;”¹⁶⁸

In this paragraph the National Assembly explicitly orders the government of Serbia not to sign any international agreement, including the CAA agreement, which would jeopardise Serbia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. This in fact means that the government must not participate in any agreements in which the territorial integrity of Serbia with sovereignty over Kosovo is not recognised, which de facto means disruption of the accession process to EU.

Chapter I, titled: Security environment, section 3. Security of the Republic of Serbia, paragraph 3 reads as follows:

„Unlawfully proclaimed independence of Kosovo and the failure of the international civil and military presence in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija in the establishment of a multiethnic, multireligious and multicultural civil society contributes to the further strengthening of the factors which manifest a negative impact on the security of the Republic of Serbia and will represent the source of its long term instability.”¹⁷⁰
This paragraph points out that the status of Kosovo is perceived as a main threat to Serbia’s national security. Emphasising, that independence of Kosovo is unlawfully proclaimed and characterising performance of international mission in Kosovo as failure which has negative impact on the security of the country and represent the source of its long term instability, can be seen as implicit critique of the international powers, who recognised Kosovo as an independent state and then failed to create a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multicultural civil society. Moreover, it directly implies that that KFOR is partially held responsible for the current Serbia’s security problems.
Further in chapter IV, titled: National security policy, section 1. Basic Orientation of National Security Policy, paragraph 3 reads as follows:

“In the protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity, the Republic of Serbia is determined to use diplomatic, legal and all other legitimate means in accordance with the firm position outlined by the Constitution never to recognize the decision of provisional institutions of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija on the unilateral declaration of independence.”¹⁷¹

This paragraph expresses determination to use diplomatic, legal and other legitimate means in accordance with the firm position outlined by the Constitution never to recognise the Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence. Taking of such firm position towards Kosovo’s independence and stating that Serbia will never recognise clearly shows both the commitment to preservation of the territorial integrity, as well as the Kosovo’s importance to Serbia. However as it was many times repeated from the highest circles of EU and USA, no one will require of Serbia to de jure recognise Kosovo¹⁷². On the other hand normalization of relations is a primary condition for further European integrations, which means that de facto recognition of independence will be necessary¹⁷³ in order for Serbia to continue with accession to EU.
Following paragraphs 4 and 5, read as follows:

“Starting from the belief that the national security of the Republic of Serbia is closely linked to the security of the region of Southeast Europe and the continent as a whole, the Republic of Serbia will improve its relations with the EU and NATO members and partners on the basis of direct, close and long-term cooperation and common action.”¹⁷⁴

“Taking into account the interest of preserving its own territorial integrity and sovereignty, the Republic of Serbia will largely harmonize its foreign and security policy with the positions and activities of the EU in all the major issues of global, European and regional character.”¹⁷⁵

These two paragraphs express a desire to improve relation with EU and NATO on the basis of direct, close and long-term cooperation and common action. What is stated above can be understood as an expression of commitment to cooperation with all relevant actors on the issues relating to national security, despite the fact that EU and USA treat Kosovo as an independent state, which is characterised as one of the major threats to Serbia’s national security.

Paragraphs 7 and 12, from the same section, read as follows:

“The Republic of Serbia’s accession to the NATO Partnership for Peace program confirms its long-term commitment to contribute to the common democratic values and strengthening regional and global security. The Republic of Serbia emphasizes its belief that the active and meaningful cooperation of all countries of the Western Balkans with the NATO and Partnership for Peace member countries is the road to permanent stabilization and prosperity of this region.”¹⁷⁷

“In accordance with the changes in security factors in strategic environment and national interests, the Republic of Serbia will determine on the content, scope and manner of the security organization of the society and integration in the security structures.”¹⁷⁸

These two paragraphs present a view of the PfP as Serbia’s long-term commitment to contribute to the common democratic values and strengthening regional and global security. While the first paragraph shows only a commitment to cooperation, second paragraph in a way leaves an open door for further future integrations. Although these integrations conditioned to be in accordance with national interests, mere not excluding them, implies that if somehow Serbia’s official position towards Kosovo changes, the biggest obstacle towards further security integrations primarily in NATO, as well in all other security structures, will be removed.

Furthermore, in section 4., titled: Elements of National Security Policy, subsection 4.1. Foreign policy, paragraph three reads:

Here a discrepancy in Serbia’s official position can be seen again. The efforts to defend constitutional order imply defending of integrity and sovereignty over Kosovo, and they are in direct collision with the acceleration of the process of European integration, which as it was many times mentioned to a great extent relies on Serbia’s normalization of relations with Kosovo.¹⁸⁰

When stating integration into European and other international security structures it is not specified to which particular international structures it relates to. That can be seen as a consequence of unresolved territorial issue with Kosovo.

