Reconsideration packet for the army board of corrections of military records captain lawrence m. Liss contents include evidence, new points of consideration



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MEDAL OF HONOR

RECONSIDERATION PACKET

FOR THE ARMY BOARD OF CORRECTIONS OF MILITARY RECORDS

CAPTAIN LAWRENCE M. LISS

CONTENTS INCLUDE EVIDENCE, NEW POINTS OF CONSIDERATION AND CLARIFICATION FROM THE PREVIOUS REVIEW COMPLETED BY THE ARMY AWARDS BRANCH. ENDING IN A DECLINATION IN 2011

AS FAILING TO:

MEET THE CRITERIA OF THE MEDAL OF HONOR”



THIS SUBMISSION ADDRESSES THE UNIQUE INTREPEDITY ENCOUNTERED AT CAU SONG BE, VIETNAM

(LATER RENAMED CHI LINH)

IT FURTHER BRINGS TO LIGHT THE ADDED HEROIC ACTIONS TAKEN

BY

CPT. LAWRENCE M. LISS

ON 14 MAY 1967

THE ORIGINAL AWARD WAS

THE DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS

The National geographic Film Documentary can be seen at

www.larryliss.com

Research was started in 2008 and compiled by ILT (Ret) Arthur E. Liss

360-907-7329

Credit for CPT Liss’ biography goes to Jack Swickard http://swickardworld.blogspot.com

His blog “The Forgotten Mission”

INJUSTICE

Question Five of DD 149:



The following are being submitted as injustices in this case which took place at the time of the original award conferral in 1967 then during the upgrade review process and up to the present preparation of the DD 149.

  1. The injustice of: An admission of adverse command influence by the II Field Force Flight Detachment S-3, CPT John Green representing the Chain of Command.



  1. The injustice of: The limit on time waiver is being addressed by the attached document referring to the start on 14 April 2007 till the last on 12 April 2013…six years.



  1. The injustice of: Letters were written and being ignored in attempts to clarify “why and specifically how CPT Liss did not meet the criteria for the Medal of Honor”.



  1. The injustice of: Disallowing the reconsideration of the use of the Main Rotors by LTC Stewart Stephenson on Sept 2, 2009 in his letter to Congressman Joe Sestak failed to allow consideration of the procedure as being impossible and rare if ever used before.



  1. The injustice: By failing to consider General Weyand’s request in 2008/2009 for an upgrade. A new affidavit is submitted by John Lovell aide to Congressman Pearce discussing the events surrounding the decision by General Weyand to address the issues so many years later (See section )



  1. The injustice of: Battle field conditions added to the hazards and risk associated with flying an unarmed aircraft and succeeding over five complete landings and extractions.

The National Geographic Documentary Helicopter Wars-Vietnam Firefight submitted as evidence. Here we redirect it back to the request for that added information that day.



  1. Clarification of the Act of Uncommon Valor demonstrated by CPT Liss and sworn to by WO Tom Baca by exiting the aircraft defending the troops.

8. Clarification of the Chain of Command requests.

Injustice Points:

1. Adverse command influence at the time of the action.

  1. This case is about an “injustice” that took place after the mission participants returned done admittedly by a young twenty-three year old CPT and Army Rotary aviator the S-3 of II Field Force HQ’s Flight detachment. CPT John Green who in his own protective way (see attached e-mails) gave his friend and fellow aviator WO Tom Baca who had 10 days in country, an easy mission did assign he and CPT Liss on his day off to an unarmed VIP helicopter while on a Sunday to be his co-pilot. I have included the signed page from CPT Liss flight log showing the action the day of 14 May 1967

  2. CPT Green states he was remiss in conferring with the pilots after the mission due to a misunderstanding. That misunderstanding was that CPT Liss who volunteered to fill in as the Co-pilot took command of the aircraft from WO Tom Baca during the highly dangerous rescue mission. Further conversations with the pilots, crew or the Special Forces soldiers were not conducted.

  3. The history of that action was recorded in the DFC citations. It was not known that he was angered by an assumption that CPT Liss as the ranking officer on board had assumed control of the aircraft during the heat of combat. This misassumption has placed doubts on the accuracy of the citation. (See tab referring to some of the original points of “new and substantial” submitted in 2009).


