Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China
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Burtless, 2001 Gary, senior fellow, Economic Studies, Brooks Institution- “Workers' Rights: Labor standards and global trade” http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2001/09/fall-globaleconomics-burtless Proponents of workers' rights argue that trading nations should be held to strict labor standards—and they offer two quite different justifications for their view. The first is a moral argument whose premise is that many labor standards, such as freedom of association and the prohibition of forced labor, protect basic human rights. Foreign nations that wish to be granted free access to the world's biggest and richest markets should be required to observe fundamental human values, including labor rights. In short, the lure of market access to the United States and the European Union should be used to expand the domain of human rights.¶ The key consideration here is the efficacy of labor standards policies. Will they improve human rights among would-be trading partners? Or will they slow progress toward human rights by keeping politically powerless workers mired in poverty? Some countries, including China, might reject otherwise appealing trade deals that contain enforceable labor standards. By insisting on tough labor standards, the wealthy democracies could lay claim to the moral high ground. But they might have to forgo a trade pact that could help their own producers and consumers while boosting the incomes and political power of impoverished Chinese workers.¶ The second argument for strict labor standards stresses not the welfare of poor workers, but simple economic self-interest. A trading partner that fails to enforce basic protections for its workers can gain an unfair trade advantage, boosting its market competitiveness against countries with stronger labor safeguards. Including labor standards in trade deals can encourage countries in a free trade zone to maintain worker protections rather than abandoning them in a race to the bottom. If each country must observe a common set of minimum standards, member countries can offer and enforce worker protections at a more nearly optimal level. This second argument, unlike the first, can be assessed with economic theory and evidence.¶ Evaluating these arguments requires answering three questions. First, what labor standards are important to U.S. trade and foreign policy? Second, how can labor standards, once negotiated, be enforced? Finally, does it make sense to insist that our trade partners adhere to a common set of core labor standards?and if so, which standards?¶ Which Labor Standards Matter Most?¶ Although the international community agrees broadly on the need to respect labor standards, agreement does not extend to what those standards should be. Forced labor and slavery are almost universally regarded as repugnant, but other labor safeguards thought vital in the world's richest countries are not widely observed elsewhere.¶ The International Labor Organization, created by the Treaty of Versailles after World War I, has published labor standards in dozens of areas, but it has identified eight essential core standards (see box on page 13), most of which refer to basic human rights. Of the 175 ILO member countries, overwhelming majorities have ratified most of the eight standards. More than 150 have ratified the four treating forced labor and discrimination in employment and wages. Washington has ratified just two standards, one abolishing forced labor and the other eliminating the worst forms of child labor, placing the United States in the company of only eight other ILO member countries, including China, Myanmar, and Oman.¶ Many proponents of labor standards would expand the core list of ILO protections to cover workplace safety, working conditions, and wages. The U.S. Trade Act of 1974 defines "internationally recognized worker rights" to include "acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health." The University of Michigan, for example, obliges producers of goods bearing its insignia to respect the core ILO standards and also requires them to pay minimum wages and to offer a "safe and healthy working environment."¶ The labor standards that might be covered by a trade agreement fall along a continuum from those that focus on basic human rights to those that stress working conditions and pay. On the whole, the case for the former is more persuasive. Insisting that other nations respect workers' right of free association reflects our moral view that this right is fundamental to human dignity. Workers may also have a "right" to a safe and healthy workplace, but that right comes at some cost to productive efficiency. Insisting that other nations adopt American standards for a safe and healthy workplace means that they must also adopt our view of the appropriate trade-off between health and safety, on the one hand, and productive efficiency, on the other.