In his exposé¹⁸², Goran Svilanović, Foreign Affairs Minister in DOS government, presents basic conceptions and strategies, highlights achievements, difficulties and dilemmas of FRY’s foreign politics. The exposé itself is divided into five sections: Necessity of new foreign policy, What influences international position of FRY, Conceptual goals of FRY’s foreign policy, FRY’s foreign policy activity from October 2000 and Conclusions.

In section II, subsection 2, while discussing FRY’s international position, with particular reference to regional factors of influence, minister Svilanović, in paragraphs 9 and 10, states:

“One of FRY’s neighbours – Hungary, has become a member of NATO; majority of other neighbours either seriously count on membership (Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia), or already have agreements which regulate NATO presence on their territory (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia). NATO is also present on the territory of FRY (Kosovo and Metohija), and all states in our neighbourhood are members of Partnership for peace, with the exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina). The Proclaimed goal of all states in the region is EU membership. Therefore, it is about the apparent general orientation towards European and Euro-Atlantic integrations as international political and economical framework which provides the most successful solution for transitional problems.”¹⁸³

“Gradual accession of the entire region to NATO and EU would present a drastic disturbance of power relations during the block division. However, in today’s conditions, although the enlargement of NATO partially provokes negative reaction from Moscow, above all, this process testifies about commitment of south-east European countries to strategic stability and accession to grouping, which can, in the long term secure frameworks for successful internal economic and social reforms.”¹⁸⁴

In paragraph 9, Svilanović presents an image of the region, in which all FRY’s neighbour countries are either in or plan to join NATO, and, with the exception of Bosnia, all of them joined NATO’s PfP programme. Viewing the surroundings of FRY in such way, Svilanović indirectly excludes every possibility for successful transition, other than through NATO accession and EU membership. Furthermore, when listing the countries that are already NATO member states, or have agreements which regulate NATO presence on their territory, Svilanović states that NATO is also present on the territory of FRY (Kosovo and Metohija). Omitting the explanation of such “presence”, i.e. Operation Allied Force, he subsequently connects it with the region’s apparent general orientation towards European and Euro-Atlantic integrations. A relationship between positioning of NATO forces in Kosovo and regions’ orientation towards European and Euro-Atlantic integrations, Svilanović presents the situation as if the NATO established its presence on the territory of Kosovo by voluntary peace-time agreement between FRY and NATO. Failing to mention any reference to the events which led to the signing of agreement¹⁸⁵ clearly indicates ideological background of such action.

Svilanović’s preoccupation with integration to European and Euro-Atlantic structures is visible when we compare paragraphs 9 and 10. In both paragraphs European and Euro-Atlantic structures are seen as international political and economical framework which provides the most successful solution for transitional problems (paragraph 9) and as a grouping which can secure frameworks for successful internal economic and social reforms (paragraph 10). It can be noticed how those structures are presented as the most successful solution for transitional problems and as secure frameworks for successful internal economic and social reforms. This overwording clearly indicates preoccupation, in this case with European and Euro-Atlantic integrations.

Furthermore in section III, paragraph 5 he states that:

“The main foreign policy orientation of FRY is directed to European and Euro Atlantic integrations. Not only does this orientation have economical but it also has a political component. It is not the result of conjecture or daily political needs; it is the expression of commitment to substantial changes in the country and the part of efforts to place the foundations of new political and economical organization of the country.”¹⁸⁶

That is followed by statement that:

“Yugoslavia will, with all of its national and regional specifics, follow the development line and also general international political orientation of the countries in transition of eastern and south-east Europe.”¹⁸⁷

He concludes this paragraph by saying that:

“basic foreign policy orientation of the country will be directed to integrative political and economical processes which centre is EU.“¹⁸⁸

What can be notice here is clear orientation towards the EU and Euro-Atlantic integrations. More specifically a desire to follow general international political orientation taken by countries of eastern and south-east Europe was expressed. It was also added that the basic foreign policy orientation will be towards integrative political and economical processes which centre is EU.

What can be noticed here as well as in the rest of the minister’s exposé is a lack of description what exactly it is meant under Euro-Atlantic integrations. He makes a distinction between European and Euro-Atlantic integrations which implies that there are two types of integrations, but leaves out more detailed explanation of which particular integrative political and economical processes. Moreover, when he expressed intention to follow general international political orientation of other eastern and south-eastern countries he indirectly included NATO membership as a possibility, considering that almost all eastern and south-eastern countries aspire to become members of NATO.

