Is Having Pets Morally Permissible?

Animal Rights Without Liberation Applied Ethics and Human Obligations (New York Columbia University
Press, 2012), pp. 128–154; S. Donaldson & W. Kymlicka, Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 82–86.
46 See, for example, S. Donaldson & W. Kymlicka, Domesticated animals within animal rights theory in
Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights (New York Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 73–100.
47 See, for example, R. Macklin, Dignity is a useless concept, British Medical Journal 327,7429 (2003):
1419–1420; R. Ashcroft, Making sense of dignity, Journal of Medical Ethics 31,11 (2005): 679–682; S.
Killmister, Dignity Not such a useless concept, Journal of Medical Ethics, 36,3 (2010): 160–164.
48 Clare Palmer makes a similar argument (Palmer op. cit, pp. 127–128). She argues that there is something morally amiss about an individual who is willing to create such dependent and, thus, vulnerable beings, even if that individual ensures that all of their needs and desires are satisfied. Unfortunately, she does not develop the argument I would like to thank David Benatar for reading countless drafts of this paper and for helping me to develop my ideas. I would also like to thank David DeGrazia and two anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments on previous drafts Society for Applied Philosophy, Is Having Pets Morally Permissible?
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