Themes of the American Civil War

McClernand) were aware of the presence of Confederate troops, and a third
(that of Benjamin M. Prentiss) was formed inline when the Confederates attacked, Grant’s army was surprised operationally and psychologically.
Grant was thinking more in terms of attack than defense, and had neglected to carryout an order of his superior, Halleck, to entrench his position.
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Fortunately, Johnston then lost control of the battle, and rode around like a brigade commander, directing regiments and siting cannon, showing a flair for leadership and exposing himself recklessly until he was mortally wounded.
Johnston thus lost the initiative and allowed Grant to galvanize himself and his command. He was handicapped by having to direct all of his six divisions himself rather than through two corps commanders. He spent much time passing from one part of the field to another, giving directions to division commanders But Grant did not lose control. On the second day of the battle, April 7, he personally gathered up a couple of regiments,
or parts of regiments, from troops nearby and formed them inline of battle and marched them forward, going in front myself to prevent premature or long-range firing At Shiloh Grant displayed powers of leadership
and the qualities of a first-rate commander. He ensured that his defensive line was not pierced, and then launched a counteroffensive in tandem with
Don Carlos Buell’s Army of the Ohio, which crossed the Tennessee River in his support. Grant also saw for the first time that Sherman displayed a comparable degree of confidence and aggressiveness.
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In his Memoirs Grant praised Buell for his intelligence and bravery,
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but during the campaign in Kentucky in the autumn of 1862 Buell showed that he lacked Grant’s drive. In someways, he conducted the campaign skillfully. Buell deftly shielded his supply base at Louisville and his lines of communication. When he advanced it was in strength and he was well supplied, unlike Braxton Bragg’s Confederates, who found foraging difficult. But Buell was more interested in driving Bragg back than in crushing him. His military outlook was essentially defensive. Like McClellan, Buell was more fearful of the enemy’s moves against him than confident that his own moves would dispose of any threat. Freeman Cleaves judges correctly that Buell was willing to accept any alternative to tangling with the enemy.”
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On October 8 Buell’s Army of the Ohio in three wings (really corps but not yet designated as such) collided with Bragg’s troops at Perryville. Bragg attacked Buell’s left under Alexander D. McCook, whose parched troops were searching for water.
The Union command system arranged before the battle was rather muddled. The week before, on September 29, the Lincoln administration became so frustrated with Buell’s slow progress that he was relieved of command. George H. Thomas, a stolid and stubborn loyal Virginian, was offered it but declined to accept it. So Buell remained in command for the
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duration of the campaign, with Thomas as his second-in command. Thomas was a kind of executive officer, but lacked authority. Even under this pressure,
Buell failed to grip the operations and impose himself on them. He did not go forward to see things for himself, and thus relied too heavily on the staff, who he complacently assumed would inform him of intelligence of serious import He was wrong. The staff, taking their cue from their rather languid master, returned to headquarters for their lunch, leaving McCook to fight his own battle. Buell did not learn that a battle had commenced until after 4.00 pm. The wing of Thomas L. Crittenden, faced by only Confederate cavalry, remained idle. The same fate seemed to face Bragg as the Confederates at Shiloh, but he was given time to disengage and withdraw back safely to Tennessee via the Cumberland Gap. Further orders for Buell’s removal soon followed.
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Buell’s successor, William S. Rosecrans, seemed more dynamic, and indeed he worked tirelessly on logistics and organization. His real skill was in strategic maneuver. Despite difficulties in coordination—signaling with flags was not easy in the wooded valleys of central and eastern Tennessee—he caught Bragg by surprise at Murfreesboro (December 31, January 2,
1863). Yet he, too, was at his best in defense, allowing Bragg to attack first.
Rosecrans did not like fighting battles. Moreover, his technique of directing strategic maneuver over great distances risked dispersal and the destruction of his corps piecemeal. In September, 1863, Rosecrans only just concentrated his corps in time before Bragg attacked at Chickamauga.
Rosecrans resembled McClellan in being well prepared and methodical.
Yet he also believed that the North’s enormous material superiority rendered battle somehow obsolete. He assumed that, if his management was meticulous enough, he could undertake strategic advances and win great battles bloodlessly. This was a delusion intellect could not serve as a substitute for battle. Under the strain of operations, when in contact with the enemy
Rosecrans neglected simple precautions. He did not take enough rest,
and became overwrought through lack of sleep. It was a muddle over confused orders at Chickamauga, caused by Rosecrans losing his temper, that resulted in the gap opening in the Union line that led to Rosecrans’s serious defeat. Rosecrans had also revealed alack of confidence by continually convening councils of war to seek the advice or the approval of his corps commanders.
