Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China



Download 2.62 Mb.
Page127/144
Date18.10.2016
Size2.62 Mb.
#2905
1   ...   123   124   125   126   127   128   129   130   ...   144

1NC BIT Pressure CP

Counterplan Text: The United States Federal Government should pressure the People’s Republic of China to ratify the Bilateral Investment Treaty with the United States.

  1. Solvency: The U.S. must exert pressure on China in order for them to ratify the treaty. Historically, China has been foreign direct investment difficult within China, and they have made little progress on opening up their country



The Diplomat, March 2016 3/24, http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/are-china-and-the-us-close-to-sealing-an-investment-treaty/
Currently, United States (and other foreign firms) are blocked from investing in a laundry list of industries in China, from genetically-modified agricultural products and domestic parcel delivery services to news outlets, publishing houses, and television stations. Other sectors are “restricted” and may require foreign investment to come as part of a Chinese majority-owned joint venture. Even the Shanghai Free Trade Zone, which is supposed to be an experimental zone with fewer restrictions than the country at large, comes with a lengthy “negative list” of off-limits industries, including automobile manufacturing, telecommunications, and banks.And to many business leaders, it seems China is getting less – not more – receptive to foreign investment; witness, for example, a new rule that bans any company with foreign investment from publishing content online. According to the U.S.-China Business Council’s 2015 China Business Environment Survey, China has made little progress on the issue over the past few years, despite repeated commitments to opening its markets. Even in sectors where foreign investment is allowed, USCBC also found that 80 percent of American companies believe their Chinese competitors receive preferential treatment — and that’s just for private enterprises. When it comes to China’s state-owned firms, 97 percent of respondents said SOEs are receiving a competitive boost from the government.USCBC, however, has been a vocal advocate for the conclusion of a BIT, arguing (in an open letter to Obama and Xi from 94 U.S. CEOs), that “a high-standard BIT – with clear provisions providing equal treatment to each country’s investors and a short list of exceptions – is one of the key items that could make an immediate and tangible impact for both of our economies.” The question, of course, is how high the standards will be, given China’s neuralgia regarding foreign investment and its stated goal of promoting Chinese domestic firms as international superstars — which to date has involved shielding them from domestic competition. China’s current commerce minister, Gao Hucheng, previously said that China and the United States have “basically completed text negotiation” on the BIT, a claim echoed by Chen this week. However, Gao was speaking in March of last year – and he noted at the time that agreeing on the actual negative lists — the areas that will remained closed to foreign investment — would be a “challenge.” Whether the U.S. and China have made any progress since exchanging their latest negatives lists in September remains to be seen

2NC/1NR Pressure CP- BIT - Solvency Overview

  1. Extend our 1NC Diplomat 2016 evidence. It indicates that China does not see it in their best interests to open up their country to Foreign Direct Investment. The affirmative can fiat US, but they cannot fiat that the PRC signs the treaty. Our evidence indicates there is not willpower to do so, and that only pressuring China, not engaging them, will lead to them signing the treaty.

  2. Here’s more evidence, China will not budge on foreign direct investment unless the USFG pressures them to do so. The counterplan solves best.



The Hill, 2015 Derek Scissors, resident scholar at American Enterprise Institute, “Bilateral investment treaty with China more than a 'BIT' of trouble”
Another problem is far worse. China's policies with regard to its SOEs (state-owned enterprises) are antithetical to a core principle of the BIT — that foreign firms should receive the same treatment as domestic (national treatment). Multinationals may receive the same treatment as private Chinese firms but they are nowhere close to receiving the same treatment as SOEs. SOEs are protected from competition in two dozen sectors. They are not allowed to fail for commercial reasons. They receive huge sums of what are essentially costless loans. These are established Chinese policies and the fall 2013 Communist Party meeting was supposed to inaugurate a new era of pro-market reform. But the principal corporate reform was allowing private firms to take minority stakes in SOEs. This is the exact opposite of what needs to occur, which is more competition between SOEs and the private sector. The SOE reform guidelines issued last month affirm this harmful notion of "reform." Remarkably, this failure was so blatant as to be recognized in the official press. It is odd that the U.S. is even negotiating with a country with such policies. A possible explanation is that the China BIT can be connected to an even bigger international economic initiative, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Not coincidentally, BIT negotiations with China quickly turned serious after Japan joined the TPP. There is a chapter in the TPP concerning SOEs — this could provide a template for how to blunt bad policies. Unfortunately, it appears as if the opposite is true with regard to China: The TPP leaves the door wide open to more predatory behavior. Final TPP text is not yet available, but a New Zealand government fact sheet indicates a number of flaws that will be exploited by governments committed to using SOEs as core economic actors. For example, under the TPP, monopolies can (apparently) behave in non-commercial fashion when fulfilling the terms of their designation, as assigned by their government. This is acceptable for countries that have no desire to hand out mandate after mandate to SOEs, but there should be no doubt that China will do exactly that. In addition, services supplied by SOEs in their own territories are (apparently) allowed to be subsidized. This could block access to the Chinese market for American services firms. Another vital issue that cannot be evaluated at present is that of nonconforming measures, the exceptions granted in specific areas. The nonconforming measures of a China BIT must be extremely limited. With countries such as Singapore and Vietnam boasting large SOEs, this weakness is a drawback for the TPP. However, it would undermine the point of any agreement with China — certainly including a BIT. With few effective restrictions on what is by far the world's largest state sector in absolute size, the opportunities truly unlocked by a China BIT would turn out to be minimal. Beijing's behavior over the past two years with regard to SOEs and treatment of multinationals makes it an undesirable partner. The TPP does not appear to provide anything close to a sufficient framework to restrict Chinese SOEs. The Obama administration will need to deliver an improbably strong BIT for it to deserve consideration.


Download 2.62 Mb.

Share with your friends:
1   ...   123   124   125   126   127   128   129   130   ...   144



The database is protected by copyright ©ininet.org 2024
send message
    Main page
Guide
Instructions
Report
Request
Review