2. The limit on time waiver

On April 13, 2007 an inquiry began out of the New Mexico office of Congressman Stevan Pearce to the April 12, 2013 response from Assistant Secretary of the Army Thomas Lamont. Ever since October 17, 2013 ongoing e-mails and phone calls to assit with HRC/Army Awards Branch in the preparation of the DD 149 have occurred between COL Mark Rado Deputy, The Adjutant General of the US Army US Army Human Resources Command and LTC Collen Carr, Chief Army Awards and Decoration Branch.

  • April 13, 2007…received Award Recommendations as written by Commander David F. Williams, Jr. USNR (RET).

  • May 2007 to August 2007…attempted to gather information concerning the operation and Award Citations for all concerned (per John Lovell at Congressman Pearce’s office.

  • June 2007 — David Williams submits note to New Mexico Congressman Steve Pearce, recommending aircrews of award upgrades

  • June 2007 — Pearce aide John Lovell asks for affidavits from people involved in mission

  • June 10, 2007 — Receive email note from Kenneth Dolan, Jack Swickard’s copilot on Cau Song Be mission

  • June 21, 2007 — Jack Swickard writes affidavit about mission

  • June 26, 2007 — Tom Baca writes affidavit about mission

  • July 2, 2007 — Larry Liss writes affidavit about mission

  • July 7, 2007 — Albert Croteau, Jack Swickard’s gunner on Cau Song Be mission, writes affidavit

  • Oct. 15, 2007 — James Dopp, Special Forces medic at Cau Song Be, writes affidavit

  • August 22, 2008…Letter to Major General Galen Jackman, U. S. Army, Chief of the Office of Army Legislative Affairs from Congressman Stevan Pearce concerning the letter from Commander David F. Williams, Jr. USNR (RET), who wrote of the helo crews and their conspicuous gallantry, superb airmanship and service above and beyond the call of duty while under intense fire from enemy combatants by the crewmembers, rescued more than 80 CIDG Forces from Cau Song Be Camp Detachment A 333, and with all documentation from crewmembers and recommending upgrades for all of the members present in these 10 helicopter extraction flights.

  • September 2, 2008…Letter to General Fredrick C. Weyand, U.S. Army (RET) from Congressman Stevan Pearce, New Mexico requesting that the General might possibly be the Recommender for awards upgrade for five crewmembers in the DA Form 638 which requires an Officer’s signature, who had knowledge of this action and agrees to be the Recommender.

  • September 15, 2008…John Lovell called and talked to General Weyand and CWO Howard S. Okada, Adjutant to General Frederick C. Weyand in Hawaii. We talked about all of the papers being submitted to the General for his review and a suggestion was requested that the General please submit letters as he felt appropriate to assist in the upgrade of the awards previously received by the helicopter crews under his command in Vietnam. During this call to the General, he advised that upgrades of all the awards were warranted and as soon as he received the package, he would help in the upgrade process.

  • September 16, 2008…Mailed the letter and all attachments to General Fredrick C. Weyand that we were submitting to the Army and honestly requested his advice on how to improve the submission of the material. He was additionally requested to write any letter he felt was necessary to further the cause of the eight heroic crewmembers.

  • November 10, 2008…Congressman Pearce was the recipient of a Letter from General Fred C. Weyand. The General cites the performance of Captain Lawrence M. Liss, and says that he did believe that these specific actions warranted the upgrading of an award performed an act of bravery and heroism under intense combat conditions which merits an award for valor.

  • January 2009 — James Lovell, an aide to Congressman Steve Pearce, has documents for award upgrades delivered to New Mexico Sen. Jeff Bingaman

  • Jan. 26, 2009 — Jack Swickard signs Right to Privacy Authorization Form, allowing Sen. Jeff Bingaman’s staff to research background

  • April 2, 2009 letter to Senator Bingaman from LTC Marion Salters, Chief Military Awards Branch (signed for him by LTC Stephen L. Harmon)

  • May 29, 2009 — Retired Lt. Col. Wallace Johnson, commander of Cau Song Be Special Forces Camp on May 14, 1967, writes affidavit about helicopter rescue and recommends upgrade to Medal of Honor for Tom Baca, Jack Swickard and Larry Liss; Distinguished Service Cross for Al Croteau and Robert Gibson; and Silver Star Medal for Kenneth Dolan, James Dopp, Dan Lawler (KIA) and Doug Lloyd (KIA)

  • May 29, 2009 letter from Congressman Sestak to then MG Galen Jackman Chief Legislative Liaison

