Paper prepared for the Ford Foundation Project on Non-Traditional Security, Seoul, South Korea, 30 January 2004 Liberal Theory and the Politics of Security in Northeast Asia



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Conclusion

What all these liberal literatures have in common is the view that deep forces of political, economic and cultural modernization are at work altering the basic terms of inter-state relations. These forces feed through three channels: changes in market incentives, changes in basic social values, and changes in domestic representative institutions. Modernization has tended, among other things, to generate technologies and capacities that push forward regional and global integration of societies. This modernization logic, in turn, unleashes both new dangers and opportunities. Integration of societies makes people more dependent on others – and therefore more vulnerable. It also creates new incentives for cooperation and the pursuit of collective action. Learning, adaptation, conflict, political change – all these processes over long stretches of history alter the international landscape. But what is central to the liberal international vision is that states and peoples can respond to threats and dislocations by shaping and reshaping international political order. Liberals are quite comfortable with the view that new forms of political community and new types of international institutions will rise up as interests and preferences change within societies.

The implication of this overview of liberal literatures is that transnational and non-traditional security threats are seen as triggers for new types of political community and institutional organization. But these communities and institutions are expected to “domesticate” the problems by creating a political order that makes them tractable. The solution to transnational, non-traditional threats is not to expand the national security state but to expand the domestic features of the international system. The logic of problem solving for liberals is to civilize and domesticate international threats. “De-securitization” might best be seen as the liberal watchword.

If the question is about a new and dangerous environmental problem, the first question might be: is it a transnational problem that can only be solves through collective action – and what are the constraints and opportunities imposed on such action by state-society relations and underlying national preferences? Another question that liberal theorists will ask is simply: how do people and groups within society perceive their interests and preferences in this area? The disagreement is not that liberals resist the view that the definition of “security” is constructed – liberals admit that actors process the real-world in complex ways and bring subjective frameworks of understanding to this task. The difference is really in the theoretical starting point.

Liberals tend to be skeptical of the view that turning all transnational threats into “security” problems because they believe that the preferences of social groups and the domestic institutions through which they are aggregated are fundamental structural constraints. In a democratic society, taking issues away from civilian, rule-of-law processes and give them to less accountable national security managers is only sometimes possible and only sometimes feasible. Securitization of issues may mobilize the state – but it also is a process where authority is handed to the state. The current American experience with terrorism is a good example. With terrorism defined by the United States government as an overriding national security threat, domestic civil liberties are more easily restricted and the Pentagon gains in importance at the expense of the State Department. Just as important, the way the problem of terrorism is defined – as a security threat requiring military action – undercuts other approaches to terrorism that focus on law enforcement, economic development and religious engagement.62

Liberal theory underscores, moreover, that solutions to international problems are often best dealt with by “domesticating” those problems. That is, it is the building of shared institutions and political community that ultimately provide sufficiently complex and diffuse forms of cooperation to tackle the great problems of any historical age. “Securitization,” in other words moves international relations in the wrong direction. The goal should be to “shrink” the space for security relations. Problems of war and peace should be turned into problems of police and law enforcement. It is the extending of logics of domestic order to the international realm that is seen as possible and desirable by liberals. As we will see below, most liberal theories identify processes that reduce the autonomy and relevance of “high state” security relations. International relations – responding to underlying changes in science, technology, communication, and socio-economic relationships – entails, to coin a term, the “civilianization” and “privatization” of world politics. The rise of a “security community” among the advanced industrial democracies is perhaps the most profound expression of this liberal anticipation. The building of community and shared mechanisms for doing business and tackling problems is the great challenge that liberal theory addresses. Arguably, “securitization” can obstruct this process.



1 For a survey of how international relations scholars theorize East Asia, see G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno, eds., International Relations Theory and the Asia Pacific (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003).

2Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, Co.: Lynne Reiner, 1998).

3 Buzan, et al, Security, p. vii.

4 Aaron Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," International Security, (Winter 1993/94), vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 5‑33.

5 Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry,” p. 7.

6 Richard K. Betts, “Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 18 (Winter 1993/94); Gerald Segal, “East Asia and the Constrainment of China,” International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 107-35; and Robert S. Ross, “The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-First Century,” International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), pp. 81-119.