Stating that European and Euro-Atlantic integrations are not the result of conjecture or daily political needs, but instead expression of commitment to substantial changes in the country and the part of efforts to place the foundations of new political and economical organization of the country Svilanović expresses firm intention to the complete reorganisation of FRY society. He sends message both to the public in FRY and to the FRY’s European partners.

In following Section III, subsection 6, Svilanović discusses military integrations, stating that:

“in its foreign policy FRY will, in greater extent, take into consideration the necessity of approaching to the existing European military and security structures, as for the fact that practically our entire region is connected with those structures, and in that sense we shouldn’t stay in isolation, as well as that, due to the fact that participating in the frameworks of these structures, or in coordination with them, guarantees greater internal stability and stronger international position of the country.”¹⁸⁹

Here Svilanović emphasises the necessity of approaching to existing European military and security structures as a guarantor of internal stability and stronger international position of the country. Approach to those security structures he sees as a way of overcoming isolation in which country was during the last years of Milošević rule. However he leaves out explanation to which specific European military and security structures he has in mind.

In addition to that in section IV, subsection 4.2. he states that:

“in the light of successful cooperation with NATO which resulted in agreement and takeover of control over entire administrative border with Kosovo and Metohija.”¹⁹⁰

In addition he expresses his belief that:

“such positive development opens a possibility for development of cooperation between our country and NATO on new grounds, which in full extent corresponds with possible inclusion of FRY in Partnership for peace programme in which almost all of our neighbouring countries take part.”¹⁹¹

Evaluating agreement between NATO and FRY as successful cooperation and positive development which pens a possibility for development of cooperation between our country and NATO on new grounds Svilanović again presents the agreement as the two sides participated in agreement as equals, while in reality FRY just had to accept what NATO offered.

Furthermore, Svilanović indicates that FRY is interesting in participation in PfP programme. However, further elaboration on the scope of military integrations is left out. That does not come as a surprise considering the state of affairs in FRY at that time and the fact that FRY had enough higher priorities than integration in military structures.¹⁹²

At such short time after bombings of 1999 it would be a political suicide to advocate FRY’s membership in NATO. Nevertheless, stating that “The main foreign policy orientation of FRY is directed to European and Euro Atlantic integrations”, setting a goal of “following the development line and general international political orientation of countries of eastern and south-east Europe”, expressing the “necessity of approaching to existing European military and security structures” and mentioning the possibility of FRY’s membership in PfP programme clearly testifies about the orientation towards EU, by no means excluding membership in NATO. Having in mind the situation at the time, when Kosovo was under international custody and far from declaring independence, this different position towards NATO and its role at Kosovo can be understood. Other interesting feature of his exposé, is the fact that he always frames FRY together with other regional countries, which are oriented towards EU and NATO, so that it would seem only logical to follow such orientation in order to avoid being left out.

Exposé of Vuk Drašković, Minister of Foreign Affairs in National Assembly of Serbia and Montenegro

In a relatively brief and up to the point exposé¹⁹³, minister Drašković concisely states main foreign policy objectives of Serbia and Montenegro: membership in EU and cooperation with US and Russia, and elaborates on them. Then discusses the position of Serbia, her potential for economical development and states his belief that Serbia should follow the developmental line of Slovenia, who he presents as a model for successful transition. Further Drašković discusses the importance of cooperation with ICTY for Euro-Atlantic integrations of the country. After that he points out to the necessity of creating conditions for safe return of Kosovo Serbs, who were forced to leave the area in 1999, underlining that there must not be double standards and that Serbs and Albanians must have equal treatment. In addition to that Drašković states, that it is clear that return to the situation before 1999 is impossible, but at the same time, he expresses his belief that it is possible to keep Kosovo as European region within Serbia and presents his plan for that. In the end he once again looks back at the cooperation with ICTY and highlights its importance for State Union of Serbia and Montenegro.

In first paragraph, right after initial greeting, Drašković states:

“Membership in European Union and priority of cooperation with USA and Russia. These are main strategic directions of foreign policy which I lead since taking the minister of foreign affairs office of State Union of Serbia and Montenegro.”¹⁹⁴

Clearly indicating that membership in EU is primary goal he poses a question:

“Why Brussels, Washington and Moscow?”¹⁹⁵

He continues by arguing this orientation. When discussing the main reasons behind commitment to EU integrations in fourth paragraph he states:

“Our shortcut to Brussels leads via Washington. The name of the shortcut is Partnership for Peace (PfP) and NATO alliance. All of the former socialist states, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary joined the NATO and after that European Union. Slovenia acted the same way. Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey are already in NATO and Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania are one step from joining.“¹⁹⁶

An intention to follow the path of other former socialist countries is obvious. Furthermore Drašković also expresses a firm conviction that without becoming member of NATO, State Union of Serbia and Montenegro cannot become a member of EU. Thus, for him EU and NATO go hand in hand i.e. NATO membership is seen as a prerequisite for EU membership.

