Masarykova univerzita
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ag.v)Types of ModalitySince modality is broad in its scope and different disciplines have approached this concept from different angles, no agreement has been reached as far as the number and type of modalities are concerned. An early attempt to define types of modality is Jespersen’s classification (1992 [1924]) containing twenty subcategories of modality which express “certain attitudes of the mind of the speaker towards the content of the sentence” (1992 [1924]:313). Jespersen himself concedes that “the categories frequently overlap, and some of the terms are not quite unobjectionable” (1992 [1924]:320). Nevertheless, his classification is important since it distinguishes two principal types of modality, “containing an element of will” and “containing no element of will” (Jespersen 1992 [1924]:319-320), which corresponds to the core distinction between deontic and epistemic modality. Rescher (1968:24ff), an American philosopher, also deals with modality and puts forward its in-depth classification. In spite of the fact that his categories rest on philosophical rather than linguistic grounds, there are two, out of eight basic types of modality which are significant for natural languages: epistemic and deontic modality. This has also been confirmed by Hoye: “In terms of natural language, there seems to be a consensus among interested parties that at least two modalities are primitive: namely, deontic and epistemic” (1997:42). This terminology is also used by Palmer (2001), Lyons (1977), Frawley (1992), among others. There is another type of modality, namely, dynamic modality which denotes the subject’s ability or willingness to do something (de Haan 2006:29). ag.v.1Epistemic ModalityEpistemic modality “is concerned with matters of knowledge or belief on which basis speakers express their judgements about states of affairs, events or actions” (Hoye 1997:42). In other words, “it concerns the speaker’s attitude to the factuality of past or present time situations [...]” (Huddleston and Pullum 2002:178). Thus, in the modalised proposition She may/might/must/could be ill, the speaker communicates his or her subjective attitude to the proposition and so s/he modifies the illocutionary force of the utterance. Frawley defines epistemic modality in the following way: “The structural and semantic resources available to a speaker to express judgment of the factual status and likelihood of a state of affairs” (1992:407), and he continues by stating that “epistemic modality is a handy cover term for the way that language denotes and encodes the following concepts, among others: possibility, necessity, inference, belief, report, hearsay, conclusion, deduction, opinion, commitment, speculation, quotation, doubt, evidence, and certainty” (1992:407, italics in original). Coates (1983) states that epistemic modality “is concerned with the speaker’s assumptions or assessment of possibilities and, in most cases, it indicates the speaker’s confidence (or lack of confidence) in the truth of the proposition expressed” (Coates 1983:18). In this connection, Frawley emphasizes that epistemic modality relates to the expression of truth, but it is “truth relativized to a speaker” (1992:407). Epistemic modality in Palmer’s classification (2001:8ff) is subsumed, together with evidential modality, under the category of propositional modality. The main reason for this is that they both relate to the “speaker’s attitude to the truth-value or factual status of the proposition” (Palmer 2001:8). However, there is a difference between these two types: “With epistemic modality speakers express their judgments about the factual status of the proposition, whereas with evidential modality, they indicate the evidence they have for its factual status” (2001:8). Palmer divides epistemic modality into three types: speculative deductive assumptive As Palmer (2001:25) points out, not all three types of epistemic modality are always present in all languages, but in English all these kinds can be found. Epistemic speculative modality is expressed by the modal verb may that conveys “a possible conclusion” (Palmer 2001:25), as for example in the sentence “John may be in his office” (2001:25). It implies that the speaker is not sure whether John is in his office or not. It is possible that he is there but it is not certain. The modal verb must is employed for the expression of epistemic deductive modality and it conveys “the only possible conclusion”, as in “John must be in his office”. The speaker is certain that John is in his office and makes “a firm judgment, on the basis of evidence” (2001:25). Huddleston and Pullum (2002:178ff) describe epistemic modality in a similar way but use a different terminology. They have divided epistemic modality into two types: epistemic necessity, or strong modality and epistemic possibility, or weak modality. Strong modality is what Palmer calls deductive type of epistemic modality and weak modality corresponds to his speculative modality. The last type of epistemic modality defined by Palmer is assumptive modality. It is expressed by the modal verb will which indicates “a reasonable conclusion”, as in the case of, “John will be in his office”, for example. The assertion stems from the facts that are generally known about John; for example, he always starts his work at a particular time, he is a