Table of contents exchange of letters with the minister executive summary



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Report of the COI into the Cyber Attack on SingHealth 10 Jan 2019

COI Report – Part VII
Page 357 of 425

administrators, developers and support team should not be able to view actual patient data. Currently, IHiS staff such as database administrators are able to access medical records. The only control is that any access by such personnel is logged for audit purposes. This is insufficient, because it does not stop access, and by definition, the logs would only be useful to show that access had already taken place.
1033. Administrators should have only the bare minimum privileges they need to do their job, and only during periods while they need access. The policy should adopt best practices for database security a) Unused accounts must be deleted. b) Shared accounts should be prohibited – While administrators may find sharing passwords convenient, doing so makes proper database security and accountability almost impossible. c) Grant privileges to administrators, developers and support team only to the extent needed (read only vs insert/delete records, for exampled) Access by administrators, developers and support team must be controlled/restricted to only the tables to which they need access. e) A system for managing privileged accounts should be in place to provide authorised users with a temporary password with the privileges they require each time they need to access a database.
44.1.3
Logging policy and audit trails
1034. The EMR system must document and keep up-to-date logs and maintain an audit trail of authorised access to the system by users. This means it must record how medical records are accessed, by whom, what information was accessed, and when. That way, security personnel can quickly investigate if they suspect an insider was involved in a data breach. As shown in the Cyber Attack,



COI Report – Part VII
Page 358 of 425

an external actor can also obtain credentials and masquerade as an authorised insider. Logging of access to the EMR from the front-end client can also therefore be essential to investigating unauthorised access by external attackers.
1035. This can be accomplished through the use of audit trails which allow organisations to precisely monitor who has accessed patient information by tracking all system activity, modifications, generating timestamps for entries, listing what was viewed, for how long, and by whom. Alerts can then beset to flag unusual activity.
1036. Although it appears that IHiS did have some policy for logging access, this was not reduced to writing. Audit trails were in place for access to the SCM medical records, and for sensitive records in particular. IHiS should rationalise which systems are subject to audit trails and reduce the policy to writing, so that it is clear and any gaps in coverage can be identified. Further, the policy should also detail what logs are kept, and how long they are kept.
44.1.4
Rate limiting
1037. Rate limiting refers to controlling the number of medical records that can be accessed by a user atone time. It appears that IHiS did have some sort of rate limiting policy in place, but it appears not to have been documented. Dr Chong testified that, when the SCM was initially procured, it was decided that if more than a certain set number of records were accessed at the same time, an alert would be sent to the IHiS security team, and the Cluster IT and Operations teams.
1038. Again, the existing policy should be reduced into writing, so that there is clarity about its requirements and scope. Any gaps can then be identified and addressed.




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