Nipping Away at Dixie: The Port by Port Campaign to Seal the Confederate Coast

Such logic would later influence Lee, as commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, to adopt his strategy of the offensive-defensive. In the current emergency, it led him to initiate three measures. These were to strengthen the defenses at Fort Pulaski, Georgia and Charleston in order to withstand a more serious bombardment than they had been built to sustain, to obstruct the waterways that might be used by Federal ships, and to assemble the scattered Confederate forces at the most probable points of Federal attack. ²² Later, Lee would put into effect a longer-range plan by ordering the withdrawal inland of garrisons and guns on outlying positions. This move was part of Lee’s plan to hold only key locations such as Charleston. Finally, at Savannah and along the southern part of the Charleston and Savannah Railroad, Lee built a strong defensive line upon which he could concentrate his forces. This would force the Federal Army to fight without the assistance of its powerful Navy. ²³ In spite of these efforts, the advantage clearly lay with the Federals.

Endnotes

Foote, vol 1, 116-117; and Clifford Dowdey and Louis Manarin, The Wartime Papers of R. E. Lee, (NY: Bramhall House, 1961), 81.

After his success at Port Royal, Du Pont began reconnoitering the adjacent coastline. As he spread out from Port Royal, he turned his attention to Fernandina, Florida which lay 25 miles north of the Saint Johns River near the Georgia border. Indeed Secretary Welles’s order convening the Navy Board, had specified, “It is imperative that two or more points should be taken possession of on the Atlantic Coast, and Fernandina and Port Royal are spoken of.” ¹ The first report of the Navy Board, issued in July 1861, stated, “It seems to be indispensable that there should exist a convenient coal depot on the southern extremity of the line of Atlantic blockades… [and it] might be used not only as a coal depot for coal, but as a depot for provisions and common stores, as a harbor of refuge, and as a general rendezvous, or headquarters, for that part of the coast.” ² The Board determined that the best location for this southern base was Fernandina.

The main ship channel over the St. Mary’s Bar into Fernandina could accommodate vessels with a 20-foot draft at high tide, deep enough for all but the largest of the Federal Navy’s ships. If seized rapidly, the docks and buildings of the unfinished Florida Railroad would provide ready facilities to store coal and repair ships. Fernandina also boasted a healthy climate, with ample wood and fresh water. The area had only a small population, and its isolation by surrounding marshes would simplify its defense once it was captured. The Board felt a force of 3,000 men could take and hold it. ³

Scant Defenses. The Confederate government never really gave much serious attention to the defense of Florida. The state was sparsely populated and its three coastal towns, Fernandina, Jacksonville, and St. Augustine, were all relatively unimportant. After the losses of Forts Henry and Donelson in February 1862, Florida received even less priority, and its defensive lines were drawn even tighter. Pursuant to his post-Port Royal strategy, on February 19 General Lee ordered all coastal forces to secure their artillery and to withdraw. The local Confederates took steps to comply, but a lack of transportation forced them to leave half their ordnance behind. Initially, the Federals did not know about the Confederate withdrawal, but Fernandina was now virtually unprotected. ⁴

What little defenses Fernandina had were built around Fort Clinch which contained six batteries that commanded the main ship channel. Among those given pause by these defenses was Admiral David Porter who after the war claimed the batteries were so well protected by sand hills and vegetation that “striking them from the sea would [be] almost a matter of chance.” ⁵ In addition, there was a battery of four guns on the south end of Cumberland Island aimed across the channel inside the bar. Still further back was a concealed battery in the town itself which controlled the anchorage. All these defenses were facilitated by a very crooked channel and shallow bar. Based on these advantages, Lee had once considered Fernandina easily defendable from naval attack. Porter was not quite as impressed, but concluded the defenses would be able to make “it warm work for the Navy.” ⁶

On March 2, 1862, Du Pont dispatched 17 armed vessels under the command of Commodore S. W. Godon to lay anchor off St. Andrew’s Island, 20 miles north of the entrance to Fernandina. In addition, six transports carried an Army brigade commanded by Brigadier General Horatio Wright. The plan was to attack by moving through the sound behind Cumberland Island to avoid any Confederate batteries until the ships reached the flank and rear of Fort Clinch. ⁷ While the vessels examined the channel and waited for the tide, they learned from residents of Cumberland Island that the Confederates had hastily abandoned Fernandina and were currently in the process of evacuating what war materials they could salvage. Porter concludes that “Such was the moral effect of the Port Royal victory, that there seemed to be a stampede along the coast as soon as our naval vessels made appearance.” ⁸ Du Pont agreed, observing that the string of successful Federal operations had the Confederates “flying about like moths around a lamp.” ⁹

