NUCLEAR TERRORISM IS TRULY A WORST-CASE SCENARIO- WE ARE WASTING TIME AND RESOURCES BY TRYING TO PREVENT AN ATTACK. John Mueller 2007 (Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center Professor of Political Science, “ THE COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF EFFORTS TO PREVENT PROLIFERATION Prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, Massachusetts, August 28-31, 2008, pg. 8-9 Nonetheless, terrorism analyses tend to focus on lurid worst-case scenarios involving weapons of mass destruction, a concept that, especially after the Cold War, has been expanded to embrace chemical and biological and sometimes radiological weapons as well as nuclear ones As Bruce Hoffman laments, "Many academic terrorism analyses are self-limited to mostly lurid hypotheses of worst-case scenarios, almost exclusively involving CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear) weapons, as opposed to trying to understand why--with the exception of September terrorists have only rarely realized their true killing potential Relatedly, William Arkin has issued a sustained lament about what he calls "the devastating consequences associated with the universal and unchallenged assumption of nuclear terrorism" Among these consequences have been not only the war in Iraq, but the single-minded attention to WMD that seduced federal agencies "to prepare for the wrong disaster before Katrina" the rise of "preemption" and the "resurgence of American nuclear capability and missile defenses Concerns about atomic terrorism have led to a special focus on port security driven by the assumptions, apparently, 1) that after manufacturing their device at great expense and effort overseas, the terrorists would supply a return address and then entrust their precious product to the tender mercies of the commercial delivery system, and 2) that Randall Larsen is incorrect to conclude that "anyone smart enough to obtain a nuclear device will be smart enough to put half an inch of lead around it As a result, with bipartisan support, huge amounts of money have been hurled in that direction to inspect and to install radiation detectors. The amazing, hugely costly, and, it would appear, quite unwarranted, even quixotic, preoccupation about detecting radioactive parcels in materials arriving at US. ports currently triggers 500 false alarms daily at the Los Angeles/Long Beach port alone generated by such substances as kitty litter and bananas This preoccupation is impressive as well because there seems to be no evidence that any terrorist has indicated any interest in, or even much knowledge about, using transnational containers to transport much of anything Perhaps, as some suggest, some of the concern was inspired by the bizarre dispute that erupted in 2006 about having a Dubai-related firm in charge of US. port security
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