  • July 10, 2009 — Retired Gen. Fred C. Weyand, former Army chief of staff and commander of U.S. military forces in Vietnam, writes letter to Maj. Gen. Galen B. Jackman, chief legislative liaison, suggesting awards previously granted to aircrew members be reviewed to determine if upgrades are warranted

  • July 24 and July 31, 2009 written by Congressman Joe Sestak to Awards Branch

  • July 24, 2009 — Frank G. Mills Sr., Pennsylvania VFW State Commander, writes letter to Pennsylvania congressional delegation, recommending Larry Liss for the Medal of Honor

  • Aug. 3, 2009 — M.A. Gedra of the National Archives writes letter to Larry Liss, informing him award case files, aside from this recommending award of the Medal of Honor, were not considered permanent records before 1969 and, therefore, are not on file

  • Aug. 9, 2010 — Art Liss compiles listing of information learned about mission since May 14, 1967, as required by Department of the Army rules for award upgrade

  • Sept. 2, 2009 letter to Senator Casey from LTC Stephenson (signed for him by LTC Stephen L. Harmon C/O Kurt Imhof

  • to Congressman Joe Sestak of Pennsylvania about Larry Liss’s award upgrade recommendation

  • Sept 2, 2009 letter to Senator Casey from LTC Stephenson (signed for him by LTC Stephen L. Harmon

  • September 17, 2009 letter from LTC Stephen Harmon Awards Branch to Senator Casey C/O Kurt Imhof

  • September 18, 2009 letter from Senator Casey to Larry

  • Big pause…………………while LTC request was being worked on.

  • February 21, 2010 Letter from LTC Stewart Stephenson to Larry answering clarification questions.

  • June 25, 2010 letter to then Defense Secretary Robert Gates by Congressman Gerlach

  • June 25, 2010 Letter from LTC Stewart Stephenson to Senator Casey C/O Teresa Dennis

  • July 7, 2010 Letter From Teresa at Senator Casey’s office to Larry

  • July 19, 2010 Letter from LTC Stewart Stephenson to Arthur Liss

  • July 22, 2010-Baca writes eye witness affidavit on Liss

  • July 22, 2010-Baca writes eye witness affidavit on Swickard

  • July 28, 2010- Liss writes eye witness affidavit on Baca

  • August 3, 2010-Swickard writes eye witness statement on Baca

  • August 3, 2010-Swickard writes eye witness statement on Liss

  • August 3, 2010-Swickard writes eye witness on Croteau

  • August 3, 2010 letter to Vice President Biden from Widener University (formally Pennsylvania Military College) President James Harris.

  • August 4, 2010-Croteau writes eye witness statement on Swickard

  • August 9, 2010-Liss writes eyewitness on Swickard

  • August 10, 2010- Final copy of “New Facts about Cau Song Be” completed

  • August 31, 2010 Dept. of Army response to June 25, 2010 letter to Sec of Defense Robert Gates

  • September 21, 2010 from Stephenson to Gerlach regarding phone call on 08.17.2010

  • September 23, 2010 John Green letter attesting to adverse command influence sent to the DOA Branch Chief

  • December 3, 2010 letter from Congressman Gerlach to LTC Stephenson

  • February 1, 2011 Letter from LTC Stewart Stephanson Awards Branch Chief to Congressman Gerlach

  • March 29, 2011 letter from Senator Toomey to COL Laura Richardson your Senate Liaison which was sent to LTC Stephenson

  • April 18, 2011 letter from LTC Stewart Stephenson to Senator Pat Toomey

  • May 11, 2011 letter from Senator Pat Toomey about the declination

  • July 27, 2011 letter from National VVA President John Rowan to Secretary of the Army McHugh forwarded back to LTC Stephenson

  • October 5, 2011 Letter from Congressman Gerlach to Secretary of the Army John McHugh

  • Jan 3, 2012 letter from Secretary of the Army Mc Hugh to Congressman Gerlach

  • May 22, 2012 Letter to Asst Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs with signatures of Pearce, Toomey and Gerlach

  • August 7, 2012 Letter from LTC Michael Reis Asst Chief Awards Branch to Congressman Gerlach

  • December 13, 2012 another letter to Asst Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs with signatures of Pearce, Toomey and Gerlach

  • April 12, 2013 Letter from Lamont to Senator Toomey

  • May 7, 2013 Letter from Jeanne Rowan AMCMR with a DD 149 attached

The year starts here

3. Letters were written and were ignored in attempts to clarify “why and specifically how CPT Liss did not meet the criteria for the Medal of Honor” and reference to a “comparison” cannot be done as pointed out by Secretary McHugh.