By presenting Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania as one step from joining, Drašković aims to indicate both certainty, as well as inevitability of NATO enlargement, thus implying that Serbia and Montenegro should also follow this path, in order not to be left behind. It is very interesting that Drašković sees PfP programme primarily as a shortcut to the main goal, which is EU membership. He deals with no particularities of PfP as for him it is just a necessary step in a way towards the end goal.

In following fifth paragraph, while discussing relations with Moscow, he asserts:

“Multilateral cooperation with Russia for us is of first rate importance. Strategic relations with Moscow are not ever to be questioned by our membership in PfP and NATO, as Russia is in PfP and maintains special relations with NATO alliance.“¹⁹⁷

Reliance on Brussels, Washington and Moscow as main foreign policy orientation of Serbia and Montenegro i.e. first diversification of possible partners, presents a beginning of the trend that following governments embraced. Further it can be noticed that Drašković does not see the potential NATO membership as an obstacle to close cooperation with Russia, which he considers to be a very important partner. This to a large extent can be seen as a unique position, especially if considering indications from Russia that they will not look favourably at Serbia’s membership in NATO¹⁹⁸.

When discussing the status of Kosovo and the impossibility of returning to condition prior to the NATO operations in 1999, in paragraph fifteen he presents his view of Kosovo autonomy in Serbia and in respect to future negotiations, stating that:

“Our state strategy must have a respect for reality and “fight” for possible and not the impossible.”¹⁹⁹

In addition to that in paragraphs sixteen and seventeen he adds:

“Members of the Contact Group (USA, Russia, Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany), that are authorized to propose to the UN Security Council future status of Kosovo, have concluded that there will be no return to the state before June 10^th 1999. That means that all commitments in order to return to the previous state are impossible.“²⁰⁰

“However, it is possible, and at the same time very realistic, to fight for Kosmet as European region in state framework of European Serbia and Montenegro i.e. Serbia.”²⁰¹

Here Drašković stresses the importance of realistic approach towards finding solution for Kosmet²⁰² status. Acknowledging that the members of The Contact Group have concluded that there will be no return to the state before June 10^th 1999, he envisages the approach based on the formula: “more than autonomy, less than a state” , that will be accepted by subsequent governments.

Then in next paragraph eighteen, Drašković presents his “three E formula” for Kosovo:

“First E: European level of protection for minorities in the province, Serbs and other non-Albanians.
Second E: European decentralization of power with respect to the basis of the government of Serbia’s plan.
Third E: European status and quality of present state border of Serbia and Montenegro with Albania, as well as internal borders of Kosmet with Serbia and Montenegro. Those borders cannot be either changed or renamed but they must be transparent and open. It is up to the citizens of Kosovo to use such borders for economical, political and cultural connections with whom they want.“²⁰³
Drašković’s “three E plan” is very unclear. Firstly, the formulations beginning with an adjective European are very general and lack more detailed explanation. Secondly, he envisages Kosovo within Serbia but with open borders, which implies that there are still some borders and not just demarcation lines. As he does not explain this further, it is hard to tell what exactly this plan suggests. However, what is certain is the fact that Drašković perceives Kosovo as a part of Serbia i.e. he is unwilling to accept any kind of Kosovo separation from Serbia.

Finally, in paragraph nineteen, Drašković, among other, states:

“we enter in consultations and difficult negotiations about the future status of Kosmet with crucial fact which is called the UN charter. Declaration of sovereign state on territory of other sovereign state is legally impossible, without that state’s consent. Kosmet was nott a member state of former Yugoslavia, but province in Serbia.”²⁰⁴

Here can be seen that Drašković finds justification for position regarding the status of Kosmet in the UN charter which, according to him, eliminates any possibility for declaration of sovereign state on territory of other sovereign state is legally impossible, without that state’s consent. This view of the Kosovo issue, especially belief in legal impossibility of declaration of independence, has proven to be significant for understanding the position of following governments towards Kosovo and at the same time towards NATO.

However, what remains unclear is how all of those contrasting positions can be incorporated into uniform state policy. Maintaining NATO membership, close cooperation with Russia and Kosovo as an autonomous region in Serbia as main goals of foreign policy is essentially unsustainable as they are more or less contradicting to each other.

