P oecd best Practice Principles for Regulatory Policy The Governance of Regulators



Download 1.83 Mb.
View original pdf
Page15/123
Date25.02.2021
Size1.83 Mb.
#55920
1   ...   11   12   13   14   15   16   17   18   ...   123
اصول حکمرانی تنظیمی
The scope of this report
Two broad aspects of governance relevant to regulators can be distinguished
• external governance (looking out from the regulator) – the roles, relationships and distribution of powers and responsibilities between the legislature, the minister, the ministry, the judiciary, the regulator’s governing body and regulated entities and
• internal governance (looking into the regulator) – the regulator’s organisational structures, standards of behaviour and roles and responsibilities, compliance and accountability measures, oversight of business processes, financial reporting and performance management. The main focus of this report is on external governance arrangements and their effect on the performance of regulators. However, as the two aspects overlap, some issues of internal governance are also addressed where relevant (such as the governing body, funding and performance evaluation of regulators. It is also recognised that a regulator cannot be effective or efficient without clear and well-functioning internal organisation. Internal governance is not only important for instilling public confidence but also is important in the context of judicial and other independent reviews such as external audits. The nature of an entity’s external governance is determined by the arrangements which establish and distribute decision-making power and authority between key decision makers. In government, the main parties involved in these arrangements are the legislature, ministers, the executive heads of ministries, and the governing bodies and executive management of regulators. The judiciary plays an important role particularly for independent


20
– INTRODUCTION
THE GOVERNANCE OF REGULATORS © OECD 2014 regulators but moreover in maintaining accountability and trust in the regulator. In some cases, such as for regulators in the European Union, the regulators are subject to and accountable to supranational regulatory frameworks and bodies. In the financial services sector there are international standard setting entities such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, G Financial Stability Board and International Organization of Securities Commissions that provides standards and guidance on regulatory frameworks that national regulators implement The generic external governance arrangements between the parties within a regulatory system are depicted in Figure 0.2. Regulators separate from ministries and those located within ministries are portrayed in the diagram, reflecting the diversity in the organisational location of many countries regulators. Central to governance arrangements are the institutional forms regulators take. Institutional form refers to a regulator’s decision-making body and legal form, the degree of organisational separation from ministries, sources of operating funds, employment powers and financial accountability obligations. The relevance of independent regulators versus ministerial regulators is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2. In addition to the legislation that determines the institutional form, there are several governance tools, such as statements of expectations, corporate plans, service agreements and protocols, framework agreements and guidance, which can be used to codify and shape the way that governance arrangements work in practice. Governance tools mayor may not have the force of law. Governance arrangements, institutional form and governance tools together comprise the governance framework for an individual regulator. The framework sets out the objectives, powers, functions, limitations and relationships of a regulator. The focus of this report is on external governance, but better internal governance can be a very effective complement to, or in some cases a substitute for, improvements to external arrangements. For example, where it is not practical to create a separate independent regulatory function because of the need to maintain close links with the funding or service delivery functions of the ministry (for example, to share industry knowledge and intelligence or scarce expertise, internal governance mechanisms, such as financial autonomy, internal protocols and reporting arrangements, may achieve some of the benefits of more robust, external arrangements.

INTRODUCTION –

Download 1.83 Mb.

Share with your friends:
1   ...   11   12   13   14   15   16   17   18   ...   123




The database is protected by copyright ©ininet.org 2024
send message

    Main page