  1. Congressman Jim Gerlach submitted this three page narrative to the Army Awards Branch on 12.03.2010. It did not contain specific reference to how the Medal of Honor was achieved. Nowhere in the narrative did he refer to the Medal of Honor thereby not presenting the “reasons for” other than statements “about”.

  2. February 1, 2011 the letter from LTC Stephenson the Awards Branch Chief said “that the degree of action and service rendered did not meet the criteria for the proposed award.”

  3. October 5, 2011 Congressman Gerlach wrote Secretary of the Army Mc Hugh and for the first time specifically referred to the fact the criteria was meet offering the some of the following points:

  1. Flying in an unarmed helicopter

  2. Volunteered to rescue allied troops against an estimated 600-700 enemy combatants

  3. That they did something never done before using the main rotors to clear through vegetation up to 40’ creating their own LZ

  4. That General Fred Weyand the units Commanding General wrote in 2009 citing the mission calling their action “Uncommon Valor”.

  5. That 5th Special Forces CDR sited “extraordinary heroism” saving over 80 soldiers.

  6. That there was no A-1E aircraft support no gunship support nor artillery support.

  7. That the definition of the MOH as it refers to “Conspicuous Gallantry” and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while engaged against in an action against an enemy of the United States did in fact reach that level.

  8. He further said ‘While I have exchanged several letters and participated in a conference call with Army staffers, I have yet to receive a satisfactory and reasonable explanation why I have yet to receive a satisfactory and reasonable explanation on why, if CPT Liss meets the criteria established by the Army, his application for upgrading his Distinguished Flying Cross Medal to the Medal of Honor has been rejected”.

  1. January 3, 2012 (letter incorrectly stated 2011) from Secretary of the Army John Mc Hugh

provided that answer “The Board did not recommend upgrade to the Medal of Honor because it determined that CPT Liss’ package, compared to other awards packages from the same time frame, did not merit the awarding of the Medal of Honor.

  1. The only viable comparisons at the MOH level are seven. During the entire war out of 246 MOH decorations, only seven were to Army Rotary aviators. There is no comparison; each case is unique and different. The following are comparisons of each of the seven pointing out the unique aspects to each. We have provided the proposed citation for CPT Liss noting those unique qualities that were apparent during his mission.

CPT Liss in his mission shared the flight duties, & going down through tall vegetation himself, exited the air craft on two occasions firing his weapons. Something none of the other seven MOH recipients did. Clarification of miscommunications via the loss of Legislative elections in 2008/2010/2012 and staff changes

Legislative disruption slowed the process down and contributed to a lack of understanding from office holder to office holder.



  1. Congressman Stevan Pearce submitted original “upgrade” inquiry with attachments on 22 August 2008 to then Legislative Liaison MG Galen Jackman and a personal letter to General Fred Weyand on 2 Sept 2008 and 19 Nov 2008 file preparation e-mail for Senator Bingaman.


He lost his election 4 November 2008


  1. Congressman Joe Sestak began work in 2009. He recommended the Medal of Honor 29 Sept 2010


He lost his election 2 November 2010
c) Senator Jeff Bingaman was involved and retired effective with the 2012 election

His term ended 6 November 2012
d) Senator Casey changed staff positions in 2010 where Kurt Imhoff was replaced by Teresa Dennis. Also through E-mails note the delays with the New Mexico delegation.


  1. Senator Patrick Toomey after the 2012 election began advocating

Introducing all seven Army aviation Medal of Honor citations and extracting those points of intrepidity/valor to compare to the proposed MOH citation of CPT Liss.

Intrepidity as it pertained to the Seven Medal of Honor Army rotary aviators

These are condensed and specific references not a full citation.


  1. Ed Freeman:

Intrepidity: Captain Freeman risked his own life by flying his unarmed helicopter through a gauntlet of enemy fire time after time, delivering critically needed ammunition, water and medical supplies to the besieged battalion. Captain Freeman flew 14 separate rescue missions, providing life-saving evacuation of an estimated 30 seriously wounded soldiers -- some of whom would not have survived had he not acted. All flights were made into a small emergency landing zone within 100 to 200 meters of the defensive perimeter where heavily committed units were perilously holding off the attacking elements.

