Appendix I Letter from Senator Cardin

Appendix I Letter from Senator Cardin
to European Ambassadors
The following letter requesting information on the Russian government’s malign influence operations was sent to more than 40 ambassadors in Washington, DC. who represent various European countries. Responses to this letter helped to inform the findings of this report.
June 13, 2017
D
EAR
A
MBASSADOR
, The US. intelligence community has assessed that the Russian government engaged in an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the US. presidential election, including sponsoring and exploiting cyber intrusions and creating and spreading disinformation. As you know, there are several investigations underway to determine the scope and impact of this interference in our democratic process. However, the Russian government’s recent actions were not the first time it has sought to interfere in the elections of other states. Over many years, the Russian government has developed, refined, and deployed its toolkit for malign influence in Europe and elsewhere. We believe that these efforts, which seek to erode citizens confidence in the credibility of democratic institutions, pose a grave threat to the national security interests of the United States and our allies and partners around the world. The United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee minority staff, as part of our oversight responsibilities, is conducting a study of the Russian government’s malign influence operations throughout Europe and other key countries around the world. To better understand the scope of this threat, we respectfully request any relevant information from your government. Specifically, we are interested in information related to any of the following activities
• Acquisitions made in your state in economic sectors such as energy, finance, infrastructure, media, and real estate by individuals or entities controlled, financed or affiliated with the Russian government, and who are known to or alleged to have engaged in corrupt practices.
• Dissemination of disinformation with the intent to influence and confuse the public debate on issues of national importance in your state, including attempts to libel or compromise leading political figures, civil society activists, and others who the Kremlin may have deemed a threat to its interests, by individ-
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200 uals or entities controlled, financed or affiliated with the Russian government.
• Expansion of media organizations into your state’s media markets, including TV, radio, and the internet by individuals or entities controlled, financed or affiliated with the Russian government Funding, organizational assistance, or other support of any political parties, civil society groups, or other nongovernmental organizations in your state by individuals or entities controlled, financed or affiliated with the Russian government.
• Attempts to infiltrate the computer systems of the government, political parties, civil society groups, nongovernmental organizations, or private enterprises in your state by individuals or entities controlled, financed or affiliated with the Russian government, especially with the intent to steal and disseminate information to influence public debate.
• Any other information that maybe relevant or helpful to our study. Finally, we are also interested in learning about any countermeasures that your country has taken to prevent or respond to these malign influence activities. We greatly appreciate your assistance in gathering this information, which will help inform our study and shape our recommendations fora strong, coordinated response with our allies and partners. Sincerely,
B
ENJAMIN
L. CARDIN,
Ranking Member.
Æ
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