Masaryk university
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Slovak-Russian RelationsDuring the period of Mečiar’s government, Slovakia had a better relationship with Russia than with its other neighbors or the United States and the EU.117 The main foreign policy issues of Slovakia towards Russia were settlement of the Russian debt, securing a stable supply of energy, military cooperation, decreasing the trade deficit with Russia and Russian cooperation in the construction of the Jadrová elektráreň Mochovce (JEMO).118 Due to Mečiar’s undemocratic methods, Slovakia grew more isolated from the West and its increasingly closer relationship with Russia was seen by many as Russia’s attempt to maintain its influence in Central Europe.119 In 1995, Slovakia became the first country in Central Europe to abolish visa requirements for Russians.120 Between 1994 and 1998 around 70 agreements with Russia were signed concerning defense and military-technical cooperation, protection of classified information, imports of fossil fuels and civil contracts.121 Some of the more important agreements were signed when Russian Prime Minister Černomyrdin visited Bratislava in 1997 and met with his Slovak counterpart Mečiar.122 During this visit, nine Slovak-Russian agreements were signed concerning military-technical cooperation, the protection of classified information, and the import of natural gas.123 The long-termed so called “gas agreements”124 signed with the Slovak Republic concerned the supply and transit of Russian gas and oil. These agreements only cemented Slovak’s dependency on Russian gas. The three agreements dealt with the long-term supply of gas to Slovakia until 2008, transit of gas through Slovakia and the creation of a joint venture between Gazprom and Slovak Gas Industry (Slovenský plynárenský priemysl - SPP).125 Dzurinda’s government elected in 1998 promised a sharp shift in the orientation of Slovakia’s foreign policy, and the government took certain steps to show that it no longer sees orientation towards Russia as a positive foreign policy alternative.126 The first step towards these goals was made when Dzurinda’s government cancelled the import of the Russian anti-missile system S-300 within the framework of debt settlement as it would not be in keeping with the new foreign policy direction of Slovakia and its goal of NATO membership.127 This agreement had been signed by Mečiar’s government and in 2001 Slovakia agreed to write off 54 million USD from the Russian debt as compensation for withdrawing from the contract.128 The main issues in Slovak-Russian relations in the year 2000-2001 were the continued settlement of Russian debt and the pipeline Jamal 2.129 In the period immediately after the election of Dzurinda’s government (1999-2000), the relationship between Russia and Slovakia cooled. Bilateral relations improved in 2001 with the visit to Bratislava by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Igor Ivanov.130 Although the minister stated that Russia would respect the euroatlantic orientation of Slovakia and continue to cooperate with the country, as the country represents a key partner in the transit of Russian gas to Europe,131 he did not believe that enlarging the alliance would strengthen security in Europe.132 Concerning debt repayment, in 2001, Dzurinda’s government announced that they planned to follow the Czech method of debt settlement which had accepted a lump sum lower than the outstanding debt instead of continuing with prolonged negotiations which would settle the entire amount.133 The government intended to use this method and lower the debt from 1.2 billion USD to 300 million USD during the year 2002. 134 The second term of Dzurinda’s government saw the continued efforts to settle Russian debt although it was no longer the main theme in bilateral dialogue. Pipelines and the import of fossil fuels were among the central themes in the relationship between Slovakia and Russia. One issue that was discussed during Ivanov’s visit was the construction of the transit pipeline Jamal 2. Gazprom had addressed the governments of Poland and Slovakia concerning the construction of a new 600 km long pipeline that would pass through Belarus, Poland and Slovakia. Jamal 2 would avoid passing through the Ukraine, and it would lower the profit the Ukraine gained from transit by one fourth.135 The Slovak government favored the deal and did not discuss the proposition with the other states involved, namely, Poland and the Ukraine. In the end, Gazprom reached an agreement with the Ukraine and the deal was shelved. Slovakia, by unilaterally supporting the deal with Russia without consulting its neighbors only damaged its reputation, and because of the shelved deal would not gain any profit from an increase from the transport of gas and neither would it further diversify its transit system.136 In 2001, the Slovak government announced an open tender for the privatization of two energy companies: Transpetrol a.s. and Slovenský plynárenský priemysel (SPP). The government offered a 49% share of Transpetrol which controls the transit and distribution of oil pipelines.137 The Russian company Yukos bought the shares of Transpetrol for 72 million USD. The goal of Yukos was to increase the supply of oil to European markets and connect the pipelines Družba and Adria to the terminal Omisalji in Croatia which would allow for the export of oil to the USA.138 The other privatization of a strategic energy company was the sale of SPP in 2002 which controls the gas pipeline system.139 A 49% stake was sold to the consortium Gaz de France and Ruhrgas while Gazprom, the dominant supplier of gas transited through SPP pipelines, acquired a two-year option to buy one third of the 49%. However, in 2005, Gazprom officially announced that it had decided not to enter the shareholder structure of SPP.140 These sales are important in Slovak-Russian relations as they illustrate the close economic ties of the countries and the entrance of Russia into the strategic energy enterprises of Slovakia.141 During his visit to Bratislava, President Putin assessed Slovak-Russian cooperation in the transit of gas as significant for all of Europe. In 2006, Fico’s new government assumed power and a new stage in the foreign policy of Slovakia began. The Prime Minister Fico and Minister of Foreign Affairs Ján Kubiš agreed that it was necessary to re-orient the foreign policy of Slovakia towards the East, with focus on Russia.142 Energy remained the main issue in Slovak-Russian bilateral relations at the beginning of Fico’s term in government. One of the efforts of the new government was to regain control over the 49% of shares of Transpetrol.143 The fate of these shares in one of Slovakia’s strategically important energy companies was now unknown due to the insolvency of the owner Yukos, which had taken place in 2004. The new Minister of Finance, Ľubomír Jahnátek described two potential solutions to the problem. The first was that Slovak government could buy back the shares in Transpetrol. The second solution was that the shares would remain in the control of unspecified Russian companies as long as four conditions were met. The conditions were: Slovak governmental control over the management of the company, increase volume of transited oil through Slovakia from the current 10,5 million tons yearly to 17 million tons yearly, connection of the current oil pipelines to the refinery Schwechat and an assured supply of energy for Slovakia.144 The second issue between Russia and Slovakia was the oil pipeline Družba. Once the construction of the Baltic pipeline is completed, Russia will be able to transit oil avoiding Belarus and consequently Slovakia’s pipeline Družba.145 Another priority of the Fico government was a new long-term contract with Russia that would secure the transit of Russian gas through Slovakia and the cooperation on the construction of the nuclear blocks in Mochovce.146 Russian President Vladimir Putin, after a meeting with Slovak President Ivan Gašparovič in Moscow, emphasized these two issues as well, and acknowledged the important role that Slovakia plays in the transit of Russian gas to the EU and the prospective cooperation between the two countries in the area of nuclear energy.147 Slovakia developed a closer relationship with Russia than many post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Although the political aspect of the relationship began to cool down with the election of a pro-West government, the economic dimension has remained strong and Fico has stated his intention to strengthen it.
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