Foreign Policy, 2015 “The U.S. Just Botched Yet Another Chance to Press for Human Rights in China” http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/07/the-u-s-just-botched-yet-another-chance-to-press-for-human-rights-in-china/ But even these relatively strong remarks betray a growing problem in U.S.-China high-level interactions: the unwillingness of American diplomats to raise publicly with their Chinese counterparts specific cases of human rights abuses. Neither Kerry nor Blinken raised Beijing’s concerted efforts to destroy Yirenping, an anti-discrimination group, or the New Citizens’ Movement, a civic rights forum. There was no public mention in this setting of well-known cases, such as imprisoned Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo, or even of Li Tingting, Wang Man, Wei Tingting, Wu Rongrong, and Zheng Churan, the five feminists detained (and later released) this spring, on whose behalf U.S. officials spoke up in April. As a result, there were few facts offered to challenge Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi’s insistence that, “In advancing human rights, China’s achievements are there for all to see.” And there was little evidence that courageous activists in China could see, of the United States taking seriously its purported “whole of government” approach. U.S. Vice President Joe Biden lowered the bar in his opening remarks. Biden didn’t remind his audience that China has freely undertaken a slew of legally binding human rights commitments or the extent to which it’s violating those. Instead, Biden gingerly introduced the topic by cautioning that he wasn’t “lecturing” and then rattled off a list of human rights abuses — without specifying that those abuses are taking place right now in China, enabled or tolerated by some of the very Chinese officials listening to the speech. Having sidestepped the opportunity to challenge those officials, or at least make a principled argument, Biden concluded that “responsible competitors” — by which he presumably meant governments that respect human rights — do so “not just because it’s the right thing to do, but because it’s absolutely economically necessary.” He then mentioned his “friendships” with people in the leadership but named no human rights defenders from China. Even China’s plans to host a commemoration this September of the landmark 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women on women’s rights went unchallenged: U.S. officials did not in public sessions challenge China’s ongoing harassment of the five feminists, who are released but remain criminal suspects, but opted instead to call the September gathering a “critical opportunity.” Rather, they elected to broadly reference restrictions on civil society, the exclusion of women from opportunities for “economic success,” and domestic violence. But no specifics were given — only broad, vague principles, which posed no meaningful challenge to the Chinese officials present. And the White House’s readout of U.S. President Barack Obama’s meeting with Chinese representatives to the Dialogue contains no reference to human rights. On top of this, the United States “committed to enhance … counterterrorism cooperation” with China. Such an agreement gives credibility where it is manifestly not due, given China’s proposed counterterrorism law, which is nothing more than a legal veneer for human rights abuses. Although China does suffer a number of deadly and apparently politically motivated attacks directed against the general population, the Chinese government long has manipulated the threat of terrorism to justify its crackdown on the 10 million ethnic Uighurs in Xinjiang province. U.S. officials will no doubt insist that it is better to have discussions that create opportunities to raise precisely those concerns. But clearly whatever concerns the United States raised at last year’s counterterrorism dialogue were brushed aside in the drafting of this law. The United States should set far higher standards for China to meet before engaging in any sort of cooperation on this issue. No doubt U.S. officials will point to their naming of individual cases at the overdue release of the State Department’s human rights report — the day after the Dialogue finished — and describe which cases they raised behind closed doors. These are necessary but far from sufficient. If publicly identifying individual cases and using them to challenge the Chinese government is a good enough strategy to use sometimes, it ought to be good enough to use in the forums where it matters most: at high-level summits where it has the power to potentially embarrass Chinese officials into behaving differently. Some senior U.S. officials shy away from causing embarrassment to senior Chinese officials, arguing that it is counterproductive. It’s hard to know that definitively, especially when former political prisoners tell us and others that their treatment improved when their cases were publicly raised, suggesting that embarrassment does prompt a change in behavior. And these U.S. officials’ logic concern about causing discomfort doesn’t seem to apply when discussing equally tense issues not related to human rights, like cybersecurity or currency manipulation. Some may think that raising individual cases or major issues like democracy will interfere with other priorities in the relationship. But both sides regularly state that the sum of the relationship is far greater than any individual issue, suggesting that bilateral ties will not collapse if the United States publicly calls for the release of a half-dozen critics of the Chinese government. In fact, some U.S. officials note with surprise that an unusual number of issues not related to human rights in the June 2012 Strategic & Economic Dialogue were dealt with efficiently — despite the parallel, global headline-making story of Chen Guangcheng’s escape from house arrest in Shandong province to the U.S. Embassy in Beijing. And some may think it more effective to be bland in public and push hard in private, as we know many U.S. diplomats have done. But despite those and other efforts, the results are there for all to see: a manifestly deteriorating human rights environment. The United States shares this view but is inexplicably unwilling to use all the tools at its disposal — despite its claims to a “whole of government” approach — to change that reality. Above all, speaking about individuals also gives critical hope to those in China who are suffering or jailed for trying to assert their rights, and no diplomat should ever shy away from an opportunity to mitigate that torment. That no single U.S. diplomat saw fit to do so publicly is a betrayal of all those in China fighting for their rights.