Armed with this new intelligence, Du Pont detached the light gunboats and light draft steamers under Commander Percival Drayton and ordered them to push ahead to try to interrupt the Confederate retreat. On entering Fernandina Harbor, Drayton sent an officer to secure Fort Clinch. The Confederates fired a few parting musket shots and then escaped on a train. Drayton gave chase along the river and fired several shells at the fleeing locomotive, but the train escaped across the railroad bridge at Kingsley’s Creek. Commander C. R. P. Rodgers pushed ahead with the steam launches, captured the Confederate Darlington laden with military supplies, and seized the drawbridge of the railroad. Rodgers later ascended the St. Mary’s River, drove away the Confederate pickets, and captured the town of St. Mary’s. In all, the Federals captured thirteen guns, including an 80-pounder and a 120-pounder. ¹⁰

Many Federal naval officers felt the Confederates had shown poor judgment in abandoning their works. Rodgers, for example, believed that the Navy might have taken heavy casualties crossing the unmarked bar under fire from Fort Clinch. Dayton agreed, writing, “they ought to have been able to keep out all the fleets of the Union combined, the bar being a very difficult one, and its turns bringing vessels directly under batteries almost end on for miles.” ¹¹

Continued Operations. Such speculation notwithstanding, Brigadier General Wright entered Fernandina Harbor on March 4 and landed his brigade. Leaving the Army in charge of occupying the fortifications at Fernandina, Du Pont continued his operations against the coast. The easy conquest of Fernandina had convinced him to tackle Jacksonville, about 30 miles from the bar up the narrow and twisting Saint Johns River. He dispatched the Ottawa, Seneca, Pembina, Huron, Isaac Smith, and Ellen for this work. Along the way, the Federals landed troops at Mayport Mills, about three miles upriver, and secured the guns there. Fleeing Confederates burned eight sawmills, over four million board feet of lumber, some ironworks, and a gunboat under construction to avoid their falling into Federal hands. On March 12, the Navy captured Saint Johns Bluff, about five miles above Mayport Mills, and then moved on to Jacksonville. The local authorities there greeted the Federals with a flag of truce. ¹²

While this part of his fleet was securing the Saint Johns River, Du Pont also learned that the Confederates had abandoned Brunswick, Georgia, and on March 7 he sent the Mohican, Pocahontas, and Potomska to secure that location. En route, he found the Confederates had abandoned two strong earthworks on St. Simon’s Island and two even stronger batteries on Jekyll Island. On March 9, the Federals pressed on up the Brunswick River and captured Brunswick, denying the Confederates the terminus of the Brunswick and Florida Railroad, another valuable logistical connection. ¹³

On March 11, Du Pont ordered the Wabash south to St. Augustine to reconnoiter and then sent Commander Rodgers ashore in a boat with a flag of truce. Rodgers found a white flag flying over Fort Marion, and the city officials met Rodgers and placed the town under his control. Du Pont’s instructions were to guarantee the inhabitants kind treatment if they would accept Federal authority and act in good faith. He even allowed municipal authority to remain in the hands of the citizens. ¹⁴ St. Augustine itself was of little importance because it mainly served as a resort for invalids, and its harbor could accommodate only the most shallow draft vessels. It did shelter a couple blockade runners, so its capture made some contribution to the blockade. ¹⁵

Indeed, Du Pont’s overall successes greatly facilitated the Federal effort to isolate the Confederacy from the outside world. The geography of the coastline and the fact that the Confederates lacked the resources necessary to defend the inlets allowed Du Pont to maintain a close or inside blockade. Possession of places like Fernandina, St. Augustine, Jacksonville, and Brunswick gave him even greater access to the inland waterways with little fear of the enemy. He now anchored his small and shallow draft vessels directly in the fairways of the inlets. Under these conditions, a lightly armed gunboat usually could control the approaches and effectively close or constrict blockade running. By April, Du Pont had eight major waterways under an inside blockade, and this arrangement virtually stopped any potential trade at these locations. ¹⁶ The Confederates could see the futility of trying to hold or recover the exposed harbors and inlets in the area, and they confined future operations to the interior where the Federal Navy could not follow them. ¹⁷

