Planet Debate 2011 September/October l-d release Animal Rights
AT: “Public Opposes Extension of Rights to Apes”
Download 1.43 Mb.
|
- Navigate this page:
- AT: “Extension of Rights Meaningless- Courts Won’t Enforce Them”
AT: “Public Opposes Extension of Rights to Apes”CAN’T PREDICT PRECISELY WHAT THE IMPLICATIONS ARE OF INCLUDING APES IN THE MORAL COMMUNITY—RIGHTS WILL CONTINUALLY EVOLVE Dale Jamieson, Professor of philosophy, University of Colorado @ Boulder, 1994, The Great Ape Project: equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 225 But having said this, it is true that it is very unclear exactly what recognizing the moral equality of great apes would man. Clearly it would end our use of chimpanzees in medical research, and our destruction of areas in which mountain gorillas live, but what other changes would it bring? We can benefit here from reflecting on the American experience of social change. Once slaves were emancipated and recognized as citizens, it remained unclear what exactly their rights and protections were. For more than a century various court decisions and legislative acts have continued to spell them out. This is an ongoing process, one that cannot entirely be envisaged in advance. If we are to change social practices that cannot be defended, then we must accept the unavoidable uncertainty that follows.
Steven M. Wise, Animal rights attorney and professor Vermont Law School, 2002, Drawing the Line: science and the case for animal rights, p. 32 A fair and rational alternative exists and it is this: most moral and political philosophers, and just about every common-law judge, recognize that less complex autonomies exist and that a being can be autonomous if she has preferences and the ability to act to satisfy them. Or if she can cope with changed circumstances. Or if she can make choices, even if she can’t evaluate their merits very well. Or if she has desires and beliefs and can make at least some sound and appropriate inferences from them. In Rattling the Cage, I called these lesser autonomies “realistic.” I now think “practical” better describes them. “Practical autonomy” is not just what most humans have but what most judges think is sufficient for basic liberty rights, and it boils down to this: a being has practical autonomy and is entitled to personhood and basic liberty rights if she:
Consciousness, not necessarily self-conscious, and sentience are implicit in practical autonomy. POLITICALLY BEST TO START WITH APES AND THEN MOVE TO OTHER ANIMALS Steve F. Sapontzis, Professor of philosophy, California State University, 1994, The Great Ape Project: equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 276 None the less, from the perspective of liberation moral practice it may be appropriate and even politically astute to emphasize the human-like characteristics of nonhuman great apes and to seek the moral and legal protection of their interests as persons before seeking such protection of interests for all feeling animals.
Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1996, Animal Rights: the changing debate, ed. Robert Garner, p. 58 An incremental approach to animal rights is also politically acceptable because it does not threaten the complete and immediate elimination of the property status of animals. This is, of course, not to say that incremental abolition will be welcomed. It will certainly be resisted by animal exploiters, who, by the way, just as vehemently fight the most moderate of animal welfare measures. One need only read the legislative history of the federal Animal Welfare Act and its various amendments to see how the biomedical establishment fought that law at every stage despite the generally accepted view that the Act has done little, if anything, to benefit animals. Nevertheless, the level of social concern about animals has not been higher in recent years, and this concern can be harnessed effectively to support such measures as prohibitions on particular experiments or procedures, prohibitions on particular practices used in animal agriculture, and prohibitions on the use of animals for entertainment. AT: “Extension of Rights Meaningless- Courts Won’t Enforce Them”EVEN IF APES “LOSE” THEIR JUDICIAL HEARING, THE FACT THAT THEY GET ONE IS A GREAT VICTORY Bernard E. Rollin, professor of philosophy, Colorado State University, 1994, The Great Ape Project: equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 218 Whatever the outcome of such a trial, the animals would of necessity win. If the trial were lost, the issues would still have been powerfully and unforgettably aired, and the failure of our current law and morality to protect these innocent creatures forcefully and indelibly imprinted in the public mind. Indeed, even if the case never came to trial, the same result would be accomplished by the vast—and doubtless sympathetic—publicity which a skillful attempt orchestrated by first-rate legal, philosophical and scienitific minds would undoubtedly generate. And, in the end, the new ethic we discussed earlier would be articulated and enlivened, to the benefit of all animals, and most assuredly to the benefit of the great apes, whose shameful treatment at human hands occasioned the need for the trial. LIMITING RIGHTS FOR GREAT APES TO BASIC LIBERTIES SUCH AS FREEDOM FROM ARBITRARY DETENTION ELIMINATES PROBLEMS OF FINDING ADEQUATE GUARDIANS TO REPRESENT THEIR INTERESTS Gary L. Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1994, The Great Ape Project: equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 255 One possible answer to this difficulty may be found by carefully describing the right accorded to nonhuman great apes, thereby limiting the range of discretion that would need to be exercised. As the range of discretion is limited, the identity of the guardian becomes less important. That is, in the case of human ”wards”, legal issues generally concern what is in the “best interests” of the ward. These issues are often very complex because it is not always clear what is in the “best interests” of a human. For example, if a guardian has to determine whether to place the minor ward in a different school, or the mentally disabled ward in a different institution, it may not be clear, even after much investigation, what is in the “best interest” of the child or the mentally disabled person. If however, we conscientiously provide to great apes the rights articulated in the Declaration—the right to life, liberty and freedom from torture—then, in most instances, we will know what is in the ‘best interests’ of great apes. For example, if we accept that there can be no unwarranted interference with the liberty of any great ape, we can longer tolerate the incarceration of these animals at research laboratories. Accordingly, the only role of the guardian would be to seek the immediate release of the great ape unjustifiably restrained or imprisoned. Of course, it may be necessary to resocialize the non-human under such circumstances, but there is far less disagreement about the methods of resocialization than there is about whether these animals may be incarcerated at all. FORMAL APPLICATION OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE CAN OVERCOME BIAS OF JUDGES Steven M. Wise, Animal rights attorney and professor Vermont Law School, 2002, Drawing the Line: science and the case for animal rights, p. 42-3 Such conundrums are typically solved by invoking the “Rule of Necessity,” which states that if all judges are disqualified from deciding a case, none are. But that does not give judges license to indulge their biases. To the contrary. Formal use of the precautionary principle is necessary just to counteract judicial bias. Judges ruling from necessity must, to rule as fairly as they can, exert every ounce of moral strength, every particle of objectivity they possess, always keeping in mind that they are prone to decide in their own favor and that long-standing inequities have, in law professor Laurence Tribe’s words, “survived this long because they have become so ingrained in our modes of thought; the US Supreme Court recognized a century ago that “habitual” discriminations are the hardest to eradicate.”
Directory: file -> view view -> Western Europe after wwii view -> Author study: paul fleischman view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy view -> Table of Contents Lesson # view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad Download 1.43 Mb. Share with your friends:
|