Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China
Download 2.62 Mb.
|
- Navigate this page:
- Xi has great authority and respect with Chinese Nationalists
- Xi’s centralized authority has stabilized the country, but he takes the heat for any problems
- Strong Chinese Nationalism now
- Xi’s Nationalism is strong
2NC/1NR AT #4—Xi Looks WeakThey say Xi looks weak now, but [GIVE :05 SUMMARY OF OPPONENT’S SINGLE ARGUMENT]
[PUT IN YOUR AUTHOR’S NAME] It’s much better than their evidence because: [PUT IN THEIR AUTHOR’S NAME] [CIRCLE ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS]: (it’s newer) (the author is more qualified) (it has more facts) (their evidence is not logical/contradicts itself) (history proves it to be true) (their evidence has no facts) (Their author is biased) (it takes into account their argument) ( ) (their evidence supports our argument) [WRITE IN YOUR OWN!]
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ [EXPLAIN WHY YOUR OPTION MATTERS BELOW] and this reason matters because: ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Crossley, March 2016 [Pamela, Professor of History, Dartmouth College, “Cracks in Xi Jinping’s Fortress?”, 3/21, https://www.chinafile.com/conversation/cracks-xi-jinpings-fortress] The emergence of an executive office as aggressive as Xi's presents China's ruling class with a test of whether it can or cannot remain intact. The CCP network of families and enterprises has retained its position through a series of rapid-fire external challenges—frequent public disorder, a bubble-and-burst economy, and escapes from predicaments in managing the currency and mounting environmental disasters. But whether it can survive an internal challenge from an executive bent upon wresting power from it is a question. That is an elementary historical theme. Ambitious rulers had to pursue control of their civil and military elites apace with tightening their grips on society and economy. The winners in those struggles are big in the history books—in China, they include Han Wudi, Tang Taizong, the Kangxi and Yongzheng emperors of the QIng— but are a tiny minority in the string of historical executives. Most emperors knew better than to challenge entrenched elite power. Of those who tried the most spectacular losers are also always good for a paragraph in the textbooks too, since the struggles they precipitated led to fatal rupture of their empires. The PRC is not an empire and the General Secretary is not an emperor. But the Party elite has some resemblance to traditional ruling classes. One is that it shows little or no collective awareness of the toll of its own excesses upon its ability to remain coherent and dominant. Xi planned carefully for his assault on elite complacency, putting his loyalists in place even before he assumed office. He has used campaigns against “corruption” to target some of his potential challengers and has imposed sobering penalties upon them. He is reducing state subsidies to inefficient industries that do nothing but channel public wealth into the coffers of the elite. These documents more than suggest that those threatened intend to strike back. Will Xi Jinping join the winners—like Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping—who increased their control at the expense of the elite? Or will he join the list of hapless state leaders who attempted a coup against immovable elites and ended not only losing his personal battle but also destabilizing the government? I agree with Andy that Xi has gone too far to back down now. Xi has invoked nationalism to legitimate his aggrandizement and to discredit critics at home and abroad. Rivals within the party, lawyers, journalists, and academics are accused of sedition if they criticize Xi and with contemning some mythical Chinese essence if they discuss democracy. Party elites who wish for their own reasons to discredit Xi will champion free speech as a necessary part of their counter-attack. We should expect that their enthusiasm for dissent will wane quickly if they succeed in curtailing Xi’s power—the way Deng Xiaoping’s invocation of the Democracy Wall movement in 1978 preceded his persecution of Wei Jingsheng in 1979. I agree with Rana that a struggle against repression does not in itself produce liberalization.