General concepts in Drašković’s exposé, in many aspects follow up on Svilanović. Both of them believe that a path taken by former socialist states should be followed. However, while Svilanović did not directly proposed accession of, at the time FRY in NATO, advocating instead Euro-Atlantic integrations, his successor openly suggested that Serbia and Montenegro should aspire for NATO membership.

After opening greetings, minister Jeremić expresses his gratitude to all the present ambassadors for the work they do. Then he addresses the oncoming presidential elections and gives his view of the four most important campaign issues, namely: economy and social protection, status of Kosovo and Metohija, Serbia's progress towards full membership of EU and consolidation of values defined in period from October 5^th 2000. He stresses the importance of the elections and underlines that they will decide whether Serbia will follow the path she took from 2000 on, or she will go in another direction. Further minister Jeremić points out to the importance of cooperation, not only with EU, but with Russia and US as well, whom he presents as three pillars of Serbia’s foreign policy. He also recognises the importance of cooperation with other countries such are China, India, and other Asian and Latin American countries. Then minister switches focus to the civil war during the 1990s and expresses Serbia’s determination not to let it happen again and its commitment to European values and to the idea of united Europe. In addition he expresses the importance of cooperation with ICTY and participation in Partnership for Peace programme as crucial for stability of western Balkans. Then he discusses the situation in Kosovo and Metohija, underlines the importance of compromise between Serbs, Albanians and international community and presents his view of possible solution of this issue. In the end he expresses readiness of his government and Serbia to maintain path assumed at October 5^th 2000, while at the same time warning that if the outcome of the negotiations with Kosovo Albanians proves to be opposite to Serbia’s vital interests, Serbia’s democratic capacity will be jeopardised. He expresses readiness and respect of keeping of territorial integrity of all western Balkan countries, while at the same time asking all actors in international system to respect Serbia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.²⁰⁵

In paragraph fourteen, minister Jeremić presents EU integrations as most important foreign policy priority, adding:

“While the central strategic priority of Serbia is accelerated accession to European Union, out of the vital national interest is further improvement of multilateral relations not only with Brussels, but with Moscow and Washington, too, which presents three pillars of our foreign policy.”²⁰⁶

This is the first time that three pillars concept (EU, USA and Russia) of Serbia’s foreign policy was introduced. This attempt of foreign policy diversification was later broadened to include China²⁰⁷ by Serbian president Boris Tadić. What also deserves attention is a statement that the improvement of multilateral relations with Brussels, Moscow and Washington is our vital national interest. Once again, here can be noticed a discrepancy between the official government position of keeping integrity and sovereignty of Serbia and consideration of cooperation with Brussels, Moscow and Washington as vital interest of Serbia, taking into consideration that majority of EU countries, as well as US, recognised Kosovo’s independence.

Further, when he addresses the importance of cooperation with ICTY for the process of regional reconciliation in paragraph twenty-six he states that:

“Finally, reconciliation enables participation in collective structures through which regional security systems can be consolidated by using benefits of PfP programme. Involving Western Balkans in large transatlantic family of nations, superficial and obsolete concepts of isolated national defence will stay aside for the benefit of all citizens of the region.”²⁰⁸

Here minister Jeremić introduces PfP programme as vital for Western Balkans, a programme which would benefit to the entire region. He presents involvement in PfP as involvement in large transatlantic family of nations. He uses word family to describe relations within the PfP programme, instead of probably more convenient ones, as for instance: alliance, association, grouping union or convent, clearly suggests that he is either convinced in almost family like relations within the PfP programme, or he is trying to present it like that to make it more appealing to the public. Be it as it may, by using the word family, which is more often associated to warm and friendly surroundings to describe a type of military cooperation has a clear ideological background.

Furthermore, when referring to the concepts of isolated national defence as superficial and obsolete, minister Jeremić suggests that such concepts are outdated, and thus that there is a necessity for new concept of national defence, provided by PfP programme.

While recognising the benefits of PfP, he makes no reference to the possible Serbia’s membership in NATO, which indicates that he sees PfP programme as quite sufficient framework for cooperation, as was later confirmed²⁰⁹.

Stressing out the importance of compromise as the only feasible solution for Kosovo, and highlighting how far Serbia is willing to go to reach the solution, in paragraph forty-one he states that:

“By reaching the compromise, we would avoid questioning of fundamental principles of international relations, which are concentrated on UN charter and continuity of Security Council legitimacy – strengthened in Europe through Helsinki Final Act, by setting up the precedent which enables that a country is parted without her consent. Forced independence of Kosovo is nothing but forced partition of Serbia.“²¹⁰

In this paragraph he suggests that Kosovo’s independence would set up a precedent in international relations, which would then spur separatist tensions in other parts of the world. Also, he emphasises that forced independence of Kosovo is forced partition of Serbia implying the illegitimacy of such act and referring to UN charter and Helsinki Final Act.

