Planet Debate 2011 September/October l-d release Animal Rights
AT: “Extension of Rights to Apes Creates Practical Difficulties”
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AT: “Extension of Rights to Apes Creates Practical Difficulties”PERSONHOOD OF GREAT APES DEMANDS SOME PROTECTIONS – DIFFERENCE IN MORAL REASONING JUSTIFIES LIMITED LIBERTY RESTRICTIONS TO PROTECT THEM AND OTHERS Robert W. Mitchell, Professor of psychology, Eastern Kentucky University, 1994, The Great Ape Project: equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 244 Clearly, the fact that great apes are not fully persons creates difficulties in our treatment of them: although it is easy and reasonable to grant the right to life and protection from torture to these apes, the right to liberty is more ethically cumbersome. Human beings murder other human beings, and can be held accountable because they have chosen to violate the liberty of another—a moral transgression. Because apes have no rules against murder, any curtailing of their liberty as a result of their murdering another—or even to prevent a potential murder of another—creates moral difficulties if apes have the status of persons without the responsibilities. We can hold a person responsible for his or her actions because he or she can recognize the (legal and moral) consequences of these actions and give reasons for the goodness of these actions. Because apes are not persons in this full sense of the term, they cannot be held accountable because they cannot understand morality and give reasons for their actions. Thus, some restrictions upon their liberty with the effect of avoiding their death or curtailing murder of them can be morally defensible because we humans value our own and their lives. (Such curtailment is also practices, of course, toward children and some intellectually disabled, immoral or amoral older human beings). Although great apes are not persons in the full sense of the term, they have psychological capacities which make them ends-in-themselves deserving of our protection. EXTENSION OF RIGHT TO NOT BE ARBITRARILY DETAINED DOES NOT NECESSITATE IMPOSITION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY ON GREAT APES Gary L. Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1994, The Great Ape Project: equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 256 It is clear, however, that the Declaration would prohibit resurrecting formal criminal liability for any nonhuman (great ape or rat). However intelligent chimpanzees, gorillas, and orang-utans are, there is no evidence that they possess the ability to commit crimes, and in this sense, they are to be treated as children or mental incompetents. Such treatment is consistent with the use of the guardianship model to facilitate the incorporation into the legal system of rights for nonhuman great apes. We have guardians who represent the interests of wards, because the wards are deemed, for whatever reason, to be incapable of making responsible choices for themselves. So too, use of the guardian model for nonhuman great apes recognizes that these nonhumans lack certain capacities, and one such capacity is the ability to comprehend and use legal rules. It would seem most unjust and unsound to recognize these incapacities for purposes of appointment of a guardian, and then to permit criminal liability to be imposed. AT: “No Place to Send Liberated Apes”GRASP AND OTHER GROUPS WORKING TO ESTABLISH SANCTUARIES FOR LIBERATED APES GRASP, 2002, [Great Ape Standing & Personhood], Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.personhood.org/main/faq.html We place a strong emphasis on discussion with the sanctuary community about the principles of personhood, because (a) one cannot free the apes unless one can think of a place for those at the beginning, already confined, to safely live their lives in relative peace and calm; and (b) one cannot ensure absolutely that they live in relative peace and calm, without betrayal, unless their legal personhood is recognized. Of course, that involves changing the way people think, and that can take generations. CAPTIVES COULD BE SET FREE OR CARED FOR IN APPROPRIATE SANCTUARIES Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 139 Non-“domesticated” captives would be set free if they could thrive without human assistance (after any necessary rehabilitation) and if appropriate habitat existed. If not, they would be permanently cared for at sanctuaries. As much as possible, these sanctuaries would provide natural, fulfilling environments CONFINEMENT CAN BE JUTIFIED IN NARROW CASES TO PROTECT THE INDIVIDUAL ANIMAL’S WELFARE Tom Regan, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, North Carolina State University, 2003, The Animal Ethics Reader, eds. Armstrong & Botzler, p. 455-6 Now, one can imagine circumstances in which such captivity might be defensible. For example, if the life of a wild animal could be saved only by temporarily removing the animal from the theatre of human predation, and if, after this threat had abated, the animals was reintroduced into the wild, then this temporary confinement arguably is not disrespectful and thus might be justified. Perhaps there are other circumstances in which a wild animal’s liberty could be limited temporarily, for that animal’s own good. Obviously, however, there will be comparatively few such cases, and no less obviously, those cases that satisfy the requirements of the rights view are significantly different from the vast majority of cases in which wild animals are today confined in zoos, for these animals are confined and exhibited not because temporary captivity is in their best interests but because their captivity serves some purpose useful to others. As such, the rights view must take a very dim view of zoos, both as we know them now and as they are likely to be in the future. In answer to our central question—Are zoos morally defensible?—the rights view’s answer, not surprisingly, is No, they are not. DETENTION OF GREAT APES MAY BE JUSTIFIED IF RELEASE POSES A DANGER TO THE APE OR HUMAN SAFETY Gary L. Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1994, The Great Ape Project: equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 256 The Declaration envisages circumstances where a great ape can be deprived of liberty for committing a crime. If this reference to criminal culpability is intended to apply to humans, and not to chimpanzees, gorillas and orang-utans, then I see no difficulty with the notion. Alternatively, if apes may be detained or incarcerated if they pose a threat to the community, then that notion may also be acceptable under at least some circumstances. For example, if, for whatever reason, a gorilla presently imprisoned in a zoo cannot be returned to the wild, some form of detention may be justified for the safety of both the gorilla and the community.
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