Council on Foreign Relations, February 2016 [International, bipartisan organization, “Xi Jinping on the Global Stage Chinese Foreign Policy Under a Powerful but Exposed Leader", February] Xi Jinping is the most powerful Chinese leader since Deng Xiaoping, and with his sweeping actions and ambitious directives he has fundamentally altered the process by which China’s domestic and foreign policy is formulated and implemented. Xi’s popular anticorruption campaign has cowed senior party and military officials and allowed him to amass dominating power in a short span of time. With this transcending authority, Xi has ended China’s carefully evolved collective and consensual leadership structure, marginalized the bureaucracy, and put himself at the center of decision-making on all consequential matters. This report discusses Xi’s transformation of China’s domestic politics, his background and beliefs, the challenges he faces from China’s slowing economy, and the implications of his foreign policy for the United States. One downside to Xi’s breathtaking success in consolidating power is that it has left him with near total responsibility for his government’s policy missteps on matters ranging from the stock market slowdown to labor market unrest. His visibility on these issues and his dominance of the decision-making process have made him a powerful but potentially exposed leader. With Xi’s image and political position vulnerable to China’s economic downturn, his country’s external behavior may increasingly be guided by his own domestic political imperatives. For the last three years, with China’s economy still producing robust growth numbers, such concerns have not fundamentally influenced Xi’s foreign policy. Xi has been able to be continuously proactive, and he has used his power to take China’s foreign policy in a new direction. He has boldly departed from Deng’s injunction to keep a low profile and has reclaimed islands, created international institutions, pressured neighbors, and deployed military assets to disputed regions. Xi’s foreign policy has been assertive, confident, and, importantly, a diversied mix of both hard and soft elements. Even as China has taken from steps on territorial issues, it has used geoeconomic instruments to offer generous loans and investments, and even created new organizations such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).1 By combin- ing inducements with intimidation, Xi has demonstrated the benefits of cooperating with China as well as the economic and military costs of opposing it, especially on issues important to Beijing.2
Wang, May 2016 [Zheng, Director of the Center for Peace and Conflict Studies in the School of Diplomacy and International Relations at Seton Hall University in New Jersey. He is also a Carnegie Fellow at New America, “The New Nationalism: 'Make My Country Great Again'”, 5/10, http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/the-new-nationalism-make-my-country-great-again/] While speaking with a Chinese journalist recently about the American presidential election, he asked me what the best way was to translate Donald Trump’s election slogan, “Make America Great Again!” The two of us discussed several Chinese wordings that might be a suitable translation of this saying, and I suddenly realized this slogan is actually the exact same as Chinese president Xi Jinping’s slogan of “realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” Rejuvenation, of course, means the same as to make great again or to revive past greatness. Then I also realized “make my country great again” is actually a popular political slogan globally. Japan’s Shinzo Abe, India’s Narendra Modi, and Russia’s Vladimir Putin all frequently mention something similar to this. What we are actually experiencing is a “make my country great again” nationalism that exists in several major powers of the world. Around the world people always speak of China’s rise, but the Chinese like to use a different word: rejuvenation. Xi called it the greatest dream of the Chinese nation. This slogan, referred to as the China Dream, has become the political manifesto and signature ideology of Xi’s administration since he came into power three years ago. The use of this word “rejuvenation” underscores a very important point: the Chinese see themselves as returning to greatness or past glory, rather than rising from nothing. I believe this is also the same reason that Trump says “make America great again” rather than “make America great.” In the last few decades China has been developing at a tremendous speed. For example, China’s economy now is 24 times larger than it was in 1989. However, the Chinese are still unsatisfied with this progress and still believe they are on the way to restoring their past greatness. And for many Americans, including Donald Trump, “Make America Great Again” is to signify the end of America’s decline in power, and to make efforts in restoring the United States’ past greatness. Xi’s “China Dream” is often labeled as Chinese nationalism, and to some extent Donald Trump’s campaign represents a rise of new American nationalism. The Trump campaign indeed emphasizes a strong U.S. first and protectionist policy, and underscores an “us versus them” mentality. However, it should be noted that while the term nationalism is often associated negatively, it can actually play a positive role. Positive nationalism has driven many good social changes in the world. And in fact we can see the banners of nationalism are currently flying highly in many major powers. Abe is working hard trying to stop Japan’s stagnation and to jump-start Japan’s economy to return to its former might of the 1970s and 80s. In New Delhi, Modi is also calling for a national campaign to push India on to a faster track of development. And in Moscow, Putin has been trying for many years to mobilize his people in the wake of the Soviet Union’s fall and to restore the luster and strength associated with the czarist era of the Russian Empire and Peter the Great. It’s a global wave of nationalism associated with the rise and fall of the great powers.
Council on Foreign Relations, February 2016 [International, bipartisan organization, “Xi Jinping on the Global Stage Chinese Foreign Policy Under a Powerful but Exposed Leader"] Xi’s arrest of senior officials is risky, and is sustained in no small part by public opinion supportive of the anticorruption campaign and of Xi more broadly. Unlike recent Chinese leaders, Xi appears to have an intuitive grasp of public sentiment and has sustained a nascent cult of personality around his image as a brash and assertive strongman, reportedly telling Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2013, “We are similar in character.”12 This image is buttressed by a relentless propaganda campaign waged through traditional and social media that portrays Xi as an incorruptible and self-sacrificial “mix of everyman and superman.”13 That effort has been successful in making public opinion a pillar of Xi’s power, with a Harvard study finding that Xi had a higher approval rating domestically than any other world leader in 2014.14 Directory: wp-content -> uploads -> 2015 2015 -> Police Militarization 2015 -> 2015 ihbb championships: hs history Bowl Round 4 – Prelims First Quarter 2015 -> Wrtp/big step · 3841 W. Wisconsin Ave., Milwaukee, wi 53208 2015 -> Rao bulletin 1 December 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Darton College 2015 -> Training Workshop on Planning and Implementation of Multi-Sectoral Development Programme (MsDP) in Bihar Date : 6th 2015 -> Rao bulletin 15 June 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Rao bulletin 1 September 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Rao bulletin 1 August 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Science, and transportation united states senate Download 2.62 Mb. Share with your friends:
|