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RELIGION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Overall, being involved in a religious community (such as a church, mosque or synagogue) correlates with higher levels of political participation than among those without a religious involvement. Verba et al. (1995) show that religious communities provide opportunities for lay people to gain the necessary skills for political participation. This participation‐enhancing effect is especially strong for those marginalised from more formal channels of political socialisation and training, such as membership of a political party or trade union, or a career in one of the professions.


Verba and his co‐authors looked at church membership. It is reasonable to expect that many of the same effects would be found in relation to membership in minority religious communities, which often provide similar opportunities to those Verba’s research found among church members. Examples include: organising others (for example, youth groups, women’s groups, parents’ groups, duty rosters); articulating a position and arguing a case in front of others (for example, when disagreements break out among members or at times of potential organisational stress such as appointing a new religious leader); planning to achieve collectively a long term aim (for example, increased membership, a new building, founding a school); and becoming comfortable with positions of leadership. Similarly, Jamal argues that mosques promote a greater sense of belonging among Arab and Black Muslims in the US, consequently playing a significant role in political mobilisation (2005).
On the other hand, holding religious beliefs, without involvement in a religious community, does not have the same correlation and in fact, according to some studies, goes with lower‐than‐average participation (Ayers & Hofstetter 2008). Ayers and Hoffstetter explain the discrepancy by distinguishing between religious belief and religious resources. While religious behaviour can be attributed to religious belief, it also allows for the accrual of religious resources, suggesting that as believers participate within their faith they develop skill sets

transferable to political participation beyond those explicitly influenced by religious belief’ (Ayers & Hoffstetter



2008). Consequently, echoing Verba et al., Ayers and Hofstetter conclude that the development of religious resources increases participation (2008) (whereas more internal and cognitive modes of identification such as prayer or assent to religious doctrine do not have such an effect).
At the same time, being a member of a minority religious community often correlates with factors which make political participation less likely. For example, members of migrant religious communities may be more likely to have difficulties with English expression, lower incomes and more restricted educational opportunities. They may also lack social contacts and associations beyond the religious community; and these are important channels of political engagement (Klofstad 2007; Fahmy 2003). Consequently, any political skills gained within the community are at risk of remaining there. Moreover, while participation in civic organisations, including religious ones, enhances many forms of political mobilisation, LeRoux finds that faith‐based non‐profit organisations are less likely than other kinds of nonprofits to encourage clients to link with public officials or forums (2007: 418‐419). She hypothesises that this may reflect leaders’ reluctance ‘to attract negative attention to their organisation by political leaders who have the power to influence funding (2006: 419). If she is right, we can expect the effect to be still stronger among non‐Christian faithbased organisations, whose relative lack of non‐government resources and sense of being at risk of discrimination would leave them more vulnerable.
A number of US studies (Sinno 2009; cf Jacob 2006) point out that possession of resources such as above‐ average income, above‐average education and so on are not, alone, enough to produce higher levels of political participation. Some minority groups whose members have achieved such resources still do not participate on the same scale as their Anglo‐American neighbours. Sinno finds this effect strongly among educated and affluent American Muslims.
A report by the Open Society Institute in 2010 considered Muslim integration across eleven European cities, taking political participation as one of the markers of integration. It measured political participation under the headings of voting, standing for elected office, attending public meetings, attending demonstrations and signing petitions. The statistics on voting are of limited relevance to Australia, since, of the European countries studied, only Belgium shares Australia’s compulsory voting in national elections. Nevertheless, the present study is informed by the European finding that, where voting is optional, self‐identified Muslims do not elect to vote at a consistent rate. For example, in countries where foreign‐born residents were eligible to vote, Muslims born outside the host country voted at higher rates than Muslims who had lived in the country from birth. The Open Society Institute authors attributed the discrepancy to the age difference between the generations (2010: 191).
The report found little push in any of the eleven cities for specifically Muslim parties, with the exception of

Brussels; and there, the several overtly Muslim parties had failed to achieve a significant Muslim vote (OSI

2010: 193). In common with other studies, including ours, the Open Society Institute found considerable reluctance among Muslim (and other ethnic‐minority) candidates to be regarded as representing a minority community. The OSI authors quote Samia Ghali, mayor of the 8 th district of Marseilles: ‘I do not want to be determined by my origin ... let’s talk about education, remedial courses and housing rehabilitiation!’ (2010:

191)


Barretto and Dana (2008) argue that political participation may be greater among devout Muslims than among their less‐devout co‐religionists. This, they argue, is because of devout Muslims’ greater knowledge and practice of religious doctrine, which generally encourages civic participation (on this issue, see also Hopkins and KahaniHopkins 2004). Mandaville (2003) concludes that the current generations of young western Muslims are engaging constructively with the societies in which they live and participating in public life. Edmunds (2006) presents a similar argument, suggesting that rather than radicalisation, young, professional Muslims are setting a new political agenda’.

Different forms of political participation do not necessarily follow one another. For example, while Fieldhouse and Cutts (2008) found British Muslim voter registration rates comparable to those of the general population, this translated into Muslim representation in the House of Commons well below population parity (and only marginally higher in the unelected House of Lords) (Sinno 2009: 77). Fieldhouse and Cutts did, however, find that ‘Muslim registration is … closely connected to the size of the local Muslim population, with both registration and turnout higher in areas with a high Muslim population. They concluded: ‘For academics, the challenge is to redress the emphasis on the negative impacts of segregation of ghettoisation” and also to consider the positive aspects of community cohesion generated by spatial concentration, and the potential negative aspects of dispersion including hidden exclusion”’ (2008: 347).





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