Appendix AThe 10 Commandments of

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When commanders make policy statements about the military justice system, particularly about what types of offenses warrant what kinds of courts or sentences, commanders run the risk that they will commit both adjudicative UCI (some witnesses may not now come forward on the accused’s behalf, and some panel members may now punish in accordance with what they believe the convening authority believes) and accusatory UCI (some commanders may make a particular decision in a case because that is what they think their commander wants them to do, not because that is their independent decision).
Commanders are used to coaching and mentoring their subordinates in all areas of command responsibility and leadership, but here, the law has carved out an exception. Commanders should consult with their staff judge advocates before entering this area.
Note that Art. a) exempts general instructional or informational courses on military justice if such courses are designed solely for the purpose of instructing members of the command in the substantive and procedural aspects of courts-martial. Commanders should consider asking their staff judge advocate to provide general instruction, and should allow judge advocates to give advice on particular cases. The readings below help illuminate the line between mentorship and unlawful command influence.
United States v. Treakle, 18 M.J. 646 (A.C.M.R. The duties of a division commander as a court-martial convening authority and as the primary leader responsible for discipline within the division are among the most challenging a commander can perform. On the one hand, effective leadership requires a commander to supervise the activities of his subordinates diligently and ensure that state of good order and discipline which is vital to combat effectiveness. On the other hand, he must exercise restraint when overseeing military justice matters to avoid unlawful interference with the discretionary functions his subordinates must perform. The process of maintaining discipline yet ensuring fairness in military justice requires what the United States Court of Military Appeals has called a delicate balance in an area filled with perils for the unwary. Many experienced line officers have expressed similar conclusions. Excerpts from two particularly useful and authoritative examples are reproduced [below].
Correction of procedural deficiencies in the military justice system is within the scope of a convening authority’s supervisory responsibility. Yet in this area, the band of permissible activity by the commander is narrow, and the risks of overstepping its boundaries are great. Interference with the discretionary functions of subordinates is particularly hazardous. While a commander is not absolutely prohibited from publishing general policies and guidance which may relate to the discretionary military justice functions of his subordinates, several decades of practical experience under the Uniform Code of Military Justice have demonstrated that the risks often outweigh the benefits. The balance between the command problem to be resolved and the risks of transgressing the limits set by the Uniform Code of Military Justice is to be drawn by the com-

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