13NFL1-Compulsory Voting Page 41 of 163 www.victorybriefs.com Although the value of equal representation to democracy might seem unquestionable, the common responses to Lijphart’s argument in the literature make clear that the issue isn’t so plain. According to Lever, The value of political participation, on any democratic view of politics is, importantly, voluntary – or an expression of the free choice, beliefs, interests and efforts of people taken individually and collectively On this view, the internal link to good representation is a voting population who freely express their authentic views in away that reflects their self-interest. Critics of compulsory voting argue that forcing nonvoters to turn up at the polls and cast ballots has a number of unsavory consequences. Jakee and Sun argue that the idea that uninformed voters will balance each other outwith random votes is misguided, and that essentially random votes that don’t reveal a voter’s true preferences can still sway elections such that informed voters don’t have their interests represented. Even more critically, how is it possible to represent a voter’s interests when that voter hasn’t reflected upon those interests and the way their choice of political candidate will affect them But must votes be informed Isn’t this kind of thinking elitist As Lever argues in her article, governments should not be given the right to coerce individuals against their will, even if that coercion is in the individual’s best interest. If this is true, one might make compelling arguments that objections to compulsory voting can’t take as their premise the notion that some human beings make better decisions than others. This seems to make sense at some level, especially on controversial political issues to which the right answer is unclear or hotly contested. But in other respects a rule of absolute inclusion seems clearly wrong. Saunders argues that voluntary voting has the natural property of encouraging relevant voting constituencies to turnout, since voters who will be affected by policy will have an incentive to vote on that policy, and voters who are apathetic to the policy issue in question will not. One wouldn’t argue that a student at high school A has an obligation to vote fora student council officer at high school B precisely because student council affairs at high school B have no impact on school A. By analogy, if a voter determines that they don’t care about/have no interest in a particular election, and believes that the election will not affect them meaningfully, why should the government compel that person to show up to a voting booth One could argue that the obligation to represent unaffected, uninterested voters is as weak as the obligation to represent disenfranchised felons. Brennan doesn’t think so, and argues even more strongly that bad voters have an obligation not to vote. Brennan argues that in the same way an individual has a fairness-based obligation not to pollute (or contribute to any collective action problems, individuals have an obligation not to