7 Avery Goldstein, International Security.

8 Thomas Berger, “The Construction of Conflict and the Prospects for Conflict and Reconciliation in East Asia,” in Ikenberry and Mastanduno, eds., International Relations Theory and the Asia Pacific.

9 On the security dilemma, see Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, 1985.

10 This is the argument of Ikenberry and Mastanduno in International Relations Theory and the Asia Pacific.

11 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

12 John Gerard Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” in Stephen Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983.

13G. John Ikenberry, “Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of the American postwar Order,” International Security (Winter 1998/99); and Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

14 Geir Lundestad, The American “Empire” (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

15 For a contrasting view of American hegemony that emphasizes its exploitive and domineering character, see Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2000).

16 John Duffield, “Asia-Pacific Security Institutions in Comparative Perspective,” in Ikenberry and Mastanduno, eds., International Relations Theory and the Asia Pacific.

17 Peter J. Katzenstein and Takahi Shiraishi, eds., Network Power: Japan and Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967).

18 Ellis S. Krauss and T.J. Pempel, eds., Beyond Bilateralism: U.S.-Japan Relations in the New Asia-Pacific (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).

19 Buzan, Waever and Wilde, Security, p. 27.

20 E.g. Peter Katzenstein, ed. The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

21 E.g. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); Stephen Van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,” International Security (Summer 1984), pp. 58-107.

22 Snyder, Myths of Empire; Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power (Princeton: Princeton Univ Pr, 1999); Randall Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” International Organization 42:3 (Summer 1988), pp. 485-508. For a critique of the incoherence of modern reformulations of realism and a demonstration of the ways in which they borrow from liberal, epistemic, and institutionalist theory, see Jefferey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?” International Security 24:2 (Autumn 2000), pp. 5-55. See also Legro and Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist? The Authors Reply," in "Correspondence: Brother, Can You Spare a Paradigm? (Or Was Anybody Ever a Realist?)," International Security (Summer 2000). (Reply to critiques by Peter Feaver, Gunther Hellmann, Randall Schweller, Jeffrey Taliaferro and William Wohlforth)

23 Andrew Moravcsik, “Liberalism, Realism and the Future of World Politics,” Debate with John Mearsheimer (Cosmos Club, Washington, DC, 2004).

24 Buzan, et al, Security. made broader notion of security more plausible.

25 For two contrasting views of this split, see Robert Kagan, “Power and Weakness,” Policy Review 113 (2002), pp. 3-28; Andrew Moravcsik, “Striking a New Transatlantic Bargain,” Foreign Affairs (July-August 2003).



26 Buzan, et al, Security, p. 26.

27 It is not a cause because it does not impose a binding constraint on policy action. In this case this may be because such rhetoric is readily available (“cheap talk”) and because it is of intrinsically secondary importance compared to more compelling reasons to take threats seriously.

28 Similar problems arise with regard to Copenhagen School analyses of the EU. See Moravcsik, "Is Something Rotten in the State of Denmark? Constructivism and European Integration," Journal of European Public Policy ("Special Issue: The Social Construction of Europe," 2000); Moravcsik, "The Future of European Integration Studies: Social Theory or Social Science?" Millennium (Autumn 1999).

29 See Moravcsik, "Why the European Community Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and International Institutions," Center for European Studies Working Paper Series 52 (Cambridge: Center for European Studies, 1994); "Is there a 'Democratic Deficit' in World Politics? A Framework for Analysis," Government and Opposition (forthcoming); “In Defense of the Democratic Deficit: Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union,” Journal of Common Market Studies (40th Anniversary Edition) 40:4 (November 2002).

30 Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Transnational Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).

31 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

32 Moravcsik, “In Defense of the Democratic Deficit.”

33 Michael Doyle, Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Marxism (New York: Norton, 1997).

34 Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: Liberalism and International Relations Theory" International Organization (Autumn 1997).

35 By pre-strategic preferences, we mean preferences across “states of the world”, not across strategic outcomes. The latter are strategies, not preferences. So, for example, in the Cold War, peace and democratic capitalism were US preferences, while deterring the Soviets or undermining a foreign government were US strategies. For a further discussion, see Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously.”

36 For a summary, see Robert O. Keohane and Helen V. Milner, Internationalization and Domestic Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

37 See Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously” for examples.

38 The recent tendency of modern constructivist theories to revert (in the face of empirical evidence) to a stress on domestic ideologies and transnational social movements, rather than more “systemic” social construction of interests, renders them entirely consistent with a liberal ontology. See, inter alia, Katzenstein, ed. Culture of National Security; Wendt, Social Theory.

