Political Parties, Legislatures, and the Organizational Foundations of Representation in America
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Yoder, Janice D. 1991. “Rethinking Tokenism: Looking Beyond Numbers.” Gender & Society 5: 178-193. 1 Individual political parties within legislatures may be composed of more women than men members. For example, women represent the majority in several political parties in American state legislatures from 2005 to 2009: California 2005: 52% [Democratic majority-Senate]; Colorado 2008: 56.4% [Democratic majority-House]; Colorado 2009, 52.4% [Democratic majority-Senate]; New Hampshire 2007-2009: 69.2%, 69.2%, and 78.7% [Democratic majority-Senate]; Washington 2005-2006: 57.7% & 57.7% [Democratic majority-Senate]. 2 See Wolbrecht (2000: Chapter 2) for a complete explanation of the evolution of both the Republican and Democratic party platforms on gender-related issues. 3 The issue of coordination among women within a party caucus is further explored later in Chapter 5 of this volume. 4 Although some scholars argue that Energy and Commerce or other substantive committees may be as important as these “top three,” our consideration here is limited to these three standard ‘power committees’ because one can be sure they are universally valued throughout the time period under consideration, whereas other committees may be differentially valued at different times by different legislators. 5 This is defined as the number of women with committee leadership positions divided over the total number of women in the party caucus. 6 Certainly, decisions about who receives powerful positions are complicated matters of institutional rules that take into account variables such as seniority and geography. Differences, then, may not be attributable to conscious efforts by men to deny such positions to their women copartisans. On the other hand, if these denials occur nonetheless, for either unconscious or institutional reasons, this fact is relevant to the descriptive-substantive link. 7 About 20 percent of House members control leadership PACs in the period under consideration. Although there is no evidence that a legislator’s decision to form a leadership PAC is related to his or her propensity to treat women well, one must acknowledge that if these two factors are related, the data may be a biased sample of Congressional “treaters”. Even if this is so, however, the data is based on the preferences of those legislators who either have, or have indicated that they would like, positions of leadership. Therefore the data includes those legislators who play the strongest role both in determining the fates of legislators and in deciding which issues are placed on the party’s agenda. 8 This measure of ideological preference divergence is based on House floor votes, which disproportionately reflect issues that are important to the party (Cox and McCubbins 2007). Therefore, ideological agreement on issues pertaining to women is unlikely to be included or controlled for in this variable. But agreement on women’s issues is the core of the substantive representation argument, so this ideological agreement ought not to be accounted for in these control variables. Rather, it rightly belongs as part of the gender dummies that measure gender-based colleague valuations. 9 Modifying Wooldridge’s analytical treatment (2002: 518-519) for purposes of our statistical modeling enterprise, the analysis assumes a generic utility function given as: where q is merely assumed to be generic for notational simplicity purposes. The optimal contribution for donor i to recipient j during election cycle 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 Download 0.72 Mb. Share with your friends:
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