  1. Bruce Crandall: Crandall made the decision –

without anyone requesting that he do so - to fly the medevac missions. When he asked for volunteers, his former colleague in Vietnam, Maj. (ret.) Ed Freeman, who had been his friend for 10 years before they deployed together to Vietnam, immediately stepped forward. Crandall's helicopter led the two, and he supervised the loading of seriously wounded Soldiers over the course of 14 landings under intense enemy fire. He and Freeman saved the lives of some 70 wounded Soldiers.

Intrepidity:  While medical evacuation was not his mission, he immediately sought volunteers and with complete disregard for his own personal safety, led the two aircraft to Landing Zone X-Ray. Despite the fact that the landing zone was still under relentless enemy fire, Major Crandall landed and proceeded to supervise the loading of seriously wounded soldiers aboard his aircraft. After his first medical evacuation, Major Crandall continued to fly into and out of the landing zone throughout the day and into the evening. That day he completed a total of 22 flights, most under intense enemy fire, retiring from the battlefield only after all possible service had been rendered to the Infantry battalion. His actions provided critical resupply of ammunition and evacuation of the wounded.


  1. Pat Brady: awarded the Medal of Honor for a series of rescues during which he used 3 helicopters to rescue over 60 wounded.

Intrepidity: volunteered to rescue wounded men from a site in enemy held territory which was reported to be heavily defended and to be blanketed by fog. To reach the site he descended through heavy fog and smoke and hovered slowly along a valley trail, turning his ship sideward to blow away the fog with the backwash from his rotor blades. Despite the unchallenged, close-range enemy fire, he found the dangerously small site, where he successfully landed and evacuated 2 badly wounded South Vietnamese soldiers. He was then called to another area completely covered by dense fog where American casualties lay only 50 meters from the enemy.

Two aircraft had previously been shot down and others had made unsuccessful attempts to reach this site earlier in the day. With unmatched skill and extraordinary courage, Maj. Brady made 4 flights to this embattled landing zone and successfully rescued all the wounded. (How many?)


  1. Stephen W. Pless:

Intrepedity: serving as a helicopter gunship pilot. Maj. Pless displayed exceptional airmanship as he launched a devastating attack against the enemy force, killing or wounding many of the enemy and driving the remainder back into a treeline. His rocket and machinegun attacks were made at such low levels that the aircraft flew through debris created by explosions from its rockets. When the wounded men were aboard, Maj. Pless maneuvered the helicopter out to sea. Before it became safely airborne, the overloaded aircraft settled 4 times into the water. Displaying superb airmanship, he finally got the helicopter aloft. Major Pless' extraordinary heroism coupled with his outstanding flying skill prevented the annihilation of the tiny force.




  1. William E. Adams…Posthumously

Intrepidity: On May 25, 1971, Adams, a major, volunteered to fly a lightly armed helicopter mission to rescue three wounded soldiers from a besieged firebase in Kontum Province, despite the clear weather which would provide the numerous enemy aircraft around the location with clear visibility. Despite fire from machine gun emplacements and rockets, Adams succeeded in landing at the firebase while supporting attacked the enemy positions. After takeoff, however, the helicopter was hit by fire. Adams momentarily regained control and attempted to land, however the helicopter exploded in mid air and crashed. Adams, who was 31 at the time, was killed.


  1. Frederick E. Ferguson: CWO Ferguson, commander of a resupply helicopter

Intrepidity: monitoring an emergency call from wounded passengers and crewmen of a downed helicopter under heavy attack within the enemy controlled city of Hue, unhesitatingly volunteered to attempt evacuation. Despite warnings from all aircraft to stay clear of the area due to heavy antiaircraft fire, CWO Ferguson began a low-level flight at maximum airspeed along the Perfume River toward the tiny, isolated South Vietnamese Army compound in which the crash survivors had taken refuge. Coolly and skillfully maintaining his course in the face of intense, short range fire from enemy occupied buildings and boats, he displayed superior flying skill and tenacity of purpose by landing his aircraft in an extremely confined area in a blinding dust cloud under heavy mortar and small-arms fire. Although the helicopter was severely damaged by mortar fragments during the loading of the wounded, CWO Ferguson disregarded the damage and, taking off through the continuing hail of mortar fire, he flew his crippled aircraft on the return route through the rain of fire that he had experienced earlier and safely returned his wounded passengers to friendly control. CWO Ferguson's extraordinary determination saved the lives of 5 of his comrades. 