workaholic, etc. (Palmer 2001:25). Huddleston and Pullum (2002:188) state that will is similar to other modal verbs semantically, pragmatically and syntactically, but it expresses “a lower degree of modal meaning”, thus, they treat it separately. They consider three uses of will that fall within epistemic modality: central-epistemic, futurity and conditional consequence. The category of central-epistemic corresponds to epistemic assumptive modality defined by Palmer. Palmer also draws attention to the fact that there are two “not entirely compatible contrasts” within the English modal system (2001:25). The first concerns the strength of the conclusion, manifested as the choice between epistemic possibility and epistemic necessity. In other words, there is a difference between what is epistemically possible (may) and what is epistemically necessary (must). The second makes a difference between “an inference from observation and an inference from experience or general knowledge, i.e. between deductive (must) and assumptive (will)” (Palmer 2001:25) (my italics). ag.v.2Deontic ModalityThis type of modality is generally defined with regard to obligation, prohibition or permission (see Palmer 2001, Huddleston and Pullum 2002, Kratzer 1978). “‘Deontic’ is derived from the Greek for “binding”, so that here it is a matter of imposing an obligation or prohibition, granting permission, and the like. [...] The person, authority, convention, or whatever from whom the obligation, etc., is understood to emanate we refer to as the deontic source” (Huddleston and Pullum 2002:178, emphasis in original). In other words, this modality expresses “the imposition of a state of affairs on individuals, or, with the modality as deixis, the imposition of an expressed world on a reference world” (Frawley 1992:420). To give an example, in All passengers must show their passports (my example), the modal verb must is used in the deontic sense with the meaning “they are obliged to show their passports”. In You may use my mobile phone (my example), the person is giving permission to another person by utilizing the modal verb may. Huddleston and Pullum distinguish between two types of deontic modality. As with epistemic modality, they designate them strong and weak. Strong deontic modality is also called “deontic necessity” or “strong obligation” and is expressed by the modal verb must. Weak deontic modality is also called “deontic possibility” and is expressed by may (Huddleston and Pullum 2002:182). Obligation and permission, two categories of deontic modality, have also been identified by Frawley (1992:421ff). However, he adds another essential characteristic of deontic modality, which is futurity, or “the directionality of the events” (1992:424). By this he means that “deontics always point to some upcoming state of affairs from the reference world” (1992:424). Palmer (2001) states that “deontic and dynamic modality refer to events that are not actualized. These are events that have not taken place, but that are merely potential, and may, therefore, be described as ‘event modality’” (Palmer 2001:70). The difference between deontic and dynamic modality is that “with dynamic modality the conditioning factors are external to the person indicated as the subject [...], whereas with deontic modality they are internal [...]” (2001:70). Palmer (2001) divides deontic modality into three types: obligative permissive commissive
ag.v.3Dynamic ModalityDynamic modality has been defined by Perkins (1983) as a type of modality that refers to “the relationship which exists between circumstances and unactualized events in accordance with natural laws” (1983:11). Huddleston and Pullum add that “the clearest cases of dynamic modality are concerned with properties and dispositions of persons, etc., referred to in the clause, especially by the subject NP” (2002:178). As already mentioned, dynamic modality together with deontic modality are two types of event modality, which were identified by Palmer. Further, he defines two types of dynamic modality, the one expressing ability, which he calls “abilitive dynamic modality”, and the other conveying willingness, which is called “volitive dynamic modality” (Palmer 2001:76ff.). Abilitive dynamic modality is expressed in English by can, volitive modality by will. Thus, in the sentence “He can run a mile in under four minutes” (Palmer 2001:77), can expresses an ability of the subject to manage something. Will in “She loves him and she won’t leave him” (2001:78) expresses willingness of somebody to do or not to do something (2001:78). Huddleston and Pullum (2002:179) emphasize that the borderline between deontic and dynamic modality is not always clear. For example, the sentence The most we can expect is a slight cut in the sales-tax cannot be clearly classified as either dynamic or deontic modality. Eventually, they categorize it as dynamic modality because “no person or institution is identifiable as a deontic source - they might be glossed with “permissible”, but not with “permission” (2002:179). It should be pointed out here that these modal verbs are also used for expressing other types of modality. Can is used to express deontic modality and also epistemic modality but only in its negative form. Will expresses not only willingness but it is also used as an assumptive. Download 1.35 Mb. Share with your friends:
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