Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China


NC/1NR Currency Manipulation “Quid Pro Quo” Topicality AT--#3A—Context



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2NC/1NR Currency Manipulation “Quid Pro Quo” Topicality AT--#3A—Context

  1. We are in the topic—our evidence is about the only way we really do economic engagement between countries. It’s predictable.




  1. Case list answers context: our interpretation includes the North Korea Aff, the BIT aff, and the Topical version of this Aff. That means there are plenty of Affs to be read and we’re being fair in the topic.




  1. They explode the number of cases that can be read—that destroys education and makes it impossible to gain depth



Resnick, 2001 [Evan, Assistant Professor and coordinator of the United States Programme at RSIS, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, 0022197X, Spring2001, Vol. 54, Issue 2,]
A second problem associated with various scholarly treatments of engagement is the tendency to define the concept too broadly to be of much help to the analyst. For instance, Cha's definition of engagement as any policy whose means are "non-coercive and non-punitive" is so vague that essentially any positive sanction could be considered engagement. The definition put forth by Alastair lain Johnston and Robert Ross in their edited volume, Engaging China, is equally nebulous. According to Johnston and Ross, engagement constitutes "the use of non-coercive methods to ameliorate the non-status quo elements of a rising power's behavior."(n14) Likewise, in his work, Rogue States and US Foreign Policy, Robert Litwak defines engagement as "positive sanctions."(n15) Moreover, in their edited volume, Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, Richard Haass and Meghan O'Sullivan define engagement as "a foreign policy strategy that depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives."(n16) As policymakers possess a highly differentiated typology of alternative options in the realm of negative sanctions from which to choose--including covert action, deterrence, coercive diplomacy, containment, limited war and total war--it is only reasonable to expect that they should have a similar menu of options in the realm of positive sanctions than simply engagement. Equating engagement with positive sanctions risks lumping together a variety of discrete actions that could be analyzed by distinguishing among them and comparing them as separate policies.

2NC/1NR Currency Manipulation “Quid Pro Quo” Topicality AT #3B—Ground

  1. We give fair ground—quid pro quo creates predictable Negative strategies against incentive mechanisms the Aff could use. In fact, their interpretation that engagement is unconditional hurts our links to Politics, China Nationalism, China Politics, and Taiwan Relations Disadvantages.




  1. Not predictable ground—there’s always predictable ground against negotiating a quid pro quo. The Aff’s interpretation denies us the ability to have these debates about the mechanisms of engagement – the process is key to the outcome in foreign policy. The entire history of our foreign policy with China since Nixon and Kissinger demonstrates that making deals is more important than doing our own policies no matter what China thinks, pretending that we aren’t interdependent and deeply tied to China.




2NC/1NR Currency Manipulation “Quid Pro Quo” Topicality AT #3C—Real World Education

  1. We give real world education—there’s still a debate about how government policy works with China. We just argue that the US must offer China a quid pro quo. This is MORE real world and the way foreign policy actually works.

  2. Debate Education—we need a fair round now. It’s great in the abstract to learn about all the different policies that might affect China, but it’s more important to have a fair and educational debate round now about policies that are already part of our negotiations with China. If too many teams lose, they’ll give up on researching and learn nothing.




2NC/1NR Currency Manipulation “Quid Pro Quo” Topicality AT #4—Reasonability

  1. Reasonability is subjective—it’s impossible to tell how fair is fair enough. Some people may think it’s fair for me to play my grandma in basketball, but I sure don’t.

  1. Judge intervention: The term “reasonable” is vague, and open to interpretation. Instead of having the judge decide which definition they find reasonable, the debaters should debate the merits of each definition.




  1. Education: Competing interpretations is better for cost benefit analysis and decision making skills. The process of weighing the pros and cons of each definition develops these skills.




  1. Look to the best interpretation—whichever interpretation is best for education and fairness should win. The Aff should have to defend their counter interpretation and win that it’s educational and fair.

Err neg on T—there’s an aff bias because the topic is enormous with diplomatic and economic engagement. Also, it’s a challenging international topic. We need to protect the limits and ground of the Neg.


1NC Human Rights Topicality – Engagement = Government to Government

  1. Interpretation: Economic engagement must be government to government



Daga, 2013 director of research at Politicas Publicas para la Libertad, in Bolivia, and a visiting senior policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation (Sergio, “Economics of the 2013-2014 Debate Topic: U.S. Economic Engagement Toward Cuba, Mexico or Venezuela”, National Center for Policy Analysis, 5/15, http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/Message_to_Debaters_6-7-13.pdf)
Economic engagement between or among countries can take many forms, but this document will focus on government-to-government engagement through 1) international trade agreements designed to lower barriers to trade; and 2) government foreign aid; next, we will contrast government-to-government economic engagement with private economic engagement through 3) international investment, called foreign direct investment; and 4) remittances and migration by individuals. All of these areas are important with respect to the countries mentioned in the debate resolution; however, when discussing economic engagement by the U.S. federal government, some issues are more important with respect to some countries than to others.

  1. Violation: The Sullivan Principles, as per the Lee evidence, only apply rules to US companies in China. The plan does not do any economic engagement government to government.




  1. Topicality is voting issue for fairness and education:

  1. Limits: There are thousands of organizations outside the U.S. government including companies, other governments, individuals, and NGO’s. They explode the topic leading to a much larger case list. The negative would not be able to research effectively and would lose.



Ground: The AFF gets to claim advantages based off company to company engagement and boosting the economy. Also, our links won’t apply to company to company action, only the federal government. Without these core Disadvantages, we won’t be able to compete. We also lose the ability to use strategies like the EU Counterplan because they act on American companies, not China.


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