  1. Michael Novosel: CWO Novosel, 82d Medical Detachment, distinguished himself while serving as commander of a medical evacuation helicopter.

Intrepidity:  He unhesitatingly maneuvered his helicopter into a heavily fortified and defended enemy training area where a group of wounded Vietnamese soldiers were pinned down by a large enemy force. Flying without gunship or other cover and exposed to intense machinegun fire, CWO Novosel was able to locate and rescue a wounded soldier. Since all communications with the beleaguered troops had been lost, he repeatedly circled the battle area, flying at low level under continuous heavy fire, to attract the attention of the scattered friendly troops. This display of courage visibly raised their morale, as they recognized this as a signal to assemble for evacuation. On 6 occasions he and his crew were forced out of the battle area by the intense enemy fire, only to circle and return from another direction to land and extract additional troops. Near the end of the mission, a wounded soldier was spotted close to an enemy bunker. Fully realizing that he would attract a hail of enemy fire, CWO Novosel nevertheless attempted the extraction by hovering the helicopter backward. As the man was pulled on aboard, enemy automatic weapons opened fire at close range, damaged the aircraft and wounded CWO Novosel. He momentarily lost control of the aircraft, but quickly recovered and departed under the withering enemy fire. In all, 15 extremely hazardous extractions were performed in order to remove wounded personnel. As a direct result of his selfless conduct, the lives of 29 soldiers were saved


  1. LISS, LAWRENCE M. CPT II Field Force Vietnam

Intrepidity: Distinguished himself by conspicuous gallantry and intrepidness above and beyond the call of duty on 14 May 1967, in combat with an opposing armed force in the Republic of Vietnam. On this date, Captain Liss was both the CMD pilot (extraction 2 and 4) and co-pilot (extraction 1,3 and 5) sharing the duties in an unarmed, VIP helicopter while transporting the II Field Forces (Vietnam) staff chaplain on this Sunday to Special Forces camps in the III Corps area for services. Upon arriving at Cau Song Be Special Forces Camp, the pilot in command, Warrant Officer Thomas Baca on the first extraction was asked by a Special Forces major to evacuate wounded members of a South Vietnamese Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) company and U.S. Special Forces advisors who had been ambushed and were under fire near Cau Song Be. While the command pilot flew to the evacuation zone, Captain Liss continued to call for additional help. Upon reaching the evacuation site, Captain Liss assessed the unfolding ambush by the North Vietnamese Regulars and reported his assessment to the commander of the Special Forces advisors at Cau Song Be. To reach the wounded troops on the ground, the command pilot used the helicopter’s main rotor blades to chop through bamboo and trees as it descended. After evacuating the wounded troops and under continuous enemy fire, the helicopter crew was asked to help extract the remaining CIDG troops and Special Forces advisors. Captain Liss flew the helicopter with its damaged rotor blades on the second and fourth of five extractions under fire. On the third approach to extract the South Vietnamese and U.S. troops, Captain Liss realized radio contact with the ground force had been lost. Upon landing, he left his seat and, exposing himself to intense ground fire from the enemy, helped the CIDG troops get on board his helicopter. Continuous small-arms fire wounded and killed more of the troops already aboard the aircraft. The helicopter again flew the troops back to Cau Song Be. Captain Liss then flew the fourth extraction flight. Knowing full well the perimeter had shrunk to a diameter of less than 50 feet and the enemy was increasing its resolve to stop the extraction and bring down the helicopter, Captain Liss was able to maneuver his UH-1D helicopter for takeoff and again returned to the camp. On the fifth extraction, flown by the command pilot, the perimeter had shrunk to a small group of CIDG troops, Captain Liss again left the cockpit, with total disregard for his own safety, and continued to assist evacuees onto the aircraft. Liss knew his helicopter had to extract all of the remaining 18 soldiers. Captain Liss directed troops into the cargo bay and told others to stand on the skids. He then returned to his seat in the cockpit and gave the “go” sign to the command pilot to take off. As the helicopter was taking off, Captain Liss held onto two CIDG soldiers hanging onto his door and window by their lapels until the helicopter landed safely at the camp. Liss’s actions in the rescue of an additional 87 South Vietnamese and U.S. soldiers were in keeping with the highest traditions of the U.S. Army and reflect great credit upon himself and the United States Army.