JBI, 2010 The Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights “The Role of Human Rights in US Foreign Policy: Setting Examples or Exercising Leadership” http://www.jbi-humanrights.org/jacob-blaustein-institute/2010/09/the-role-of-human-rights-in-us-foreign-policy-setting-examples-or-exercising-leadership.html Second, the U.S. must integrate human rights into U.S. bilateral diplomacy. To be effective, human rights must be "part and parcel to our diplomacy with the countries whose practices we’re trying to change" as well as with other relevant and influential countries, Nossel explained. An example was the way the U.S. mobilized, together with Europeans and others, to prevent Iran's election to the UN Human Rights Council. As a result, despite “very aggressive lobbying” by Iran initially, Teheran ultimately withdrew from the race when it realized it would be defeated. ¶ To be "more credible and effective," the U.S. should "begin with dialogue and a conversation," according to Nossel. When she and her colleagues have discussions with Beijing and Moscow, they "try to be forthright when it comes to serious issues that need to be raised and serious human rights concerns and abuses that have to be called to account." Yet at the same time, human rights are "not the only dimension" to the bilateral relations. There are many other officials in the system; those whose job is to raise human rights must coordinate with others and try to fit in the issues when dealing with other countries; these dialogues are "constructive" but as Nossel concedes, "they don’t necessary yield results as quickly as some might like, and perhaps as we all might like." In cases when engagement does not succeed, the U.S. may seek to “create a foundation for more forceful action” perhaps at the multilateral level. But precisely in such cases, “our efforts are more credible and effective if they begin with a dialogue,” according to Nossel.¶ Third, the U.S. must develop stronger multilateral tools for the promotion of human rights. For example, on Iran, the task is to broaden the range of voices that are speaking out, so that advancing rights is not only a U.S. agenda item. That also means working within the UN system because it has a unique credibility and a statement can be heard a different way in Tehran when it comes from the UN rather than from the U.S. It can often be more effective. As an example, Nossel pointed to a “cross-regional” statement critical of Iran to be delivered the following day in Geneva, signed by more than 50 countries. Of course, the limitations of the multilateral system of human rights are well known, especially to the Jacob Blaustein Institute. For example, the U.S. was deeply concerned over the UN's approach to the Goldstone report, and with the flotilla to Gaza. Ultimately the UN Security Council adopted a more measured approach that the U.S. could support, but in Geneva, the Human Rights Council "reverted to form" and the resolution was one-sided. ¶ "We look at every single session of the Human Rights Council as an important opportunity to try to move the ball forward and the Council to take on more issues in a serious way," says Nossel. The U.S. also faces new challenges with new groupings such as the Organization of the Islamic Conference now playing a much bigger role than they did previously. The U.S. continues to fight the effort to impose a norm of "defamation of religion" which would in fact ban speech that is critical of religion.¶ Fourth, there is the power of norms, and the U.S. is working on new norms, but also on countering “aggressive norms.” Secretary Clinton has also worked to champion Internet freedom, standing up for bloggers and content providers on the Internet despite unhappiness from China and others. The U.S. is very careful about what it supports, unlike many other countries that join resolutions casually. The U.S. will not sign on to anything without a thorough review, to ensure that we can adhere to the agreement fully. ¶ An example of a success of this administration's approach at the UN is the joint resolution with Egypt at the Human Rights Council on freedom of expression, which grew out of the Cairo speech. Of course, the practices of Egypt regarding journalists and bloggers is nowhere near the language affirmed in the resolution¶ Nossel emphasized that a key reason for the U.S. being present and engaged in the multilateral human rights bodies is “to counter aggressive norms” and that this was demonstrated clearly in the fight over the “defamation of religions” – which the U.S. actively opposed. “It’s still a work in progress but it’s very important that we are there to … counter what is an aggressive initiative,” she stated.