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Grant’s style of command was the opposite of that adopted by McClellan,
Buell, and Rosecrans. After his first action at Belmont in November, Grant learnt that his opponent was just as nervous of his moves as he was of the enemy’s. From this experience stemmed Grant’s confidence and aggressiveness. He realized that it was more important to concentrate on what he was going to do to the enemy than worry about what the enemy was going to do to him. Moreover, Grant concluded after Shiloh that I gave up
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all idea of saving the Union except by complete conquest Although later writers, such as his former military secretary and semiofficial biographer,
Adam Badeau, tended to exaggerate the totality of his strategic ideas,
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there can be no doubting Grant’s commitment to the complete military defeat of the Confederacy. Also, he showed a taste and flair for confronting his enemies, using a combination of maneuver and battle. He evolved this successful technique during the Vicksburg and Chattanooga campaigns.
The pivot of Grant’s system was, of course, his own personality. He was modest, taciturn, and of a tranquil nature. He could be very blunt, but rarely raised his voice. Unlike Rosecrans (or Sherman) he was not volatile or highly strung. He appeared flat and uninspired, but the opposite was true. He adjusted his thoughts to meet the demands of the levels of military activity over which he rose to preside he took decisions swiftly and assumed responsibility effortlessly. He spent much of his time in quiet contemplation.
“He talked less and thought more than anyone in the service wrote Horace
Porter, a former member of his staff. From this capacity for reflection, free from routine and petty distraction, grew Grant’s overall grasp of the campaign.
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There was one feature of Grant’s system that was unusual. He relied on a chief of staff. Lee had a chief of staff in 1862 but could not make much use of him. During the Peninsular campaign McClellan’s chief of staff was his father-in-law, Brigadier General Randolph B. Marcy, and he had a negligible impact on operations. Throughout the Kentucky campaign Bragg acted as his own chief of staff, which exacerbated his tendency to overwork and bad temper. In December, 1862, Colonel George W. Brent became Bragg’s acting chief of staff but he lacked formal military training his orders did nothing to clarify Bragg’s instructions, which simply listed units and their destinations without detailing tasks or their relative importance. During the
Chancellorsville campaign in April–May, 1863, Hooker had hoped to make effective use of his chief of staff, Daniel Butterfield, in coordinating the two wings of his army while Hooker went to the front. However, the experiment failed because the telegraph broke down and Butterfield became swamped.
He was, in any case, much disliked and inspired confidence in no one save
Hooker himself.
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Grant remained fresh by delegating urgent—but not operational—duties to his staff, headed by his family lawyer, John A. Rawlins. Because of their specialist knowledge, Grant always invited the most frank and cordial interchange of views, and never failed to listen particularly to the more prominent members of his staff.”
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Rawlins was forthright, impetuous and articulate. He tended to complement Grant, but lacked formal military training he was certainly no Gneisenau, Blucher’s brilliant chief of staff in 1813–14. His real significance was political. Rawlins dealt skillfully with politicians and journalists. These included Charles A. Dana, the Assistant
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Secretary of War, and Sylvanus Cadwallader of the Chicago Tribune, both of whom became powerful allies of Grant. Rawlins also served as a liaison with
Grant’s political mentor, Congressman Elihu B. Washburne, who had the ear of the President. Grant did not meet Lincoln until 1864. Rawlins also claimed that he served as a kind of moral guardian, protecting Grant from the evils of drink. The value of this function was probably exaggerated.
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Rawlins was not a chief of staff in the Prussian sense of enjoying real operational control. Sometimes Rawlins presented the staff view, which
Grant often ignored. Rawlins, in short, had a limited role to play. One of
Grant’s finest skills was as a writer. During the Vicksburg campaign, Grant’s span of command grew enormously and he could not travel with his corps because they were so spread out. So he stayed behind the front line, going forward (like Lee) only when necessary, which increased the morale effect of such appearances.
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The separation of the commander from the battle required that he supply precise written orders. Grant wrote fluently in lucid, unvarnished prose—his meaning was never in doubt. Grant was thus a commander, and he increasingly fulfilled Americans expectations of what a commander should do. By the end of 1863 Grant had also forged a strong partnership with Sherman, based on close friendship. Yet it is indicative of how the Civil War system of command was based on personality rather than staff networks that some of Grant’s critics thought his limited use of Rawlins indicated that he was in thrall to his staff.

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