4. The injustice of: Disallowing the reconsideration of the use of the Main Rotors by LTC Stewart Stephenson on Sept 2, 2009 in his letter to Congressman Joe Sestak failed to allow consideration of the procedure as being impossible and rare if ever used before. It is a basis for the criteria for the Medal of Honor as presented:

(Continued below)

c:\users\art\documents\larry\larry\'s awards\letter from doug brown 7-24-12.jpg

DISCUSSION:

The use of the Main Rotors to chop down or cut your way into a landing zone is risky placing the lives of the crew at risk, downing the aircraft, the skills necessary to work under heavy combat conditions while watching out for main and tail rotor strikes especially in an unarmed VIP helicopter. CPT Liss and crew were subjected to six separate and ongoing rescue missions and this as not just simple “weed whacking. Is this the definition of the Medal of Honor that of intrepidity “above and beyond the call of duty” performed as such to separate him from “what would be expected of their peers”?



AN EXPERT’S POINT OF VIEW:

  1. General Brown’s letter is a way for him to describe the risks of a “blade strike”. As an experienced Vietnam Veteran and Army Rotary Wing Aviator, General (Ret) Doug Brown is not making a formal MOH recommendation. His point of view does lead the reader to understand the risks and “what if at 40’ it could be proven”?

TO RECAP WHAT HE OFFERED:

    1. Using a rotor blade as a way to chop into an LZ is not taught, recommended or allowed”

    2. The letter from Congress states it was “dense vegetation and bamboo to 40’, if accurate that would indeed be an amazing feat, one that I have never seen.”

    3. It would be totally impossible in my judgment to chop your way through dense vegetation and not destroy the blades. They may get you home but would not be useable again”.

    4. Again, I am totally impressed with the Act of Valor, but to know if it is sufficient for me to recommend and MOH would take would take great additional study or analysis”

  1. I refer back to the original DFC of CPT Liss which said “to successfully land on a narrow dirt road flanked by bamboo thickets and heavy foliage, CPT Liss had to use his rotors to cut through the dense underbrush … an extremely hazardous undertaking…again using his Rotors to clear a path for takeoff CPT Liss brought the wounded soldiers back to Cau Song Be. Upon landing he was asked to return to evacuate the entire company.”

  2. The reference to 40’ was affirmed by the SF Medic on the flight SPC 5 James Dopp who attested to: the vegetation was tall, by my estimation 40’. There was no clear opening; The piloting to maneuver down through the same vegetation was unusual yet bold and decisive; it took extreme courage for these pilots to return to the area with neither active air support nor a ground element to suppress anti-aircraft fire; the pilot found a small extremely small landing pad, surrounded by tall trees (I estimate 40’-50’ or more). We took out the first 5-6 CIDG’s to reach the helicopter. As we lifted off we received intense small arms fire directed at the helicopter. Some of the fire with green tracers appeared to me to be from what I came to know as a wheel mounted, 51 caliber machine gun, a formidable anti-aircraft weapon.”

  3. Further reference to aviation intrepidity can be gleaned from the book “We were Soldiers” on page 109/110 where in MOH recipient Bruce Crandall wrote:

Crandall now powered his over loaded Huey out of X-ray, hitting some tree tops with his Main Rotor on the way, he recalls. We almost didn’t make it. In training sometimes we deliberately hit the tree tops with our skids to scare the shit out of the Infantry, especially if they were new guys. But hitting trees with the rotor blades scared the shit out of me. Once we cleared the trees we again received fire. When we got back to Plei Me, I switched back to my first ship which had been checked out and refueled”.

POINT OF REFERENCE:

This was an accidental strike going up not a purposeful strike coming down.

Reality was to even MOH recipient Bruce Crandall…it scared the shit out of him.

Further, he changed helicopters.

5. The injustice: Lack of consideration to General Weyand’s request in 2008/2009 for an upgrade. He was the highest ranking General Officer at the time of the original award. A new affidavit is submitted by John Lovell dated 21 January 2014 aide to Congressman Pearce discussing the events surrounding the decision by General Weyand to address the issues so many years later.(See A43)
General Weyand had a sterling career spanning three wars. Of note in his attention to this case was the fact he was:

  1. The Legislative Liaison from 1962 to 1964

  2. Weyand was in Vietnam through three critical periods, arriving as commander of the 25th Infantry Division in Vietnam. He commanded II Field Force. After serving on the US negotiating team in Paris peace talks for two years, Weyand returned in 1970 for his final Vietnam tour as Commander of MACV.