Further, in paragraph forty-five he states:

“If the result, which is opposite to our vital interests is forced, capacity of democratic Serbia to continue with reforms necessary for continuing the path towards EU membership, would reach the breaking point.”²¹¹

In addition to that, in paragraph forty-six he asserts:

“Democratic values, which were embraced by our citizens in the elections in 2000 and which were again confirmed on all presidential, parliamentary and local election held since then, would be irrevocably delegitimized in the eyes of our people if Kosovo independence is forced.”²¹²

Emphasising that democratic values embraced after 2000 will be irrevocably delegitimized in the eyes of the people, if Kosovo’s independence is forced, aims to point out that citizens of Serbia gave their vote to those who promised them to keep Kosovo in Serbia. This statement is further strengthened by underlying that such position towards the Status of Kosovo was legitimised on all presidential, parliamentary and local election held since then, which openly indicates the obligation of elected authorities to act accordingly to their electoral promises.

On the other hand it sends a warning to the proponents of Kosovo’s independence, that in case of forced independence, democratic forces in Serbia will be discredited, which will open a possibility for return of nationalist parties to power.

Minister Vuk Jeremić, just as his predecessors, maintains the main goal of Serbia’s foreign policy – accession to EU. However, unlike them, he considers PfP programme to by a sufficient form of security cooperation and therefore he did not either indirectly, as Goran Svilanović, nor directly as Vuk Drašković mentioned a possibility of full NATO membership. The main reason behind such position is probably an increased international support for Kosovo independence by NATO member states, which helped in increasing already negative perception of NATO in Serbia.

The intensity of struggle between Serbia’s claims on Kosovo and international community support for Kosovo’s independence is visible in Jeremić’s references to legal acts, which should guarantee indivisibility of Kosovo from Serbia. He even goes that far to put at stake Serbia’s orientation to EU membership, if Kosovo would declare independence.

In spite of work on the attempts of diversification of foreign policy Serbia still wanted to cooperate with EU and US who actively supported Kosovo independency. Both Kosovo and EU²¹³ foreign policy orientation follows up Drašković contradictory positions, but still marks slight turn in Serbian foreign policy, from the minister Drašković.

If one is to look back at all of those reviewed party programmes, governmental documents and strategies, he or she can notice to what extent lack of single national strategy document hampers every attempt of finding one, unified and resolute position of Serbia towards the NATO membership. Even when the foreign ministers addresses’ are observed, in order to find is there any connections between them in respect of Serbia’s membership in NATO, there are very few signs of that. Goran Svilanović was pro Euro-Atlantic integrations, but failed to specify further what he meant under that notion. His successor, Vuk Drašković, on the other hand openly advocated NATO integrations of the country. And finally, Vuk Jeremić believed that PfP programme provided sufficient framework of security cooperation with NATO, implying that the accession of Serbia to NATO was not necessary.

All of that lead singles out major characteristic of the official Serbia’s position towards NATO integrations – ambiguity. The main reasons for such position are: negative perception of NATO by Serbian citizens and closely related to that, the unresolved status of Kosovo. To be more precise, the problem is in the perception of Kosovo. For NATO as well as for majority of EU countries independence of Kosovo, was the only feasible solution for the peace in the region and that is why such independence was supported. However, Serbia perceived Kosovo as an integral part of the country, which should be granted a large degree of autonomy in Serbia, at maximum. That is why Kosovo’s declaration of independence was seen as illegal act of secession. Those diametrically opposed positions in respect of the status of Kosovo, are main obstacles for any kind of closer cooperation of Serbia with NATO, let alone Serbia’s eventual membership in the alliance.

The problem of future integrations of Serbia in NATO is almost entirely a political issue, as the military cooperation is already established in the framework of the PfP programme. Situation seems fairly simple. If Serbia wants to deepen cooperation with NATO and perhaps progress towards full membership in the alliance, it has to recognise Kosovo as an independent state, due to the fact that NATO almost certainly would not allow the country with unresolved territorial issues to become its member. However, that would mean that with recognition of Kosovo’s independence Serbia would agree to territorial losses and in a way it would legitimise NATO intervention in 1999. As public opinion polls show, vast majority of citizens are against joining NATO. In addition to that Serbian political elites over and over asserted that recognition of Kosovo is not an option.²¹⁴

Furthermore, after some time it became clear that “twofold” state policies embodied in formula “EU and Kosovo” and in some cases even “EU, NATO and Kosovo” are unsustainable. Protection of the “sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia”, which is among main goals of every political party in Serbia, does not coincide with the politics of EU integrations and deepening of cooperation with NATO. This discrepancy in positions towards EU and NATO on one hand and Kosovo on the other, had a major influence on the political discourse in Serbia, what can be seen in if one look at the party programmes and governmental documents reviewed in this work.