39 Micahel W. Doyle, "Kant, Libreal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Philosophy and Public Affairs 12:3 (Summer, 1983), pp. 205-235.

40 On this point, Keohane is unambiguous. See Robert Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), Introduction.

41 Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously”; Jeffrey W. Legro “Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step,” American Political Science Review 90:1 (March 1996).


42 Jack L. Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (New York: Norton, 2000).

43 Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics," International Organization 42:3 (Summer 1988), pp. 427-461; Helen Milner, Interests, Institutions and Information (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); Lisa Martin, Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and International Co-operation (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2000); Moravcsik, Why the European Union Strengthens the State.

44 Moravcsik, “In Defense of the Democratic Deficit”.

45 John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino, “The Emergence and Evolution of Constitutional Courts,” Paper presented at Harvard University Center for European Studies (December 2001); Moravcsik, "The Origins of International Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe" International Organization (Spring 2000).

46 See for example, Ernst Haas, "Technology, Pluralism, and the New Europe," in J. Nye, ed., International Regionalism, pp. 149-176; Donald Puchala, "Integration and Disintegration in Franco-German Relations," International Organization 24 (Spring 1970), pp. 183-208; and Donald Puchala, "Domestic Politics and Regional Integration," World Politics 27 (July 1975), pp. 496-520.

47 For a critique, see fn. below.

48 Philippe Schmitter, "Three Neo-Functional Hypotheses About International Integration," International Organization 23 (Winter 1969), pp. 161-166.

49 For a discussion of these issues, see Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Interests and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1998).

50 Moravcsik, Choice for Europe. Moravcsik has criticized this tendency to theorize the dynamics of cooperation over time without a firm micro-foundational theory of preferences, bargaining and institutionalization at any give time as seeking to “run before one can walk”. Cite to Choice.

51 So, for example, some of the most fundamental EU policies (such as internal tariff reduction) required almost no centralized institutional infrastructure, whereas others (such as operation of the common external tariff) required far more.

52 This is often referred to as “neo-liberal institutionalist” theory, thereby leading to the erroneous assumption that it shares basic assumptions with liberal theories.

53 Ernst Haas, Beyond the Nation-State (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966).

54 For an explicit link with regional integration, see Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, “International Interdependence and Integration,“ Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds. Handbook of Political Science (Andover, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 363-414.

55 Andrew Scott, The Revolution in Statecraft: Informal Penetration, (New York: Random Huse, 1965); Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, eds., Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971); and Samuel P. Huntington, "Transnational Organization and World Politics," World Politics, Vol.25, No.3, April 1973.

56 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).

57 Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed., Bringing Transnational Relations Back In.

58 Slaughter, New World Order.

59 Peter M. Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," International Organization, Vol.46, No. 1, winter 1992, pp. 1-35. As of yet there are few empirical examples of successful epistemic communities at work against state interests. Cases often cited, such as the Mediterranean Plan analyzed by Peter Haas, have proven to be limited in their effectiveness. When traditional political channels are circumvented, the result is often very poor compliance performance, as with the Med Plan. For a similar example from the EU, see Lisa Conant, Justice Contained: Law and Politics in the European Union (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002).

60 Karl Deutsch et al, Political Community in the North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), pp. 1-116; Richard Merritt and Bruce Russett, eds., >From National Development to World Community, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1981); Emanuel Adler, “Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations,” Millennium, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Winter 1997), pp. 249-77; Deutsch, et al, eds., International Political Communities: An Anthology (Doubleday, 1966); Karl Deusch, “Communication Theory and Political Integration,” “Transaction Flows as Indicators of Political Cohesion,” “The Price of Integration,” “Integration and the Social System,” in Philip E. Jacobs and James V. Toscano, eds., The Integration of Political Communities (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964).

61 For a recent restatement of this theory, see Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds. Security Communities (Cambridge University Press, 1998).

62 This is an important debate in the United States and Western Europe. Some scholars, such as Michael Howard, have argued that it is a mistake to call it a “war” on terrorism. In this view, it is better to see the problem like organized crime across borders and other transnational problems that require criminal investigation, law enforcement and judicial proceedings. To call it a war is to bring the wrong institutions and thinking to the task.




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