Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China



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1NC Solvency Frontline

  1. China fails to contain North Korea, enough is being done already, and the US should negotiate with other states



Lord, February 2016 [Winston, U.S. Ambassador to China from 1985 to 1989. He was sworn in as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs in 1993, “What New Approach Should the U.S. and China Take to North Korea?”, February 10, https://www.chinafile.com/conversation/what-new-approach-should-us-and-china-take-north-korea]
I think we can all agree on a few points: U.S. policies under successive Administrations of both parties have not worked. We cannot rely on China. We need a radically different approach. We should rule out a military attack (unless provoked militarily). We must reach consensus with South Korea and Japan, and at least keep in touch with China and Russia. Any proposed course will be very difficult and risky, but should be measured against the mounting dangers of North Korea’s nuclear and proliferation threats to the U.S. and allies and, I would add, the continuing crushing of the North Korean people. In this context, the implied recommendations that we engage North Korea with comprehensive offers deserve a respectful hearing, assuming they are coupled with serious threats, the “fork in the road” approach, and our allies are on board. But the arguments rest on some distorted history and flawed assumptions—I only have space to cover a few. We have not completely outsourced our policy. We have already offered continually to Pyongyang to negotiate all that it seeks, e.g. security guarantees, economic engagement, diplomatic relations, etc. We have done this bilaterally and multilaterally, in grand bargains and interim steps. Nothing has succeeded because the Kims will never denuclearize, sticks don’t work because of Chinese sabotage, carrots don’t work because of Kim fears of losing political control. China is not the solution. It is a major part of the problem. It is wrong to say that sanctions have not worked. We have not really tested this approach. The one time we got semi-serious, a la Banco Delta, etc., we got the attention of North Korea (and China). Current sanctions fall far short of those on Iran, and in some respects those on Burma and Zimbabwe. And North Korea has always counted on China to bail it out. So what should we do? I am not John Bolton or seeking the GOP nomination. I was an enthusiastic, supporting member of the Clinton Administration team which negotiated the 1994 Accord. I would be willing today to see a verifiable cap on North Korea’s nuclear, missile, and proliferation capabilities if achievable at a acceptable price. But the only way to solve not only the nuclear challenge and the most horrific human rights problem in the world, is through a defacto policy of regime change, or perhaps as one observer put it, “systems change.” Of course, the Kim regime is resilient, but we have never tried very hard, and no one saw the Berlin Wall coming down. And if our pressures don’t topple the regime, perhaps they would induce it to genuinely negotiate. And we would bring home the costs to Beijing of its policy, not only American and allied military moves but vastly increased economic expenses. Briefly, the major components of this policy (some of these steps are already underway): Increased U.S. military presence and joint exercises. Rapid deployment of THAAD and any other relevant missile defense systems. More vigorous efforts to stop North Korean proliferation, including intense pressure on China. Disproportionate retaliation against any North Korea cyber attacks. Truly serious and comprehensive sanctions, including bank moves, a terrorist and any other relevant list, impact on third country business, etc., no matter what strains this causes with Beijing (indeed it might finally get its attention). Major efforts to flood North Korea with information, including greatly increased funding for Radio Free Asia, social media, cassettes, etc. In close concert with our allies, candid talks with the Chinese about the possible fallout of “reunification” (we must use verbal camouflage). I don’t know whether the Chinese have been willing to engage on this taboo topic. In any event, we should seek to allay their concerns: Loose nukes would be secured by the United Nations, not the People’s Liberation Army or the U.S. Army’s 82nd Airborne.

  1. Sanctions are high now —The US and other countries already sanction North Korea heavily and have been doing so for decades. There’s no reason China will make the difference.

  2. Diplomatic talks fail



Council on Foreign Relations, 2013 [Major international political journal, “The Six Party Talks on North Korea's Nuclear Program”, September 13, http://www.cfr.org/proliferation/six-party-talks-north-koreas-nuclear-program/p13593]
Obstacles to the Talks An unpredictable North Korean regime. The United States has found North Korea to be erratic in negotiations and actions. "They know that we have a tough time figuring out what really motivates them," says Christopher Hill, Washington's former chief envoy to the talks. Differing approaches by Six Party governments. CFR's Snyder says the Six Party Talks and other regional efforts preceding it failed because the participating states "placed their own immediate priorities and concerns above the collective need to halt North Korea's nuclear program." While Japan and the United States have consistently pushed for strong sanctions, China, South Korea, and Russia have settled for less stringent actions from fear that a sudden toppling of the regime would trigger major refugee influxes. Pyonyang's most recent provocations have pushed boundaries, however, and all three countries ultimately backed the March 2013 UN sanctions. North Korea's own approach exhibits an openness to separate dialogues with both the United States and Japan, but not with Seoul. "The North Koreans may be interested in moving forward with the United States and/or Japan while not addressing inter-Korean tensions," Snyder says. U.S. resistance to bilateral negotiations. For much of the Bush administration, Washington resisted direct dialogue with Pyongyang so that any compromise with the Kim regime would be framed as a multilateral decision. Yet North Korea repeatedly demanded dialogue as a condition to halting its nuclear program. In June 2007, former envoy Hill made a surprise visit to Pyongyang to advance the February deal, marking a reversal in the U.S. stance. The two countries have since held bilateral talks on several occasions. It has also been reported that an Obama administration official made secret visits to North Korea in April and August 2012 in an unsuccessful bid to engage the new leadership and moderate its foreign policy. Solving the Policy Puzzle So far, the Six Party Talks have yielded little progress in denuclearizing North Korea, and some experts think that the country is determined to be recognized as a nuclear weapon state. In 2012, its leadership included a new preamble to the constitution that describes the country as a "nuclear state and a militarily powerful state that is indomitable." Former secretary of state Henry A. Kissinger wrote in the Washington Post in June 2009 that "the issue for diplomacy has become whether the goal should be to manage North Korea's nuclear arsenal or to eliminate it." He argued that any policy that does not eliminate the North's nuclear military capability "in effect acquiesces in its continuation." Experts say that the Obama administration's diplomatic channels for dialogue quickly evaporated with Pyongyang's exit from the Six Party Talks in 2009. In testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in April 2012, CFR's Snyder said that the "United States should redouble its efforts to shape North Korea's strategic environment rather than [try] to identify the right combination of carrots and sticks to be used in a negotiation with Pyongyang." However, some experts say that although a multilateral approach may be the best option, it has borne little fruit. Charles Pritchard, former ambassador and special envoy for negotiations with North Korea from 2001 to 2003, writes that "it is a bilateral approach between the United States and North Korea that has worked the best, that has produced the most results in the shortest period of time." In the end, however, few analysts believe that North Korea has any intention of giving up its nuclear program, and they argue that Pyongyang makes concessions to gain the aid it needs to survive. Other analysts say that the world has "run out of ideas" about how to disarm North Korea, and that the West's hopes now hinge on China to rein in its ally. "North Korea, we now know, will probably never truly and fully disarm of its own volition," wrote Max Fisher in the Atlantic in February 2012. Despite the stalemate, some view the cooperation between the United States and China on the drafting of the most recent UN sanctions as an effort that could move the needle.


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