Petroleum Development Oman L. L. C. Document Title: Specification for hse cases
Download 1.14 Mb.
|
- Navigate this page:
- 5.1Purpose
- 5.2General Definitions
- 5.4Deviation from Standard
5IntroductionAn HSE Case provides a documented demonstration that risk reduction philosophies and measures have been developed and implemented at each phase of the Opportunity Realisation Process (ORP) to ensure that the risks are tolerable and as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) through the systematic application of the Hazards and Effects Management Process (HEMP) as set out in the PDO HSE Management System (HSE-MS). This document should be read in conjunction with the guideline Applying Process Safety in Projects GU-648 [4]. 5.1PurposeThis purpose of this specification is to establish minimum requirements for the content of HSE Cases and it shall be used for the development of HSE Input to Concept Select Reports, Design HSE Cases and Operations HSE Cases. This specification SHALL [PS] be used for demonstration of the following requirements of the Process Safety Manual in the Shell HSSE & SP Control Framework [Ref. 7]:
This specification contains information on the contents of each type of HSE Case and gives guidance and examples of information to be contained in specific sections. 5.2General DefinitionsThe capitalised term SHALL [PS] indicates a process safety requirement. The lower case word shall indicates a requirement. The word should indicates a recommendation.
5.3Review and Improvement (SP 2062)Responsibility for the upkeep of this Specification shall be with the CFDH Technical Safety Engineering (Owner of this Specification). Changes to this document shall only be authorised and approved by the Owner. Any user of this document who encounters a mistake or confusing entry is requested to immediately notify the Document Custodian using the form provided in CP 122 Health, Safety and Environment Management System [Ref. 1]. This document shall be reviewed as necessary by the Owner, but not less than every two years.
6WHEN ARE HSE CASES REQUIRED?HSE Cases are mandatory for all PDO operated (owned, leased or contracted) projects/operations containing hazards rated severity five or high risk on the PDO risk assessment matrix (RAM) as per Figure 2 [Ref. 1]. Hazards to that fall into this category are referred to as Major Accident Hazards (MAH), and are typically identified during the HAZID conducted at the start of concept phase of a project. However, for smaller, less complex projects or modifications to an existing asset where an Operations HSE Case already exists, it may be suitable to undertake a design review in place of a Design HSE Case and then update the existing Operations HSE Case. For projects that fall into Category C as per Figure 2 overleaf, both qualitative (bow-tie analysis) and quantitative analysis (QRA) are required to determine the level of risk and to demonstrate that risks are reduced to tolerable and ALARP, thus a Design and Operations HSE Case must be compiled. Guidance and confirmation shall be sought from MSE/4 on an individual project basis. 
Figure 2 : PDO Risk Assessment Matrix Figure 2 shows the industry guidelines for a framework for risk related decision support by Oil and Gas UK in 1997 (formerly the UK Offshore Operations Association, UKOOA). Once a new project has been assessed against the risk assessment matrix in Figure 2 and found to contain level 5 or high risk hazards, it shall be categorised as per the chart in Figure 2 . 
Figure 2 : Framework for risk related decision support in PDO To use the Framework, first relate the decision being considered to the decision context characteristics on the right hand side of the Framework. Establish a horizontal line across the Framework at the point that best fits the nature of the decision. The segments of this horizontal line define the relative weight that should be given to the different decision making approaches in the ALARP determination. The descriptors on the lefthand side of the diagram describe the type and extent of consultation that is needed for the selected decision context and type. Type B and C decisions shall be taken at higher levels within an organisation than Type A decisions. Type A decisions are those involving well-understood hazards and proven solutions. The lessons learned from past years have been incorporated into authoritative Good Practice. Reference to the relevant Good Practice, supported by expert judgment, is sufficient to define the barriers needed to reduce the risks to both tolerable and ALARP. Type B decisions are those involving less well-understood hazards. Good Practice has to be supplemented by more detailed analytical methods such as quantified risk assessment (QRA) particularly to address the uncertainties of novel aspects of design. However, risk-based analysis cannot be the only approach, as illustrated by the fact that it forms no more than 40% of a horizontal line through the Type B band. Type C decisions are those involving hazards that may create societal concerns. The more technological factors in the ALARP determination need to be “conditioned”, or viewed in the context of how the situation will be seen by stakeholders. The A, B, C groupings are not intended to split the framework into three discrete sections, but should be used to indicate a continuum of decision context types from a strongly Type A (technology based) at one extreme to a strongly Type C (judgment based) at the other extreme. A range of decision-making approaches will contribute, especially to Type B and C decisions. The background to the Framework is described in [4]. Directory: hsems -> Documents -> Specifications Specifications -> Health, safety and environment specification Download 1.14 Mb. Share with your friends:
|