DETERRENCE BLUFFS RESULT IN LYING TO THE PUBLIC James A. Stegenga. Deterrence Bankrupt Ideology Policy Sciences, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Nov, 1983), pp. 127-1145. Nuclear deterrence involves the serious possibility of at least two sorts of morally troublesome deception. First, if the thermonuclear threat is a bluff that the leadership would not actually carryout, if there is a gulf between declaratory policy and action policy, this massive public deception raises the usual moral problems that deception raises, especially deception by public officials in a democracy grounded on an informed citizenry. If the highest officials can, for years, dissemble about this most important matter, it will become too easy for them to lie on all manner of lesser matters. Second, if the leaders know, as they must, that deterrence might fail and they nevertheless still profess such confidence in it (partly to promote credibility, their confident, soothing reassurances involve improper deception damaging to the delicate bond of trust that should exist between the leaders and the citizenry in a democracy.