Keck, 2014 (Zachary, Deputy Editor of e-International Relations and has interned at the Center for a New American Security and in the U.S. Congress, where he worked on defense issues, 1-24-14, “America’s Relative Decline: Should We Panic?”, The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/americas-relative-decline-should-we-panic/) Regardless of your opinion on U.S. global leadership over the last two decades, however, there is good reason to fear its relative decline compared with China and other emerging nations. To begin with, hegemonic transition periods have historically been the most destabilizing eras in history. This is not only because of the malign intentions of the rising and established power(s). Even if all the parties have benign, peaceful intentions, the rise of new global powers necessitates revisions to the “rules of the road.” This is nearly impossible to do in any organized fashion given the anarchic nature of the international system, where there is no central authority that can govern interactions between states. We are already starting to see the potential dangers of hegemonic transition periods in the Asia-Pacific (and arguably the Middle East). As China grows more economically and militarily powerful, it has unsurprisingly sought to expand its influence in East Asia. This necessarily has to come at the expense of other powers, which so far has primarily meant the U.S., Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. Naturally, these powers have sought to resist Chinese encroachments on their territory and influence, and the situation grows more tense with each passing day. Should China eventually emerge as a global power, or should nations in other regions enjoy a similar rise as Kenny suggests, this situation will play itself out elsewhere in the years and decades ahead. All of this highlights some of the advantages of a unipolar system. Namely, although the U.S. has asserted military force quite frequently in the post-Cold War era, it has only fought weak powers and thus its wars have been fairly limited in terms of the number of casualties involved. At the same time, America’s preponderance of power has prevented a great power war, and even restrained major regional powers from coming to blows. For instance, the past 25 years haven’t seen any conflicts on par with the Israeli-Arab or Iran-Iraq wars of the Cold War. As the unipolar era comes to a close, the possibility of great power conflict and especially major regional wars rises dramatically. The world will also have to contend with conventionally inferior powers like Japan acquiring nuclear weapons to protect their interests against their newly empowered rivals. But even if the transitions caused by China’s and potentially other nations’ rises are managed successfully, there are still likely to be significant negative effects on international relations. In today’s “globalized” world, it is commonly asserted that many of the defining challenges of our era can only be solved through multilateral cooperation. Examples of this include climate change, health pandemics, organized crime and terrorism, global financial crises, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, among many others. A unipolar system, for all its limitations, is uniquely suited for organizing effective global action on these transnational issues. This is because there is a clear global leader who can take the initiative and, to some degree, compel others to fall in line. In addition, the unipole’s preponderance of power lessens the intensity of competition among the global players involved. Thus, while there are no shortages of complaints about the limitations of global governance today, there is no question that global governance has been many times more effective in the last 25 years than it was during the Cold War. The rise of China and potentially other powers will create a new bipolar or multipolar order. This, in turn, will make solving these transnational issues much more difficult. Despite the optimistic rhetoric that emanates from official U.S.-China meetings, the reality is that Sino-American competition is likely to overshadow an increasing number of global issues in the years ahead. If other countries like India, Turkey, and Brazil also become significant global powers, this will only further dampen the prospects for effective global governance.
Mazo, 2010 – PhD in Paleoclimatology from UCLA (Jeffrey Mazo, Managing Editor, Survival and Research Fellow for Environmental Security and Science Policy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, 3-2010, “Climate Conflict: How global warming threatens security and what to do about it,” pg. 122) The best estimates for global warming to the end of the century range from 2.5-4.~C above pre-industrial levels, depending on the scenario. Even in the best-case scenario, the low end of the likely range is 1.goC, and in the worst 'business as usual' projections, which actual emissions have been matching, the range of likely warming runs from 3.1--7.1°C. Even keeping emissions at constant 2000 levels (which have already been exceeded), global temperature would still be expected to reach 1.2°C (O'9""1.5°C)above pre-industrial levels by the end of the century." Without early and severe reductions in emissions, the effects of climate change in the second half of the twenty-first century are likely to be catastrophic for the stability and security of countries in the developing world - not to mention the associated human tragedy. Climate change could even undermine the strength and stability of emerging and advanced economies, beyond the knock-on effects on security of widespread state failure and collapse in developing countries.' And although they have been condemned as melodramatic and alarmist, many informed observers believe that unmitigated climate change beyond the end of the century could pose an existential threat to civilisation." What is certain is that there is no precedent in human experience for such rapid change or such climatic conditions, and even in the best case adaptation to these extremes would mean profound social, cultural and political changes. Directory: wp-content -> uploads -> 2015 2015 -> Police Militarization 2015 -> 2015 ihbb championships: hs history Bowl Round 4 – Prelims First Quarter 2015 -> Wrtp/big step · 3841 W. Wisconsin Ave., Milwaukee, wi 53208 2015 -> Rao bulletin 1 December 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Darton College 2015 -> Training Workshop on Planning and Implementation of Multi-Sectoral Development Programme (MsDP) in Bihar Date : 6th 2015 -> Rao bulletin 15 June 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Rao bulletin 1 September 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Rao bulletin 1 August 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Science, and transportation united states senate Download 2.62 Mb. Share with your friends:
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