Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China


AC AT Global Economy #1—China Investment High



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2AC AT Global Economy #1—China Investment High



They say the US and China already trade heavily, but

[Give :05 summary of opponent’s single argument]




  1. Extend our Diplomat evidence.

[PUT IN YOUR AUTHOR’S NAME]

It’s much better than their Morrison evidence because:

[PUT IN THEIR AUTHOR’S NAME]

[CIRCLE ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS]:

(it’s newer) (the author is more qualified) (it has more facts)

(their evidence is not logical/contradicts itself) (history proves it to be true)

(their evidence has no facts) (Their author is biased) (it takes into account their argument)

( ) ( )

[THINK OF YOUR OWN!] [THINK OF YOUR OWN!]


[EXPLAIN HOW YOUR OPTION IS TRUE BELOW]

The evidence says that the US and China are yet to agree on a BIT. That means there are many parts of the economy where the US and China do not cooperate at all. Just because the US and China sell cars together is not how the whole economy works. Also, their evidence does not talk about future trade.

and this reason matters because:

[EXPLAIN YOUR REASONING BELOW]



While there may be some economic cooperation, the US and China need much more to prevent economic collapse. Our facts are better so we still have our advantage.
  1. Foreign Direct Investment is quite low—this evidence is from your author



Morrison, 2015 [Wayne, Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance, “China-U.S. Trade Issues”, December 15, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33536.pdf]
The level of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows between China and the United States is relatively small given the large volume of trade between the two countries. Many analysts contend that an expansion of bilateral FDI flows could greatly expand commercial ties. The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) is the main U.S. federal agency that collects data on FDI flows to and from the United States.35 It reported that in 2014 the flow of Chinese FDI to the United States was $968 million, (in comparison, Japanese FDI was $33.8 billion), while U.S. FDI in China in 2014 was $6.3 billion. Annual U.S. FDI flows to China have changed significantly from year to year (the peak year for U.S. FDI in China was 2008 at $16 billion), and in some years, U.S. net FDI flows to China have been negative (reflecting an outflow of funds by U.S. investors in China back to the United States).
  1. US-China economic cooperation limited—US is hesitant to work with China



Morrison, 2015 [Wayne, Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance, “China-U.S. Trade Issues”, December 15, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33536.pdf]
Despite growing commercial ties, the bilateral economic relationship has become increasingly complex and often fraught with tension. From the U.S. perspective, many trade tensions stem from China’s incomplete transition to a free market economy. While China has significantly liberalized its economic and trade regimes over the past three decades, it continues to maintain (or has recently imposed) a number of state-directed policies that appear to distort trade and investment flows. Major areas of concern expressed by U.S. policymakers and stakeholders include China’s alleged widespread cyber economic espionage against U.S. firms; relatively poor record of intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement; discriminatory innovation policies; mixed record on implementing its World Trade Organization (WTO) obligations; extensive use of industrial policies (such as financial support of state-owned firms and trade and investment barriers) in order to promote and protect industries favored by the government; and interventionist policies to control the value of its currency. Many U.S. policymakers argue that such policies negatively impact U.S. economic interests and have contributed to U.S. job losses. There are a number of U.S. views on how to better address commercial disputes with China:

2AC AT Global Economy #2—Economic Decline War



They say economic decline does not cause war, but

[GIVE :05 SUMMARY OF OPPONENT’S SINGLE ARGUMENT]



  1. Extend our Mead evidence.

[PUT IN YOUR AUTHOR’S NAME]

It’s much better than their analytic argument because: [PUT IN THEIR AUTHOR’S NAME]
[CIRCLE ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS]:

(it’s newer) (the author is more qualified) (it has more facts)

(their evidence is not logical/contradicts itself) (history proves it to be true)

(their evidence has no facts) (Their author is biased) (it takes into account their argument)

( ) (their evidence supports our argument)

[WRITE IN YOUR OWN!]


[EXPLAIN HOW YOUR OPTION IS TRUE BELOW]

Our Mead evidence shows that economic decline causes war through WWII. When Germany was hurt economically, a strong ruler rose up and killed millions. This could happen today again if the economy truly crashed.
[EXPLAIN WHY YOUR OPTION MATTERS BELOW]

This matters because:



Economic decline is a huge impact and could cause a war where millions would die. That will outweigh the negative impacts and we should win.


  1. Economic decline causes war—three warrants



Royal, 2010 [DoD Cooperative Threat Reduction Director – Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215
Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defense behavior of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson’s (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crisis could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Seperately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland’s (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that ‘future expectation of trade’ is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviours of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain specific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations, However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resourcesthe likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resourcesCrisis could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states. Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favor. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflict self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. P. 89) Economic decline has been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. ‘Diversionary theory’ suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a ‘rally around the flag’ effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995), and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlated economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels. This implied connection between integration, crisis and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.


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