  3. Appointed Army Chief of Staff, succeeding Gen. Creighton Abrams who died of lung cancer in September 1974. He retired in 1976

General Weyand, Congressman Pearce and his aide John Lovell period 2008

Two time frames were involved: 1) the initial conversations that produced references to CPT Liss and the initial recommendation for a Silver Star on 10 November 2008 and 2) the added evidence he received which prompted the more compelling “Uncommon Valor” letter of 10 July 2009 recognizing all of the original awards should be higher.



The process started with

  1. CDR David Williams a Riverine SQD operative during Vietnam who wrote a letter on 13 April 2007 to Congressman Pearce informing him of Jack Swickard ’s part in the historic mission.

  2. Congressman Pearce writes MG Galen Jackman the Legislative Liaison on 22 August with attachments.

  3. Congressman Pearce out reaches to General Fred Weyand well into retirement on 2 Sept 2008 sending him similar attachments asking for assistance in being “the recommender” and assist with the appropriate paperwork. He included the picture of he and CPT Liss at the Awards presentation.

  4. John Lovell spoke with General Weyand on 15 Sept 2008 who “advised that upgrades of all awards were warranted and as soon as he received the package, he would help in the upgrade process.”

  5. John Lovell mailed the packet on 16 September 2008 to General Weyand who “was additionally requested to write any letter he felt was necessary to further the cause of the eight heroic crew members.”

  6. Congressman Pearce received a letter 10 October 2008 from General Fred Weyand. “He cited the performance of CPT Liss and said that he did believe that these specific actions warranted the upgrading of an award performed an act of bravery and heroism under intense combat conditions which merits an award for Valor.”

Six months later new evidence was gathered for the General to review

  1. The National Geographic Documentary depicting his role at the end of the movie.

  2. A copy of the DFC citation he personally signed on 19 June 1967 for CPT Liss

  3. Photo of CPT Liss and General Weyand at Awards presentation at II Field Force Hq.

  4. An MOH recommendation from Congressman Joe Sestak

  5. The “key document” was the personal account from CPT Wallace Johnson an eye witness who wrote an affidavit about the missions success as commander of 5th Special Forces Detachment A-333

  6. New facts on Cau Song Be

  7. July 11, 2009…CWO Okada sent a copy of General Weyand’s letter of July 10, 2009 to Major General Galen B. Jackman, Chief of Legislative Liaison, 1600 Army Pentagon Washington, DC 20310. It was a heads up notifying me that the upgrades recommended all of the flight crewmembers deserved further consideration for higher awards. He considered that the process might begin now and completed later. I still have CWO Okada’s envelope that was sent to me on July 11, 2009.

  8. July 10, 2009 “Uncommon Valor” letter from General Weyand to MG Galen B. Jackman recommending upgrades of all awards.


6. Battle field conditions added to the hazards and risk associated with flying an unarmed aircraft and succeeding over five complete landings and extractions. The Documentary is submitted supporting the request on 2 Sept 2009 from LTC Stewart Stephenson Chief, Awards Branch:

An award narrative that specifically details “the conditions and situation at the time of the Soldier’s action as well as details concerning the actions of said Soldier, records, extracts, sketches, maps, diagrams and photography which support the level of heroism, an official unit, report of the action, and multiple eyewitness statements that specifically details the soldiers actions”.

Battlefield Conditions

The conditions that existed that day were germane to both WO Baca and CPT Liss who shared the flight duties while CPT Liss exited the aircraft twice and experienced what is described as follows. The uniqueness of this mission is in the piloting maneuverability required to operate not once but five times in these conditions as well as exiting the aircraft twice under these conditions. This mission was on the last day of JUNCTION CITY a major offense. This map could be viewed as enemy forces being driven that last day to the NE, right into the A-333 patrol.

.

The size of the enemy force as reported in the original three DFC’s was:


  1. LISS” “well armed enemy force”

  2. BACA “numerically superior force

  3. SWICKARD “heavily armed force”

Higher command did not know that the extent of the numbers stated by Johnson and Dopp was 600 and never made known to the pilots. None of them were interviewed as part of the preparation for the award of the DFC.




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