Animal Rights Focus Undermines Environmental Movements

Animal Rights Focus Undermines Environmental Movements

Bryan G. Norton, professor of philosophy, science and technology, School of Public Policy, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2003, Searching for Sustainability: interdisciplinary essays in the philosophy of conservation biology, p. 468-9

While references to rights of wild species are appealing and may be rhetorically useful as propaganda, most philosophers now agree that appeals to rights of nonhuman species do not provide a coherent and adequate basis for protecting biological diversity. Many philosophers have therefore concluded that when environmentalists speak of rights, they really mean that wild species have intrinsic value in some broader sense, a sense that does not require that we attribute rights to them. What is important, on this view, is that wild species are valued for themselves, and not as mere instruments for the fulfillment of human needs and desires. This view is attractive in many ways, but it is extremely difficult to explain clearly. Does it mean that other species had value even before any conscious valuers emerged on the evolutionary scene? Could species be valued by no valuers?

Or does this view that species have intrinsic value mean only that all conscious valuers should be able to perceive it. But what if some people, such as the little girl and her family, fail to see it? Do we simply accuse them, metaphorically, of moral blindness? Or can we somehow explain to them what this intrinsic value is and why they should perceive it?

My point in asking all of these questions is not to prove that intrinsic value in other species does not exist. It may. I hope that someday we will be able to show that it does. In asking these questions, and emphasizing their difficulty, I am trying to refocus attention on a related but importantly different question: Can appeals to intrinsic value in nonhuman species be made with sufficient clarity and persuasiveness to effect new policies adequate to protect biological diversity before it is too late? With some experts projecting that a fourth of all species could be lost in the next two decades, I fear not. As a philosopher, I can perhaps say in modesty what would appear to be carping criticism if said by someone else: philosophers seldom resolve big issues quickly. We are still, for example, struggling with a number of questions posed by Socrates. It seems unlikely that the issue of whether wild species have intrinsic value will be decided before the question of saving wild nature has become moot. There are, then two separate debates about environmental values. One debate is intellectual, the other is strategic. The first debate concerns the correct moral stance toward nature. The second debate concerns which moral stance, or rationale, is likely to be effective in saving wild species and natural ecosystems.
GROUNDING CONSERVATION ARGUMENTS IN INTRINSIC VALUE OF INDIVIDUAL ANIMALS INEFFECTIVE

Steve Sanderson, Wildlife Conservation Society, 2001, Conservation of Exploited Species, eds. Reynolds, Mace, Redford & Robinson, p. 478

Essential to conservation’s ability to counter such campaigns, or their analogues (pitting recreational and commercial near-shore fishers against each other at the expense of local small-scale fishers; large-scale agriculture against forest preservation in the tropics, with local settlers buffeted by both) is the willingness to form coalitions with local contingents who may not be conservationists per se. These partners may be near-coast shrimpers in Louisiana, or wildlife “poachers” from traditional Florida. They may even extend to agriculturalists and hunters, as has been the case with migratory birds. To be associated with extreme organizations advocating the complete sanctity of all animal life is to fly in the face of human history and to give up far more in gains than could possibly result in productive alliance.

Animal Rights Focus Undermines Environmental Movements

Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law, meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 83-4

Gary Francione, Professor of Law at Rutgers . “An Interview with Professor Gary L. Francione on the State”. Friends of Animals 2002 http://www.friendsofanimals.org/programs/animal-rights/interview-with-gary-francione.html

I have no illusions about the usefulness of the legal system. Veterinary malpractice cases, cruelty cases, and cases brought under the Animal Welfare Act are pretty much meaningless in terms of reducing suffering, and have absolutely no effect on the property status of animals. But they have created job security for lawyers. Anna Charlton, who has taught the animal rights law course with me at Rutgers University for over a decade, often points out that the legal system will never respond differently to animal issues unless and until there is a significant shift in prevailing social consensus about animal exploitation. For the most part, the law reflects social attitudes and does not form them. This is particularly true when the behavior in question is deeply embedded in the cultural fabric, as our exploitation of animals undoubtedly is. As long as most people think that it’s fine to eat animals, use them in experiments, or use them for entertainment purposes, the law is not likely to be a particularly useful tool to help animals. If, for example, Congress or a state legislature abolished factory farming, that would drive the cost of meat up and there would be a social revolt! There are some lawyers, such as those involved with the Animal Legal Defense Fund, who promote the notion that law will be at the forefront of social change for animals. But these people make a living from practicing law and they are not likely to say otherwise, are they?

Nonhumans will continue to be exploited until there is a revolution of the human spirit, and that will not happen without visionaries trying to change the paradigm that has become accustomed to and tolerant of patriarchal violence. At this moment, the job of the animal rights lawyer is not to be the primary force for change within the system. As lawyers, we are part of the system that exists to protect property interests. William Kunstler, although the most prominent civil rights lawyer of the 20th century, nevertheless once said to me that I should never think that the lawyer is the “star” of the show. Our job as lawyers is to keep social activists out of harm’s way. In my view, a useful “animal rights” lawyer is a criminal lawyer one day, helping activists who are charged with civil disobedience; an administrative lawyer the next day, helping activists obtain permits for demonstrations; and a constitutional lawyer the next day, helping students who do not want to vivisect as part of their course work, or helping prisoners who want vegan food. But the lawyer always serves and protects the activist. It is the activist who helps to change the paradigm. Without committed clients who reflect a growing social consensus, lawyers are useless.