Fact is that the major parties, either avoided direct answer to the question of possible future NATO membership or they have demonstrated a strong support for military neutrality of the country, which was proclaimed in December 2007. From the adoption of the resolution until present day Serbia’s military neutrality was not confirmed by any international agreement, which proves that no country so far considers Serbia to be military neutral country. Moreover, that leads to conclusion that National assembly resolution on military neutrality was just a declarative-political statement, conceived last appeal to the Western countries not to support Kosovo’s independence.²¹⁵

If that is taken into account it becomes apparent that the parties, which showed support to the military neutrality of Serbia, are just hiding behind that notion in efforts to keep Kosovo in Serbia. In favour of that speaks the absence of any detailed reference to how the concept of military should be conceived both in political party programmes and government documents, as well as complete disregard of military neutrality concept in National Security Strategy.

Taking into consideration all that has been said and done by Serbian authorities and political parties, it can be concluded that they first need to find some form of sustainable policy where the positions towards Kosovo, NATO and EU will be synchronised and transparent. In other words they have to decide either to de facto recognise Kosovo as an independent state and thus continue with Euro Atlantic integrations, or to continue with the politics of claiming sovereignty over Kosovo and not recognising it as a independent state, which would probably mean giving up Euro Atlantic integrations and eventually it would lead to self isolation.

[All electronic sources are lastly accessed in April 2013]

Bayram, Fatih. “Ideology and Political Discourse: A Critical Discourse Analysis of Erdogan’s Political Speech.” Arecls, Vol. 7. 2010.

Fairclough, Norman. Language and power. New York: Longman, 1989.

Lees, Lorraine M. “Keeping Tito Afloat, The United States, Yugoslavia and the Cold War.“ Philadelphia: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997.

Milošević, Nemanja. “Yugoslavia, USA and NATO in the 1950s”, Case Study: How Far is NATO from the Western Balkans?, July 16, 2007.

Stone, David R. “The Balkan Pact and the American Policy.” East European Quarterly XXVIII, no 3. (September 1994), 398-405.

Demokratska opozicija Srbije (Democratic Opposition of Serbia). Program za demokratsku Srbiju (Programme for Democratic Serbia).2000.http://www.vreme.com/arhiva_html/502/10.html

Demokratska stranka (Democratic party). Program Demokratske stranke (Democratic Party Programme). 2001. http://www.ds.org.rs/dokumenti/ds-program.pdf

Demokratska stranka (Democratic party). Strategija Promena(Strategy of changes). 2005.http://www.ds.org.rs/dokumenti/ds-strategija_promena.pdf

Demokratska stranka (Democratic party). Za bolji život (For Better life). 2007.http://www.ds.org.rs/dokumenti/program_ds_za_bolji_zivot_2007.pdf

Demokratska stranka Srbije (Democratic party of Serbia). Program Demokratske Stranke Srbije (Democratic party of Serbia programme). http://dss.rs/dss-izbliza/program/

G17PLUS. Program G17PLUS (G17PLUS programme).http://www.g17plus.rs/v2/images/stories/dokumentiarhiva/programzavladu.pdf

Sociijalistička partija Srbije (Socialist Party of Serbia). Program Sociijalističke partije Srbije [Socialist Party of Serbia programme]. http://sps.org.rs/documents/PROGRAM%20SPS.pdf

Srpska radikalna stranka (Serbian Radical Party). Program Srpske radikalne stranke za parlamentarne izbore (Serbian Radical Party programme for parliamentary elections). 2012.YouTube video, 24:43. Posted on May 2012.http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bokl1YMT124

Srpska radikalna stranka (Serbian Radical Party). Program Srpske radikalne stranke (Serbian Radical Party programme).http://www.srpskaradikalnastranka.org.rs/pdf/misc/20091023-program.pdf

Srpski pokret obnove (Serbian Renewal Movement). Program Srpskog pokreta obnove (Serbian Renewal Movement programme).http://spons.rs.loopiadns.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/program-spo-eds.pdf

Resolutions, Treaties and Strategies

Military Assistance Agreement Between the United States and Yugoslavia, November 14, 1951.http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/yugo001.asp

North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO). Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force ("KFOR") and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia. June 9, 1999.http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990609a.htm

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), The North Atlantic Treaty, 1949.http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm

Republic of Serbia, Ministry of Defence. National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia. October 2009. http://www.mod.gov.rs/multimedia/file/staticki_sadrzaj/dokumenta/strategije/Strategija_nacionalne_bezbednosti_RS_eng.pdf

Republic of Serbia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Rezolucija Narodne skupštine o zaštiti suvereniteta, teritorijalnog integriteta i ustavnog poretka Republike Srbije (Resolution of the National Assembly on the protection of Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and Constitutional Order of the Republic of Serbia). Beograd, 2007.

