13NFL1-Compulsory Voting Page 153 of 163 www.victorybriefs.com VOLUNTARY VOTING ALLOWS INTENSE MINORITIES TO ASSERT THEIR INTERESTS MORE STRONGLY Ben Saunders Temporary
Lecturer in Philosophy, Increasing Turnout A Compelling Case
Politics: 2010 Vol. 30(1), 70
–77 The costs of voting make probable that those who really have significant interests at
stake are more likely to vote, and thus that they have more influence on decisions that affect them In effect, this is to restate the familiar pluralist solution to the problem of intense minorities. Robert
Dahl suggests that those who feel strongly about a given issue can have greater influence on outcomes through means
such as persuasion and protest, affecting how others vote (Dahl, 1956, pp. 134
–135). Because this extra influence is mediated through the need to convince fellow citizens, it is compatible with formal equality. It maybe objected that not all groups are equally easily mobilised or able to explain
their position to others, which is a problem if we rely on them persuading others to take their interests into account when voting (Rehfeld, 2005, pp. 233
–234). However, we can assume that those who are more affected by a given decision are more likely to vote on it, ceteris paribus. A low turnout from those who are not greatly affected by a given decision thus increases the likelihood that the decision is actually made
by the relevant constituency 
