Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons Updated July 15, 2021 Congressional Research Service



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CRS RL32572 Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons-2020
CRS RL32572 Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons-2020
Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons

Congressional Research Service
31 2019 that Russia’s stockpile of nonstrategic nuclear weapons is already large and diverse and is being modernized with an eye towards greater accuracy, longer ranges, and lower yields to suit their potential warfighting role He stated that Russia’s overall nuclear stockpile is likely to grow significantly over the next decade with this growth primarily driven by a significant projected increase in the number of Russia’s nonstrategic nuclear weapons He also noted that Russia is adding new capabilities, including those employable by ships, aircraft, and ground forces.
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There is widespread agreement that Russia is pursuing a broad-based modernization program for its nonstrategic nuclear weapons, although experts disagree on the pace, direction, and rationale for this program. Some sources assert that this effort appears to involve phasing out Soviet-era weapons and replacing them with newer but fewer arms Some argue that Russia will retire more of these weapons than it acquires as it develops more capable advanced conventional weapons. Others, however, see Russia’s modernization of its nonstrategic nuclear weapons as a partner to its escalate to deescalate nuclear doctrine and argue that Russia will expand its nonstrategic nuclear forces as it raises their profile in its doctrine and war-fighting plans. The
2018 Nuclear Posture Review notes that Russia is building a large, diverse, and modern set of nonstrategic systems that ... maybe armed with nuclear or conventional weapons The NPR argues that Russia is increasing the total number of such weapons in its arsenal, while significantly improving its delivery capabilities.”
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The 2018 NPR also noted that one of Russia’s new nonstrategic nuclear weapons is aground- launched cruise missile with a range between 500 and 5,000 kilometers, which made it a violation of the 1987 INF Treaty. The Obama Administration had first reported that Russia was in violation of INF in 2014, in the State Department’s Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms
Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments.
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According to the
2017 report, Russia began deploying the missile, now known as the Min late 2016.
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The United States cited this missile’s development and deployment when it withdrew from the INF Treaty in 2019.

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