Resolution of the Information Bureau Concerning the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, June 28, 1948.http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1948cominform-yugo1.html

Treaty of Friendship and Collaboration Between the Turkish Republic, The Kingdom of Greece, and the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, February 28, 1953. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/eu001.asp

United Nations, “Treaty Of Peace With Italy”, 1947.http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/973F5ACC5148F42B85257506007BDAC2

United Nations, Security Council. Security Council Resolution 1244. June 2000.http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1244%281999%29

United Nations. “Treaty of Alliance, Political Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance Between the Turkish Republic, the Kingdom of Greece, and the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (Balkan Pact).“ August 9, 1954.http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/eu002.asp

Bush, George W. Speech given in Bucharest prior to North Atlantic Council Summit meeting, April 2008. http://www.cfr.org/nato/president-bush-visits-bucharest-romania-discusses-nato-april-2008/p15928

Drašković, Vuk. Exposé of Vuk Drašković, Minister of Foreign Affairs in National Assembly of Serbia and Montenegro, Belgrade, December 16, 2004. Spoljna politika Srbije: Strategije i dokumenti (Foreigin Policy of Serbia: Strategies and Documents). Belgrade: European Movement in Serbia, 2011.

Drašković, Vuk. Exposé of Vuk Drašković, Minister of Foreign Affairs in National Assembly of Serbia and Montenegro, Belgrade, December 16, 2004. Spoljna politika Srbije: Strategije i dokumenti (Foreigin Policy of Serbia: Strategies and Documents). Belgrade: European Movement in Serbia, 2011.

Jeremić, Vuk . Address Before the First Serbian Ambassadors’ Conference, by H.E. Mr. Vuk Jeremić, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, Belgrade, December 16, 2007; Spoljna politika Srbije: Strategije i dokumenti (Foreigin Policy of Serbia: Strategies and Documents), (Belgrade: European Movement in Serbia, 2011).

Koštunica Vojislav – Former President of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, former Prime Minister of Serbia, Leader of Democratic Party of Serbia. Interview by Democratic Party of Serbia. “Zašto Srbija, a ne Evropska Unija?(Why Serbia, and not the EU?).” March 15, 2012.http://dss.rs/zasto-srbija-a-ne-evropska-unija/

Svilanović, Goran. Exposé of Goran Svilanović, Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs, in FRY Federal Parliament, Belgrade, October 24, 2001; Spoljna politika Srbije: Strategije i dokumenti (Foreigin Policy of Serbia: Strategies and Documents), Belgrade: European Movement in Serbia, 2011.

Svilanović, Goran. MP and former Foreign Affairs Minister of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia and Montenegro. Interview by B92, October 25, 2005.http://www.b92.net/info/emisije/poligraf.php?yyyy=2005&mm=10&nav_id=179170

American Cold War Veterans . “Cold War Casualties.”

http://membership-americancoldwarvets.org/cold-war-casualties
Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku (Belgrade Centre for Security Policy).“Građani Srbije: između EU, RUSIJE I NATO (Citizens of Serbia: between EU, RUSSIA and NATO),” September 2012. http://www.bezbednost.org/Bezbednost/4927/Gradjani-Srbije-izmedju-EU-Rusije-i-NATO.shtml

Council of Europe. “What is a Euroregion?” http://www.coe.int/t/dgap/localdemocracy/Areas_of_Work/Transfrontier_Cooperation/Euroregions/What_is_en.asp

Council of the European Union. “Presidency Conclusions.” December 14, 2007. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/97669.pdf

European Commission(EC), Enlargement. “EU-Serbia relations.” http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/potential-candidate countries/serbia/eu_serbia_relations_en.htm

G17PLUS, “O nama (About us),” [“Accessed April 22, 2013”] http://www.g17plus.rs/v2/od-a-do-s/o-nama.html

Republic of Serbia, Republic Electoral Commission, Documents of the Republic Electoral Commission, www.rik.parlament.gov.rs

http://membership-americancoldwarvets.org