As far as St. Augustine was concerned, Du Pont thought, “I could not only take St. Augustine—of course without asking him [Sherman] if I please—but hold it too.” Du Pont thus proceeded to garrison St. Augustine with a battalion of marines, much to Sherman’s chagrin. Sherman responded by dispatching two companies commanded by a lieutenant colonel in order to outrank Du Pont’s marine major. Du Pont then withdrew his marines and sent them back to Washington. Army-Navy relations were rapidly turning sour. ¹⁹

At the end of March, Major General David Hunter replaced Sherman as commander of the newly created Department of the South. While Du Pont’s objective was to capture as much territory as possible, the Army was rapidly beginning to feel overextended. Hunter ordered the withdrawal of troops from Jacksonville, an act which forced the Navy to abandon both the town and the river and withdraw its gunboats to the mouth of the Saint Johns River. This development disappointed not just Du Pont, but also those Jacksonville residents who had “committed themselves to the Union cause.” When the Federal garrison departed on April 9, the Confederates immediately reoccupied Jacksonville. ²⁰

Hunter would make an ill-conceived attack on Jacksonville almost a year later on March 10, 1863, only to then evacuate the town on March 27. Hunter’s antics were exasperating to Du Pont who was under orders to take as many ports as possible. They also caused Du Pont to realize he could not depend on Hunter to be a part of the attack on Charleston, South Carolina then being considered. ²¹ Jacksonville would be the site of guerrilla fighting and brown water naval operations until February 7, 1864 when Federal forces occupied it for the fourth and final time. ²² But, as frustrating as Hunter’s first abandonment of Jacksonville would be to Du Pont, continued Federal possession of Fernandina offered the promise of facilitating upcoming operations against nearby Fort Pulaski, Georgia. ²³

Endnotes

Fernandina and Jacksonville

By 1847, the basic structure of Fort Pulaski was finished. It encompassed approximately five acres and could mount up to 146 guns. The fort was surrounded by a moat seven feet deep and 35 feet wide. But what would prove to be the greatest obstacle to would-be attackers were the fort’s brick walls which were seven and a half feet thick and 35 feet high. It was this barrier that caused the defenders to be so confident. In fact, in November 1861, Lee inspected Fort Pulaski and assured Colonel Charles Olmstead, the Confederate commander there, that the Federal guns on Tybee Island could “make it pretty warm for you here with shells, but they cannot breach your walls at that distance.” Lee’s remarks were not the result of overconfidence, wishful thinking, or personal attachment. Brigadier General Joseph Totten, the Federal Army’s chief engineer, agreed that “the work could not be reduced in a month’s firing with any number of guns of manageable calibers.” ²

Instead, things muddled along from bad to worse. Du Pont dispatched his trusted subordinate Commodore John Rodgers to conduct reconnaissance, and Rodgers concluded that the Wall’s Cut channel was too shallow to risk running gunboats without first being marked. Knowing that the Army would consider him “uncooperative,” Du Pont still refused to supply Sherman with any vessels until the channel could be buoyed or staked. Sherman, however, was powerless to do anything without Du Pont, because the general was still waiting for the light-draft steam transports the War Department had promised him. Sherman claimed that if he had the necessary transportation he would attack without the Navy, but the point was moot. Instead, Sherman could only complain that the plan failed to materialize for a “want of cooperation of the navy.” ⁴

Rather than the planned coup de main, Sherman and Du Pont finally agreed to make a “strong feint” against Savannah, hoping it would draw Confederate troops away from Fernandina, the next Federal objective. The feint consisted of two squadrons of warships, one probing to the south of Savannah and one to the north. These were followed by three regiments of soldiers aboard Army transports.

When the Confederates saw the warships, they were convinced the Federals were launching a major assault on Fort Pulaski, and Flag Officer Tattnall responded with an expedition to resupply the fort with six months’ worth of provisions. To do so he would have to run between the two Federal fleets. Tattnall succeeded in his mission, showing the Federals that the Navy could not prevent communication with Fort Pulaski from its positions on the river during the feint. In a future operation, the Federals would have to secure Wilmington Island to accomplish this purpose. But if the feint failed in this aspect, it did accomplish its goal of unnerving the Confederates. In the meantime, Major General George McClellan sent instructions that the War Department did not consider Savannah to be worth putting under siege and instead instructed Sherman to concentrate his forces on Fort Pulaski, Fernandina, and maybe St. Augustine. On February 14, McClellan sent another message promising to send Sherman a siege train of heavy guns to be used in reducing Fort Pulaski. ⁵